



Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Enver Hoxha

5 Classics of Marxism

Comintern (Stalinist-Hoxhaists)

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SHMG Press

Karl Marx Press of the Georgian section of
Comintern (SH) – Stalinist-Hoxhaists Movement of Georgia

J. STALIN

PROBLEMS
OF
LENINISM



H. G. Wells

J. STALIN

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OF
LENINISM



FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
MOSCOW 1954

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This translation of J. V. Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* has been made from the latest, eleventh, Russian edition (Gospolitizdat, Moscow 1952).

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM. <i>Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University</i>	
I. The Historical Roots of Leninism	15
II. Method.	23
III. Theory	30
IV The Dictatorship of the Proletariat	46
V. The Peasant Question	57
VI. The National Question	70
VII. Strategy and Tactics	79
VIII. The Party	95
IX. Style in Work	109
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS	112
I. The External and Internal Setting for the October Revolution	112
II. Two Specific Features of the October Revolution—or October and Trotsky's Theory of "Permanent" Revolution	115
III. Certain Specific Features of the Tactics of the Bolsheviks During the Period of Preparation for October	130
IV. The October Revolution as the Beginning of and the Pre-Condition for the World Revolution	143
CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM	149
I. The Definition of Leninism	149
II. The Main Thing in Leninism	151
III. The Question of "Permanent" Revolution	153
IV. The Proletarian Revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.	155
V. The Party and the Working Class in the System of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat	164
VI. The Question of the Victory of Socialism in One Country	188
VII. The Fight for the Victory of Socialist Construction	200

THE PARTY'S THREE FUNDAMENTAL SLOGANS ON THE PEASANT PROBLEM. <i>Reply to Yan-sky</i>	213
THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE POOR PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER. <i>Reply to S. Pokrovsky.</i>	226
THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. <i>On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution</i>	237
ON THE GRAIN FRONT. <i>Excerpt From a Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov University on May 28, 1928</i>	247
LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT. <i>Reply to Comrade S.</i>	260
THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.). <i>Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), October 19, 1928</i>	273
THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.). <i>Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), April 1929 (Stenographic Record).</i>	287
I. One or Two Lines?	288
II. Class Changes and Our Differences	294
III. Differences on Comintern Questions	302
IV. Differences on Internal Policy	308
a) The Class Struggle	309
b) The Intensification of the Class Struggle	314
c) The Peasantry	318
d) NEP and Market Relations	321
e) The So-Called "Tribute"	326
f) The Rate of Development of Industry and the New Forms of the Bond	332
g) Bukharin as a Theoretician	341
h) A Five-Year Plan or a Two-Year Plan	350
i) The Question of the Crop Area	353
j) The Grain-Purchasing Campaign	355
k) Foreign Currency Reserve and Imports of Grain	361

V. Problems of Party Leadership	364
a) The Factionalism of Bukharin's Group	364
b) Loyalty and Collective Leadership	366
c) The Fight Against the Right Deviation	370
VI. Conclusions	372
 A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE. <i>On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution</i>	 374
I. In the Sphere of Productivity of Labour	375
II. In the Sphere of Industrial Construction	376
III. In the Sphere of Agricultural Construction	379
Conclusions	388
 PROBLEMS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. <i>Speech Delivered at the Conference of Marxist Students of the Agrarian Question, December 27, 1929</i>	 389
I. The Theory of "Equilibrium"	391
II. The Theory of "Spontaneity" in Socialist Construction .	393
III. The Theory of the "Stability" of Small-Peasant Farming	395
IV. Town and Country .	401
V. The Nature of Collective Farms	404
VI. The Class Changes and the Turn in the Party's Policy	408
VII. Conclusions	412
 THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS	 414
 DIZZY WITH SUCCESS. <i>Problems of the Collective-Farm Movement</i>	 419
 REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES	 426
 THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES. <i>Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry, February 4, 1931</i>	 448
 NEW CONDITIONS—NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION. <i>Speech Delivered at a Conference of Business Executives, June 23, 1931.</i>	 459
I. Labour Power	460
II. Wages	462
III. The Organization of Work	466
IV. A Working-Class Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia	470
V. Symptoms of a Change of Attitude Among the Old Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia	473
VI. Business Accounting	476
VII. New Methods of Work, New Methods of Management	479

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM. Letter to the Editorial Board of <i>Proletarskaya Revolyutsia</i>	483
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN.	
<i>Report Delivered at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), January 7, 1933</i>	493
I. The International Significance of the Five-Year Plan	498
II. The Fundamental Task of the Five-Year Plan and the Path of Its Fulfilment	507
III. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years in the Sphere of Industry	512
IV The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years in the Sphere of Agriculture	520
V The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years as Regards the Improvement of the Material Conditions of the Workers and Peasants	526
VI. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years as Regards Trade Turnover Between Town and Country	531
VII. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years in the Sphere of the Struggle Against the Remnants of the Hostile Classes	535
VIII. General Conclusions	540
WORK IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS. <i>Speech Delivered at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), January 11, 1933</i>	543
SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK WORKERS, February 19, 1933	
I. The Collective-Farm Path Is the Only Right Path	559
II. Our Immediate Task—to Make All the Collective Farmers Prosperous	566
III. A Few Remarks	570
REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, <i>January 26, 1934</i>	576
I. The Continuing Crisis of World Capitalism and the Position of the Soviet Union in International Affairs	576
1. The Course of the Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries	577

2. The Growing Tension in the Political Situation in the Capitalist Countries	583
3. The Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist States	590
II. The Continued Progress of the National Economy and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R.	595
1. Progress of Industry	598
2. Progress of Agriculture	604
3. The Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard of the Working People	617
4. Progress in Trade Turnover and the Transport Services	623
III. The Party	628
1. Problems of Ideological-Political Leadership	629
2. Problems of Organizational Leadership	643
IN LIEU OF CONCLUDING REMARKS, January 31, 1934	656
ADDRESS DELIVERED IN THE KREMLIN PALACE TO THE GRADUATES FROM THE RED ARMY ACADEMIES, May 4, 1935	657
SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF STA-KHANOVITES, November 17, 1935	663
1. The Significance of the Stakhanov Movement	663
2. The Roots of the Stakhanov Movement .	668
3. New People—New Technical Standards	672
4. Immediate Tasks .	675
5. A Few More Words	678
ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., November 25, 1936	679
I. Formation of the Constitution Commission and Its Tasks	679
II. Changes in the Life of the U.S.S.R. in the Period from 1924 to 1936	680
III. The Principal Specific Features of the Draft Constitution	688
IV. Bourgeois Criticism of the Draft Constitution .	693
V. Amendments and Addenda to the Draft Constitution .	700
VI. The Significance of the New Constitution of the U.S.S.R.	711
DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (September 1938)	713

REPORT TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)
ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, *March 10,*
1939.

I. The Soviet Union and International Affairs	746
1. New Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries. Intensification of the Struggle for Markets and Sources of Raw Material, and for a New Redivision of the World	747
2. Increasing Acuteness of the International Political Situation. Collapse of the Postwar System of Peace Treaties. Beginning of a New Imperialist War	751
3. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist Countries	756
II. Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union	759
1. Further Progress of Industry and Agriculture	760
2. Further Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard of the People	773
3. Further Consolidation of the Soviet System	777
III. Further Strengthening of the C.P.S.U.(B.)	780
1. Measures to Improve the Composition of the Party. Division of Organizations. Closer Contact Between the Leading Party Bodies and the Work of the Lower Bodies	781
2. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres	784
3. Party Propaganda. Marxist-Leninist Training of Party Members and Party Cadres	787
4. Some Questions of Theory	790

PUBLISHER'S NOTE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION

The present, eleventh, edition of *Problems of Leninism* differs from the tenth edition in that it includes a number of more recent works which are, relatively, of greater importance at the present moment, namely:

1) Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies (delivered in the Kremlin, May 4, 1935).

2) Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites (November 17, 1935).

3) On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (Report delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., November 25, 1936).

4) Dialectical and Historical Materialism (written by Comrade Stalin for the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—Short Course* in September 1938).

5) Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the work of the Central Committee (delivered March 10, 1939).

In order not to unduly increase the size of the book, the present edition omits the "Interview with the First American Labour Delegation," the "Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" and the "Interview with the English Author H. G. Wells," which appeared in the tenth edition.

These changes were made with the consent of the author.

*State Publishing House
of Political Literature*

PROBLEMS OF LENINISM

THE FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM

Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University

DEDICATED TO THE LENIN ENROLMENT

J. STALIN

The foundations of Leninism is a big subject. To exhaust it a whole volume would be required. Indeed, a number of volumes would be required. Naturally, therefore, my lectures cannot be an exhaustive exposition of Leninism; at best they can only offer a concise synopsis of the foundations of Leninism. Nevertheless, I consider it useful to give this synopsis, in order to lay down some basic points of departure necessary for the successful study of Leninism.

Expounding the foundations of Leninism still does not mean expounding the basis of Lenin's world outlook. Lenin's world outlook and the foundations of Leninism are not identical in scope. Lenin was a Marxist, and Marxism is, of course, the basis of his world outlook. But from this it does not at all follow that an exposition of Leninism ought to begin with an exposition of the foundations of Marxism. To expound Leninism means to expound the distinctive and new in the works of Lenin that Lenin contributed to the general treasury of Marxism and that is naturally connected with his name. Only in this sense will I speak in my lectures of the foundations of Leninism.

And so, what is Leninism?

Some say that Leninism is the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to the situation in Russia. This definition contains a particle of truth, but not the whole truth by any means. Lenin, indeed, applied Marxism to Russian conditions, and applied it in a masterly way. But if Leninism were only the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to Russia it would be a purely national and only a national, a purely Russian and only a Russian, phenomenon. We know, however,

that Leninism is not merely a Russian, but an international phenomenon rooted in the whole of international development. That is why I think this definition suffers from one-sidedness.

Others say that Leninism is the revival of the revolutionary elements of Marxism of the forties of the nineteenth century, as distinct from the Marxism of subsequent years, when, it is alleged, it became moderate, nonrevolutionary. If we disregard this foolish and vulgar division of the teachings of Marx into two parts, revolutionary and moderate, we must admit that even this totally inadequate and unsatisfactory definition contains a particle of truth. This particle of truth is that Lenin did indeed restore the revolutionary content of Marxism, which had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. Still, that is but a particle of the truth. The whole truth about Leninism is that Leninism not only restored Marxism, but also took a step forward, developing Marxism further under the new conditions of capitalism and of the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, then, in the last analysis, is Leninism?

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels pursued their activities in the prerevolutionary period (we have the proletarian revolution in mind), when developed imperialism did not yet exist, in the period of the proletarians' preparation for revolution, in the period when the proletarian revolution was not yet an immediate practical inevitability. But Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, pursued his activities in the period of developed imperialism, in the period of the unfolding proletarian revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets.

That is why Leninism is the further development of Marxism.

It is usual to point to the exceptionally militant and exceptionally revolutionary character of Leninism. This is quite correct.

But this specific feature of Leninism is due to two causes: firstly, to the fact that Leninism emerged from the proletarian revolution, the imprint of which it cannot but bear; secondly, to the fact that it grew and became strong in clashes with the opportunism of the Second International, the fight against which was and remains an essential preliminary condition for a successful fight against capitalism. It must not be forgotten that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of undivided domination of the opportunism of the Second International, and the ruthless struggle against this opportunism could not but constitute one of the most important tasks of Leninism.

I

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LENINISM

Leninism grew up and took shape under the conditions of imperialism, when the contradictions of capitalism had reached an extreme point, when the proletarian revolution had become an immediate practical question, when the old period of preparation of the working class for revolution had arrived at and passed into a new period, that of direct assault on capitalism.

Lenin called imperialism "moribund capitalism." Why? Because imperialism carries the contradictions of capitalism to their last bounds, to the extreme limit, beyond which revolution begins. Of these contradictions, there are three which must be regarded as the most important.

The *first contradiction* is the contradiction between labour and capital. Imperialism is the omnipotence of the monopolist trusts and syndicates, of the banks and the financial oligarchy, in the industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the customary methods of the working class—trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties and the parliamentary struggle—have proved to be totally inadequate. Either place yourself at the mercy of capital, eke out a wretched existence as of old and sink lower and lower, or adopt a new weapon—this is the

alternative imperialism puts before the vast masses of the proletariat. Imperialism brings the working class to revolution.

The *second contradiction* is the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist Powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory. Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources, the struggle for a redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular fury by new financial groups and Powers seeking a "place in the sun" against the old groups and Powers, which cling tenaciously to what they have seized. This frenzied struggle among the various groups of capitalists is notable in that it includes as an inevitable element imperialist wars, wars for the annexation of foreign territories. This circumstance, in its turn, is notable in that it leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to the acceleration of the advent of the proletarian revolution and to the practical necessity of this revolution.

The *third contradiction* is the contradiction between the handful of ruling, "civilized" nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world. Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonies and dependent countries. The purpose of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out superprofits. But in exploiting these countries imperialism is compelled to build there railways, factories and mills, industrial and commercial centres. The appearance of a class of proletarians, the emergence of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the liberation movement—such are the inevitable results of this "policy." The growth of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependent countries without exception clearly testifies to this fact. This circumstance is of importance for the proletariat inasmuch as it saps radically the position of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.

Such, in general, are the principal contradictions of imperialism which have converted the old, "flourishing" capitalism into moribund capitalism.

The significance of the imperialist war which broke out ten years ago lies, among other things, in the fact that it gathered all these contradictions into a single knot and threw them on to the scales, thereby accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat.

In other words, imperialism was instrumental not only in making the revolution a practical inevitability, but also in creating favourable conditions for a direct assault on the citadels of capitalism.

Such was the international situation which gave birth to Leninism.

Some may say: this is all very well, but what has it to do with Russia, which was not and could not be a classical land of imperialism? What has it to do with Lenin, who worked primarily in Russia and for Russia? Why did Russia, of all countries, become the home of Leninism, the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Because Russia was the focus of all these contradictions of imperialism.

Because Russia, more than any other country, was pregnant with revolution, and she alone, therefore, was in a position to solve those contradictions in a revolutionary way.

To begin with, tsarist Russia was the home of every kind of oppression—capitalist, colonial and militarist—in its most inhuman and barbarous form. Who does not know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital was combined with the despotism of tsarism, the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism with tsarism's role of executioner in regard to the non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions—Turkey, Persia, China—with the seizure of these regions by tsarism, with wars of conquest? Lenin was right in saying that tsarism was "military-feudal imperialism." Tsarism was the concentration of the worst features of imperialism, raised to a high pitch.

To proceed. Tsarist Russia was a major reserve of Western imperialism, not only in the sense that it gave free entry to foreign capital, which controlled such basic branches of Russia's national economy as the fuel and metallurgical industries, but also in the sense that it could supply the Western imperialists with millions of soldiers. Remember the Russian army, fourteen million strong, which shed its blood on the imperialist fronts to safeguard the staggering profits of the British and French capitalists.

Further. Tsarism was not only the watchdog of imperialism in the east of Europe, but, in addition, it was the agent of Western imperialism for squeezing out of the population hundreds of millions by way of interest on loans obtained in Paris and London, Berlin and Brussels.

Finally, tsarism was a most faithful ally of Western imperialism in the partition of Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Who does not know that the imperialist war was waged by tsarism in alliance with the imperialists of the Entente, and that Russia was an essential element in that war?

That is why the interests of tsarism and of Western imperialism were interwoven and ultimately became merged in a single skein of imperialist interests.

Could Western imperialism resign itself to the loss of such a powerful support in the East and of such a rich reservoir of manpower and resources as old, tsarist, bourgeois Russia was without exerting all its strength to wage a life and death struggle against the revolution in Russia, with the object of defending and preserving tsarism? Of course not.

But from this it follows that whoever wanted to strike at tsarism necessarily raised his hand against imperialism, whoever rose against tsarism had to rise against imperialism as well; for whoever was bent on overthrowing tsarism had to overthrow imperialism too, if he really intended not merely to defeat tsarism, but to make a clean sweep of it. Thus the revolution against tsarism verged on and had to pass into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution.

Meanwhile, in Russia a tremendous popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which possessed such an important ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia. Does it need proof that such a revolution could not stop halfway, that in the event of success it was bound to advance further and raise the banner of revolt against imperialism?

That is why Russia was bound to become the focus of the contradictions of imperialism, not only in the sense that it was in Russia that these contradictions were revealed most plainly, in view of their particularly repulsive and particularly intolerable character, and not only because Russia was a highly important prop of Western imperialism, connecting Western finance capital with the colonies in the East, but also because Russia was the only country in which there existed a real force capable of resolving the contradictions of imperialism in a revolutionary way.

From this it follows, however, that the revolution in Russia could not but become a proletarian revolution, that from its very inception it could not but assume an international character, and that, therefore, it could not but shake the very foundations of world imperialism.

Under these circumstances, could the Russian Communists confine their work within the narrow national bounds of the Russian revolution? Of course not. On the contrary, the whole situation, both internal (the profound revolutionary crisis) and external (the war), impelled them to go beyond these bounds in their work, to transfer the struggle to the international arena, to expose the ulcers of imperialism, to prove that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, to smash social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, and, finally, to overthrow capitalism in their own country and to forge a new fighting weapon for the proletariat—the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution—in order to facilitate the task of overthrowing capitalism for the proletarians of all countries. Nor could the Russian Communists act otherwise, for only this path offered the chance of producing certain changes

in the international situation which could safeguard Russia against the restoration of the bourgeois order.

That is why Russia became the home of Leninism, and why Lenin, the leader of the Russian Communists, became its creator.

The same thing, approximately, "happened" in the case of Russia and Lenin as in the case of Germany and Marx and Engels in the forties of the last century. Germany at that time was pregnant with bourgeois revolution just like Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Marx wrote at that time in the *Communist Manifesto*:

"The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution."

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was shifting to Germany.

There can hardly be any doubt that it was this very circumstance, noted by Marx in the above-quoted passage, that served as the probable reason why it was precisely Germany that became the birthplace of scientific socialism and why the leaders of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels, became its creators.

The same, only to a still greater degree, must be said of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was then on the eve of a bourgeois revolution; she had to accomplish this revolution at a time when conditions in Europe were more advanced, and with a proletariat that was more developed than that of Germany in the forties of the nineteenth century (let alone Britain and France); moreover, all the evidence went to show that this revolution was bound to serve as a ferment and as a prelude to the proletarian revolution.

We cannot regard it as accidental that as early as 1902, when the Russian revolution was still in an embryonic state, Lenin wrote the prophetic words in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*:

"History has now confronted us (i.e., the Russian Marxists—*J. St.*) with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks that confront the proletariat of any country,"

and that "the fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat." (See Vol. IV, p. 382.*)

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was bound to shift to Russia.

As we know, the course of the revolution in Russia has more than vindicated Lenin's prediction.

Is it surprising, after all this, that a country which has accomplished such a revolution and possesses such a proletariat should have been the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Is it surprising that Lenin, the leader of Russia's proletariat, became also the creator of this theory and tactics and the leader of the international proletariat?

II METHOD

I have already said that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of domination of the opportunism of the Second International. For the sake of exactitude I must add that it is not the formal domination of opportunism I have in mind, but only its actual domination. Formally, the Second International was headed by "faithful" Marxists, by the "orthodox"—Kautsky and others. Actually, however, the main work of the Second International followed the line of opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie because of their adaptive, petty-bourgeois nature; the "orthodox," in their turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists in order to "preserve unity" with them, in the interests of

*The reference here, as in other citations from the works of V. I. Lenin, is to the Third Russian Edition of the *Works* of V. I. Lenin.—*Ed.*

"peace within the party." Thus the link between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the "orthodox" was closed, and, as a result, opportunism reigned supreme.

This was the period of the relatively peaceful development of capitalism, the prewar period, so to speak, when the catastrophic contradictions of imperialism had not yet become so glaringly evident, when workers' economic strikes and trade unions were developing more or less "normally," when election campaigns and parliamentary groups yielded "dizzying" successes, when legal forms of struggle were lauded to the skies, and when it was thought that capitalism would be "killed" by legal means—in short, when the parties of the Second International were living in clover and had no inclination to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Instead of an integral revolutionary theory, there were contradictory theoretical postulates and fragments of theory, which were divorced from the actual revolutionary struggle of the masses and had been turned into threadbare dogmas. For the sake of appearances, Marx's theory was mentioned, of course, but only to rob it of its living, revolutionary spirit.

Instead of a revolutionary policy, there was flabby philistinism and sordid political bargaining, parliamentary diplomacy and parliamentary scheming. For the sake of appearances, of course, "revolutionary" resolutions and slogans were adopted, but only to be pigeonholed.

Instead of the party being trained and taught correct revolutionary tactics on the basis of its own mistakes, there was a studied evasion of vexed questions, which were glossed over and veiled. For the sake of appearances, of course, there was no objection to talking about vexed questions, but only in order to wind up with some sort of "elastic" resolution.

Such was the physiognomy of the Second International, its method of work, its arsenal.

Meanwhile, a new period of imperialist wars and of revolutionary battles of the proletariat was approaching. The old

methods of fighting were proving obviously inadequate and impotent in face of the omnipotence of finance capital.

It became necessary to overhaul the entire activity of the Second International, its entire method of work, and to drive out all philistinism, narrow-mindedness, political scheming, renegacy, social-chauvinism and social-pacifism. It became necessary to examine the entire arsenal of the Second International, to throw out all that was rusty and antiquated, to forge new weapons. Without this preliminary work it was useless embarking upon war against capitalism. Without this work the proletariat ran the risk of finding itself inadequately armed, or even completely unarmed, in the future revolutionary battles.

The honour of bringing about this general overhauling and general cleansing of the Augean stables of the Second International fell to Leninism.

Such were the conditions under which the method of Leninism was born and hammered out.

What are the requirements of this method?

Firstly, the *testing* of the theoretical dogmas of the Second International in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the crucible of living practice—that is to say, the restoration of the broken unity between theory and practice, the healing of the rift between them; for only in this way can a truly proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory be created.

Secondly, the *testing* of the policy of the parties of the Second International, not by their slogans and resolutions (which cannot be trusted), but by their deeds, by their actions; for only in this way can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won and deserved.

Thirdly, the *reorganization* of all Party work on new revolutionary lines, with a view to training and preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle; for only in this way can the masses be prepared for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, *self-criticism* within the proletarian parties, their education and training on the basis of their own mistakes:

for only in this way can genuine cadres and genuine leaders of the Party be trained.

Such is the basis and substance of the method of Leninism.

How was this method applied in practice?

The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas to which they always revert as their starting point. Let us take a few of these:

First dogma: concerning the conditions for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists assert that the proletariat cannot and ought not to take power unless it constitutes a majority in the country. No proofs are brought forward, for there are no proofs, either theoretical or practical, that can bear out this absurd thesis. Let us assume that this is so, Lenin replies to the gentlemen of the Second International; but suppose a historical situation has arisen (a war, an agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, constituting a minority of the population, has an opportunity to rally around itself the vast majority of the labouring masses; why should it not take power then? Why should the proletariat not take advantage of a favourable international and internal situation to pierce the front of capital and hasten the general denouement? Did not Marx say as far back as the fifties of the last century that things could go "splendidly" with the proletarian revolution in Germany were it possible to back it by, so to speak, a "second edition of the Peasant War"? Is it not a generally known fact that in those days the number of proletarians in Germany was relatively smaller than, for example, in Russia in 1917? Has not the practical experience of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this favourite dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of all vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses refutes and smashes this obsolete dogma?

Second dogma: the proletariat cannot retain power if it lacks an adequate number of trained cultural and administrative cadres capable of organizing the administration of the country; these cadres must first be trained under capitalist conditions, and only

then can power be taken. Let us assume that this is so, replies Lenin; but why not turn it this way: first take power, create favourable conditions for the development of the proletariat, and then proceed with seven-league strides to raise the cultural level of the labouring masses and train numerous cadres of leaders and administrators from among the workers? Has not Russian experience shown that the cadres of leaders recruited from the ranks of the workers develop a hundred times more rapidly and effectually under the rule of the proletariat than under the rule of capital? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses ruthlessly smashes this theoretical dogma of the opportunists too?

Third dogma: the proletariat cannot accept the method of the *political* general strike because it is unsound in theory (see Engels' criticism) and dangerous in practice (it may disturb the normal course of economic life in the country, it may deplete the coffers of the trade unions), and cannot serve as a substitute for parliamentary forms of struggle, which are the principal form of the class struggle of the proletariat. Very well, reply the Leninists; but, firstly, Engels did not criticize every kind of general strike. He only criticized a certain kind of general strike, namely, the *economic* general strike advocated by the Anarchists *in place of* the political struggle of the proletariat. What has this to do with the method of the *political* general strike? Secondly, where and by whom has it ever been proved that the parliamentary form of struggle is the principal form of struggle of the proletariat? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show that the parliamentary struggle is only a school for, and an auxiliary in, organizing the extraparliamentary struggle of the proletariat, that under capitalism the fundamental problems of the working-class movement are solved by force, by the direct struggle of the proletarian masses, their general strike, their uprising? Thirdly, who suggested that the method of the political general strike be substituted for the parliamentary struggle? Where and when have the supporters of the political general strike sought to substitute extraparliamentary forms of struggle for parliamentary forms?

Fourthly, has not the revolution in Russia shown that the *political* general strike is a highly important school for the proletarian revolution and an indispensable means of mobilizing and organizing the vast masses of the proletariat on the eve of storming the citadels of capitalism? Why then the philistine lamentations over the disturbance of the normal course of economic life and over the coffers of the trade unions? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle smashes this dogma of the opportunists too?

And so on and so forth.

That is why Lenin said that "revolutionary theory is not a dogma," that it "assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement" (*"Left-Wing" Communism*); for theory must serve practice, for "theory must answer the questions raised by practice" (*What the "Friends of the People" Are*), for it must be tested by practical results.

As to the political slogans and the political resolutions of the parties of the Second International, it is sufficient to recall the history of the slogan "war against war" to realize how utterly false and utterly rotten are the political practices of these parties, which use pompous revolutionary slogans and resolutions to cloak their antirevolutionary deeds. We all remember the pompous demonstration of the Second International at the Basle Congress, at which it threatened the imperialists with all the horrors of insurrection if they should dare to start a war, and with the menacing slogan "war against war." But who does not remember that some time after, on the very eve of the war, the Basle resolution was pigeonholed and the workers were given a new slogan—to exterminate each other for the glory of their capitalist fatherlands? Is it not clear that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are not worth a farthing unless backed by deeds? One need only contrast the Leninist policy of transforming the imperialist war into civil war with the treacherous policy of the Second International during the war to understand the utter baseness of the op-

portunist politicians and the full grandeur of the method of Leninism.

I cannot refrain from quoting at this point a passage from Lenin's book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, in which Lenin severely castigates an opportunist attempt by the leader of the Second International, K. Kautsky, to judge parties not by their deeds, but by their paper slogans and documents:

"Kautsky is pursuing a typically petty-bourgeois, philistine policy by pretending that *putting forward a slogan* alters the position. The entire history of bourgeois democracy refutes this illusion; the bourgeois democrats have always advanced and still advance all sorts of 'slogans' in order to deceive the people. The point is to *test* their sincerity, to compare their words with their *deeds*, not to be satisfied with idealistic or charlatan *phrases*, but to get down to *class reality*." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 377.)

There is no need to mention the fear the parties of the Second International have of self-criticism, their habit of concealing their mistakes, of glossing over vexed questions, of covering up their shortcomings by a deceptive show of well-being which blunts living thought and prevents the Party from deriving revolutionary training from its own mistakes—a habit which was ridiculed and pilloried by Lenin. Here is what Lenin wrote about self-criticism in proletarian parties in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing Communism*:

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its *class* and the toiling *masses*. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analyzing the circumstances which gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the *class*, and then the *masses*." (See Vol. XXV, p. 200.)

Some say that the exposure of its own mistakes and self-criticism are dangerous for the Party because they may be used by the enemy against the party of the proletariat. Lenin regarded such objections as trivial and entirely wrong. Here is what he wrote

on this subject as far back as 1904, in his pamphlet *One Step Forward*, when our Party was still weak and small:

"They (i.e., the opponents of the Marxists—*J. St.*) gloat and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pinpricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings, which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows." (See Vol. VI, p. 161.)

Such, in general, are the characteristic features of the method of Leninism.

What is contained in Lenin's method was in the main already contained in the teachings of Marx, which, according to Marx himself, were "in essence critical and revolutionary." It is precisely this critical and revolutionary spirit that pervades Lenin's method from beginning to end. But it would be wrong to suppose that Lenin's method is merely the restoration of the method of Marx. As a matter of fact, Lenin's method is not only the restoration, but also the concretization and further development of the critical and revolutionary method of Marx, of his materialist dialectics.

III THEORY

From this theme I take three questions:

- a) the importance of theory for the proletarian movement;
- b) criticism of the "theory" of spontaneity;
- c) the theory of the proletarian revolution.

1) *The importance of theory.* Some think that Leninism is the precedence of practice over theory in the sense that its main point is the translation of the Marxist theses into deeds, their "execution"; as for theory, it is alleged that Leninism is rather uncon-

cerned about it. We know that Plekhanov time and again chaffed Lenin about his "unconcern" for theory, and particularly for philosophy. We also know that theory is not held in great favour by many present-day Leninist practical workers, particularly in view of the immense amount of practical work imposed upon them by the situation. I must declare that this more than odd opinion about Lenin and Leninism is quite wrong and bears no relation whatever to the truth; that the attempt of practical workers to brush theory aside runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious dangers to the work.

Theory is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries taken in its general aspect. Of course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become a tremendous force in the working-class movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice; for theory, and theory alone, can give the movement confidence, the power of orientation, and an understanding of the inner relation of surrounding events; for it, and it alone, can help practice to realize not only how and in which direction classes are moving at the present time, but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future. None other than Lenin uttered and repeated scores of times the well-known thesis that:

*"Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."** (See Vol. IV, p. 380.)

Lenin, better than anyone else, understood the great importance of theory, particularly for a party such as ours, in view of the role of vanguard fighter of the international proletariat which has fallen to its lot, and in view of the complicated internal and international situation in which it finds itself. Foreseeing this special role of our Party as far back as 1902, he thought it necessary even then to point out that:

* My italics.—J. St:

"The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory." (See Vol. IV, p. 380.)

It scarcely needs proof that now, when Lenin's prediction about the role of our Party has come true, this thesis of Lenin's acquires special force and special importance.

Perhaps the most striking expression of the great importance which Lenin attached to theory is the fact that none other than Lenin undertook the very serious task of generalizing, on the basis of materialist philosophy, the most important achievements of science from the time of Engels down to his own time, as well as of subjecting to comprehensive criticism the antimaterialistic trends among Marxists. Engels said that "materialism must assume a new aspect with every new great discovery." It is well known that none other than Lenin accomplished this task for his own time in his remarkable work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. It is well known that Plekhanov, who loved to chaff Lenin about his "unconcern" for philosophy, did not even dare to make a serious attempt to undertake such a task.

2) *Criticism of the "theory" of spontaneity, or the role of the vanguard in the movement.* The "theory" of spontaneity is a theory of opportunism, a theory of worshipping the spontaneity of the labour movement, a theory which actually repudiates the leading role of the vanguard of the working class, of the party of the working class.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to the revolutionary character of the working-class movement; it is opposed to the movement taking the line of struggle against the foundations of capitalism; it is in favour of the movement proceeding exclusively along the line of "realizable" demands, of demands "acceptable" to capitalism; it is wholly in favour of the "line of least resistance." The theory of spontaneity is the ideology of trade unionism.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a politically conscious, planned character. It is opposed to the Party marching at the head of the working class, to the Party raising the masses to the level

of political consciousness, to the Party leading the movement; it is in favour of the politically conscious elements of the movement not hindering the movement from taking its own course; it is in favour of the Party only heeding the spontaneous movement and dragging at the tail of it. The theory of spontaneity is the theory of belittling the role of the conscious element in the movement, the ideology of "khvostism," the logical basis of all opportunism.

In practice this theory, which appeared on the scene even before the first revolution in Russia, led its adherents, the so-called "Economists," to deny the need for an independent workers' party in Russia, to oppose the revolutionary struggle of the working class for the overthrow of tsarism, to preach a purely trade-unionist policy in the movement, and, in general, to surrender the labour movement to the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The fight of the old *Iskra* and the brilliant criticism of the theory of "khvostism" in Lenin's pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* not only smashed so-called "Economism," but also created the theoretical foundations for a truly revolutionary movement of the Russian working class.

Without this fight it would have been quite useless even to think of creating an independent workers' party in Russia and of its playing a leading part in the revolution.

But the theory of worshipping spontaneity is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. It is extremely widespread—in a somewhat different form, it is true—in all the parties of the Second International, without exception. I have in mind the so-called "productive forces" theory as debased by the leaders of the Second International, which justifies everything and conciliates everybody, which records facts and explains them after everyone has become sick and tired of them, and, having recorded them, rests content. Marx said that the materialist theory could not confine itself to explaining the world, that it must also change it. But Kautsky and Co. are not concerned with this; they prefer to rest content with the first part of Marx's formula.

Here is one of the numerous examples of the application of this "theory." It is said that before the imperialist war the parties of the Second International threatened to declare "war against war" if the imperialists should start a war. It is said that on the very eve of the war these parties pigeonholed the "war against war" slogan and applied an opposite one, viz., "war for the imperialist fatherland." It is said that as a result of this change of slogans millions of workers were sent to their death. But it would be a mistake to think that there were some people to blame for this, that someone was unfaithful to the working class or betrayed it. Not at all! Everything happened as it should have happened. Firstly, because the International, it seems, is "an instrument of peace," and not of war. Secondly, because, in view of the "level of the productive forces" which then prevailed, nothing else could be done. The "productive forces" are "to blame." That is the precise explanation vouchsafed to "us" by Mr. Kautsky's "theory of the productive forces." And whoever does not believe in that "theory" is not a Marxist. The role of the parties? Their importance for the movement? But what can a party do against so decisive a factor as the "level of the productive forces"?...

One could cite a host of similar examples of the falsification of Marxism.

It scarcely needs proof that this spurious "Marxism," designed to hide the nakedness of opportunism, is merely a European variety of the selfsame theory of "khvostism" which Lenin fought even before the first Russian revolution.

It scarcely needs proof that the demolition of this theoretical falsification is a preliminary condition for the creation of truly revolutionary parties in the West.

3) *The theory of the proletarian revolution.* Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution proceeds from three fundamental theses.

First thesis: The domination of finance capital in the advanced capitalist countries; the issue of stocks and bonds as one of the principal operations of finance capital; the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, which is one of the foundations of imperialism; the omnipotence of a financial oligarchy, which

is the result of the domination of finance capital—all this reveals the grossly parasitic character of monopolist capitalism, makes the yoke of the capitalist trusts and syndicates a hundred times more burdensome, intensifies the indignation of the working class with the foundations of capitalism, and brings the masses to the proletarian revolution as their only salvation. (See Lenin, *Imperialism*.)

Hence the first conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary crisis within the capitalist countries and growth of the elements of an explosion on the internal, proletarian front in the “metropolises.”

Second thesis: The increase in the export of capital to the colonies and dependent countries; the expansion of “spheres of influence” and colonial possessions until they cover the whole globe; the transformation of capitalism into a *world system* of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries—all this has, on the one hand, converted the separate national economies and national territories into links in a single chain called world economy, and, on the other hand, split the population of the globe into two camps: a handful of “advanced” capitalist countries which exploit and oppress vast colonies and dependencies, and the huge majority consisting of colonial and dependent countries which are compelled to wage a struggle for liberation from the imperialist yoke. (See *Imperialism*.)

Hence the second conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the colonial countries and growth of the elements of revolt against imperialism on the external, colonial front.

Third thesis: The monopolistic possession of “spheres of influence” and colonies; the uneven development of the capitalist countries, leading to a frenzied struggle for the redivision of the world between the countries which have already seized territories and those claiming their “share”; imperialist wars as the only means of restoring the disturbed “equilibrium”—all this leads to the intensification of the struggle on the third front, the intercapitalist front, which weakens imperialism and facilitates the union of the first two fronts against imperialism: the front of the revolu-

tionary proletariat and the front of colonial emancipation. (See *Imperialism*.)

Hence the third conclusion: that under imperialism wars cannot be averted, and that a coalition between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East in a united world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism is inevitable.

Lenin combines all these conclusions into one general conclusion that "*imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution.*"* (See Vol. XIX, p. 71.)

The very approach to the question of the proletarian revolution, of the character of the revolution, of its scope, of its depth, the scheme of the revolution in general, changes accordingly.

Formerly, the analysis of the prerequisites for the proletarian revolution was usually approached from the point of view of the economic state of individual countries. Now, this approach is no longer adequate. Now the matter must be approached from the point of view of the economic state of all or the majority of countries, from the point of view of the state of world economy; for individual countries and individual national economies have ceased to be self-sufficient units, have become links in a single chain called world economy; for the old "cultured" capitalism has evolved into imperialism, and imperialism is a world system of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries.

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the existence or absence of objective conditions for the proletarian revolution in individual countries, or, to be more precise, in one or another developed country. Now this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the existence of objective conditions for the revolution in the entire system of world imperialist economy as an integral whole; the existence within this system of some countries that are not sufficiently developed industrially cannot serve

* My italics.—J. St.

as an insuperable obstacle to the revolution, *if* the system as a whole or, more correctly, *because* the system as a whole is already ripe for revolution.

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the proletarian revolution in one or another developed country as of a separate and self-sufficient entity opposing a separate national front of capital as its antipode. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the world proletarian revolution; for the separate national fronts of capital have become links in a single chain called the world front of imperialism, which must be opposed by a common front of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

Formerly the proletarian revolution was regarded exclusively as the result of the internal development of a given country. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now the proletarian revolution must be regarded primarily as the result of the development of the contradictions within the world system of imperialism, as the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front in one country or another.

Where will the revolution begin? Where, in what country, can the front of capital be pierced first?

Where industry is more developed, where the proletariat constitutes the majority, where there is more culture, where there is more democracy—that was the reply usually given formerly.

No, objects the Leninist theory of revolution, *not necessarily where industry is more developed*, and so forth. The front of capital will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front at its weakest link; and it may turn out that the country which has started the revolution, which has made a breach in the front of capital, is less developed in a capitalist sense than other, more developed, countries, which have, however, remained within the framework of capitalism.

In 1917 the chain of the imperialist world front proved to be weaker in Russia than in the other countries. It was there that the chain broke and provided an outlet for the proletarian revolu-

tion. Why? Because in Russia a great popular revolution was unfolding, and at its head marched the revolutionary proletariat, which had such an important ally as the vast mass of the peasantry, which was oppressed and exploited by the landlords. Because the revolution there was opposed by such a hideous representative of imperialism as tsarism, which lacked all moral prestige and was deservedly hated by the whole population. The chain proved to be weaker in Russia, although Russia was less developed in a capitalist sense than, say, France or Germany, Britain or America.

Where will the chain break in the near future? Again, where it is weakest. It is not precluded that the chain may break, say, in India. Why? Because that country has a young, militant, revolutionary proletariat, which has such an ally as the national liberation movement—an undoubtedly powerful and undoubtedly important ally. Because there the revolution is confronted by such a well-known foe as foreign imperialism, which has no moral credit and is deservedly hated by all the oppressed and exploited masses of India.

It is also quite possible that the chain will break in Germany. Why? Because the factors which are operating, say, in India are beginning to operate in Germany as well; but, of course, the enormous difference in the level of development between India and Germany cannot but stamp its imprint on the progress and outcome of a revolution in Germany.

That is why Lenin said that:

"The West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism ... not by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement." (See Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16.)

Briefly: the chain of the imperialist front must, as a rule, break where the links are weaker and, at all events, not necessarily

where capitalism is more developed, where there is such and such a percentage of proletarians and such and such a percentage of peasants, and so on.

That is why in deciding the question of proletarian revolution statistical estimates of the percentage of the proletarian population in a given country lose the exceptional importance so eagerly attached to them by the doctrinaires of the Second International, who have not understood imperialism and who fear revolution like the plague.

To proceed. The heroes of the Second International asserted (and continue to assert) that between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution there is a chasm, or at any rate a Chinese Wall, separating one from the other by a more or less protracted interval of time, during which the bourgeoisie having come into power, develops capitalism, while the proletariat accumulates strength and prepares for the "decisive struggle" against capitalism. This interval is usually calculated to extend over many decades, if not longer. It scarcely needs proof that this Chinese Wall "theory" is totally devoid of scientific meaning under the conditions of imperialism, that it is and can be only a means of concealing and camouflaging the counterrevolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that under the conditions of imperialism, fraught as it is with collisions and wars; under the conditions of the "eve of the socialist revolution," when "flourishing" capitalism becomes "mori-bund" capitalism (*Lenin*) and the revolutionary movement is growing in all countries of the world; when imperialism is allying itself with all reactionary forces without exception, down to and including tsarism and serfdom, thus making imperative the coalition of all revolutionary forces, from the proletarian movement of the West to the national liberation movement of the East; when the overthrow of the survivals of the regime of feudal serfdom becomes impossible without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism—it scarcely needs proof that the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in a more or less developed country, must under such circumstances verge upon the proletarian revolution,

that the former must pass into the latter. The history of the revolution in Russia has provided palpable proof that this thesis is correct and incontrovertible. It was not without reason that Lenin, as far back as 1905, on the eve of the first Russian revolution, in his pamphlet *Two Tactics* depicted the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution as two links in the same chain, as a single and integral picture of the sweep of the Russian revolution:

"The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Such are the tasks of the proletariat, which the new Iskra-ists present so narrowly in all their arguments and resolutions about the sweep of the revolution." (See Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96.)

There is no need to mention other, later works of Lenin's, in which the idea of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution stands out in greater relief than in *Two Tactics* as one of the cornerstones of the Leninist theory of revolution.

Some comrades believe, it seems, that Lenin arrived at this idea only in 1916, that up to that time he had thought that the revolution in Russia would remain within the bourgeois framework, that power, consequently, would pass from the hands of the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry into the hands of the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat. It is said that this assertion has even penetrated into our communist press. I must say that this assertion is absolutely wrong, that it is totally at variance with the facts.

I might refer to Lenin's well-known speech at the Third Congress of the Party (1905), in which he defined the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, i.e., the victory of the democratic revolution, not as the "organization of 'order'" but as the "organization of war." (See Vol. VII, p. 264.)

Further, I might refer to Lenin's well-known articles "On a Provisional Government" (1905), where, outlining the prospects of the unfolding Russian revolution, he assigns to the Party the task of "ensuring that the Russian revolution is not a movement of a few months, but a movement of many years, that it leads, not merely to slight concessions on the part of the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers"; where, enlarging further on these prospects and linking them with the revolution in Europe, he goes on to say:

"And if we succeed in doing that, then then the revolutionary conflagration will spread all over Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn and will show us 'how it is done'; then the revolutionary wave in Europe will sweep back again into Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an epoch of several revolutionary decades...." (*Ibid.*, p. 191.)

I might further refer to a well-known article by Lenin published in November 1915, in which he writes:

"The proletariat is fighting, and will fight valiantly, to capture power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land ... for the participation of the 'nonproletarian masses of the people' in liberating *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* 'imperialism' (=tsarism). And the proletariat will immediately* take advantage of this liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism, from the agrarian power of the landlords, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural worker, but to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe." (See Vol. XVIII, p. 318.)

Finally, I might refer to the well-known passage in Lenin's pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, where, referring to the above-quoted passage in *Two Tactics* on the sweep of the Russian revolution, he arrives at the following conclusion:

"Things turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the 'whole' of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the medieval regime (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). *Then*, with the poor peasants, with the semiprole-

* My italics.—J. St.

tarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and second, to separate them by anything else *than* the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarize it, to replace it by liberalism." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 391.)

That is sufficient, I think.

Very well, we may be told; but if that is the case, why did Lenin combat the idea of "permanent (uninterrupted) revolution"?

Because Lenin proposed that the revolutionary capacities of the peasantry be "exhausted" and that the fullest use be made of their revolutionary energy for the complete liquidation of tsarism and for the transition to the proletarian revolution, whereas the adherents of "permanent revolution" did not understand the important role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution, underestimated the strength of the revolutionary energy of the peasantry, underestimated the strength and ability of the Russian proletariat to lead the peasantry, and thereby hampered the work of emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie, the work of rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

Because Lenin proposed that the revolution *be crowned* with the transfer of power to the proletariat, whereas the adherents of "permanent" revolution wanted *to begin* at once with the establishment of the power of the proletariat, failing to realize that in so doing they were closing their eyes to such a "minor detail" as the survivals of serfdom and were leaving out of account so important a force as the Russian peasantry, failing to understand that such a policy could only retard the winning of the peasantry over to the side of the proletariat.

Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of "permanent" revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat, because they failed to understand the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

The idea of "permanent" revolution should not be regarded as a new idea. It was first advanced by Marx at the end of the forties in his well-known *Address to the Communist League* (1850). It is from this document that our "permanentists" took the idea of uninterrupted revolution. It should be noted that in taking it from Marx our "permanentists" altered it somewhat, and in altering it "spoilt" it and made it unfit for practical use. The experienced hand of Lenin was needed to rectify this mistake, to take Marx's idea of uninterrupted revolution in its pure form and make it a cornerstone of his theory of revolution.

Here is what Marx says in his *Address* about uninterrupted (permanent) revolution, after enumerating a number of revolutionary-democratic demands which he calls upon the Communists to win:

"While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power, and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians."

In other words:

a) Marx did not at all propose to begin the revolution in the Germany of the fifties with the immediate establishment of proletarian power—*contrary* to the plans of our Russian "permanentists."

b) Marx proposed only that the revolution be crowned with the establishment of proletarian state power, by hurling, step by step, one section of the bourgeoisie after another from the heights of power, in order, after the attainment of power by the proletariat, to kindle the fire of revolution in every country—and everything that Lenin taught and carried out in the course of our revolution in pursuit of his theory of the proletarian revolution under the conditions of imperialism was *fully in line* with that proposition.

It follows, then, that our Russian "permanentists" have not only underestimated the role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution and the importance of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat, but have altered (for the worse) Marx's idea of "permanent" revolution and made it unfit for practical use.

That is why Lenin ridiculed the theory of our "permanentists," calling it "original" and "fine," and accusing them of refusing to "think why, for ten whole years, life has passed by this fine theory." (Lenin's article was written in 1915, ten years after the appearance of the theory of the "permanentists" in Russia. See Vol. XVIII, p. 317.)

That is why Lenin regarded this theory as a semi-Menshevik theory and said that it "borrows from the Bolsheviks their call for a resolute revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and the conquest of political power by the latter, and from the Mensheviks the 'repudiation' of the role of the peasantry." (See Lenin's article "Two Lines of the Revolution," *ibid.*)

This, then, is the position in regard to Lenin's idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into the proletarian revolution, of utilizing the bourgeois revolution for the "immediate" transition to the proletarian revolution.

To proceed. Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world—all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries. The history of the revolution in Russia is direct proof of this. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that the overthrow of the

bourgeoisie can be successfully accomplished only when certain absolutely necessary conditions exist, in the absence of which there can be even no question of the proletariat taking power.

Here is what Lenin says about these conditions in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*:

"The fundamental law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions, and particularly by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: it is not enough for revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses should understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; it is essential for revolution that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. Only when the '*lower classes*' *do not want* the old way, and when the '*upper classes*' *cannot carry on in the old way*—only then can revolution triumph. This truth may be expressed in other words: *revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters)*.* It follows that for revolution it is essential, first, that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand that revolution is necessary and be ready to sacrifice their lives for it; secondly, that the ruling classes should be passing through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics—weakens the government and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly." (See Vol. XXV, p. 222.)

But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. After consolidating its power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of socialism, i.e., does it mean that with the forces of only one country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully guarantee that country against intervention and, consequently, also against restoration? No, it does not. For this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore, the development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution. Therefore, the revolution which has been victo-

* My italics.—J. St.

rious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries.

Lenin expressed this thought succinctly when he said that the task of the victorious revolution is to do "the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 385.)

These, in general, are the characteristic features of Lenin's theory of proletarian revolution.

IV

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From this theme I take three fundamental questions:

- a) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution;
- b) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie;
- c) Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) *The dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution.* The question of the proletarian dictatorship is above all a question of the main content of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution, its movement, its sweep and its achievements acquire flesh and blood only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important mainstay, brought into being for the purpose of, firstly, crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and consolidating the achievements of the proletarian revolution, and, secondly, carrying the proletarian revolution to its completion, carrying the revolution to the complete victory of socialism. The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to

maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay.

"The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power." (*Lenin.*) Does this mean that all that is required is to assume power, to seize it? No, it does not. The seizure of power is only the beginning. For many reasons, the bourgeoisie that is overthrown in one country remains for a long time stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it. Therefore, the whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible. What is needed to attain this? To attain this it is necessary to carry out at least three main tasks that confront the dictatorship of the proletariat "on the morrow" of victory:

a) to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists who have been overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, to liquidate every attempt on their part to restore the power of capital;

b) to organize construction in such a way as to rally all the working people around the proletariat, and to carry on this work along the lines of preparing for the elimination, the abolition of classes;

c) to arm the revolution, to organize the army of the revolution for the struggle against foreign enemies, for the struggle against imperialism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to carry out, to fulfil these tasks.

"The transition from capitalism to communism," says Lenin, "represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this *hope* is converted into *attempts* at restoration. And after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters—who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it—throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise' of which they have been deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the 'common herd' is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to

'common' labour...). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic-stricken at the first defeat or semidefeat of the workers, grow nervous, rush about, snivel, and run from one camp into the other." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 355.)

The bourgeoisie has its grounds for making attempts at restoration, because for a long time after its overthrow it remains stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it.

"If the exploiters are defeated in one country only," says Lenin, "and this, of course, is the typical case, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, they *still remain stronger than the exploited.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 354.)

Wherein lies the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie?

Firstly, "in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

Secondly, in the fact that "for a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property—often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organization and management, knowledge of all the 'secrets' (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, superior education, close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on, and so forth." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 354.)

Thirdly, "in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" for "the abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists—that we accomplished with comparative ease—it also means *abolishing the small commodity producers*, and they *cannot be driven out*, or crushed; we *must live in harmony* with them, they can (and must) be remoulded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organizational work." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 173 and 189.)

That is why Lenin says:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by its overthrow,"

that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society." (*Ibid.*, pp. 173 and 190.)

It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing all this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of "superrevolutionary" acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organizational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. This historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, firstly, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remould the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organization of socialist production.

"You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international conflicts," Marx said to the workers, "not only to change existing conditions, but also to change yourselves and to make yourselves capable of wielding political power." (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 506.)

Continuing and developing Marx's idea still further, Lenin wrote that:

"It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to re-educate millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, to subordinate them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, to overcome their bourgeois habits and traditions," just as we must—in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat—re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the bidding of the Virgin Mary, at the bidding of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult

mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 248 and 247.)

2) The dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. From the foregoing it is evident that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a mere change of personalities in the government, a change of the "cabinet," etc., leaving the old economic and political order intact. The Mensheviks and opportunists of all countries, who fear dictatorship like fire and in their fright substitute the concept "conquest of power" for the concept dictatorship, usually reduce the "conquest of power" to a change of the "cabinet," to the accession to power of a new ministry made up of people like Scheidemann and Noske, MacDonald and Henderson. It is hardly necessary to explain that these and similar cabinet changes have nothing in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the conquest of real power by the real proletariat. With the MacDonalds and Scheidemanns in power, while the old bourgeois order is allowed to remain, their so-called governments cannot be anything else than an apparatus serving the bourgeoisie, a screen to conceal the ulcers of imperialism, a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed and exploited masses. Capital needs such governments as a screen when it finds it inconvenient, unprofitable, difficult to oppress and exploit the masses without the aid of a screen. Of course, the appearance of such governments is a symptom that "over there" (i.e., in the capitalist camp) all is not quiet "at the Shipka Pass"; nevertheless, governments of this kind inevitably remain governments of capital in disguise. The government of a MacDonald or a Scheidemann is as far removed from the conquest of power by the proletariat as the sky from the earth. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not a change of government, but a new state, with new organs of power, both central and local;

* A Russian saying carried over from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. There was heavy fighting at the Shipka Pass, but tsarist Headquarters in their communiques reported: "All quiet at the Shipka Pass."—Tr.

it is the state of the proletariat, which has arisen on the ruins of the old state, the state of the bourgeoisie.

The dictatorship of the proletariat arises not on the basis of the bourgeois order, but in the process of the breaking up of this order, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in the process of the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists, in the process of the socialization of the principal instruments and means of production, in the process of violent proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a revolutionary power based on the use of force against the bourgeoisie.

The state is a machine in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its class enemies. *In this respect* the dictatorship of the proletariat does not differ essentially from the dictatorship of any other class, for the proletarian state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie. But there is one *substantial* difference. This difference consists in the fact that all hitherto existing class states have been dictatorships of an exploiting minority over the exploited majority, whereas the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the exploited majority over the exploiting minority.

Briefly: *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule—unrestricted by law and based on force—of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring and exploited masses.* (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)

From this follow two main conclusions:

First conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be “complete” democracy, democracy for *all*, for the rich as well as for the poor; the dictatorship of the proletariat “must be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (*for* * the proletarians and the nonpropertied in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (*against* * the bourgeoisie).” (See Vol. XXI, p. 393.) The talk of Kautsky and Co. about universal equality, about “pure” democracy, about “perfect” democracy, and the like, is a bourgeois disguise of the indubitable fact that equality between exploited and exploiters

* My italics.—J. St.

is impossible. The theory of "pure" democracy is the theory of the upper stratum of the working class, which has been broken in and is being fed by the imperialist robbers. It was brought into being for the purpose of concealing the ulcers of capitalism, of embellishing imperialism and lending it moral strength in the struggle against the exploited masses. Under capitalism there are no real "liberties" for the exploited, nor can there be, if for no other reason than that the premises, printing plants, paper supplies, etc., indispensable for the enjoyment of "liberties" are the privilege of the exploiters. Under capitalism the exploited masses do not, nor can they ever, really participate in governing the country, if for no other reason than that, even under the most democratic regime, under conditions of capitalism, governments are not set up by the people but by the Rothschilds and Stinneses, the Rockefellers and Morgans. Democracy under capitalism is *capitalist* democracy, the democracy of the exploiting minority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploited majority and directed against this majority. Only under the proletarian dictatorship are real liberties for the exploited and real participation of the proletarians and peasants in governing the country possible. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, democracy is *proletarian* democracy, the democracy of the exploited majority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploiting minority and directed against this minority.

Second conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus, the bourgeois police.

"The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes," say Marx and Engels in a preface to the *Communist Manifesto*.—The task of the proletarian revolution is "... no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it...—this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent," says Marx in his letter to Kugelmann in 1871.

Marx's qualifying phrase about the continent gave the opportunists and Mensheviks of all countries a pretext for clamouring that Marx had thus conceded the possibility of the peaceful evolution of bourgeois democracy into a proletarian democracy, at least in certain countries outside the European continent (Britain, America). Marx did in fact concede that possibility, and he had good grounds for conceding it in regard to Britain and America in the seventies of the last century, when monopoly capitalism and imperialism did not yet exist, and when these countries, owing to the particular conditions of their development, had as yet no developed militarism and bureaucracy. That was the situation before the appearance of developed imperialism. But later, after a lapse of thirty or forty years, when the situation in these countries had radically changed, when imperialism had developed and had embraced all capitalist countries without exception, when militarism and bureaucracy had appeared in Britain and America also, when the particular conditions for peaceful development in Britain and America had disappeared—then the qualification in regard to these countries necessarily could no longer hold good.

"Today," said Lenin, "in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this qualification made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives—in the whole world—of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty' in the sense that they had no militarism and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and trample everything underfoot. Today, in Britain and in America, too, 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution' is the *s m a s h i n g*, the *d e s t r u c t i o n* of the 'ready-made state machinery' (perfected in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, up to the 'European' general imperialist standard)." (See Vol. XXI, p. 395.)

In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution, is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world.

Of course, in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the principal capitalist countries, and if the present capi-

talist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a "peaceful" path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the "unfavourable" international situation, will consider it expedient "voluntarily" to make substantial concessions to the proletariat. But this supposition applies only to a remote and possible future. With regard to the immediate future, there is no ground whatsoever for this supposition.

Therefore, Lenin is right in saying:

"The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a *new one*." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 342.)

3) *Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, and the substitution of proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy. That is clear. But by means of what organizations can this colossal work be carried out? The old forms of organization of the proletariat, which grew up on the basis of bourgeois parliamentarism, are inadequate for this work—of that there can hardly be any doubt. What, then, are the new forms of organization of the proletariat that are capable of serving as the gravediggers of the bourgeois state machine, that are capable not only of smashing this machine, not only of substituting proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy, but also of becoming the foundation of the proletarian state power?

This new form of organization of the proletariat is the Soviets.

Wherein lies the strength of the Soviets as compared with the old forms of organization?

In that the Soviets are the most *all-embracing* mass organizations of the proletariat, for they and they alone embrace all workers without exception.

In that the Soviets are the *only* mass organizations which unite all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and in which the vanguard of the masses, the proleta-

riat, can, for this reason, most easily and most completely exercise its political leadership of the mass struggle.

In that the Soviets are the *most powerful organs* of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the political actions of the masses, of the uprising of the masses—organs capable of breaking the omnipotence of finance capital and its political appendages.

In that the Soviets are the *immediate organizations* of the masses themselves, i.e., they are the *most democratic* and therefore the most authoritative organizations of the masses, which facilitate to the utmost their participation in the work of building up the new state and in its administration, and which bring into full play the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative abilities of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order, in the struggle for the new, proletarian order.

Soviet power is the union and constitution of the local Soviets into one common state organization, into the state organization of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class—their union in the Republic of Soviets.

The essence of Soviet power consists in the fact that these most all-embracing and most revolutionary mass organizations of precisely those classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landlords are now the “*permanent and sole* basis of the whole power of the state, of the whole state apparatus”; that “precisely those masses which even in the most democratic bourgeois republics,” while being equal in law, “have in fact been prevented by thousands of tricks and devices from taking part in political life and from enjoying democratic rights and liberties, are now drawn unfailingly into *constant* and, moreover, *decisive* participation in the democratic administration of the state.”* (See Lenin, Vol. XXIV, p. 13.)

That is why Soviet power is a *new form* of state organization, different in principle from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, a *new type* of state, adapted not to the task of

* All italics mine.—J. St.

exploiting and oppressing the labouring masses, but to the task of completely emancipating them from all oppression and exploitation, to the tasks facing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin is right in saying that with the appearance of Soviet power "the era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has drawn to a close and a new chapter in world history—the era of proletarian dictatorship—has been opened."

Wherein lie the characteristic features of Soviet power?

In that Soviet power is the most all-embracing and most democratic state organization of all possible state organizations while classes continue to exist; for, being the arena of the bond and collaboration between the workers and the exploited peasants in their struggle against the exploiters, and basing itself in its work on this bond and on this collaboration, Soviet power is thus the power of the majority of the population over the minority, it is the state of the majority, the expression of its dictatorship.

In that Soviet power is the most internationalist of all state organizations in class society, for, by destroying every kind of national oppression and resting on the collaboration of the labouring masses of the various nationalities, it facilitates the uniting of these masses into a single state union.

In that Soviet power, by its very structure, facilitates the task of leading the oppressed and exploited masses by the vanguard of these masses—by the proletariat, as the most united and most politically conscious core of the Soviets.

"The experience of all revolutions and of all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us," says Lenin, "that the proletariat alone is able to unite and lead the scattered and backward strata of the toiling and exploited population." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 14.) The point is that the structure of Soviet power facilitates the practical application of the lessons drawn from this experience.

In that Soviet power, by combining legislative and executive power in a single state organization and replacing territorial electoral constituencies by industrial units, factories and mills, thereby directly links the workers and the labouring masses in general

with the apparatus of state administration, teaches them how to govern the country.

In that Soviet power alone is capable of releasing the army from its subordination to bourgeois command and of converting it from the instrument of oppression of the people which it is under the bourgeois order into an instrument for the liberation of the people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, both native and foreign.

In that "the Soviet organization of the state alone is capable of immediately and effectively smashing and finally destroying the old, i.e., the bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial apparatus." (*Ibid.*)

In that the Soviet form of state alone, by drawing the mass organizations of the toilers and exploited into constant and unrestricted participation in state administration, is capable of preparing the ground for the withering away of the state, which is one of the basic elements of the future stateless communist society.

The Republic of Soviets is thus the political form, so long sought and finally discovered, within the framework of which the economic emancipation of the proletariat, the complete victory of socialism, must be accomplished.

The Paris Commune was the embryo of this form; Soviet power is its development and culmination.

That is why Lenin says:

"The Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies is not only the form of a higher type of democratic institution ... but is the *only** form capable of ensuring the most painless transition to socialism." (See Vol. XXII, p. 131.)

V

THE PEASANT QUESTION

From this theme I take four questions:

- a) the presentation of the question;
- b) the peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution;
- c) the peasantry during the proletarian revolution;

* My italics.—J. St.

d) the peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.

1) *The presentation of the question.* Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.

This circumstance, however, does not in the least deprive the peasant question of the serious and vital importance it unquestionably has for the proletarian revolution. It is known that the serious study of the peasant question in the ranks of Russian Marxists began precisely on the eve of the first revolution (1905), when the question of overthrowing tsarism and of realizing the hegemony of the proletariat confronted the Party in all its magnitude, and when the question of the ally of the proletariat in the impending bourgeois revolution became of vital importance. It is also known that the peasant question in Russia assumed a still more urgent character during the proletarian revolution, when the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of achieving and maintaining it, led to the question of allies for the proletariat in the impending proletarian revolution. And this was natural. Those who are marching towards and preparing to assume power cannot but be interested in the question of who are their real allies.

In this sense the peasant question is part of the general question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and as such it is one of the most vital problems of Leninism.

The attitude of indifference and sometimes even of outright aversion displayed by the parties of the Second International towards the peasant question is to be explained not only by the specific conditions of development in the West. It is to be explained primarily by the fact that these parties do not believe in the proletarian dictatorship, that they fear revolution and have no inten-

tion of leading the proletariat to power. And those who are afraid of revolution, who do not intend to lead the proletarians to power, cannot be interested in the question of allies for the proletariat in the revolution—to them the question of allies is one of indifference, of no immediate significance. The ironical attitude of the heroes of the Second International towards the peasant question is regarded by them as a sign of good breeding, a sign of "true" Marxism. As a matter of fact, there is not a grain of Marxism in this, for indifference towards so important a question as the peasant question on the eve of the proletarian revolution is the reverse side of the repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is an unmistakable sign of downright betrayal of Marxism.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the peasantry by virtue of certain conditions of its existence *already exhausted*, or not; and if not, *is there any hope, any basis*, for utilizing these potentialities *for* the proletarian revolution, for transforming the peasantry, the exploited majority of it, from the reserve of the bourgeoisie which it was during the bourgeois revolutions in the West and still is even now, into a reserve of the proletariat, into its ally?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognizes the existence of revolutionary capacities in the ranks of the majority of the peasantry, and the possibility of using these in the interests of the proletarian dictatorship.

The history of the three revolutions in Russia fully corroborates the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the practical conclusion that the toiling masses of the peasantry must be supported in their struggle against bondage and exploitation, in their struggle for deliverance from oppression and poverty. This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* peasant movement. What we have in mind here is support for a movement or struggle of the peasantry which, directly or indirectly, facilitates the emancipation movement of the proletariat, which, in one way or another, brings grist to the mill of the proletarian revolution, and which helps to transform the peasantry into a reserve and ally of the working class.

2) *The peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution.* This period extends from the first Russian revolution (1905) to the second revolution (February 1917), inclusive. The characteristic feature of this period is the emancipation of the peasantry from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Cadets, its *turn* towards the proletariat, towards the Bolshevik Party. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Cadets (the liberal bourgeoisie) and the Bolsheviks (the proletariat) for the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the Duma period, for the period of the four Dumas served as an object lesson to the peasantry, and this lesson brought home to the peasantry the fact that they would receive neither land nor liberty at the hands of the Cadets; that the tsar was wholly in favour of the landlords, and that the Cadets were supporting the tsar; that the only force they could rely on for assistance was the urban workers, the proletariat. The imperialist war merely confirmed the lessons of the Duma period and consummated the peasantry's *desertion* of the bourgeoisie, consummated the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie; for the years of the war revealed the utter futility, the utter deceptiveness of all hopes of obtaining peace from the tsar and his bourgeois allies. Without the object lessons of the Duma period, the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

That is how the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the bourgeois-democratic revolution took shape. That is how the hegemony (leadership) of the proletariat in the common struggle for the overthrow of tsarism took shape—the hegemony which led to the February Revolution of 1917.

The bourgeois revolutions in the West (Britain, France, Germany, Austria) took, as is well known, a different road. There, hegemony in the revolution belonged not to the proletariat, which by reason of its weakness did not and could not represent an independent political force, but to the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry obtained its emancipation from feudal regimes, not at the hands of the proletariat, which was numerically weak and unorganized, but at the hands of the bourgeoisie. There the peasantry

marched against the old order side by side with the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry acted as the reserve of the bourgeoisie. There the revolution, in consequence of this, led to an enormous increase in the political weight of the bourgeoisie.

In Russia, on the contrary, the bourgeois revolution produced quite opposite results. The revolution in Russia led not to the strengthening, but to the weakening of the bourgeoisie as a political force, not to an increase in its political reserves, but to the loss of its main reserve, to the loss of the peasantry. The bourgeois revolution in Russia brought to the forefront not the liberal bourgeoisie but the revolutionary proletariat, rallying around the latter the millions of the peasantry.

Incidentally, this explains why the bourgeois revolution in Russia passed into a proletarian revolution in a comparatively short space of time. The hegemony of the proletariat was the embryo of, and the transitional stage to, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

How is this peculiar phenomenon of the Russian revolution, which has no precedent in the history of the bourgeois revolutions of the West, to be explained? Whence this peculiarity?

It is to be explained by the fact that the bourgeois revolution unfolded in Russia under more advanced conditions of class struggle than in the West; that the Russian proletariat had at that time already become an independent political force, whereas the liberal bourgeoisie, frightened by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, lost all semblance of revolutionary spirit (especially after the lessons of 1905) and turned towards an alliance with the tsar and the landlords against the revolution, against the workers and peasants.

We should bear in mind the following circumstances, which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

a) The unprecedented concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution. It is known, for instance, that in Russia 54 per cent of all the workers were employed in enterprises employing over 500 workers each, whereas in so highly developed a country as the United States of America no more than 33 per cent of

all the workers were employed in such enterprises. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance alone, in view of the existence of a revolutionary party like the Party of the Bolsheviks, transformed the working class of Russia into an immense force in the political life of the country.

b) The hideous forms of exploitation in the factories, coupled with the intolerable police regime of the tsarist henchmen—a circumstance which transformed every important strike of the workers into an imposing political action and steeled the working class as a force that was revolutionary to the end.

c) The political flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which after the Revolution of 1905 turned into servility to tsarism and downright counterrevolution—a fact to be explained not only by the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat, which flung the Russian bourgeoisie into the embrace of tsarism, but also by the direct dependence of this bourgeoisie upon government contracts.

d) The existence in the countryside of the most hideous and most intolerable survivals of serfdom, coupled with the unlimited power of the landlords—a circumstance which threw the peasantry into the embrace of the revolution.

e) Tsarism, which stifled everything that was alive, and whose tyranny aggravated the oppression of the capitalist and the landlord—a circumstance which united the struggle of the workers and peasants into a single torrent of revolution.

f) The imperialist war, which fused all these contradictions in the political life of Russia into a profound revolutionary crisis, and which lent the revolution tremendous striking force.

To whom could the peasantry turn under these circumstances? From whom could it seek support against the unlimited power of the landlords, against the tyranny of the tsar, against the devastating war which was ruining it? From the liberal bourgeoisie? But it was an enemy, as the long years of experience of all four Dumas had proved. From the Socialist-Revolutionaries? The Socialist-Revolutionaries were "better" than the Cadets, of course, and their program was "suitable," almost a peasant

program; but what could the Socialist-Revolutionaries offer, considering that they thought of relying only on the peasants and were weak in the towns, from which the enemy primarily drew its forces? Where was the new force which would stop at nothing either in town or country, which would boldly march in the front ranks to fight the tsar and the landlords, which would help the peasantry to extricate itself from bondage, from land hunger, from oppression, from war? Was there such a force in Russia at all? Yes, there was. It was the Russian proletariat, which had shown its strength, its ability to fight to the end, its boldness and revolutionary spirit, as far back as 1905.

At any rate, there was no other such force; nor could any other be found anywhere.

That is why the peasantry, when it turned its back on the Cadets and attached itself to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, at the same time came to realize the necessity of submitting to the leadership of such a courageous leader of the revolution as the Russian proletariat.

Such were the circumstances which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

3) *The peasantry during the proletarian revolution.* This period extends from the February Revolution of 1917 to the October Revolution of 1917. This period is comparatively short, eight months in all; but from the point of view of the political enlightenment and revolutionary training of the masses these eight months can safely be put on a par with whole decades of ordinary constitutional development, for they were eight months of *revolution*. The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionization of the peasantry, its disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, its new *turn* towards a *direct rally* around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries (petty-bourgeois democracy) and the Bolsheviks (proletarian democracy) for the peasantry, to win over the majority

of the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt.

Whereas before, in the preceding period, the basic question of the revolution had been the overthrow of the tsar and of the power of the landlords, now, in the period following the February Revolution, when there was no longer any tsar, and when the interminable war had exhausted the economy of the country and utterly ruined the peasantry, the question of liquidating the war became the main problem of the revolution. The centre of gravity had manifestly shifted from purely internal questions to the main question—the war. "End the war," "Let's get out of the war"—such was the general outcry of the war-weary nation and primarily of the peasantry.

But in order to get out of the war it was necessary to overthrow the Provisional Government, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, for they, and they alone, were dragging out the war to a "victorious finish." Practically, there was no way of getting out of the war except by overthrowing the bourgeoisie.

This was a new revolution, a proletarian revolution, for it ousted from power the last group of the imperialist bourgeoisie, its extreme Left wing, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks, in order to set up a new, proletarian power, the power of the Soviets, in order to put in power the party of the revolutionary proletariat, the Bolshevik Party, the party of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war and for a democratic peace. The majority of the peasantry supported the struggle of the workers for peace, for the power of the Soviets.

There was no other way out for the peasantry. Nor could there be any other way out.

Thus, the Kerensky period was a great object lesson for the toiling masses of the peasantry, for it showed clearly that with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in power the country would not extricate itself from the war, and the peasants would never get either land or liberty; that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries differed from the Cadets only in their honeyed phrases and false promises, while they actually pursued the same imperialist, Cadet policy; that the only power that could lead the country on to the proper road was the power of the Soviets. The further prolongation of the war merely confirmed the truth of this lesson, spurred on the revolution, and drove millions of peasants and soldiers to *rally directly* around the proletarian revolution. The isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks became an incontrovertible fact. Without the object lessons of the coalition period the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible.

Such were the circumstances which facilitated the process of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution.

That is how the dictatorship of the proletariat took shape in Russia.

4) *The peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.* Whereas before, in the first period of the revolution, the main objective was the overthrow of tsarism, and later, after the February Revolution, the primary objective was to get out of the imperialist war by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, now, after the liquidation of the civil war and the consolidation of Soviet power, questions of economic construction came to the forefront. Strengthen and develop the nationalized industry; for this purpose link up industry with peasant economy through state-regulated trade; replace the surplus-appropriation system by the tax in kind so as, later on, by gradually lowering the tax in kind, to reduce matters to the exchange of products of industry for the products of peasant farming; revive trade and develop the cooperatives, drawing into them the vast masses of the peasantry—this is how Lenin outlined the immediate tasks of economic construction on the way to building the foundations of socialist economy.

It is said that this task may prove beyond the strength of a peasant country like Russia. Some sceptics even say that it is simply utopian, impossible, for the peasantry is a peasantry—it consists of small producers, and therefore cannot be of use in organizing the foundations of socialist production.

But the sceptics are mistaken, for they fail to take into account certain circumstances which in the present case are of decisive significance. Let us examine the most important of these:

Firstly. The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat—such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and political collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for economic collaboration with the proletariat.

Engels said that "the conquest of political power by the Socialist Party has become a matter of the not too distant future," that "in order to conquer political power this Party must first go from the towns to the country, must become a power in the countryside." (See Engels, *The Peasant Question*, 1922 ed.) He wrote this in the nineties of the last century, having in mind the Western peasantry. Does it need proof that the Russian Communists, after accomplishing an enormous amount of work in this field in the course of three revolutions, have already succeeded in gaining in the countryside an influence and backing the like of which our Western comrades dare not even dream of? How can it be de-

nied that this circumstance must decidedly facilitate the organization of economic collaboration between the working class and the peasantry of Russia?

The sceptics maintain that the small peasants are a factor that is incompatible with socialist construction. But listen to what Engels says about the small peasants of the West:

"We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the cooperative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain on his small holding for a protracted length of time to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision. We do this not only because we consider the small peasant who does his own work as virtually belonging to us, but also in the direct interest of the Party. The greater the number of peasants whom we can save from being actually hurled down into the proletariat, whom we can win to our side while they are still peasants, the more quickly and easily the social transformation will be accomplished. It will serve us nought to wait with this transformation until capitalist production has developed everywhere to its utmost consequences, until the last small handicraftsman and the last small peasant have fallen victim to capitalist large-scale production. The material sacrifices to be made for this purpose in the interest of the peasants and to be defrayed out of public funds can, from the point of view of capitalist economy, be viewed only as money thrown away, but it is nevertheless an excellent investment because it will effect a perhaps tenfold saving in the cost of the social reorganization in general. In this sense we can, therefore, afford to deal very liberally with the peasants." (*Ibid.*)

That is what Engels said, having in mind the Western peasantry. But is it not clear that what Engels said can nowhere be realized so easily and so completely as in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not clear that only in Soviet Russia is it possible at once and to the fullest extent for "the small peasant who does his own work" to come over to our side, for the "material sacrifices" necessary for this to be made, and for the necessary "liberality towards the peasants" to be displayed? Is it not clear that these and similar measures for the benefit of the peasantry are already being carried out in Russia? How can it be denied that this circumstance, in its turn, must facilitate and advance the work of economic construction in the land of the Soviets?

Secondly. Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalization of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organizing millions of small and middle peasants in cooperatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass cooperative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on cooperation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the cooperatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products.

Of extreme interest in this respect are several new phenomena observed in the countryside in connection with the work of the agricultural cooperatives. It is well known that new, large organizations have sprung up within the Selskosoyuz, in different branches of agriculture, such as production of flax, potatoes, butter, etc., which have a great future before them. Of these, the Flax Centre, for instance, unites a whole network of peasant flax growers' associations. The Flax Centre supplies the peasants with seeds and implements; then it buys all the flax produced by these peasants, disposes of it on the market on a large scale, guarantees the peasants a share in the profits, and in this way links peasant economy with state industry through the Selskosoyuz. What shall we call this form of organization of production? In my opinion, it is the domestic system of large-scale state-socialist pro-

duction in the sphere of agriculture. In speaking of the domestic system of state-socialist production I do so by analogy with the domestic system under capitalism, let us say, in the textile industry, where the handicraftsmen received their raw material and tools from the capitalist and turned over to him the entire product of their labour, thus being in fact semiwage earners working in their own homes. This is one of numerous indices showing the path along which our agriculture must develop. There is no need to mention here similar indices in other branches of agriculture.

It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin.

Here is what Lenin says about the path of development of our agriculture:

"State power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 392.)

Further on, speaking of the necessity of giving financial and other assistance to the cooperatives, as a "new principle of organizing the population" and a new "social system" under the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin continues:

"Every social system arises only with the financial assistance of a definite class. There is no need to mention the hundreds and hundreds of millions of rubles that the birth of 'free' capitalism cost. Now we must realize, and apply in our practical work, the fact that the social system which we must now give more than usual assistance is the cooperative system. But it must be assisted in the real sense of the word, i.e., it will not be enough to interpret assistance to mean assistance for any kind of cooperative trade;

by assistance we must mean assistance for cooperative trade in which *really large masses of the population really take part.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 393.)

What do all these facts prove?

That the sceptics are wrong.

That Leninism is right in regarding the masses of labouring peasants as the reserve of the proletariat.

That the proletariat in power can and must use this reserve in order to link industry with agriculture, to advance socialist construction, and to provide for the dictatorship of the proletariat that necessary foundation without which the transition to socialist economy is impossible.

VI

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

From this theme I take two main questions:

- a) the presentation of the question;
- b) the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution.

1) *The presentation of the question.* During the last two decades the national question has undergone a number of very important changes. The national question in the period of the Second International and the national question in the period of Leninism are far from being the same thing. They differ profoundly from each other, not only in their scope, but also in their intrinsic character.

Formerly, the national question was usually confined to a narrow circle of questions, concerning, primarily, "civilized" nationalities. The Irish, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs, and several other European nationalities—that was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies the leaders of the Second International were interested. The scores and hundreds of millions of Asiatic and African peoples who are suffering national oppression in its most savage and cruel form usually remained outside of their field of vision. They hesitated to put white

and black, "civilized" and "uncivilized" on the same plane. Two or three meaningless, lukewarm resolutions, which carefully evaded the question of liberating the colonies—that was all the leaders of the Second International could boast of. Now we can say that this duplicity and half-heartedness in dealing with the national question has been brought to an end. Leninism laid bare this crying incongruity, broke down the wall between whites and blacks, between Europeans and Asiatics, between the "civilized" and "uncivilized" slaves of imperialism, and thus linked the national question with the question of the colonies. The national question was thereby transformed from a particular and internal state problem into a general and international problem, into a world problem of emancipating the oppressed peoples in the dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.

Formerly, the principle of self-determination of nations was usually misinterpreted, and not infrequently it was narrowed down to the idea of the right of nations to autonomy. Certain leaders of the Second International even went so far as to turn the right to self-determination into the right to cultural autonomy, i.e., the right of oppressed nations to have their own cultural institutions, leaving all political power in the hands of the ruling nation. As a consequence, the idea of self-determination stood in danger of being transformed from an instrument for combating annexations into an instrument for justifying them. Now we can say that this confusion has been cleared up. Leninism broadened the conception of self-determination, interpreting it as the right of the oppressed peoples of the dependent countries and colonies to complete secession, as the right of nations to independent existence as states. This precluded the possibility of justifying annexations by interpreting the right to self-determination as the right to autonomy. Thus, the principle of self-determination itself was transformed from an instrument for deceiving the masses, which it undoubtedly was in the hands of the social-chauvinists during the imperialist war, into an instrument for exposing all imperialist aspirations and chauvinist machinations, into an

instrument for the political education of the masses in the spirit of internationalism.

Formerly, the question of the oppressed nations was usually regarded as purely a juridical question. Solemn proclamations about "national equality of rights," innumerable declarations about the "equality of nations"—that was the stock-in-trade of the parties of the Second International, which glossed over the fact that "equality of nations" under imperialism, where one group of nations (a minority) lives by exploiting another group of nations, is sheer mockery of the oppressed nations. Now we can say that this bourgeois-juridical point of view on the national question has been exposed. Leninism brought the national question down from the lofty heights of high-sounding declarations to solid ground, and declared that pronouncements about the "equality of nations" not backed by the direct support of the proletarian parties for the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations are meaningless and false. In this way the question of the oppressed nations became one of supporting the oppressed nations, of rendering real and continuous assistance to them in their struggle against imperialism for real equality of nations, for their independent existence as states.

Formerly, the national question was regarded from a reformist point of view, as an independent question having no connection with the general question of the power of capital, of the overthrow of imperialism, of the proletarian revolution. It was tacitly assumed that the victory of the proletariat in Europe was possible without a direct alliance with the liberation movement in the colonies, that the national-colonial question could be solved on the quiet, "of its own accord," off the highway of the proletarian revolution, without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Now we can say that this antirevolutionary point of view has been exposed. Leninism has proved, and the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia have confirmed, that the national question can be solved only in connection with and on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance

with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national question is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the revolutionary liberation movement of the oppressed countries *already exhausted*, or not; and if not, is there any hope, any basis, for utilizing these potentialities for the proletarian revolution, for transforming the dependent and colonial countries from a reserve of the imperialist bourgeoisie into a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat, into an ally of the latter?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognizes the existence of revolutionary capacities in the national liberation movement of the oppressed countries, and the possibility of using these for overthrowing the common enemy, for overthrowing imperialism. The mechanics of the development of imperialism, the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia wholly confirm the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the necessity for the proletariat of the "dominant" nations to support—resolutely and actively to support—the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* national movement, everywhere and always, in every individual concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur when the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. In such cases support is, of course, entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is a part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole. In the forties of the last century Marx supported the national movement of the Poles and Hungarians and was opposed to the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs. Why? Because the Czechs

and the South Slavs were then "reactionary peoples," "Russian outposts" in Europe, outposts of absolutism; whereas the Poles and the Hungarians were "revolutionary peoples," fighting against absolutism. Because support of the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs was at that time equivalent to indirect support of tsarism, the most dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement in Europe.

"The various demands of democracy," writes Lenin, "including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a *small part* of the general democratic (now: general socialist) *world* movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected." (See Vol. XIX, pp. 257-58.)

This is the position in regard to the question of particular national movements, of the possible reactionary character of these movements—if, of course, they are appraised not from the formal point of view, not from the point of view of abstract rights, but concretely, from the point of view of the interests of the revolutionary movement.

The same must be said of the revolutionary character of national movements in general. The unquestionably revolutionary character of the vast majority of national movements is as relative and peculiar as is the possible reactionary character of certain particular national movements. The revolutionary character of a national movement under the conditions of imperialist oppression does not necessarily presuppose the existence of proletarian elements in the movement, the existence of a revolutionary or a republican program of the movement, the existence of a democratic basis of the movement. The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism; whereas the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist

war was a *reactionary* struggle, for its result was the embellishment, the strengthening, the victory, of imperialism. For the same reasons, the struggle that the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the independence of Egypt is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they are opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the British "Labour" Government is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reasons a *reactionary* struggle, despite the proletarian origin and the proletarian title of the members of that government, despite the fact that they are "for" socialism. There is no need to mention the national movement in other, larger, colonial and dependent countries, such as India and China, every step of which along the road to liberation, even if it runs counter to the demands of formal democracy, is a steam-hammer blow at imperialism, i.e., is undoubtedly a *revolutionary* step.

Lenin was right in saying that the national movement of the oppressed countries should be appraised not from the point of view of formal democracy, but from the point of view of the actual results, as shown by the general balance sheet of the struggle against imperialism, that is to say, "not in isolation, but on a world scale." (See Vol. XIX, p. 257.)

2) *The liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution.* In solving the national question Leninism proceeds from the following theses:

a) the world is divided into two camps: the camp of a handful of civilized nations, which possess finance capital and exploit the vast majority of the population of the globe; and the camp of the oppressed and exploited peoples in the colonies and dependent countries, which constitute that majority;

b) the colonies and the dependent countries, oppressed and exploited by finance capital, constitute a vast reserve and a very important source of strength for imperialism;

c) the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples in the dependent and colonial countries against imperialism is the only

road that leads to their emancipation from oppression and exploitation;

d) the most important colonial and dependent countries have already taken the path of the national liberation movement, which cannot but lead to the crisis of world capitalism;

e) the interests of the proletarian movement in the developed countries and of the national liberation movement in the colonies call for the union of these two forms of the revolutionary movement into a common front against the common enemy, against imperialism;

f) the victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the formation and the consolidation of a common revolutionary front;

g) the formation of a common revolutionary front is impossible unless the proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of its "own country," for "no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations" (*Engels*);

h) this support implies the upholding, defence and implementation of the slogan of the right of nations to secession, to independent existence as states;

i) unless this slogan is implemented, the union and collaboration of nations within a single world economic system, which is the material basis for the victory of world socialism, cannot be brought about;

j) this union can only be voluntary, arising on the basis of mutual confidence and fraternal relations among peoples.

Hence the two sides, the two tendencies in the national question: the tendency towards political emancipation from the shackles of imperialism and towards the formation of an independent national state—a tendency which arose as a consequence of imperialist oppression and colonial exploitation, and the tendency towards closer economic relations among nations, which arose as a result of the formation of a world market and a world economic system.

"Developing capitalism," says Lenin, "knows two historical tendencies in the national question. First: the awakening of national life and national movements, struggle against all national oppression, creation of national states. Second: development and acceleration of all kinds of intercourse between nations, breakdown of national barriers, creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

"Both tendencies are a world-wide law of capitalism. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterizes mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society." (See Vol. XVII, pp. 139-40.)

For imperialism these two tendencies represent irreconcilable contradictions; because imperialism cannot exist without exploiting colonies and forcibly retaining them within the framework of the "integral whole"; because imperialism can bring nations together only by means of annexations and colonial conquest, without which imperialism is, generally speaking, inconceivable.

For communism, on the contrary, these tendencies are but two sides of a single cause—the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism; because communism knows that the union of peoples in a single world economic system is possible only on the basis of mutual confidence and voluntary agreement, and that the road to the formation of a voluntary union of peoples lies through the separation of the colonies from the "integral" imperialist "whole," through the transformation of the colonies into independent states.

Hence the necessity for a stubborn, continuous and determined struggle against the dominant-nation chauvinism of the "Socialists" of the ruling nations (Britain, France, America, Italy, Japan, etc.), who do not want to fight their imperialist governments, who do not want to support the struggle of the oppressed peoples in "their" colonies for emancipation from oppression, for secession.

Without such a struggle the education of the working class of the ruling nations in the spirit of true internationalism, in the spirit of closer relations with the toiling masses of the dependent countries and colonies, in the spirit of real preparation for the

proletarian revolution, is inconceivable. The revolution would not have been victorious in Russia, and Kolchak and Denikin would not have been crushed, had not the Russian proletariat enjoyed the sympathy and support of the oppressed peoples of the former Russian Empire. But to win the sympathy and support of these peoples it had first of all to break the fetters of Russian imperialism and free these peoples from the yoke of national oppression.

Without this it would have been impossible to consolidate Soviet power, to implant real internationalism and to create that remarkable organization for the collaboration of peoples which is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which is the living prototype of the future union of peoples in a single world economic system.

Hence the necessity of fighting against the national isolationism, narrowness and aloofness of the Socialists in the oppressed countries, who do not want to rise above their national parochialism and who do not understand the connection between the liberation movement in their own countries and the proletarian movement in the ruling countries.

Without such a struggle it is inconceivable that the proletariat of the oppressed nations can maintain an independent policy and its class solidarity with the proletariat of the ruling countries in the fight for the overthrow of the common enemy, in the fight for the overthrow of imperialism.

Without such a struggle, internationalism would be impossible.

Such is the way in which the toiling masses of the dominant and of the oppressed nations must be educated in the spirit of revolutionary internationalism.

Here is what Lenin says about this twofold task of communism in educating the workers in the spirit of internationalism:

"Can such education ...be *concretely identical* in great, oppressing nations and in small, oppressed nations, in annexing nations and in annexed nations?

"Obviously not. The way to the one goal—to complete equality, to the closest relations and the subsequent *amalgamation of all nations*—obvi-

ously proceeds here by different routes in each concrete case; in the same way, let us say, as the route to a point in the middle of a given page lies towards the left from one edge and towards the right from the opposite edge. If a Social-Democrat belonging to a great, oppressing, annexing nation, while advocating the amalgamation of nations in general, were to forget even for one moment that 'his' Nicholas II, 'his' Wilhelm, George, Poincaré, etc., also stands for amalgamation with small nations (by means of annexations)—Nicholas II being for 'amalgamation' with Galicia, Wilhelm II for 'amalgamation' with Belgium, etc.—such a Social-Democrat would be a ridiculous doctrinaire in theory and an abettor of imperialism in practice.

"The weight of emphasis in the internationalist education of the workers in the oppressing countries must necessarily consist in their advocating and upholding freedom of secession for oppressed countries. Without this there can be *no* internationalism. It is our right and duty to treat every Social-Democrat of an oppressing nation who *fails* to conduct such propaganda as an imperialist and a scoundrel. This is an absolute demand, even if the *chance* of secession being possible and 'feasible' before the introduction of socialism be only one in a thousand....

"On the other hand, a Social-Democrat belonging to a small nation must emphasize in his agitation the *second* word of our general formula: 'voluntary union' of nations. He may, without violating his duties as an internationalist, be in favour of *either* the political independence of his nation *or* its inclusion in a neighbouring state X, Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow-mindedness, isolationism and aloofness, he must fight for the recognition of the whole and the general, for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general.

"People who have not gone thoroughly into the question think there is a 'contradiction' in Social-Democrats of oppressing nations insisting on 'freedom of secession,' while Social-Democrats of oppressed nations insist on 'freedom of union.' However, a little reflection will show that there is not, and cannot be, any *other* road leading from the *given* situation to internationalism and the amalgamation of nations, any other road to this goal." (See Vol. XIX, pp. 261-62.)

VII

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

From this theme I take six questions:

- a) strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat;
- b) stages of the revolution, and strategy;
- c) the flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics;

- d) strategic leadership;
- e) tactical leadership;
- f) reformism and revolutionism.

1) *Strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat.* The period of the domination of the Second International was mainly a period of the formation and training of the proletarian political armies under conditions of more or less peaceful development. It was the period of parliamentarism as the predominant form of the class struggle. Questions of great class conflicts, of preparing the proletariat for revolutionary clashes, of the means of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, did not seem to be on the order of the day at that time. The task was confined to utilizing all means of legal development for the purpose of forming and training the proletarian armies, to utilizing parliamentarism in conformity with the conditions under which the status of the proletariat remained, and, as it seemed, had to remain, that of an opposition. It scarcely needs proof that in such a period and with such a conception of the tasks of the proletariat there could be neither an integral strategy nor any elaborated tactics. There were fragmentary and detached ideas about tactics and strategy, but no tactics or strategy as such.

The mortal sin of the Second International was not that it pursued at that time the tactics of utilizing parliamentary forms of struggle, but that it overestimated the importance of these forms, that it considered them virtually the only forms; and that when the period of open revolutionary battles set in and the question of extraparliamentary forms of struggle came to the fore, the parties of the Second International turned their backs on these new tasks, refused to shoulder them.

Only in the subsequent period, the period of direct action by the proletariat, the period of proletarian revolution, when the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie became a question of immediate practical action; when the question of the reserves of the proletariat (strategy) became one of the most burning questions; when all forms of struggle and of organization, parliamentary

and extraparliamentary (tactics), had quite clearly manifested themselves—only in this period could an integral strategy and elaborated tactics for the struggle of the proletariat be worked out. It was precisely in this period that Lenin brought out into the light of day the brilliant ideas of Marx and Engels on tactics and strategy that had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. But Lenin did not confine himself to restoring particular tactical propositions of Marx and Engels. He developed them further and supplemented them with new ideas and propositions, combining them all into a system of rules and guiding principles for the leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat. Lenin's pamphlets, such as *What Is To Be Done?*, *Two Tactics*, *Imperialism*, *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "Left-Wing" Communism, undoubtedly constitute priceless contributions to the general treasury of Marxism, to its revolutionary arsenal. The strategy and tactics of Leninism constitute the science of leadership in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

2) *Stages of the revolution, and strategy.* Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of the revolution.

Our revolution had already passed through two stages, and after the October Revolution it entered a third one. Our strategy changed accordingly.

First stage. 1903 to February 1917. Objective: to overthrow tsarism and completely wipe out the survivals of medievalism. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the peasantry. Direction of the main blow: the isolation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which was striving to win over the peasantry and liquidate the revolution by a compromise with tsarism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the working class with the peasantry. "The proletariat must carry

to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie." (See Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96.)

Second stage. March 1917 to October 1917. Objective: to overthrow imperialism in Russia and to withdraw from the imperialist war. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the poor peasantry. The proletariat of neighbouring countries as probable reserves. The protracted war and the crisis of imperialism as a favourable factor. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), who were striving to win over the toiling masses of the peasantry and to put an end to the revolution by a *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry. "The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie." (*Ibid.*)

Third stage. Began after the October Revolution. Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the defeat of imperialism in all countries. The revolution spreads beyond the confines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has begun. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. Main reserves: the semiproletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries.

Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains basically unchanged throughout a given stage.

3) *The flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics.* Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat in the comparatively short period of the flow or ebb of the movement, of the rise or decline of the revolution, the fight to carry out this line by means of replacing old forms of struggle and organization by new ones, old slogans by new ones, by combining these forms, etc. While the object of strategy is to win the war against tsarism, let us say, or against the bourgeoisie, to carry through the struggle against tsarism or against the bourgeoisie to its end, tactics pursue less important objects, for their aim is not the winning of the war as a whole, but the winning of some particular engagements or some particular battles, the carrying through successfully of some particular campaigns or actions corresponding to the concrete circumstances in the given period of rise or decline of the revolution. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and serving it.

Tactics change according to flow and ebb. While the strategic plan remained unchanged during the first stage of the revolution (1903 to February 1917), tactics changed several times during that period. In the period from 1903 to 1905 the Party pursued offensive tactics, for the tide of the revolution was rising, the movement was on the upgrade, and tactics had to proceed from this fact. Accordingly, the forms of struggle were revolutionary, corresponding to the requirements of the rising tide of the revolution. Local political strikes, political demonstrations, the general political strike, boycott of the Duma, uprising, revolutionary fighting slogans—such were the successive forms of struggle during that period. These changes in the forms of struggle were accompanied by corresponding changes in the forms of organization. Factory committees, revolutionary peasant committees, strike committees, Soviets of workers' deputies, a workers' party operating more or less openly—such were the forms of organization during that period.

In the period from 1907 to 1912 the Party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat; for we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement, the ebb of the revolution, and tactics necessarily had to take this fact into consideration. The forms of struggle, as well as the forms of organization, changed accordingly: instead of the boycott of the Duma—participation in the Duma; instead of open revolutionary actions outside the Duma—actions and work in the Duma; instead of general political strikes—partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities. Of course, the Party had to go underground during that period, while the revolutionary mass organizations were replaced by cultural, educational, cooperative, insurance and other legal organizations.

The same must be said of the second and third stages of the revolution, during which tactics changed dozens of times, whereas the strategic plans remained unchanged.

Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organization of the proletariat, with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline, of the revolution.

4) Strategic leadership. The reserves of the revolution can be:

direct: a) the peasantry and in general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; b) the proletariat of neighbouring countries; c) the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries; d) the conquests and gains of the dictatorship of the proletariat—part of which the proletariat may give up temporarily, while retaining superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite; and

indirect: a) the contradictions and conflicts among the nonproletarian classes within the country, which can be utilized by the proletariat to weaken the enemy and to strengthen its own reserves; b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state, which can be utilized by the proletariat in its offensive or in manoeuvring in the event of a forced retreat.

There is no need to speak at length about the reserves of the first category, as their significance is clear to everyone. As for the reserves of the second category, whose significance is not always clear, it must be said that sometimes they are of prime importance for the progress of the revolution. One can hardly deny the enormous importance, for example, of the conflict between the petty-bourgeois democrats (Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (the Cadets) during and after the first revolution, which undoubtedly played its part in freeing the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie. Still less reason is there for denying the colossal importance of the fact that the principal groups of imperialists were engaged in a deadly war during the period of the October Revolution, when the imperialists, engrossed in war among themselves, were unable to concentrate their forces against the young Soviet power, and the proletariat, for this very reason, was able to get down to the work of organizing its forces and consolidating its power, and to prepare the rout of Kolchak and Denikin. It must be presumed that now, when the contradictions among the imperialist groups are becoming more and more profound, and when a new war among them is becoming inevitable, reserves of this description will assume ever greater importance for the proletariat.

The task of strategic leadership is to make proper use of all these reserves for the achievement of the main object of the revolution at the given stage of its development.

What does making proper use of reserves mean?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. The concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full-steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success. The Party's strategy during the period from April to October 1917 can be taken as an example of this manner of utilizing reserves. Undoubtedly, the enemy's most vulnerable

spot at that time was the war. Undoubtedly, it was on this question, as the fundamental one, that the Party rallied the broadest masses of the population around the proletarian vanguard. The Party's strategy during that period was, while training the vanguard for street action by means of manifestations and demonstrations, to bring the reserves up to the vanguard through the medium of the Soviets in the rear and the soldiers' committees at the front. The outcome of the revolution has shown that the reserves were properly utilized.

Here is what Lenin, paraphrasing the well-known theses of Marx and Engels on insurrection, says about this condition of the strategic utilization of the forces of the revolution:

"1) Never *play* with insurrection, but when beginning it firmly realize that you must go to *the end*.

"2) Concentrate a great *superiority of forces* at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.

"3) Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest *determination*, and by all means, without fail, take the *offensive*. 'The defensive is the death of every armed rising.'

"4) You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

"5) You must strive for *daily* successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain the '*moral ascendancy*'." (See Vol. XXI, pp. 319-20.)

Secondly. The selection of the moment for the decisive blow, of the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when it is already the case that the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy.

The decisive battle, says Lenin, may be deemed to have fully matured if "(1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength"; if "(2) all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced them-

selves through their practical bankruptcy"; if "(3) among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favour of supporting the most determined, supremely bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and begun vigorously to grow. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured." (See Vol. XXV, p. 229.)

The manner in which the October uprising was carried out may be taken as a model of such strategy.

Failure to observe this condition leads to a dangerous error called "loss of tempo," when the Party lags behind the movement or runs far ahead of it, courting the danger of failure. An example of such "loss of tempo," of how the moment for an uprising should not be chosen, may be seen in the attempt made by a section of our comrades to begin the uprising by arresting the Democratic Conference in September 1917, when wavering was still apparent in the Soviets, when the armies at the front were still at the crossroads, when the reserves had not yet been brought up to the vanguard.

Thirdly. Undeviating pursuit of the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road towards the goal; this is necessary in order that the vanguard may not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and that the masses may not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard. Failure to observe this condition leads to a grave error, well known to sailors as "losing one's bearings." As an example of this "losing one's bearings" we may take the erroneous conduct of our Party when, immediately after the Democratic Conference, it adopted a resolution to participate in the Preparliament. For the moment the Party, as it were, forgot that the Preparliament was an attempt of the bourgeoisie to switch the country from the path of the Soviets to the path of bourgeois parliamentarism, that the Party's participation in such a body might result in mixing everything up and confusing the workers and peasants, who were waging a revolutionary struggle under the slogan: "All Power to the Soviets." This mistake was rectified by the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Preparliament.

Fourthly. Manoeuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and to retain the reserves for the latter.

"The revolutionary parties," says Lenin, "must complete their education. They have learned to attack. Now they have to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge how to retreat properly. They have to realize—and the revolutionary class is taught to realize it by its own bitter experience—that victory is impossible unless they have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly." (See Vol. XXV, p. 177.)

The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.

The signing of the Brest Peace may be taken as a model of this strategy, for it enabled the Party to gain time, to take advantage of the conflicts in the camp of the imperialists, to disrupt the forces of the enemy, to retain the support of the peasantry, and to accumulate forces in preparation for the offensive against Kolchak and Denikin.

"In concluding a separate peace," said Lenin at that time, "we free ourselves as much as is possible at the present moment from both warring imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare, which hinder them from making a deal against us, and for a certain period have our hands free to advance and to consolidate the socialist revolution." (See Vol. XXII, p. 198.)

"Now even the biggest fool," said Lenin three years after the Brest Peace, "can see that the 'Brest Peace' was a concession that strengthened us and broke up the forces of international imperialism." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 7.)

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct strategic leadership.

5) *Tactical leadership.* Tactical leadership is a part of strategic leadership, subordinated to the tasks and the requirements of the latter. The task of tactical leadership is to master all forms

of struggle and organization of the proletariat and to ensure that they are used properly so as to achieve, with the given relation of forces, the maximum results necessary to prepare for strategic success.

What is meant by making proper use of the forms of struggle and organization of the proletariat?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. To put in the forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the flow or ebb of the movement at a given moment, and which therefore can facilitate and ensure the bringing of the masses to the revolutionary positions, the bringing of the millions to the revolutionary front, and their disposition at the revolutionary front.

The point here is not that the vanguard should realize the impossibility of preserving the old regime and the inevitability of its overthrow. The point is that the masses, the millions, should understand this inevitability and display their readiness to support the vanguard. But the masses can understand this only from their own experience. The task is to enable the vast masses to realize from their own experience the inevitability of the overthrow of the old regime, to promote such methods of struggle and forms of organization as will make it easier for the masses to realize from experience the correctness of the revolutionary slogans.

The vanguard would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost contact with the masses, if the Party had not decided at the time to participate in the Duma, if it had not decided to concentrate its forces on work in the Duma and to develop a struggle on the basis of this work, in order to make it easier for the masses to realize from their own experience the futility of the Duma, the falsity of the promises of the Cadets, the impossibility of compromise with tsarism, and the inevitability of an alliance between the peasantry and the working class. Had the masses not gained their experience during the period of the Duma, the exposure of the Cadets

and the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

The danger of the "Otzovist" tactics was that they threatened to detach the vanguard from the millions of its reserves.

The Party would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost its influence among the broad masses of the peasants and soldiers, if the proletariat had followed the "Left" Communists, who called for an uprising in April 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had not yet exposed themselves as advocates of war and imperialism, when the masses had not yet realized from their own experience the falsity of the speeches of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries about peace, land and freedom. Had the masses not gained this experience during the Kerensky period, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries would not have been isolated and the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible. Therefore, the tactics of "patiently explaining" the mistakes of the petty-bourgeois parties and of open struggle in the Soviets were the only correct tactics.

The danger of the tactics of the "Left" Communists was that they threatened to transform the Party from the leader of the proletarian revolution into a handful of futile conspirators with no ground to stand on.

"Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone," says Lenin. "To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realize through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness, of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability

of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn resolutely towards communism." (See Vol. XXV, p. 228.)

Secondly. To locate at any given moment the particular link in the chain of processes which, if grasped, will enable us to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The point here is to single out from all the tasks confronting the Party the particular immediate task, the fulfilment of which constitutes the central point, and the accomplishment of which ensures the successful fulfilment of the other immediate tasks.

The importance of this thesis may be illustrated by two examples, one of which could be taken from the remote past (the period of the formation of the Party) and the other from the immediate present (the period of NEP).

In the period of the formation of the Party, when the innumerable circles and organizations had not yet been linked together, when amateurishness and the parochial outlook of the circles were corroding the Party from top to bottom, when ideological confusion was the characteristic feature of the internal life of the Party, the main link and the main task in the chain of links and in the chain of tasks then confronting the Party proved to be the establishment of an all-Russian illegal newspaper (*Iskra*). Why? Because, under the conditions then prevailing, only by means of an all-Russian illegal newspaper was it possible to create a solid core of the Party capable of uniting the innumerable circles and organizations into one whole, to prepare the conditions for ideological and tactical unity, and thus to build the foundations for the formation of a real party.

During the period of transition from war to economic construction, when industry was vegetating in the grip of disruption and agriculture was suffering from a shortage of urban manufactured goods, when the establishment of a bond between state industry and peasant economy became the fundamental condition for suc-

cessful socialist construction—in that period it turned out that the main link in the chain of processes, the main task among a number of tasks, was to develop trade. Why? Because under the conditions of NEP the bond between industry and peasant economy cannot be established except through trade; because under the conditions of NEP production without sale is fatal for industry; because industry can be expanded only by the expansion of sales as a result of developing trade; because only after we have consolidated our position in the sphere of trade, only after we have secured control of trade, only after we have secured this link can there be any hope of linking industry with the peasant market and successfully fulfilling the other immediate tasks in order to create the conditions for building the foundations of socialist economy.

"It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general," says Lenin. "One must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which one must grasp with all one's might in order to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link..."

"At the present time this link is the revival of internal *trade* under proper state regulation (direction). Trade—that is the 'link' in the historical chain of events, in the transitional forms of our socialist construction in 1921-22, '*which we must grasp with all our might!*'..." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 82.)

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct tactical leadership.

6) *Reformism and revolutionism.* What is the difference between revolutionary tactics and reformist tactics?

Some think that Leninism is opposed to reforms, opposed to compromises and to agreements in general. This is absolutely wrong. Bolsheviks know as well as anybody else that in a certain sense "every little helps," that under certain conditions reforms in general, and compromises and agreements in particular, are necessary and useful.

"To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie," says Lenin, "a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to

refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to reject agreements and compromises with possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, when making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to refuse beforehand ever to move in zigzags, ever to retrace our steps, ever to abandon the course once selected and to try others?" (See Vol. XXV, p. 210.)

Obviously, therefore, it is not a matter of reforms or of compromises and agreements, but of the use people make of reforms and agreements.

To a reformist, reforms are everything, while revolutionary work is something incidental, something just to talk about, mere eyewash. That is why, with reformist tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are inevitably transformed into an instrument for strengthening that rule, an instrument for disintegrating the revolution.

To a revolutionary, on the contrary, the main thing is revolutionary work and not reforms; to him reforms are a by-product of the revolution. That is why, with revolutionary tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are naturally transformed into an instrument for disintegrating that rule, into an instrument for strengthening the revolution, into a strongpoint for the further development of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining legal work with illegal work and to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

That is the essence of making revolutionary use of reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The reformist, on the contrary, will accept reforms in order to renounce all illegal work, to thwart the preparation of the masses for the revolution and to rest in the shade of "bestowed" reforms.

That is the essence of reformist tactics.

Such is the position in regard to reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The situation changes somewhat, however, after the overthrow of imperialism, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under certain conditions, in a certain situation, the proletarian power may find itself compelled temporarily to leave the path of the revolutionary reconstruction of the existing order of things and to take the path of its gradual transformation, the "reformist path," as Lenin says in his well-known article "The Importance of Gold," the path of flanking movements, of reforms and concessions to the nonproletarian classes—in order to disintegrate these classes, to give the revolution a respite, to recuperate one's forces and prepare the conditions for a new offensive. It cannot be denied that in a sense this is a "reformist" path. But it must be borne in mind that there is a fundamental distinction here, which consists in the fact that in this case the reform emanates from the proletarian power, it strengthens the proletarian power, it procures for it a necessary respite, its purpose is to disintegrate, not the revolution, but the nonproletarian classes.

Under such conditions a reform is thus transformed into its opposite.

The proletarian power is able to adopt such a policy because, and only because, the sweep of the revolution in the preceding period was great enough and therefore provided a sufficiently wide expanse within which to retreat, substituting for offensive tactics the tactics of temporary retreat, the tactics of flanking movements.

Thus, while formerly, under bourgeois rule, reforms were a by-product of revolution, now, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the source of reforms is the revolutionary gains of the proletariat, the reserves accumulated in the hands of the proletariat and consisting of these gains.

"Only Marxism," says Lenin, "has precisely and correctly defined the relation of reforms to revolution. However, Marx was able to see this relation only from one aspect, namely, under the conditions preceding the first to any extent permanent and lasting victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country. Under those conditions, the basis of the proper relation was: reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletar-

iat.... After the victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country, something new enters into the relation between reforms and revolution. In principle, it is the same as before, but a change in form takes place, which Marx himself could not foresee, but which can be appreciated only on the basis of the philosophy and politics of Marxism.... After the victory (while still remaining a 'by-product' on an international scale) they (i.e., reforms—*J. St.*) are, in addition, for the country in which victory has been achieved, a necessary and legitimate respite in those cases when, after the utmost exertion of effort, it becomes obvious that sufficient strength is lacking for the revolutionary accomplishment of this or that transition. Victory creates such a 'reserve of strength' that it is possible to hold out even in a forced retreat, to hold out both materially and morally." (See Vol. XXVII, pp. 84-85.)

VIII THE PARTY

In the prerevolutionary period, the period of more or less peaceful development, when the parties of the Second International were the predominant force in the working-class movement and parliamentary forms of struggle were regarded as the principal forms—under these conditions the Party neither had nor could have had that great and decisive importance which it acquired afterwards, under conditions of open revolutionary clashes. Defending the Second International against attacks made upon it, Kautsky says that the parties of the Second International are an instrument of peace and not of war, and that for this very reason they were powerless to take any important steps during the war, during the period of revolutionary action by the proletariat. That is quite true. But what does it mean? It means that the parties of the Second International are unfit for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, that they are not militant parties of the proletariat, leading the workers to power, but election machines adapted for parliamentary elections and parliamentary struggle. This, in fact, explains why, in the days when the opportunists of the Second International were in the ascendancy, it was not the party but its parliamentary group that was the chief political organization of the proletariat. It is well known that

the party at that time was really an appendage and subsidiary of the parliamentary group. It scarcely needs proof that under such circumstances and with such a party at the helm there could be no question of preparing the proletariat for revolution.

But matters have changed radically with the dawn of the new period. The new period is one of open class collisions, of revolutionary action by the proletariat, of proletarian revolution, a period when forces are being directly mustered for the overthrow of imperialism and the seizure of power by the proletariat. In this period the proletariat is confronted with new tasks, the tasks of reorganizing all party work on new, revolutionary lines; of educating the workers in the spirit of revolutionary struggle for power; of preparing and moving up reserves; of establishing an alliance with the proletarians of neighbouring countries; of establishing firm ties with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, etc., etc. To think that these new tasks can be performed by the old Social-Democratic parties, brought up as they were in the peaceful conditions of parliamentarism, is to doom oneself to hopeless despair, to inevitable defeat. If, with such tasks to shoulder, the proletariat remained under the leadership of the old parties, it would be completely unarmed. It scarcely needs proof that the proletariat could not consent to such a state of affairs.

Hence the necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to lead the proletarians in the struggle for power, sufficiently experienced to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of a revolutionary situation, and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal.

Without such a party it is useless even to think of overthrowing imperialism, of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This new party is the party of Leninism.

What are the specific features of this new party?

1) *The Party as the advanced detachment of the working class.*

The Party must be, first of all, the advanced detachment of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the

working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the advanced detachment, the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of the movement, with a knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this it will be incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat, of leading the proletariat. The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertia and the political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class; it must lead the proletariat, and not drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement. The parties of the Second International, which preach "khvostism" are vehicles of bourgeois policy, which condemns the proletariat to the role of a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party which adopts the standpoint of advanced detachment of the proletariat and is able to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat—only such a party can divert the working class from the path of trade unionism and convert it into an independent political force.

The Party is the political leader of the working class.

I have already spoken of the difficulties of the struggle of the working class, of the complicated conditions of the struggle, of strategy and tactics, of reserves and manoeuvring, of attack and retreat. These conditions are no less complicated, if not more so, than the conditions of war. Who can see clearly in these conditions, who can give correct guidance to the proletarian millions? No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to be doomed to defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to allow itself to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of

the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.

The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat.

But the Party cannot be only an *advanced* detachment. It must at the same time be a detachment of the *class*, part of the class, closely bound up with it by all the fibres of its being. The distinction between the advanced detachment and the rest of the working class, between Party members and non-Party people, cannot disappear until classes disappear; it will exist as long as the ranks of the proletariat continue to be replenished with former members of other classes, as long as the working class as a whole is not in a position to rise to the level of the advanced detachment. But the Party would cease to be a party if this distinction developed into a gap, if the Party turned in on itself and became divorced from the non-Party masses. The Party cannot lead the class if it is not connected with the non-Party masses, if there is no bond between the Party and the non-Party masses, if these masses do not accept its leadership, if the Party enjoys no moral and political credit among the masses.

Recently two hundred thousand new members from the ranks of the workers were admitted into our Party. The remarkable thing about this is the fact that these people did not merely join the Party themselves, but were rather sent there by all the rest of the non-Party workers, who took an active part in the admission of the new members, and without whose approval no new member was accepted. This fact shows that the broad masses of non-Party workers regard our Party as *their* Party, as a Party *near* and *dear* to them, in whose expansion and consolidation they are vitally interested and to whose leadership they voluntarily entrust their destiny. It scarcely needs proof that without these intangible moral threads which connect the Party with the non-Party masses, the Party could not have become the decisive force of its class.

The Party is an inseparable part of the working class.

"We," says Lenin, "are the Party of a class, and therefore *almost the whole class* (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the whole class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party

as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism* and 'khvostism' to think that at any time under capitalism almost the whole class, or the whole class, would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its advanced detachment, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible Social-Democrat has ever yet doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organizations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped strata) are unable to embrace almost the whole, or the whole, working class. To forget the distinction between the advanced detachment and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the advanced detachment to raise ever wider strata to this most advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks." (See Vol. VI, pp. 205-06.)

2) The Party as the organized detachment of the working class. The Party is not only the *advanced* detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the *organized* detachment of its class. The Party's tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the proletariat so as to escape the blow of a powerful enemy when the situation calls for retreat; it must imbue the millions of unorganized non-Party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organization and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of discipline and organization, if it is itself the *organized* detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no question of the Party really leading the vast masses of the proletariat.

The Party is the organized detachment of the working class.

The conception of the Party as an organized whole is embodied in Lenin's well-known formulation of the first paragraph of our Party Rules, in which the Party is regarded as the *sum total*

* *Manilovism*—smug complacency, futile daydreaming; from the landowner Manilov, a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*.—Tr.

of its organizations, and the Party member as a member of one of the organizations of the Party. The Mensheviks, who objected to this formulation as early as 1903, proposed to substitute for it a "system" of self-enrolment in the Party, a "system" of conferring the "title" of Party member upon every "professor" and "high-school student," upon every "sympathizer" and "striker" who supported the Party in one way or another, but who did not join and did not want to join any one of the Party organizations. It scarcely needs proof that had this singular "system" become entrenched in our Party it would inevitably have led to our Party becoming inundated with professors and high-school students and to its degeneration into a loose, amorphous, disorganized "formation," lost in a sea of "sympathizers," that would have obliterated the dividing line between the Party and the class and would have upset the Party's task of raising the unorganized masses to the level of the advanced detachment. Needless to say, under such an opportunist "system" our Party would have been unable to fulfil the role of the organizing core of the working class in the course of our revolution.

"From the point of view of Comrade Martov," says Lenin, "the border line of the Party remains quite indefinite, for 'every striker' may 'proclaim himself a Party member.' What is the use of this vagueness? A wide extension of the 'title.' Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganizing* idea, the confusing of class and Party." (See Vol. VI, p. 211.)

But the Party is not merely the *sum total* of Party organizations. The Party is at the same time a single *system* of these organizations, their formal union into a single whole, with higher and lower leading bodies, with subordination of the minority to the majority, with practical decisions binding on all members of the Party. Without these conditions the Party cannot be a single organized whole capable of exercising systematic and organized leadership in the struggle of the working class.

"Formerly," says Lenin, "our Party was not a formally organized whole, but only the sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. Now we have become an organized Party, and this implies the establishment of au-

thority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher Party bodies." (See Vol. VI, p. 291.)

The principle of the minority submitting to the majority, the principle of directing Party work from a centre, not infrequently gives rise to attacks on the part of wavering elements, to accusations of "bureaucracy," "formalism," etc. It scarcely needs proof that systematic work by the Party as one whole, and the directing of the struggle of the working class, would be impossible without putting these principles into effect. Leninism in questions of organization is the unswerving application of these principles. Lenin terms the fight against these principles "Russian nihilism" and "aristocratic anarchism," which deserves to be ridiculed and swept aside.

Here is what Lenin says about these wavering elements in his book *One Step Forward*:

"This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organization as a monstrous 'factory'; he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as 'serfdom'..., division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragicomical outcry against people being transformed into 'wheels and cogs'..., mention of the organizational rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful ... remark that one could very well dispense with rules altogether."

"It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig leaf.... You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the congress not by my will, but against it; you are a formalist because you rely on the formal decisions of the congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you plead the 'mechanical' majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old gang."* (See Vol. VI, pp. 310, 287.)

3) The Party as the highest form of class organization of the proletariat. The Party is the organized detachment of the working

* The "gang" here referred to is that of Axelrod, Martov, Potresov and others, who would not submit to the decisions of the Second Congress and who accused Lenin of being a "bureaucrat."—J. St.

class. But the Party is not the only organization of the working class. The proletariat has also a number of other organizations, without which it cannot wage a successful struggle against capital: trade unions, cooperatives, factory organizations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organizations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organizations (in times of open revolutionary action), Soviets of deputies as the form of state organization (if the proletariat is in power), etc. The overwhelming majority of these organizations are non-Party, and only some of them adhere directly to the Party, or constitute offshoots from it. All these organizations, under certain conditions, are absolutely necessary for the working class, for without them it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of the proletariat in the diverse spheres of struggle; for without them it would be impossible to steel the proletariat as the force whose mission it is to replace the bourgeois order by the socialist order. But how can single leadership be exercised with such an abundance of organizations? What guarantee is there that this multiplicity of organizations will not lead to divergence in leadership? It may be said that each of these organizations carries on its work in its own special field, and that therefore these organizations cannot hinder one another. That, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organizations should work in one direction for they serve *one* class, the class of the proletarians. The question then arises: who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organizations is to be conducted? Where is the central organization which is not only able, because it has the necessary experience, to work out such a general line, but, in addition, is in a position, because it has sufficient prestige, to induce all these organizations to carry out this line, so as to attain unity of leadership and to make hitches impossible?

That organization is the Party of the proletariat.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications for this because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with

the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class.

The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat.

This does not mean, of course, that non-Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, etc., should be officially subordinated to the Party leadership. It only means that the members of the Party who belong to these organizations and are doubtlessly influential in them should do all they can to persuade these non-Party organizations to draw nearer to the Party of the proletariat in their work and voluntarily accept its political leadership.

That is why Lenin says that the Party is "the *highest* form of proletarian class association," whose political leadership must extend to every other form of organization of the proletariat. (See Vol. XXV, p. 194.)

That is why the opportunist theory of the "independence" and "neutrality" of the non-Party organizations, which breeds *independent* members of parliament and journalists *isolated* from the Party, *narrow-minded* trade union leaders and *philistine* cooperative officials, is wholly incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism.

4) *The Party as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The Party is the highest form of organization of the proletariat. The Party is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organizations of that class. But it does not by any means follow from this that the Party can be regarded as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient force. The

Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians; it is at the same time an *instrument* in the hands of the proletariat *for* achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and *for* consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has already been achieved. The Party could not have risen so high in importance and could not have exerted its influence over all other forms of organization of the proletariat, if the latter had not been confronted with the question of power, if the conditions of imperialism, the inevitability of wars, and the existence of a crisis had not demanded the concentration of all the forces of the proletariat at one point, the gathering of all the threads of the revolutionary movement in one spot in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. It scarcely needs proof that without a party capable of rallying around itself the mass organizations of the proletariat, and of centralizing the leadership of the entire movement during the progress of the struggle, the proletariat in Russia could not have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the dictatorship, to consolidate and expand it in order to achieve the complete victory of socialism.

"Certainly, almost everyone now realizes," says Lenin, "that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class, that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

Now, what does to "maintain" and "expand" the dictatorship mean? It means imbuing the millions of proletarians with the spirit of discipline and organization; it means creating among the proletarian masses a cementing force and a bulwark against the corrosive influences of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces and

petty-bourgeois habits; it means enhancing the organizing work of the proletarians in re-educating and remoulding the petty-bourgeois strata; it means helping the masses of the proletarians to educate themselves as a force capable of abolishing classes and of preparing the conditions for the organization of socialist production. But it is impossible to accomplish all this without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and discipline.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (See Vol. XXV, p. 190.)

The proletariat needs the Party *for* the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party also will wither away.

5) *The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, unity incompatible with the existence of factions.* The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of course, that the possibility of conflicts of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflict of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a conflict of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been

arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable.

"In the present epoch of acute civil war," says Lenin, "the Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized manner, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party centre is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the Party." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 282-83.)

This is the position in regard to discipline in the Party in the period of struggle preceding the achievement of the dictatorship.

The same, but to an even greater degree, must be said about discipline in the Party after the dictatorship has been achieved.

"Whoever," says Lenin, "weakens in the least the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat." (See Vol. XXV, p. 190.)

But from this it follows that the existence of factions is compatible neither with the Party's unity nor with its iron discipline. It scarcely needs proof that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres means the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship. Of course, the parties of the Second International, which are fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat and have no desire to lead the proletarians to power, can afford such liberalism as freedom of factions, for they have no need at all for iron discipline. But the parties of the Communist International, whose activities are conditioned by the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot afford to be "liberal" or to permit freedom of factions.

The Party represents unity of will, which precludes all factionalism and division of authority in the Party.

Hence Lenin's warning about the "danger of factionalism from the point of view of Party unity and of effecting the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition

for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is embodied in the special resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party "On Party Unity."

Hence Lenin's demand for the "complete elimination of all factionalism" and the "immediate dissolution of all groups, without exception, that have been formed on the basis of various platforms," on pain of "unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party." (See the resolution "On Party Unity.")

6) *The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.* The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not an isolated class. It is constantly replenished by the influx of peasants, petty bourgeois and intellectuals proletarianized by the development of capitalism. At the same time the upper stratum of the proletariat, principally trade union leaders and members of parliament who are fed by the bourgeoisie out of the superprofits extracted from the colonies, is undergoing a process of decay. "This stratum of bourgeoisieified workers, or the 'labour aristocracy,'" says Lenin, "who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement*, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class ..., real channels of reformism and chauvinism." (See Vol. XIX, p. 77.)

In one way or another, all these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism, the spirit of demoralization and uncertainty. It is they, principally, that constitute the source of factionalism and disintegration, the source of disorganization and disruption of the Party from within. To fight imperialism with such "allies" in one's rear means to put oneself in the position of being caught between two fires, from the front and from the rear. Therefore, ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party, is a prerequisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of "defeating" opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of "overcoming" these elements within the confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party, threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the fight against imperialism. Our Party could not have emerged on to the broad highway, it could not have seized power and organized the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could not have emerged victorious from the civil war, if it had had within its ranks people like Martov and Dan, Potresov and Axelrod. Our Party succeeded in achieving internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of the Liquidators and Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.

The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.

"With reformists, Mensheviks, in our ranks," says Lenin, "it is *impossible* to be victorious in the proletarian revolution, it is *impossible* to defend it. That is obvious in principle, and it has been strikingly confirmed by the experience of both Russia and Hungary.... In Russia, difficult situations have arisen *many times*, when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown had Mensheviks, reformists and petty-bourgeois democrats remained in our Party ... in Italy, where, as is generally admitted, decisive battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the possession of state power are imminent. At such a moment it is not only absolutely necessary to remove the Mensheviks, reformists, the Turatists from the Party, but it may even be useful to remove excellent Communists who are liable to waver, and who reveal a tendency to waver towards 'unity' with the reformists, to remove them from all responsible posts.... On the eve of a revolution, and at a moment when a most fierce struggle is being waged for its victory, the slightest wavering in the ranks of the Party may *wreck everything*, frustrate the revolution, wrest the power from the hands of the proletariat; for this power is not yet consolidated, the attack upon it is still

very strong. The desertion of wavering leaders at such a time does not weaken but strengthens the Party, the working-class movement and the revolution." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 462, 463, 464.)

IX

STYLE IN WORK

I am not referring to literary style. What I have in mind is style in work, that specific and peculiar feature in the practice of Leninism which creates the special type of Leninist worker. Leninism is a school of theory and practice which trains a special type of Party and state worker, creates a special Leninist style in work.

What are the characteristic features of this style? What are its peculiarities?

It has two specific features:

- a) Russian revolutionary sweep and
- b) American efficiency.

The style of Leninism consists in combining these two specific features in Party and state work.

Russian revolutionary sweep is an antidote to inertia, routine, conservatism, mental stagnation and slavish submission to ancient traditions. Russian revolutionary sweep is the life-giving force which stimulates thought, impels things forward, breaks the past and opens up perspectives. Without it no progress is possible.

But Russian revolutionary sweep has every chance of degenerating in practice into empty "revolutionary" Manilovism if it is not combined with American efficiency in work. Examples of this degeneration are only too numerous. Who does not know the disease of "revolutionary" scheme concocting and "revolutionary" plan drafting, which springs from the belief in the power of decrees to arrange everything and re-make everything? A Russian writer, I. Ehrenburg, in his story *The Percommunist (The Perfect Communist Man)*, has portrayed the type of a "Bolshevik" afflicted with this

disease, who set himself the task of finding a formula for the ideally perfect man and became "submerged" in this "work." The story contains a great exaggeration, but it certainly gives a correct likeness of the disease. But no one, I think, has so ruthlessly and bitterly ridiculed those afflicted with this disease as Lenin. Lenin stigmatized this morbid belief in concocting schemes and in turning out decrees as "communist vainglory."

"Communist vainglory," says Lenin, "means that a man, who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees." (See Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51.)

Lenin usually contrasted hollow "revolutionary" phrasemongering with plain everyday work, thus emphasizing that "revolutionary" scheme concocting is repugnant to the spirit and the letter of true Leninism.

"Fewer pompous phrases, more plain, *everyday work* . . . says Lenin. "Less political fireworks and more attention to the simplest but vital... facts of communist construction...." (See Vol. XXIV, pp. 343 and 335.)

American efficiency, on the other hand, is an antidote to "revolutionary" Manilovism and fantastic scheme concocting. American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles; which with its businesslike perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable.

But American efficiency has every chance of degenerating into narrow and unprincipled practicalism if it is not combined with Russian revolutionary sweep. Who has not heard of that disease of narrow empiricism and unprincipled practicalism which has not infrequently caused certain "Bolsheviks" to degenerate and to abandon the cause of the revolution? We find a reflection of this peculiar disease in a story by B. Pilnyak, entitled *The Barren Year*, which depicts types of Russian "Bolsheviks" of strong will and practical determination who "function" very "energetically," but without vision, without knowing "what it is all about," and who, there-

fore, stray from the path of revolutionary work. No one has ridiculed this disease of practicalism so incisively as Lenin. He branded it as "narrow-minded empiricism" and "brainless practicalism." He usually contrasted it with vital revolutionary work and the necessity of having a revolutionary perspective in all our daily activities, thus emphasizing that this unprincipled practicalism is as repugnant to true Leninism as "revolutionary" scheme concocting.

The combination of Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in Party and state work.

This combination alone produces the finished type of Leninist worker, the style of Leninism in work.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

*Preface to the Book
“On the Road to October”*

I

THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SETTING FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Three circumstances of an external nature determined the comparative ease with which the proletarian revolution in Russia succeeded in breaking the chains of imperialism and thus overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.

Firstly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began in a period of desperate struggle between the two principal imperialist groups, the Anglo-French and the Austro-German; at a time when, engaged in mortal struggle between themselves, these two groups had neither the time nor the means to devote serious attention to the struggle against the October Revolution. This circumstance was of tremendous importance for the October Revolution, for it enabled it to take advantage of the fierce conflicts within the imperialist world to strengthen and organize its own forces.

Secondly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began during the imperialist war, at a time when the labouring masses, exhausted by the war and thirsting for peace, were by the very logic of facts led up to the proletarian revolution as the only way out of the war. This circumstance was of extreme importance for the October Revolution, for it put into its hands the mighty weapon of peace, made it easier for it to link the Soviet revolution with the ending of the hated war, and thus created mass sympathy for it both in the West, among the workers, and in the East, among the oppressed peoples.

Thirdly, the existence of a powerful working-class movement in Europe and the fact that a revolutionary crisis was maturing in the West and in the East, brought on by the protracted imperialist war. This circumstance was of inestimable importance for the revolution in Russia, for it ensured the revolution faithful allies outside Russia in its struggle against world imperialism.

But in addition to circumstances of an external nature, there were also a number of favourable internal conditions which facilitated the victory of the October Revolution.

Of these conditions, the following must be regarded as the chief ones:

Firstly, the October Revolution enjoyed the most active support of the overwhelming majority of the working class in Russia.

Secondly, it enjoyed the undoubted support of the poor peasants and of the majority of the soldiers, who were thirsting for peace and land.

Thirdly, it had at its head, as its guiding force, such a tried and tested party as the Bolshevik Party, strong not only by reason of its experience and discipline acquired through the years, but also by reason of its vast connections with the labouring masses.

Fourthly, the October Revolution was confronted by enemies who were comparatively easy to overcome, such as the rather weak Russian bourgeoisie, a landlord class which was utterly demoralized by peasant "revolts," and the compromising parties (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), which had become completely bankrupt during the war.

Fifthly, it had at its disposal the vast expanses of the young state, in which it was able to manoeuvre freely, retreat when circumstances so required, enjoy a respite, gather strength, etc.

Sixthly, in its struggle against counterrevolution the October Revolution could count upon sufficient resources of food, fuel and raw materials within the country.

The combination of these external and internal circumstances created that peculiar situation which determined the comparative ease with which the October Revolution won its victory.

This does not mean, of course, that there were no unfavourable features in the external and internal setting of the October Revolution. Think of such an unfavourable feature as, for example, the isolation, to some extent, of the October Revolution, the absence near it, or bordering on it, of a Soviet country on which it could rely for support. Undoubtedly, the future revolution, for example, in Germany, will be in a much more favourable situation in this respect, for it has in close proximity a powerful Soviet country like our Soviet Union. I need not mention so unfavourable a feature of the October Revolution as the absence of a proletarian majority within the country.

But these unfavourable features only emphasize the tremendous importance of the peculiar internal and external conditions of the October Revolution of which I have spoken above.

These peculiar conditions must not be lost sight of for a single moment. They must be borne in mind particularly in analyzing the events of the autumn of 1923 in Germany. Above all, they should be borne in mind by Trotsky, who draws an unfounded analogy between the October Revolution and the revolution in Germany and lashes violently at the German Communist Party for its actual and alleged mistakes.

"It was easy for Russia," says Lenin, "in the specific, historically very special situation of 1917, to *start* the socialist revolution, but it will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and carry it through to the end. I had occasion to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view. Such specific conditions, as 1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; 2) the possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal conflict between two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; 3) the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; 4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to take the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-

Revolutionary Party, the majority of the members of which were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realize them at once, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat—such specific conditions do not exist in Western Europe at present; and a repetition of such or similar conditions will not come so easily. That, by the way, apart from a number of other causes, is why it will be more difficult for Western Europe to *start* a socialist revolution than it was for us." (See Vol. XXV, p. 205.)

These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.

II

TWO SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION— OR OCTOBER AND TROTSKY'S THEORY OF "PERMANENT" REVOLUTION

There are two specific features of the October Revolution which must be understood first of all if we are to comprehend the inner meaning and the historical significance of that revolution.

What are these features?

Firstly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country as a power which came into existence on the basis of an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry, the latter being led by the proletariat. Secondly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat became established in our country as a result of the victory of socialism in one country—a country in which capitalism was little developed—while capitalism was preserved in other countries where capitalism was more highly developed. This does not mean, of course, that the October Revolution has no other specific features. But it is precisely these two specific features that are important for us at the present moment, not only because they distinctly express the essence of the October Revolution, but also because they brilliantly reveal the opportunist nature of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Let us briefly examine these features.

The question of the labouring masses of the petty bourgeoisie, both urban and rural, the question of winning these masses to the side of the proletariat, is highly important for the proletarian revolution. Whom will the labouring people of town and country support in the struggle for power, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat; whose reserve will they become, the reserve of the bourgeoisie or the reserve of the proletariat—on this depend the fate of the revolution and the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolutions in France in 1848 and 1871 came to grief chiefly because the peasant reserves proved to be on the side of the bourgeoisie. The October Revolution was victorious because it was able to deprive the bourgeoisie of its peasant reserves, because it was able to win these reserves to the side of the proletariat, and because in this revolution the proletariat proved to be the only guiding force for the vast masses of the labouring people of town and country.

He who has not understood this will never understand either the character of the October Revolution, or the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the specific characteristics of the internal policy of our proletarian power.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum "skilfully" "selected" by the careful hand of an "experienced strategist," and "judiciously relying" on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat.

Thus, it is not a question of "slightly" underestimating or "slightly" overestimating the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement, as certain diplomatic advocates of "permanent revolution" are now fond of expressing it. It is a question of the nature of the new proletarian state which arose as a result of the October Revolution. It is a question of the character of the proletarian power, of the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat itself.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous nonproletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 311.)

And further on:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat, if we translate this Latin, scientific, historical-philosophical term into simpler language, means the following:

"Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the toilers and exploited in the struggle for the overthrow of the yoke of capital, in the process of the overthrow itself, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system, in the whole struggle for the complete abolition of classes." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 336.)

Such is the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin.

One of the specific features of the October Revolution is the fact that this revolution represents a classic application of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Some comrades believe that this theory is a purely "Russian" theory, applicable only to Russian conditions. That is wrong. It is absolutely wrong. In speaking of the labouring masses of the nonproletarian classes which are led by the proletariat, Lenin has in mind not only the Russian peasants, but also the labouring elements of the border regions of the Soviet Union, which until recently were colonies of Russia. Lenin constantly reiterated that without an alliance with these masses of other nationalities the proletariat of Russia could not achieve victory. In his articles on the national question and in his speeches at the congresses of the Comintern, Lenin repeatedly said that the victory of the world revolution was impossible without a revolutionary alliance, a revolutionary bloc, between the proletariat of the advanced countries and

the oppressed peoples of the enslaved colonies. But what are colonies if not the oppressed labouring masses, and, primarily, the labouring masses of the peasantry? Who does not know that the question of emancipating the colonies is *essentially* a question of emancipating the labouring masses of the nonproletarian classes from the oppression and exploitation of finance capital?

But from this it follows that Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a purely "Russian" theory, but a theory which necessarily applies to all countries. Bolshevism is not only a Russian phenomenon. "Bolshevism," says Lenin, is "*a model of tactics for all.*" (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.)

Such are the characteristics of the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

How do matters stand with regard to Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" in the light of this specific feature of the October Revolution?

We shall not dwell at length on Trotsky's position in 1905, when he "simply" forgot all about the peasantry as a revolutionary force and advanced the slogan of "no tsar, but a workers' government," that is, the slogan of revolution without the peasantry. Even Radek, that diplomatic defender of "permanent revolution," is now obliged to admit that "permanent revolution" in 1905 meant a "leap into the air" away from reality. Now, apparently everyone admits that it is not worth while bothering with this "leap into the air" any more.

Nor shall we dwell at length on Trotsky's position in the period of the war, say, in 1915, when, in his article "The Struggle for Power," proceeding from the fact that "we are living in the era of imperialism," that imperialism "sets up not the bourgeois nation in opposition to the old regime, but the proletariat in opposition to the bourgeois nation," he arrived at the conclusion that the revolutionary role of the peasantry was bound to subside, that the slogan of the confiscation of the land no longer had the same importance as formerly. It is well known that at that time, Lenin, examining this article of Trotsky's, accused him of "denying" "the

role of the peasantry," and said that "Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who understand 'denial' of the role of the peasantry to mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution!" (See Vol. XVIII, p. 318.)

Let us rather pass on to the later works of Trotsky on this subject, to the works of the period when the proletarian dictatorship had already become established and when Trotsky had had the opportunity to test his theory of "permanent revolution" in the light of actual events and to correct his errors. Let us take Trotsky's "Preface" to his book *The Year 1905*, written in 1922. Here is what Trotsky says in this "Preface" concerning "permanent revolution":

"It was precisely during the interval between January 9 and the October strike of 1905 that the views on the character of the revolutionary development of Russia which came to be known as the theory of 'permanent revolution' crystallized in the author's mind. This abstruse term represented the idea that the Russian revolution, whose immediate objectives were bourgeois in nature, could not, however, stop when these objectives had been achieved. The revolution would not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois problems except by placing the proletariat in power. And the latter, upon assuming power, would not be able to confine itself to the bourgeois limits of the revolution. On the contrary, precisely in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not only into feudal property but into bourgeois property as well. In this it would come into *hostile collision* not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also with the *broad masses of the peasantry* with whose assistance it came into power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved *only* on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."*

That is what Trotsky says about his "permanent revolution."

One need only compare this quotation with the above quotations from Lenin's works on the dictatorship of the proletariat to

* My italics.—J. St.

perceive the great chasm that separates Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat from Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution."

Lenin speaks of the *alliance* between the proletariat and the labouring strata of the peasantry as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky sees a "*hostile collision*" between "the proletarian vanguard" and "the broad masses of the peasantry."

Lenin speaks of the *leadership* of the toiling and exploited masses by the proletariat. Trotsky sees "*contradictions* in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population."

According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found *only* "in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution? Trotsky offers no ray of hope, for "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government could be solved *only* in the arena of the world proletarian revolution." According to this plan, there is but one prospect left for our revolution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away while waiting for the world revolution.

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Lenin?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which rests on an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for "the complete overthrow of capital" and for "the final establishment and consolidation of socialism."

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Trotsky?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which comes "into hostile collision" with "the broad masses of the peasantry" and seeks the solution of its "contradictions" *only* "in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

What difference is there between this "theory of permanent revolution" and the well-known theory of Menshevism which repudiates the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. "Permanent revolution" is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. "Permanent revolution" is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the *repudiation* of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is a variety of Menshevism.

This is how matters stand with regard to the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

What are the characteristics of the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

In his study of imperialism, especially in the period of the war, Lenin arrived at the law of the uneven, spasmodic, economic and political development of the capitalist countries. According to this law, the development of enterprises, trusts, branches of industry and individual countries proceeds not evenly—not according to an established sequence, not in such a way that one trust, one branch of industry or one country is always in advance of the others, while other trusts or countries keep consistently one behind the other—but spasmodically, with interruptions in the development of some countries and leaps ahead in the development of others. Under these circumstances the "quite legitimate" striving of the countries that have slowed down to hold their old positions, and the equally "legitimate" striving of the countries that have leapt ahead to seize new positions, lead to a situation in which armed clashes among the imperialist countries become an inescapable necessity. Such was the case, for example, with Germany, which half a century ago was a backward country in comparison with France and Britain. The same must be said of Japan as compared with Russia. It is well known, however, that by the beginning of the twentieth century Germany and Japan had leapt so far ahead that Germany had succeeded in overtak-

ing France and had begun to press Britain hard on the world market, while Japan was pressing Russia. As is well known, it was from these contradictions that the recent imperialist war arose.

This law proceeds from the following:

1) "Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries" (see Preface to French edition of Lenin's *Imperialism*, Vol. XIX, p. 74);

2) "This 'booty' is shared between two or three powerful world robbers armed to the teeth (America, Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in *their* war over the sharing of *their* booty" (*ibid.*);

3) The growth of contradictions within the world system of financial oppression and the inevitability of armed clashes lead to the world front of imperialism becoming easily vulnerable to revolution, and to a breach in this front in individual countries becoming probable;

4) This breach is most likely to occur at those points, and in those countries, where the chain of the imperialist front is weakest, that is to say, where imperialism is least consolidated, and where it is easiest for a revolution to expand;

5) In view of this, the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense, while capitalism remains in other countries, even if those countries are more highly developed in the capitalist sense—is quite possible and probable.

Such, briefly, are the foundations of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

What is the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

The second specific feature of the October Revolution lies in the fact that this revolution represents a model of the practical application of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

He who has not understood this specific feature of the October Revolution will never understand either the international nature of this revolution, or its colossal international might, or the specific features of its foreign policy.

"Uneven economic and political development," says Lenin, "is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.". For "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states." (See Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33.)

The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin—if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory—only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and one in which capitalism is little developed at that, is excluded as something absolutely improbable. As far back as the period of the war, Lenin, taking as his basis the law of the uneven development of the imperialist states, opposed to the opportunists his theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is one in which capitalism is less developed.

It is well known that the October Revolution fully confirmed the correctness of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

How do matters stand with Trotsky's "permanent revolution" in the light of Lenin's theory of the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country?

Let us take Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Revolution* (1906).
Trotsky writes:

"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant."

What does this quotation mean? It means that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible "without direct state support from the European proletariat," i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power.

What is there in common between this "theory" and Lenin's thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism "in one capitalist country taken separately"?

Clearly, there is nothing in common.

But let us assume that Trotsky's pamphlet, which was published in 1906, at a time when it was difficult to determine the character of our revolution, contains inadvertent errors and does not fully correspond to Trotsky's views at a later period. Let us examine another pamphlet written by Trotsky, his *Peace Program*, which appeared before the October Revolution of 1917 and has now (1924) been republished in his book *The Year 1917*. In this pamphlet Trotsky criticizes Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country and opposes to it the slogan of a United States of Europe. He asserts that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, that the victory of socialism is possible only as the victory of several of the principal countries of Europe (Britain, Russia, Germany), which combine into a United States of Europe; otherwise it is not possible at all. He says quite plainly that "a victorious revolution in Russia or in Britain is inconceivable without a revolution in Germany, and vice versa."

"The only more or less concrete historical argument," says Trotsky, "advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss *Sotsial-Demokrat* (at that time the central organ of the Bolsheviks—*J. St.*) in the following sentence. 'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the pro-

letariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible argument. But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of Britain, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison with Africa and Asia all these countries represent capitalist 'Europe,' which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporizing international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world."

As you see, we have before us the same theory of the simultaneous victory of socialism in the principal countries of Europe which, as a rule, excludes Lenin's theory of revolution about the victory of socialism in one country.

It goes without saying that for the *complete* victory of socialism, for a *complete* guarantee against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not have held out against the general onslaught, just as without the support given by the revolution in Russia to the revolutionary movement in the West the latter could not have developed at the pace at which it has begun to develop since the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. It goes without saying that we need support. But what does support of our revolution by the West-European proletariat imply? Is not the sympathy of the European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention—is not all this support, real assistance? Unquestionably it is. Without such support, without such assistance, not only from the European workers but also from the colonial and dependent countries, the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would have been hard pressed.

Up to now, has this sympathy and this assistance, coupled with the might of our Red Army and the readiness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend their socialist fatherland to the last—has all this been sufficient to beat off the attacks of the imperialists and to win us the necessary conditions for the serious work of construction? Yes, it has been sufficient. Is this sympathy growing stronger, or is it waning? Unquestionably, it is growing stronger. Hence, have we favourable conditions, not only for pushing on with the organizing of socialist economy, but also, in our turn, for giving support to the West-European workers and to the oppressed peoples of the East? Yes, we have. This is eloquently proved by the seven years' history of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. Can it be denied that a mighty wave of labour enthusiasm has already risen in our country? No, it cannot be denied.

After all this, what does Trotsky's assertion that a revolutionary Russia could not hold out in the face of a conservative Europe signify?

It can signify only this: firstly, that Trotsky does not appreciate the inherent strength of our revolution; secondly, that Trotsky does not understand the inestimable importance of the moral support which is given to our revolution by the workers of the West and the peasants of the East; thirdly, that Trotsky does not perceive the internal infirmity which is consuming imperialism today.

Carried away by his criticism of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution, Trotsky unwittingly dealt himself a smashing blow in his pamphlet *Peace Program* which appeared in 1917 and was republished in 1924.

But perhaps this pamphlet, too, has become out of date and has ceased for some reason or other to correspond to Trotsky's present views? Let us take his later works, written after the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country, in Russia. Let us take, for example, Trotsky's "Postscript," written in 1922, for the new edition of his pamphlet *Peace Program*. Here is what he says in this "Postscript":

"The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Program* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilized countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the creation of a socialist society.... As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreement with the capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory** of the proletariat in the major European countries."

Thus speaks Trotsky, plainly sinning against reality and stubbornly trying to save his "permanent revolution" from final shipwreck.

It appears, then, that, twist and turn as you like, we not only have "not arrived," but we have "not even begun to arrive" at the creation of a socialist society. It appears that some people have been hoping for "agreements with the capitalist world," but it also appears that nothing will come of these agreements, for, -twist and turn as you like, "real progress of a socialist economy" will not be possible until the proletariat has been victorious in the "major European countries."

Well, then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only "choice" that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state.

It is no accident that Trotsky has been talking for two years now about the "degeneration" of our Party.

It is no accident that last year Trotsky prophesied the "doom" of our country.

* My italics.—*J. St.*

How can this strange "theory" be reconciled with Lenin's theory of the "victory of socialism in one country"?

How can this strange "prospect" be reconciled with Lenin's view that the New Economic Policy will enable us "to build the foundations of socialist economy"?

How can this "permanent" hopelessness be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

"Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this task may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter how many difficulties it may entail, we shall all—not in one day, but in the course of several years—all of us together fulfil it whatever happens so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 366.)

How can this "permanent" gloominess of Trotsky's be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

"As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 392.).

It is plain that these two views are incompatible and cannot in any way be reconciled. Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is the repudiation of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution; and conversely, Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution is the repudiation of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Lack of faith in the strength and capacities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian proletar-

iat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of “permanent revolution.”

Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of “permanent revolution” has usually been noted—lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect—lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia.

What difference is there between Trotsky’s theory and the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution “in the principal countries of Western Europe”?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. Trotsky’s theory of “permanent revolution” is a variety of Menshevism.

Of late rotten diplomats have appeared in our press who try to palm off the theory of “permanent revolution” as something compatible with Leninism. Of course, they say, this theory proved to be worthless in 1905; but the mistake Trotsky made was that he ran too far ahead at that time, in an attempt to apply to the situation in 1905 what could not then be applied. But later, they say, in October 1917, for example, when the revolution had had time to mature completely, Trotsky’s theory proved to be quite appropriate. It is not difficult to guess that the chief of these diplomats is Radek. Here, if you please, is what he says:

“The war created a chasm between the peasantry, which was striving to win land and peace, and the petty-bourgeois parties; the war placed the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and of its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. This rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the working class relying on the peasantry. What Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky advanced against Lenin in 1905 (i.e., “permanent revolution”—*J. St.*) proved, as a matter of fact, to be the second stage of the historic development.”

Here every statement is a distortion.

It is not true that the war “rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of

the working class relying on the peasantry." Actually, the February Revolution of 1917 was the materialization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, interwoven in a peculiar way with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution," which Radek bashfully refrains from mentioning, was advanced in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. Actually, this theory was advanced by Parvus and Trotsky. Now, ten months later, Radek corrects himself and deems it necessary to castigate Parvus for the theory of "permanent revolution." But in all fairness Radek should also castigate Parvus's partner, Trotsky.

It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution," which was brushed aside by the 1905 revolution, proved to be correct in the "second stage of the historic development," that is, during the October Revolution. The whole course of the October Revolution, its whole development, demonstrated and proved the utter bankruptcy of the theory of "permanent revolution" and its absolute incompatibility with the foundations of Leninism.

Honeyed speeches and rotten diplomacy cannot hide the yawning chasm which lies between the theory of "permanent revolution" and Leninism.

III

CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE TACTICS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

In order to understand the tactics pursued by the Bolsheviks during the period of preparation for October we must get a clear idea of at least some of the particularly important features of those tactics. This is all the more necessary since in numerous pamphlets on the tactics of the Bolsheviks precisely these features are frequently overlooked.

What are these features?

First specific feature. If one were to listen to Trotsky, one would think that there were only two periods in the history of the preparation for October: the period of reconnaissance and the period of uprising, and that all else comes from the evil one. What was the April demonstration of 1917? "The April demonstration, which went more to the 'Left' than it should have, was a reconnoitring sortie for the purpose of probing the disposition of the masses and the relations between them and the majority in the Soviets." And what was the July demonstration of 1917? In Trotsky's opinion "this, too, was in fact another, more extensive, reconnaissance at a new and higher phase of the movement." Needless to say, the June demonstration of 1917, which was organized at the demand of our Party, should, according to Trotsky's idea, all the more be termed a "reconnaissance."

This would seem to imply that as early as March 1917, the Bolsheviks had ready a political army of workers and peasants, and that if they did not bring this army into action for an uprising in April, or in June, or in July, but engaged merely in "reconnaissance," it was because, and only because, "the information obtained from the reconnaissance" at the time was unfavourable.

Needless to say, this oversimplified notion of the political tactics of our Party is nothing but a confusion of ordinary military tactics with the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, all these demonstrations were primarily the result of the spontaneous pressure of the masses, the result of the fact that the indignation of the masses against the war had boiled over and sought an outlet in the streets.

Actually, the task of the Party at that time was to shape and to guide the spontaneously arising demonstrations of the masses along the line of the revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, the Bolsheviks had no political army ready in March 1917, nor could they have had one. The Bolsheviks built up such an army (and had finally built it up by October 1917) only in the course of the struggle and conflicts of the classes between April

and October 1917, through the April demonstration, the June and July demonstrations, the elections to the district and city Dumas, the struggle against the Kornilov revolt, and the winning over of the Soviets. A political army is not like a military army. A military command begins a war with an army ready to hand, whereas the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of class conflicts, as the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of the Party's slogans and policy.

Of course, every such demonstration at the same time threw a certain amount of light on the hidden interrelations of the forces involved, provided certain reconnaissance information, but this reconnaissance was not the motive for the demonstration, but its natural result.

In analyzing the events preceding the uprising in October and comparing them with the events that marked the period from April to July, Lenin says:

"The situation now is not at all what it was prior to April 20-21, June 9, July 3, for then there was *spontaneous excitement* which we, as a party, either failed to perceive (April 20) or tried to restrain and shape into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3). For at that time we were fully aware that the Soviets were *not yet ours*, that the peasants *still* trusted the Lieber-Dan-Chernov course and not the Bolshevik course (uprising), and that, consequently, we could not have the majority of the people behind us, and hence, an uprising was premature." (See Vol. XXI, p. 345.)

It is plain that "reconnaissance" alone does not get one very far.

Obviously, it was not a question of "reconnaissance," but of the following:

1) all through the period of preparation for October the Party invariably relied in its struggle upon the spontaneous upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement;

2) while relying on the spontaneous upsurge, it maintained its own undivided leadership of the movement;

3) this leadership of the movement helped it to form the mass political army for the October uprising;

4) this policy was bound to result in the entire preparation for October proceeding under the leadership of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party;

5) this preparation for October, in its turn, brought it about that as a result of the October uprising power was concentrated in the hands of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the undivided leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party, as the principal factor in the preparation for October—such is the characteristic feature of the October Revolution, such is the first specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of Bolshevik tactics the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the conditions of imperialism would have been impossible.

In this the October Revolution differs favourably from the revolution of 1871 in France, where the leadership was divided between two parties, neither of which could be called a Communist party.

Second specific feature. The preparation for October thus proceeded under the leadership of one party, the Bolshevik Party. But how did the Party carry out this leadership, along what line did the latter proceed? This leadership proceeded along the line of isolating the *compromising* parties, as the most dangerous groupings in the period of the outbreak of the revolution, the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

What is the fundamental strategic rule of Leninism?

It is the recognition of the following:

1) the *compromising* parties are the most dangerous social support of the enemies of the revolution in the period of the approaching revolutionary outbreak;

2) it is impossible to overthrow the enemy (tsarism or the bourgeoisie) unless these parties are isolated;

3) the main weapons in the period of preparation for the revolution must therefore be directed towards isolating these parties, towards winning the broad masses of the working people away from them.

In the period of the struggle against tsarism, in the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905-16), the most dangerous social support of tsarism was the liberal-monarchist party, the Cadet Party. Why? Because it was the compromising party, the party of *compromise* between tsarism and the majority of the people, i.e., the peasantry as a whole. Naturally, the Party at that time directed its main blows at the Cadets, for unless the Cadets were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the peasantry and tsarism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory of the revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of Bolshevik strategy and accused the Bolsheviks of excessive "Cadetophobia"; they asserted that with the Bolsheviks the struggle against the Cadets "overshadowed" the struggle against the principal enemy—tsarism. But these accusations, for which there was no justification, revealed an utter failure to understand the Bolshevik strategy, which called for the isolation of the compromising party *in order* to facilitate, to hasten the victory over the principal enemy.

It scarcely needs proof that without this strategy the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution would have been impossible.

In the period of preparation for October the centre of gravity of the conflicting forces shifted to another plane. The tsar was gone. The Cadet Party had been transformed from a compromising force into a governing force, into the ruling force of imperialism. Now the fight was no longer between tsarism and the people, but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In this period the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were the most dangerous social support of imperialism. Why? Because these parties were then the compromising parties, the parties of *compromise* between imperialism and the labouring masses. Naturally, the Bolsheviks at that time directed their main blows at these parties, for unless these parties were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the labouring masses and imperialism, and unless this rupture was ensured

there could be no hope of the victory of the Soviet revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics and accused the Bolsheviks of displaying "excessive hatred" towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and of "forgetting" the principal goal. But the entire period of preparation for October eloquently testifies to the fact that only by pursuing these tactics could the Bolsheviks ensure the victory of the October Revolution.

The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionization of the labouring masses of the peasantry, their disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, their defection from these parties, their turn towards rallying directly around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks, on the other, for the labouring masses of the peasantry, for winning over these masses. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt. And they decided the issue of this struggle entirely in favour of the Bolshevik strategy; for had not the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks been isolated it would have been impossible to overthrow the government of the imperialists, and had this government not been overthrown it would have been impossible to break away from the war. The policy of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks proved to be the only correct policy.

Thus, isolation of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the main line in directing the preparations for October—such was the second specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks, the alliance of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry would have been left hanging in the air.

It is characteristic that in his *Lessons of October* Trotsky says nothing, or next to nothing, about this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics.

Third specific feature. Thus, the Party, in directing the preparations for October, pursued the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, of winning the broad masses of the workers and peasants away from them. But how, concretely, was this isolation effected by the Party—in what form, under what slogan? It was effected in the form of the revolutionary mass movement for the power of the Soviets, under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!", by means of the struggle to convert the Soviets from organs for mobilizing the masses into organs of the uprising, into organs of power, into the apparatus of a new proletarian state power.

Why was it precisely the Soviets that the Bolsheviks seized upon as the principal organizational lever that could facilitate the task of isolating the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, that was capable of advancing the cause of the proletarian revolution, and that was destined to lead the millions of labouring masses to the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

What are the Soviets?

"The Soviets," said Lenin as early as September 1917, "are a new state apparatus, which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is most closely bound up with the people. From the military standpoint, this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary standpoint, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the masses, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so readily controllable and renewable, that there was nothing even remotely like it in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the will of the people without any bureau-

cratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most diverse professions, thus facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most profound reforms without bureaucracy. Fifthly, it provides a form of organization of the vanguard, i.e., of the most politically conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the *oppressed* classes, the workers and peasants, and thus constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead *the entire vast mass* of these classes, which has hitherto stood quite remote from political life, from history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parliamentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to unite in the persons of the elected representatives of the people both legislative *and executive* functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamentarism, this represents an advance in the development of democracy which is of world-wide historic significance....

"Had not the creative spirit of the revolutionary classes of the people given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would be a hopeless affair, for the proletariat undoubtedly could not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately." (See Vol. XXI, pp. 258-59.)

That is why the Bolsheviks seized upon the Soviets as the principal organizational link that could facilitate the task of organizing the October Revolution and the creation of a new, powerful apparatus of the proletarian state power.

From the point of view of its internal development, the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" passed through two stages: the first (up to the July defeat of the Bolsheviks, during the period of dual power), and the second (after the defeat of the Kornilov revolt).

During the first stage this slogan meant breaking the bloc of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the Cadets, the formation of a Soviet government consisting of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the Soviets were Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik), the right of free agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolsheviks), and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, in the expectation that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks would succeed in capturing the Soviets and changing the composition of the Soviet government in the course of a peaceful development of the revolu-

tion. This plan, of course, did not signify the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly facilitated the preparation of the conditions required for ensuring the dictatorship, for, by putting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in power and compelling them to carry out in practice their antirevolutionary platform, it hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, hastened their isolation, their divorce from the masses. The July defeat of the Bolsheviks, however, interrupted this development, for it gave preponderance to the generals' and Cadets' counter-revolution and threw the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks into the arms of that counterrevolution. This compelled the Party temporarily to withdraw the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!", only to put it forward again in the conditions of a fresh revolutionary upsurge.

The defeat of the Kornilov revolt ushered in the second stage. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" became again the immediate slogan. But now this slogan had a different meaning from that in the first stage. Its content had radically changed. Now this slogan meant a complete rupture with imperialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for the majority of the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this slogan meant the revolution's direct approach towards the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of an uprising. More than that, this slogan now meant the organization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and giving it a state form.

The inestimable significance of the tactics of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power lay in the fact that they caused millions of working people to break away from imperialism, exposed the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the tools of imperialism, and brought the masses by a direct route, as it were, to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the policy of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power, as the most important condition for isolating the compromising parties and for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat—such is the third specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

Fourth specific feature. The picture would not be complete if we did not deal with the question of how and why the Bolsheviks were able to transform their Party slogans into slogans for the vast masses, into slogans which pushed the revolution forward; how and why they succeeded in convincing not only the vanguard, and not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the people, of the correctness of their policy.

The point is that for the victory of the revolution, if it is really a people's revolution embracing the masses in their millions, correct Party slogans alone are not enough. For the victory of the revolution one more necessary condition is required, namely, that the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of these slogans. Only then do the slogans of the Party become the slogans of the masses themselves. Only then does the revolution really become a people's revolution. One of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October was that they correctly determined the paths and turns which would naturally lead the masses to the Party's slogans—to the very threshold of the revolution, so to speak—thus helping them to feel, to test, to realize by their own experience the correctness of these slogans. In other words, one of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks is that they do not confuse leadership of the Party with leadership of the masses; that they clearly see the difference between the first sort of leadership and the second; that they, therefore, represent the science, not only of leadership of the Party, but of leadership of the vast masses of the working people.

A graphic example of the manifestation of this feature of Bolshevik tactics was provided by the experience of convening and dispersing the Constituent Assembly:

It is well known that the Bolsheviks advanced the slogan of a Republic of Soviets as early as April 1917. It is well known that the Constituent Assembly was a bourgeois parliament, fundamentally opposed to the principles of a Republic of Soviets. How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were advancing towards

a Republic of Soviets, at the same time demanded that the Provisional Government should immediately convene the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks not only took part in the elections, but themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that a month before the uprising, in the transition from the old to the new, the Bolsheviks considered a temporary combination of a Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly possible?

This "happened" because:

- 1) the idea of a Constituent Assembly was one of the most popular ideas among the broad masses of the population;
- 2) the slogan of the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly helped to expose the counterrevolutionary nature of the Provisional Government;
- 3) in order to discredit the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the eyes of the masses, it was necessary to lead the masses to the walls of the Constituent Assembly with their demands for land, for peace, for the power of the Soviets, thus bringing them face to face with the actual, live Constituent Assembly;
- 4) only this could help the masses to become convinced through their own experience of the counterrevolutionary nature of the Constituent Assembly and of the necessity of dispersing it;
- 5) all this naturally presupposed the possibility of a temporary combination of the Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly, as one of the means for eliminating the Constituent Assembly;
- 6) such a combination, if brought about *under* the condition that all power was transferred to the Soviets, could only signify the subordination of the Constituent Assembly to the Soviets, its conversion into an appendage of the Soviets, its painless extinction.

It scarcely needs proof that had the Bolsheviks not adopted such a policy the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly would not have taken place so smoothly, and the subsequent actions of

the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks under the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!" would not have failed so signally.

"We took part," says Lenin, "in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not?... Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we had, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That, owing to a number of special conditions, the working class of the towns and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were in September-November 1917 exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political power and *after*." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02.)

Why then did they not boycott the Constituent Assembly? Because, says Lenin:

"participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet Republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but actually helps it to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *helps* their successful dispersal, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarism 'politically obsolete.'" (*Ibid.*)

It is characteristic that Trotsky does not understand this feature of Bolshevik tactics and snorts at the "theory" of combining the Constituent Assembly with the Soviets, qualifying it as Hilferdingism.

He does not understand that to permit such a combination, accompanied by the slogan of an uprising and the probable victory of the Soviets, in connection with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, was the only revolutionary tactics, which had nothing in common with the Hilferding tactics of converting the Soviets into an appendage of the Constituent Assembly; he does

not understand that the mistake committed by some comrades in *this* question gives him no grounds for disparaging the absolutely correct position taken by Lenin and the Party on the "combined type of state power" *under certain conditions*. (Cf. Vol. XXI, p. 338.)

He does not understand that if the Bolsheviks had not adopted this special policy towards the Constituent Assembly they would not have succeeded in winning over to their side the vast masses of the people; and if they had not won over these masses they could not have transformed the October uprising into a profound people's revolution.

It is interesting to note that Trotsky even snorts at the words "people," "revolutionary democracy," etc., occurring in articles by Bolsheviks, and considers them improper for a Marxist to use.

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that even in September 1917, a month before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, wrote of "the necessity of the immediate transfer of the whole power to *the revolutionary democracy headed by the revolutionary proletariat*." (See Vol. XXI, p. 198.)

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, quoting the well-known letter of Marx to Kugelmann (April 1871) to the effect that the smashing of the bureaucratic-military state machine is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent, writes in black and white the following lines:

"particular attention should be paid to Marx's extremely profound remark that the destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine is 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution.' This concept of a 'people's' revolution seems strange coming from Marx, and the Russian Plekhanovites and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who wish to be regarded as Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression to be a 'slip of the pen' on Marx's part. They have reduced Marxism to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution—and even this antithesis they interpret in an extremely lifeless way...."

"In Europe, in 1871, there was not a single country on the continent in which the proletariat constituted the majority of the people. A 'people's' revolution, one that actually brought the majority into movement, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasantry. These two classes then constituted the 'people.' These two classes are united by the fact that the 'hureaucratic-military state machine' oppresses, crushes, exploits them. To *break up* this machine, to *smash* it—this is truly in the interest of the 'people,' of the majority, of the workers and most of the peasants, this is 'the preliminary condition' for a free alliance between the poor peasants and the proletarians, whereas without such an alliance democracy is unstable and socialist transformation is impossible." (See Vol. XXI, pp. 395-96.)

These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.

Thus, ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party slogans on the basis of their own experience, by bringing them to the revolutionary positions, as the most important condition for the winning over of the millions of working people to the side of the Party—such is the fourth specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

I think that what I have said is quite sufficient to get a clear idea of the characteristic features of these tactics.

IV

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AS THE BEGINNING OF AND THE PRE-CONDITION FOR THE WORLD REVOLUTION

There can be no doubt that the universal theory of a simultaneous victory of the revolution in the principal countries of Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable theory. The seven years' history of the proletarian revolution in Russia speaks not for but against this theory. This theory is unacceptable not only as a scheme of development of the world revolution, for it contradicts obvious facts. It is still less acceptable as a slogan, for it fetters, rather than releases, the initiative of individual

countries which, by reason of certain historical conditions, obtain the opportunity to break through the front of capital independently; for it does not stimulate an active onslaught on capital in individual countries, but encourages passive waiting for the moment of the "universal denouement"; for it cultivates among the proletarians of the different countries not the spirit of revolutionary determination, but the mood of Hamlet-like doubt over the question as to "what if the others fail to back us up?" Lenin was absolutely right in saying that the victory of the proletariat in one country is the "typical case," that "a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries" can only be a "rare exception." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 354.)

But, as is well known, Lenin's theory of revolution is not limited only to this side of the question. It is also the theory of the development of the world revolution.* The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means *for* hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the precondition for the world revolution.

Undoubtedly, the paths of development of the world revolution are not as plain as it may have seemed previously, before the victory of the revolution in one country, before the appearance of developed imperialism, which is "the eve of the socialist revolution." For a new factor has arisen—the law of the uneven development of the capitalist countries, which operates under the conditions of developed imperialism, and which implies the inevitability of armed collisions, the general weakening of the world front of capital, and the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries. For a new factor has arisen—the vast So-

* See above *The Foundations of Leninism*.—J. St.

viet country, lying between the West and the East, between the centre of the financial exploitation of the world and the arena of colonial oppression, a country which by its very existence is revolutionizing the whole world.

All these are factors (not to mention other less important ones) which cannot be left out of account in studying the paths of development of the world revolution.

Formerly, it was commonly thought that the revolution would develop through the even "maturing" of the elements of socialism, primarily in the more developed, the "advanced," countries. Now this view must be considerably modified.

"The system of international relationships," says Lenin, "has now taken a form in which one of the states of Europe, viz., Germany, has been enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, a number of states, which are, moreover, the oldest states in the West, find themselves in a position, as the result of their victory, to utilize this victory to make a number of insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes—concessions which nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some semblance of 'social peace.'

"At the same time, precisely as a result of the last imperialist war, a number of countries—the East, India, China, etc.—have been completely dislodged from their groove. Their development has definitely shifted to the general European capitalist lines. The general European ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world that they have been drawn into a process of development that cannot but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism."

In view of this fact, and in connection with it, "the West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism ... not as we formerly expected. They are consummating it not by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement." (See Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16.)

If we add to this the fact that not only the defeated countries and colonies are being exploited by the victorious countries, but

that some of the victorious countries are falling into the orbit of financial exploitation at the hands of the most powerful of the victorious countries, America and Britain; that the contradictions among all these countries are an extremely important factor in the disintegration of world imperialism; that, in addition to these contradictions, very profound contradictions exist and are developing within each of these countries; that all these contradictions are becoming more profound and more acute because of the existence, alongside these countries, of the great Republic of Soviets—if all this is taken into consideration, then the picture of the special character of the international situation will become more or less complete.

Most probably, the world revolution will develop by the breaking away of a number of new countries from the system of the imperialist states as a result of revolution, while the proletarians of these countries will be supported by the proletariat of the imperialist states. We see that the first country to break away, the first victorious country, is already being supported by the workers and the labouring masses of other countries. Without this support it could not hold out. Undoubtedly, this support will increase and grow. But there can also be no doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a number of new countries will be the more rapid and thorough, the more thoroughly socialism becomes consolidated in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

While it is true that the *final* victory of socialism in the first country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true that the unfolding of the world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the assistance rendered by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring masses of all other countries.

In what should this assistance be expressed?

It should be expressed, firstly, in the victorious country achieving "the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*." (See Lenin, Vol. XXIII, p. 385.)

It should be expressed, secondly, in that the "victorious proletariat" of one country, "having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up... *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." (See Lenin, Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33.)

The characteristic feature of the assistance given by the victorious country is not only that it hastens the victory of the proletarians of other countries, but also that, by facilitating this victory, it ensures the *final* victory of socialism in the first victorious country.

Most probably, in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and with the system of these countries throughout the world, centres of socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centres throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill the history of the unfolding of the world revolution.

For, says Lenin, "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states." (*Ibid.*)

The world significance of the October Revolution lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a great beginning made by one country in causing a breach in the system of imperialism and that it is the first centre of socialism in the ocean of imperialist countries, but also in that it constitutes the first stage of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further development.

Therefore, not only those are wrong who forget the international character of the October Revolution and declare the victory

of socialism in one country to be a purely national, and only a national, phenomenon, but also those who, although they bear in mind the international character of the October Revolution, are inclined to regard this revolution as something passive, merely destined to accept help from without. Actually, not only does the October Revolution need support from the revolution in other countries, but the revolution in those countries needs the support of the October Revolution in order to accelerate and advance the cause of overthrowing world imperialism.

December 17, 1924

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM

DEDICATED TO THE LENINGRAD
ORGANIZATION OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. STALIN

I

THE DEFINITION OF LENINISM

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a definition of Leninism which seems to have received general recognition. It runs as follows:

"Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular."

Is this definition correct?

I think it is correct. It is correct, firstly, because it correctly indicates the historical roots of Leninism, characterizing it as Marxism of the *era of imperialism*, as against certain critics of Lenin who wrongly think that Leninism originated after the imperialist war. It is correct, secondly, because it correctly notes the international character of Leninism, as against Social-Democracy, which considers that Leninism is applicable only to Russian national conditions. It is correct, thirdly, because it correctly notes the organic connection between Leninism and the teachings of Marx, characterizing Leninism as *Marxism* of the era of imperialism, as against certain critics of Leninism who consider it not a further development of Marxism, but merely the restoration of Marxism and its application to Russian conditions.

All that, one would think, needs no special comment.

Nevertheless, it appears that there are people in our Party who consider it necessary to define Leninism somewhat differently. Zinoviev, for example, thinks that:

"Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialist wars and of the world revolution which began directly in a country where the peasantry predominates."

What can be the meaning of the words underlined by Zinoviev? What does introducing the backwardness of Russia, its peasant character, into the definition of Leninism mean?

It means transforming Leninism from an international proletarian doctrine into a product of specifically Russian conditions.

It means playing into the hands of Bauer and Kautsky, who deny that Leninism is suitable for other countries, for countries in which capitalism is more developed.

It goes without saying that the peasant question is of very great importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant country. But what significance can this fact have in characterizing the foundations of Leninism? Was Leninism elaborated only on Russian soil, for Russia alone, and not on the soil of imperialism, and for the imperialist countries generally? Do such works of Lenin as *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, etc., apply only to Russia, and not to all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism the generalization of the experience of the revolutionary movement of *all* countries? Are not the fundamentals of the theory and tactics of Leninism suitable, are they not obligatory, for the proletarian parties of *all* countries? Was not Lenin right when he said that "Bolshevism can serve as a model of tactics for all"? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.) Was not Lenin right when he spoke about the "*international significance** of Soviet power and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics"? (See Vol. XXV, pp. 171-72.) Are not, for example, the following words of Lenin correct?

"In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain specific features from that in the advanced countries, owing to

* My italics.—J. St.

the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country. But the basic forces—and the basic forms of social economy—are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that *these specific features can relate only to what is not most important.** (See Vol. XXIV, p. 508.)

But if all that is true, does it not follow that Zinoviev's definition of Leninism cannot be regarded as correct?

How can this nationally restricted definition of Leninism be reconciled with internationalism?

II

THE MAIN THING IN LENINISM

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, it is stated:

"Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question."

Is this thesis correct?

I think it is correct. This thesis follows entirely from the definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the basic content of the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this question, the substantiation and concretization of this question.

Nevertheless, Zinoviev evidently does not agree with this thesis. In his article "In Memory of Lenin," he says:

"As I have already said, the question of the role of the peasantry is the fundamental question* of Bolshevism, of Leninism."

* My italics.—J. St.

As you see, Zinoviev's thesis follows entirely from his wrong definition of Leninism. It is therefore as wrong as his definition of Leninism is wrong.

Is Lenin's thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the "root content of the proletarian revolution" correct? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 337.) It is unquestionably correct. Is the thesis that Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution correct? I think it is correct. But what follows from this? From this it follows that the fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, its foundation, is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question of the spasmodic character of the development of imperialism, the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the question of the proletarian state, the question of the Soviet form of this state, the question of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the paths of building socialism—that all these questions were elaborated precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that it is precisely these questions that constitute the basis, the foundation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that without the elaboration of these fundamental questions, the elaboration of the peasant question from the standpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?

It goes without saying that Lenin was an expert on the peasant question. It goes without saying that the peasant question as the question of the ally of the proletariat is of the greatest significance for the proletariat and forms a constituent part of the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the derivative question of the ally of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry, would not have arisen either? Is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat, the question of an alliance with the peasantry would not have arisen either?

Lenin would not have been the great ideological leader of the proletariat that he unquestionably is—he would have been a simple “peasant philosopher,” as foreign literary philistines often depict him—had he elaborated the peasant question, not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but independently of this basis, apart from this basis.

One or the other:

Either the peasant question is the main thing in Leninism, and in that case Leninism is not suitable, not obligatory, for capitalistically developed countries, for those which are not peasant countries.

Or the main thing in Leninism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that case Leninism is the international doctrine of the proletarians of all lands, suitable and obligatory for all countries without exception, including the capitalistically developed countries.

Here one must choose.

III

THE QUESTION OF “PERMANENT” REVOLUTION

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, the “theory of permanent revolution” is appraised as a “theory” which underestimates the role of the peasantry. There it is stated:

“Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of ‘permanent’ revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat.”

This characterization of the Russian “permanentists” was considered as generally accepted until recently. Nevertheless, although in general correct, it cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The discussion of 1924, on the one hand, and a careful analysis of the works of Lenin, on the other hand, have shown that the

mistake of the Russian "permanentists" lay not only in their underestimation of the role of the peasantry, but also in their underestimation of the strength of the proletariat and its capacity to lead the peasantry, in their disbelief in the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

That is why, in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924), I broadened this characterization and replaced it by another, more complete one. Here is what is stated in that pamphlet:

"Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of 'permanent revolution' has usually been noted—lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect—lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia."

This does not mean, of course, that Leninism has been or is opposed to the idea of permanent revolution, without quotation marks, which was proclaimed by Marx in the forties of the last century. On the contrary, Lenin was the only Marxist who correctly understood and developed the idea of permanent revolution. What distinguishes Lenin from the "permanentists" on this question is that the "permanentists" distorted Marx's idea of permanent revolution and transformed it into lifeless, bookish wisdom, whereas Lenin took it in its pure form and made it one of the foundations of his own theory of revolution. It should be borne in mind that the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, propounded by Lenin as long ago as 1905, is one of the forms of the embodiment of Marx's theory of permanent revolution. Here is what Lenin wrote about this as far back as 1905:

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. *We stand for uninterrupted revolution.** We shall not stop halfway....

"Without succumbing to adventurism or going against our scientific conscience, without striving for cheap popularity, we can and do say *only*

* My italics.—J. St.

one thing: we shall put every effort into assisting the entire peasantry to carry out the democratic revolution *in order thereby to make it easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution." (See Vol. VIII, pp. 186-87.)

And here is what Lenin wrote on this subject sixteen years later, after the conquest of power by the proletariat:

"The Kautskys, Hilferdings, Martovs, Chernovs, Hillquits, Longuets, MacDonalds, Turatis, and other heroes of 'Two-and-a-Half' Marxism were incapable of understanding the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolutions. *The first grows over into the second.** The second, in passing, solves the questions of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second succeeds in outgrowing the first." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 26.)

I draw special attention to the first of the above quotations, taken from Lenin's article entitled "The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement," published on September 1, 1905. I emphasize this for the information of those who still continue to assert that Lenin arrived at the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, that is to say, the idea of permanent revolution, after the imperialist war. This quotation leaves no doubt that these people are profoundly mistaken.

IV

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

What are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution as distinct from the bourgeois revolution?

The distinction between the proletarian revolution and the bourgeois revolution may be reduced to five main points.

1) The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to the capitalist

* My italics.—J. St.

order, forms which have grown and matured within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolution, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready-made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent, or almost absent.

2) The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists, after seizing power, in building a new, socialist economy.

3) The bourgeois revolution is usually *consummated* with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the *beginning*, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organizing the new one.

4) The bourgeois revolution limits itself to replacing one group of exploiters in power by another group of exploiters, in view of which it need not smash the old state machine; whereas the proletarian revolution removes all exploiting groups from power and places in power the leader of all the toilers and exploited, the class of proletarians, in view of which it cannot manage without smashing the old state machine and substituting a new one for it.

5) The bourgeois revolution cannot rally the millions of the toiling and exploited masses around the bourgeoisie for any length of time, for the very reason that they are toilers and exploited; whereas the proletarian revolution can and must link them, precisely as toilers and exploited, in a durable alliance with the proletariat, if it wishes to carry out its main task of consolidating the power of the proletariat and building a new, socialist economy.

Here are some of Lenin's main theses on this subject:

"One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution," says Lenin, "is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organizations are gradually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task—to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding society. By fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution fulfills all that is required of it: it accelerates the growth of capitalism."

"The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has proved to

be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction are added new tasks of unprecedented difficulty—organizational tasks." (See Vol. XXII, p. 315.)

"Had not the popular creative spirit of the Russian revolution," continues Lenin, "which had gone through the great experience of the year 1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not under any circumstances have seized power in October, because success depended entirely upon the existence of ready-made organizational forms of a movement embracing millions. These ready-made forms were the Soviets, and that is why in the political sphere there awaited us those brilliant successes, the continuous triumphant march, that we experienced; for the new form of political power was ready to hand, and all we had to do was, by passing a few decrees, to transform the power of the Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months of the revolution into a legally recognized form which has become established in the Russian state—i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic." (See Vol. XXII, p. 315.)

"But two problems of enormous difficulty still remained," says Lenin, "the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphant march which our revolution experienced in the first months...." (*Ibid.*)

"Firstly, there were the problems of internal organization, which confront every socialist revolution. The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter finds ready-made forms of capitalist relationships, while Soviet power—proletarian power—does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organization of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that works in such a way that hundreds of millions of people are guided by a single plan—such was the enormous organizational problem that rested on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem could not possibly be solved by the 'burrah' methods by which we were able to solve the problems of the Civil War." (*Ibid.*, p. 316.)

"The second enormous difficulty was the international question. The reason why we were able to cope so easily with Kerensky's gangs, why we so easily established our power and without the slightest difficulty passed the decrees on the socialization of the land and on workers' control, the reason why we achieved all this so easily was only that a fortunate combination of circumstances protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organized military technique, which is a real force, a real fortress

of international capital, could in no case, under no circumstances, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which is embodied in it—it could not do so because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solving the international tasks, the necessity of calling forth an international revolution." (See Vol. XXII, p. 317.)

Such is the intrinsic character and the basic meaning of the proletarian revolution.

Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution.

This thesis must be emphasized all the more strongly and categorically for the reason that we are dealing with the proletarian revolution which for the time being has triumphed only in one country, a country which is surrounded by hostile capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie of which cannot fail to receive the support of international capital.

That is why Lenin says that:

"The emancipation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class." (See Vol. XXI, p. 373.)

"First let the majority of the population, while private property still exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exists, express themselves in favour of the party of the proletariat, and only then can and should the party take power—so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves 'Socialists' but who are in reality the servitors of the bourgeoisie."*(See Vol. XXIV, p. 647.)

* My italics.—J. St.

"We say: * Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bourgeoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus, then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly to gain the sympathy and support of the majority of the toiling nonproletarian masses by satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters." (*Ibid.*)

"In order to win the majority of the population to its side," Lenin says further, "the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet power and smash the old state apparatus to bits, whereby it immediately undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the nonproletarian toiling masses. Thirdly, it must *entirely destroy* the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the *majority* of the nonproletarian toiling masses by satisfying *their* economic needs *in a revolutionary way at the expense of the exploiters.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 641.)

Such are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution.

What, in this connection, are the main features of the dictatorship of the proletariat, once it is admitted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the proletarian revolution?

Here is the most general definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of the class struggle, but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished has not been annihilated, has not disappeared, has not ceased its resistance, has increased its resistance." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 311.)

Arguing against confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with "popular" government, "elected by all," with "nonclass" government, Lenin says:

"The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing that it took power *alone*.* That is a part of the concept dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows that it alone is taking political power in its hands, and does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular' government, 'elected by all, sanctified by the whole people.'" (See Vol. XXVI, p. 286.)

* My italics.—J. St.

This does not mean, however, that the power of one class, the class of the proletarians, which does not and cannot share power with other classes, does not need aid from, and an alliance with, the labouring and exploited masses of other classes for the achievement of its aims. On the contrary. This power, the power of one class, can be firmly established and exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of the peasantry.

What is this special form of alliance? What does it consist in? Does not this alliance with the labouring masses of other, non-proletarian, classes wholly contradict the idea of the dictatorship of one class?

This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of alliance consists in that the leader of the state, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is *one party*, the party of the proletariat, the party of the Communists, which *does not and cannot share leadership with other parties*.

As you see, the contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a special form of class alliance* between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous nonproletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism. It is a special type of alliance, which is being built up in special circumstances, namely, in the circumstances of fierce civil war; it is an alliance of the firm supporters of socialism with the latter's wavering allies and sometimes with 'neutrals' (then instead of an agreement for struggle, the alliance becomes an agreement for neutrality), an alliance between classes which differ economically, politically, socially and ideologically."* (See Vol. XXIV, p. 311.)

* My italics.—*J. St.*

In one of his instructional reports, Kamenev, disputing this conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, states:

"The dictatorship *is not** an alliance of one class with another."

I believe that Kamenev here has in view, primarily, a passage in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, where it is stated:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum 'skilfully' 'selected' by the careful hand of an 'experienced strategist,' and 'judiciously relying' on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat."

I wholly endorse this formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for I think that it fully and entirely coincides with Lenin's formulation, just quoted.

I assert that Kamenev's statement that "the dictatorship *is not* an alliance of one class with another," in the categorical form in which it is made, has nothing in common with Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I assert that such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand the meaning of the idea of the bond, the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, the idea of the *hegemony* of the proletariat within this alliance.

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

*"Only an agreement with the peasantry** can save the socialist revolution in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken place." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 238.)

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

*"The supreme principle of the dictatorship** is the maintenance of the

* My italics.—J. St.

alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power." (*Ibid.*, p. 460.)

Pointing out one of the most important aims of the dictatorship, the aim of suppressing the exploiters, Lenin says:

"The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on the use of force." (See Vol. XXV, p. 441.)

"Dictatorship means—note this once and for all, Messrs. Cadets—unrestricted power, based on force and not on law. In time of civil war any victorious power can be only a dictatorship." (See Vol. XXV, p. 436.)

But of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean only the use of force, although there is no dictatorship without the use of force.

"Dictatorship," says Lenin, "does not mean only the use of force, although it is impossible without the use of force; it also means the organization of labour on a higher level than the previous organization." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 305.)

"The dictatorship of the proletariat ... is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this revolutionary use of force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organization of labour compared with capitalism. This is the essence. This is the source of the strength and the guarantee of the inevitable complete triumph of communism." (See Vol. XXIV, pp. 335-36.)

"Its quintessence (i.e., of the dictatorship—*J. St.*) is the organization and discipline of the advanced detachment of the working people, of its vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, to abolish the division of society into classes, to make all members of society working people, to remove the basis for any exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganization of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois conduct of economy can be overcome only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism." (*Ibid.*, p. 314.)

Such are the characteristic features of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hence the three main aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat for the suppression of the exploiters, for the defence of the country, for the consolidation of the ties with the proletarians of other lands, and for the development and victory of the revolution in all countries.

2) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat in order to detach the labouring and exploited masses once and for all from the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the alliance of the proletariat with these masses, to draw these masses into the work of socialist construction, and to ensure the state leadership of these masses by the proletariat.

3) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat for the organization of socialism, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a socialist society.

The proletarian dictatorship is a combination of all these three aspects. No single one of these aspects can be advanced as the sole characteristic feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement, the absence of even one of these features is sufficient for the dictatorship of the proletariat to cease being a dictatorship. Therefore, not one of these three aspects can be omitted without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only all these three aspects taken together give us the complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special forms, diverse methods of work. During the period of civil war, it is the forcible aspect of the dictatorship that is most conspicuous. But it by no means follows from this that no constructive work is carried on during the period of civil war. Without constructive work it is impossible to wage civil war. During the period of socialist construction, on the other hand, it is the peaceful, organizational and cultural work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., that are most conspicuous. But, again, it by no means follows from this that the forcible aspect of the dictatorship has ceased to exist or can cease to exist in the period of construction.

The organs of suppression, the army and other organizations; are as necessary now, at the time of construction, as they were during the period of civil war. Without these organs, constructive work by the dictatorship with any degree of security would be impossible. It should not be forgotten that for the time being the revolution has been victorious in only one country. It should not be forgotten that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the danger of intervention, with all the consequences resulting from this danger, will also exist.

V

THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

I have dealt above with the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its historical inevitability, from the point of view of its class content, from the point of view of its state nature, and, finally, from the point of view of the destructive and creative tasks which it performs throughout the entire historical period that is termed the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Now we must say something about the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its structure, from the point of view of its "mechanism," from the point of view of the role and significance of the "transmission belts," the "levers," and the "directing force" which in their totality constitute "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (*Lenin*), and with the help of which the daily work of the dictatorship of the proletariat is accomplished.

What are these "transmission belts" or "levers" in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this "directing force"? Why are they needed?

The levers or transmission belts are those very mass organizations of the proletariat without the aid of which the dictatorship cannot be realized.

The directing force is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, its vanguard, which is the main guiding force of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them, in its struggle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in face of organized and armed capital. The proletariat needs these organizations because without them it would suffer inevitable defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its fight for the consolidation of its rule, in its fight for the building of socialism. The systematic help of these organizations and the directing force of the vanguard are needed because in the absence of these conditions it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

What are these organizations?

Firstly, there are the workers' *trade unions*, with their central and local ramifications in the shape of a whole series of organizations concerned with production, culture, education, etc. These unite the workers of all trades. They are non-Party organizations. The trade unions may be termed the all-embracing organization of the working class, which is in power in our country. They are a school of communism. They promote the best people from their midst for the work of leadership in all branches of administration. They form the link between the advanced and the backward elements in the ranks of the working class. They connect the masses of the workers with the vanguard of the working class.

Secondly, there are the *Soviets*, with their numerous central and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, economic, military, cultural and other state organizations, plus the innumerable mass associations of the working people which have sprung up of their own accord and which encompass these organizations and connect them with the population. The Soviets are a mass organization of all the working people of town and country. They are a non-Party organization. The Soviets are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is through the Soviets

that all measures for strengthening the dictatorship and for building socialism are carried out. It is through the Soviets that the state leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is exercised. The Soviets connect the vast masses of the working people with the vanguard of the proletariat.

Thirdly, there are the *cooperatives* of all kinds, with all their ramifications. These are a mass organization of the working people, a non-Party organization, which unites the working people primarily as consumers, and also, in the course of time, as producers (agricultural cooperatives). The cooperatives acquire special significance after the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the period of extensive construction. They facilitate contact between the vanguard of the proletariat and the mass of the peasantry and make it possible to draw the latter into the channel of socialist construction.

Fourthly, there is the *Youth League*. This is a mass organization of young workers and peasants; it is a non-Party organization, but is linked with the Party. Its task is to help the Party to educate the young generation in the spirit of socialism. It provides young reserves for all the other mass organizations of the proletariat in all branches of administration. The Youth League has acquired special significance since the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of extensive cultural and educational work carried on by the proletariat.

Lastly, there is the *Party* of the proletariat, its vanguard. Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organizations of the latter. Its function is to *combine* the work of all the mass organizations of the proletariat without exception and to *direct* their activities towards a single goal, the goal of the emancipation of the proletariat. And it is absolutely necessary to combine and direct them towards a single goal, for otherwise unity in the struggle of the proletariat is impossible, for otherwise the guidance of the proletarian masses in their struggle for power, in their struggle for building socialism, is impossible. But only the vanguard of the proletariat, its Party, is capable of combining and

directing the work of the mass organizations of the proletariat. Only the party of the proletariat, only the Communist Party, is capable of fulfilling this role of main leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Why?

"...because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class." (See *The Foundations of Leninism*.)

The Party is the main guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat." (*Lenin*.)

To sum up: the *trade unions*, as the mass organization of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production; the *Soviets*, as the mass organization of the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of state administration; the *cooperatives*, as the mass organization mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses primarily in the economic sphere, in the sphere of drawing the peasantry into the work of socialist construction; the *Youth League*, as the mass organization of young workers and peasants, whose mission it is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the socialist education of the new generation and in training young reserves; and, finally, the *Party*, as the main directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose mission it is to lead all these mass organizations—such, in general, is the picture of the "mechanism" of the dictatorship, the picture of "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Without the Party as the main guiding force, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

Thus, in the words of Lenin, "taken as a whole, we have a formally non-Communist, flexible and relatively wide, and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked with the *class* and with the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *dictatorship of the class* is exercised." (See Vol. XXV, p. 192.)

Of course, this must not be understood in the sense that the Party can or should take the place of the trade unions, the Soviets, and the other mass organizations. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through the Soviets and their ramifications. Without these "transmission belts," it would be impossible for the dictatorship to be at all firm.

"It is impossible to exercise the dictatorship," says Lenin, "without having a number of 'transmission belts' from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 65.)

"The Party, so to speak, draws into its ranks the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without a foundation like the trade unions the dictatorship cannot be exercised, state functions cannot be fulfilled. And these functions have to be exercised *through** a number of special institutions also of a new type, namely, *through** the Soviet apparatus." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 64.)

The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directives from the Party. *In this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern:

* My italics.—J. St.

"Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority.

"And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic feature of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in every capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favour of the minority consisting of the best organized and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us." (See Vol. XXV, p. 347.)

But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a *sign of equality* can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party) that the former can be *identified* with the latter, that the latter can be *substituted* for the former. Sorin, for example, says that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party*." This thesis, as you see, identifies the "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot. And for the following reasons:

Firstly. In the passage from his speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern quoted above, Lenin does not by any means identify the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. He merely says that "only this class-conscious minority (i.e., the Party—*J. St.*) can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them," that it is *precisely in this sense* that "by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority."

* My italics.—*J. St.*

To say "in essence" does not mean "wholly." We often say that the national question is, in essence, a peasant question. And this is quite true. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question, that the peasant question is equal in scope to the national question, that the peasant question and the national question are identical. There is no need to prove that the national question is wider and richer in its scope than the peasant question. The same must be said by analogy as regards the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the "dictatorship" of its party, this does not mean that the "dictatorship of the Party" (its leading role) is *identical* with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the former is *equal* in scope to the latter. There is no need to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is wider and richer in its scope than the leading role of the Party. The Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it carries out the dictatorship of the *proletariat*, and not any other kind of dictatorship. Whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes "dictatorship" of the Party for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly. Not a single important decision is arrived at by the mass organizations of the proletariat without guiding directives from the Party. That is perfectly true. But does that mean that the dictatorship of the proletariat *consists entirely* of the guiding directives given by the Party? Does that mean that, in view of this, the guiding directives of the Party can be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not. The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the guiding directives of the Party plus the carrying out of these directives by the mass organizations of the proletariat, plus their fulfilment by the population. Here, as you see, we have to deal with a whole series of transitions and intermediary steps which are by no means unimportant elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, between the guiding directives of the Party and their fulfilment lie the will and actions

of those who are led, the will and actions of the class, its willingness (or unwillingness) to support such directives, its ability (or inability) to carry out these directives, its ability (or inability) to carry them out in strict accordance with the demands of the situation. It scarcely needs proof that the Party, having taken the leadership into its hands, cannot but reckon with the will, the condition, the level of political consciousness of those who are led, cannot leave out of account the will, the condition, and level of political consciousness of its class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the directives given by the Party for the will and actions of the class.

Thirdly. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 311.) How can this *class* struggle find expression? It may find expression in a series of armed actions by the proletariat against the sorties of the overthrown bourgeoisie, or against the intervention of the foreign bourgeoisie. It may find expression in civil war, if the power of the proletariat has not yet been consolidated. It may find expression, after power has already been consolidated, in the extensive organizational and constructive work of the proletariat, with the enlistment of the broad masses in this work. In all these cases, the acting force is the proletariat as *a class*. It has never happened that the Party, the Party alone, has undertaken all these actions with only its own forces, without the support of the class. Usually it only directs these actions, and it can direct them only to the extent that it has the support of the class. For the Party cannot cover, cannot replace the class. For, despite all its important leading role, the Party still remains *a part* of the class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the class.

Fourthly. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The Party is the direct governing vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader." (*Lenin.*) In this sense the Party *takes*

power, the Party *governs the country*. But this must not be understood in the sense that the Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat separately from the state power, without the state power; that the Party governs the country separately from the Soviets, not through the Soviets. This does not mean that the Party can be identified with the Soviets, with the state power. The Party is the core of this power, but it is not and cannot be identified with the state power.

"As the ruling Party," says Lenin, "we could not but merge the Soviet 'top leadership' with the Party 'top leadership'—in our country they are merged and will remain so." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 208.) This is quite true. But by this Lenin by no means wants to imply that our Soviet institutions as a whole, for instance our army, our transport, our economic institutions, etc., are Party institutions, that the Party can replace the Soviets and their ramifications, that the Party can be identified with the state power. Lenin repeatedly said that "the system of Soviets is the dictatorship of the proletariat," and that "the Soviet power is the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 15, 14); but he never said that the Party is the state power, that the Soviets and the Party are one and the same thing. The Party, with a membership of several hundred thousand, guides the Soviets and their central and local ramifications, which embrace tens of millions of people, both Party and non-Party, but it cannot and should not supplant them. That is why Lenin says that "the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organized in the Soviets, the proletariat led by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks"; that "all the work of the Party is carried on *through** the Soviets, which embrace the labouring masses irrespective of occupation" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 192, 193); and that the dictatorship "has to be exercised *through** the Soviet apparatus." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 64.) Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power.

* My italics.—J. St.

Fifthly. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat is a state concept. The dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes the concept of force. There is no dictatorship without the use of force, if dictatorship is to be understood in the strict sense of the word. Lenin defines the dictatorship of the proletariat as "power based directly on the *use of force*." (See Vol. XIX, p. 315.) Hence, to talk about dictatorship of the Party in *relation to the proletarian class*, and to identify it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, is tantamount to saying that in relation to its class the Party must be not only a guide, not only a leader and teacher, but also a sort of dictator employing force against it, which, of course, is quite incorrect. Therefore, whoever identifies "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat tacitly proceeds from the assumption that the prestige of the Party can be built up on force employed against the working class, which is absurd and quite incompatible with Leninism. The prestige of the Party is sustained by the confidence of the working class. And the confidence of the working class is gained not by force—force only kills it—but by the Party's correct theory, by the Party's correct policy, by the Party's devotion to the working class, by its connection with the masses of the working class, by its readiness and ability to *convince* the masses of the correctness of its slogans.

What, then, follows from all this?

From this it follows that:

1) Lenin uses the word *dictatorship* of the Party not in the strict sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"), but in the figurative sense, in the sense of its undivided leadership.

2) Whoever identifies the leadership of the Party with the *dictatorship* of the proletariat distorts Lenin, wrongly attributing to the Party the function of employing force against the working class as a whole.

3) Whoever attributes to the Party the function, which it does not possess, of employing force against the working class as a whole, violates the elementary requirements of correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, between the Party and the proletariat.

Thus, we have come right up to the question of the mutual relations between the Party and the class, between Party and non-Party members of the working class.

Lenin defines these mutual relations as "*mutual confidence** between the vanguard of the working class and the mass of the workers." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 235.)

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that the Party must closely heed the voice of the masses; that it must pay careful attention to the revolutionary instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice of the struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correctness of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only teach the masses, but also learn from them.

It means, secondly, that the Party must day by day win the confidence of the proletarian masses; that it must by its policy and work secure the support of the masses; that it must not command but primarily convince the masses, helping them to realize through their own experience the correctness of the policy of the Party; that, consequently, it must be the guide, the leader and teacher of its class.

To violate these conditions means to upset the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, to undermine "mutual confidence," to shatter both class and Party discipline.

"Certainly," says Lenin, "almost everyone now realizes that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and *without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class*,* that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin further, "is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without

* My italics.—J. St.

a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class,* without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully." (See Vol. XXV, p. 190.)

But how does the Party acquire this confidence and support of the class? How is the iron discipline necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat built up within the working class; on what soil does it grow up?

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

"How is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? Firstly, by the class consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its stamina, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, by its ability to link itself with, to keep in close touch with, and to a certain extent, if you like, *to merge with the broadest masses of the working people**—primarily with the proletarian, but also with the nonproletarian, labouring masses. Thirdly, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided that the broadest masses have been convinced *through their own experience* of this correctness. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party that is really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, attempts to establish discipline inevitably become a cipher, an empty phrase, mere affectation. On the other hand, these conditions cannot arise all at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated only by correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement." (See Vol. XXV, p. 174.)

And further:

"Victory over capitalism requires the correct correlation between the leading, Communist, Party, the revolutionary class—the proletariat—and the masses, i.e., the working people and exploited as a whole. Only the Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that class, if it consists of fully class-conscious and devoted Communists who have been educated and

* My italics.—J. St.

stealed by the experience of stubborn revolutionary struggle, if this Party has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of exploited, and if it has succeeded in inspiring *the complete confidence* of this class and *this mass**—only such a party is capable of leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, resolute and final struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a party can the proletariat develop the full might of its revolutionary onslaught and nullify the inevitable apathy and, partly, resistance of the small minority of the labour aristocracy corrupted by capitalism, and of the old trade-union and cooperative leaders, etc.—only then will it be able to display its full strength, which, owing to the very economic structure of capitalist society, is immeasurably greater than the proportion of the population it constitutes." (See Vol. XXV, p. 315.)

From these quotations it follows that:

- 1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat are built up not on fear or on "unrestricted" rights of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the Party, on the support which the Party receives from the working class.
- 2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not acquired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the working class, but by the Party's prolonged work among the masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the Party to convince the masses through their own experience of the correctness of its policy, by the ability of the Party to secure the support of the working class and to take the lead of the masses of the working class.
- 3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experience of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership by the Party.
- 4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership, cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, because without the leadership of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the

* My italics.—J. St.

Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all firm.

Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron discipline within the working class are either empty phrases or boastfulness and adventurism.

It is impossible to counterpose the dictatorship of the proletariat to the leadership (the "dictatorship") of the Party. It is impossible because the leadership of the Party is the principal thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we have in mind a dictatorship that is at all firm and complete, and not one like the Paris Commune, for instance, which was neither a complete nor a firm dictatorship. It is impossible because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Party lie, as it were, on the same line of activity, operate in the same direction.

"The mere presentation of the question," says Lenin, "dictatorship of the Party *or* dictatorship of the class? dictatorship (Party) of the leaders *or* dictatorship (Party) of the masses?" testifies to the most incredible and hopeless confusion of thought.... Everyone knows that the masses are divided into classes...; that usually, and in the majority of cases, at least in modern civilized countries, classes are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are directed by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions and are called leaders.... To go so far ... as to counterpose, in general, dictatorship of the masses to dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd and stupid." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 187, 188.)

That is absolutely correct. But that correct statement proceeds from the premise that correct mutual relations exist between the vanguard and the masses of the workers, between the Party and the class. It proceeds from the assumption that the mutual relations between the vanguard and the class remain, so to say, normal, remain within the bounds of "mutual confidence."

But what if the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, the relations of "mutual confidence" between the Party and the class are upset?

What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations of its

correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the foundations of "mutual confidence"?

Are such cases at all possible?

Yes, they are.

They are possible:

1) if the Party begins to build its prestige among the masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses, but on its "unrestricted" rights;

2) if the Party's policy is obviously wrong and the Party is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;

3) if the Party's policy is correct on the whole but the masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own experience that the Party's policy is correct, and seeks to impose it on the masses.

The history of our Party provides a number of such cases. Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief and disappeared because they violated one of these three conditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.

But it follows from this that counterposing the dictatorship of the proletariat to the "dictatorship" (leadership) of the Party can be regarded as incorrect only:

1) if by dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class we mean not a dictatorship in the proper sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"), but the leadership of the Party, which precludes the use of force against the working class as a whole, against its majority, precisely as Lenin meant it;

2) if the Party has the qualifications to be the real leader of the class, i.e., if the Party's policy is correct, if this policy accords with the interests of the class;

3) if the class, if the majority of the class, accepts that policy, makes that policy its own, becomes convinced, as a result of the work of the Party, that that policy is correct, has confidence in the Party and supports it.

The violation of these conditions inevitably gives rise to a conflict between the Party and the class, to a split between them, to their being counterposed to each other.

Can the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force? No, it cannot. At all events, *such* a leadership cannot be at all durable. If the Party wants to remain the Party of the proletariat it must know that it is, primarily and principally, the *guide*, the *leader*, the *teacher* of the working class. We must not forget what Lenin said on this subject in his pamphlet *The State and Revolution*:

"By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, which is capable of taking power and *of leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the *teacher*, the *guide*, the *leader** of all the toilers and exploited in building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie." (See Vol. XXI, p. 386.)

Can one consider the Party as the real leader of the class if its policy is wrong, if its policy comes into collision with the interests of the class? Of course not. In such cases the Party, if it wants to remain the leader, must reconsider its policy, must correct its policy, must acknowledge its mistake and correct it. In confirmation of this thesis one could cite, for example, such a fact from the history of our Party as the period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system, when the masses of workers and peasants were obviously discontented with our policy and when the Party openly and honestly decided to reconsider this policy. Here is what Lenin said at the time, at the Tenth Party Congress, on the question of abolishing the surplus-appropriation system and introducing the New Economic Policy:

"We must not try to conceal anything, but must say straightforwardly that the peasantry is not satisfied with the form of relations that has been established with it, that it does not want this form of relations and will not go on living in this way. That is indisputable. It has definitely expressed this will. This is the will of the vast mass of the labouring population. We must reckon with this; and we are sufficiently sober politicians to

* My italics.—J. St.

say straightforwardly: *Let us reconsider our policy towards the peasantry.*" (See Vol. XXVI, p. 238.)

Can one consider that the Party should take the initiative and leadership in organizing decisive actions by the masses merely on the ground that its policy is correct on the whole, *if* that policy does not yet meet the confidence and support of the class because, say, of the latter's political backwardness; *if* the Party has not yet succeeded in convincing the class of the correctness of its policy because, say, events have not yet matured? No, one cannot. In such cases the Party, if it wants to be a real leader, must know how to bide its time, must convince the masses that its policy is correct, must help the masses to become convinced through their own experience that this policy is correct.

"If the revolutionary party," says Lenin, "has not a majority in the advanced detachments of the revolutionary classes and in the country, an uprising is out of the question." (See Vol. XXI, p. 282.)

"Revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, and this change is brought about by the political experience of the masses." (See Vol. XXV, p. 221.)

"The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this not even the first step towards victory can be made. But it is still a fairly long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience." (*Ibid.*, p. 228.)

We know that this is precisely how our Party acted during the period from Lenin's April Theses to the October uprising of 1917. And it was precisely because it acted according to these directives of Lenin's that it was successful in the uprising.

Such, basically, are the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

* My italics.—J. St.

What does *leadership* mean when the policy of the Party is correct and the correct relations between the vanguard and the class are not upset?

Leadership under these circumstances means the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to put forward and to carry out such slogans as bring the masses to the Party's positions and help them to realize through their own experience the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to raise the masses to the Party's level of political consciousness, and thus secure the support of the masses and their readiness for the decisive struggle.

Therefore, the method of persuasion is the principal method of the Party's leadership of the working class.

"If we, in Russia today," says Lenin, "after two-and-a-half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of trade-union membership, we should be committing a folly, we should be damaging our influence over the masses, we should be helping the Mensheviks. For the whole task of the Communists is to be able to *convince* the backward elements, to be able to work *among* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them by artificial and childishly 'Left' slogans." (See Vol. XXV, p. 197.)

This, of course, must not be understood in the sense that the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man, and that only after this is it possible to proceed to action; that only after this is it possible to start operations. Not at all! It only means that before entering upon decisive political actions the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary work, secure for itself the support of the majority of the masses of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the majority of the class. Otherwise Lenin's thesis, that a necessary condition for victorious revolution is that the Party should win over the majority of the working class, would be devoid of all meaning.

Well, and what is to be done with the minority, if it does not wish, if it does not agree voluntarily to submit to the will of the majority? Can the Party, must the Party, enjoying the confidence

of the majority, compel the minority to submit to the will of the majority? Yes, it can and it must. Leadership is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the principal method by which the Party influences the masses. This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party and support for it on the part of the majority of the working class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has convinced the majority.

It would be well to recall the controversies around this subject that took place in our Party during the discussion on the trade union question. What was the mistake of the Opposition, the mistake of the Tsektran, at that time? Was it that the Opposition then considered it possible to resort to coercion? No! It was not that. The mistake of the Opposition at that time was that, being unable to convince the majority of the correctness of its position, having lost the confidence of the majority, it nevertheless began to apply coercion, began to insist on "shaking up" those who enjoyed the confidence of the majority.

Here is what Lenin said at that time, at the Tenth Congress of the Party, in his speech on the trade unions:

"In order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the masses of the workers, it was necessary, if the Tsektran had made a mistake to correct this mistake. But when people begin to defend this mistake, it becomes a source of political danger. Had not the utmost possible been done in the way of democracy in heeding the moods expressed here by Kutuzov, we would have met with political bankruptcy. *First we must convince, and then coerce. We must at all costs first convince, and then coerce.** We were not able to convince the broad masses, and we upset the correct relations between the vanguard and the masses." (See Vol. XXVI, p. 235.)

Lenin says the same thing in his pamphlet *On the Trade Unions*:

"We applied coercion correctly and successfully only when we were able to create beforehand a basis of conviction for it." (*Ibid.*, p. 74.)

* My italics.—J. St.

And that is quite true, for without those conditions no leadership is possible. For only in that way can we ensure unity of action in the Party, if we are speaking of the Party, or unity of action of the class, if we are speaking of the class as a whole. Without this there is splitting, confusion and demoralization in the ranks of the working class.

Such in general are the fundamentals of correct leadership of the working class by the Party.

Any other conception of leadership is syndicalism, anarchism, bureaucracy—anything you please, but not Bolshevism, not Leninism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be counterposed to the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party if correct mutual relations exist between the Party and the working class, between the vanguard and the masses of the workers. But from this it follows that it is all the more impermissible to identify the Party with the working class, the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party with the dictatorship of the working class. *On the ground* that the "dictatorship" of the Party cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sorin arrived at the wrong conclusion that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.*"

But Lenin not only speaks of the impermissibility of such counterposition, he also speaks of the impermissibility of counterposing "the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders." Would you, *on this ground*, have us identify the dictatorship of leaders with the dictatorship of the proletariat? If we took that line, we would have to say that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our leaders.*" But it is precisely to this absurdity that we are led, properly speaking, by the policy of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat....

Where does Zinoviev stand on this subject?

In essence, Zinoviev shares Sorin's point of view of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat—with the difference, however, that Sorin expresses

himself more openly and clearly, whereas Zinoviev "wriggles." One need only take, for instance, the following passage in Zinoviev's book *Leninism* to be convinced of this:

"What," says Zinoviev, "is the system existing in the U.S.S.R. from the standpoint of its class content? It is the dictatorship of the proletariat. What is the direct mainspring of power in the U.S.S.R.? Who exercises the power of the working class? The Communist Party! In this sense, *we have** the dictatorship of the Party. What is the juridical form of power in the U.S.S.R.? What is the new type of state system that was created by the October Revolution? The Soviet system. The one does not in the least contradict the other."

That the one does not contradict the other is, of course, correct *if* by the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class as a whole we mean the leadership of the Party. But how is it possible, *on this ground*, to place a sign of equality between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "dictatorship" of the Party, between the Soviet system and the "dictatorship" of the Party? Lenin identified the system of Soviets with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he was right, for the Soviets, *our* Soviets, are organizations which rally the labouring masses around the proletariat under the leadership of the Party. But when, where, and in which of his writings did Lenin place a sign of equality between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the system of Soviets, as Zinoviev does now? Neither the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party nor the leadership ("dictatorship") of the leaders contradicts the dictatorship of the proletariat. Would you, *on this ground*, have us proclaim that our country is the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the Party, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the leaders? And yet the "principle" of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Zinoviev enunciates surreptitiously and uncourageously, leads precisely to this absurdity.

* My italics.—J. St.

In Lenin's numerous works I have been able to note only five cases in which he touches, in passing, on the question of the dictatorship of the Party.

The first case is in his controversy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, where he says:

"When we are reproached with the dictatorship of one party, and when, as you have heard, a proposal is made to establish a united socialist front, we reply: 'Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand by it, and cannot depart from it, for it is that Party which, in the course of decades, has won the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat.'" (See Vol. XXIV, p. 423.)

The second case is in his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak," in which he says:

"Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries—all of them, even the 'Lefts' among them) are trying to scare the peasants with the bogey of the 'dictatorship of one party,' the party of Bolsheviks, Communists.

"The peasants have learned from the instance of Kolchak not to be afraid of this bogey.

"Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron rule) of the landlords and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 436.)

The third case is Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern in his controversy with Tanner. I have quoted it above.

The fourth case is a few lines in the pamphlet "*Left-Wing* Communism, an Infantile Disorder. The passages in question have already been quoted above.

And the fifth case is in his draft outline of the dictatorship of the proletariat, published in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Volume III, where there is a sub-heading "Dictatorship of One Party." (See *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. III, p. 497.)

It should be noted that in two out of the five cases, the last and the second, Lenin puts the words "dictatorship of one party" in quotation marks, thus clearly emphasizing the inexact, figurative sense of this formula.

It should also be noted that in every one of these cases, by the "dictatorship of the Party" Lenin meant dictatorship ("iron rule") over the "landlords and capitalists," and not over the working class, contrary to the slanderous fabrications of Kautsky and Co.

It is characteristic that in *none* of his works, major or secondary, in which Lenin discusses or merely alludes to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is there any hint whatever that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party." On the contrary, every page, every line of these works cries out against such a formula. (See *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*, etc.)

Even more characteristic is the fact that in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the role of a political party, which were drawn up under the direct guidance of Lenin, and to which Lenin repeatedly referred in his speeches as a model of the correct formulation of the role and tasks of the Party, we find *not one word*, literally *not one word*, about dictatorship of the Party.

What does all this indicate?

It indicates that:

a) Lenin did not regard the formula "dictatorship of the Party" as irreproachable and exact, for which reason it is very rarely used in Lenin's works, and is sometimes put in quotation marks;

b) on the few occasions that Lenin was obliged, in controversy with opponents, to speak of the dictatorship of the Party, he usually referred to the "dictatorship of *one* party," i.e., to the fact that our Party holds power *alone*, that it *does not share* power with *other* parties. Moreover, he always made it clear that the dictatorship of the Party *in relation to the working class* meant the leadership of the Party, its leading role;

c) in all those cases in which Lenin thought it necessary to give a scientific definition of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he spoke *exclusively* of the

leading role of the Party in relation to the working class (and there are thousands of such cases);

d) that is why it never "occurred" to Lenin to include the formula "dictatorship of the Party" in the fundamental resolution on the role of the Party—I have in mind the resolution adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern;

e) the comrades who identify, or try to identify, the "dictatorship" of the Party and, therefore, the "dictatorship of the leaders" with the dictatorship of the proletariat are wrong from the point of view of Leninism, and are politically shortsighted, for they thereby violate the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

This is apart from the fact that the formula "dictatorship of the Party," when taken without the above-mentioned reservations, can give rise to quite a number of dangers and political setbacks in our practical work. This formula, taken without reservations, says, as it were:

a) *to the non-Party masses*: don't dare to contradict, don't dare to argue, for the Party can do everything, for we have the dictatorship of the Party;

b) *to the Party cadres*: act more boldly, tighten the screw, there is no need to heed what the non-Party masses say, we have the dictatorship of the Party;

c) *to the top leadership of the Party*: you may indulge in the luxury of a certain amount of complacency, you may even become conceited, for we have the dictatorship of the Party, and, "consequently," the dictatorship of the leaders.

It is opportune to call attention to these dangers precisely at the present moment, in a period when the political activity of the masses is rising, when the readiness of the Party to heed the voice of the masses is of particular value to us, when attention to the requirements of the masses is a fundamental precept of our Party, when it is incumbent upon the Party to display particular caution and particular flexibility in its policy, when the danger of becoming conceited is one of the most serious dangers confronting the Party in its task of correctly leading the masses.

One cannot but recall Lenin's golden words at the Eleventh Congress of our Party:

"Among the mass of the people we (the Communists—*J. St.*) are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we properly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 256.)

"Properly express what the people are conscious of"—this is precisely the necessary condition that ensures for the Party the honourable role of the principal guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

VI

THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* (May 1924, first edition) contains two formulations on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. The first of these says:

"Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world—all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries." (See *The Foundations of Leninism*.)

This thesis is quite correct and needs no comment. It is directed against the theory of the Social-Democrats, who regard the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country, without the simultaneous victory of the revolution in other countries, as utopian.

But the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a second formulation, which says:

"But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. The principal task of socialism—the organization of socialist production—has still to be fulfilled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be achieved in one country, without the joint efforts of the proletarians in several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required." (See *The Foundations of Leninism*, first edition.)

This second formulation was directed against the assertions of the critics of Leninism, against the Trotskyists, who declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, in the absence of victory in other countries, could not "hold out in the face of a conservative Europe."

To that extent—but only to that extent—this formulation was then (May 1924) adequate, and undoubtedly it was of some service.

Subsequently, however, when the criticism of Leninism in this sphere had already been overcome in the Party, when a new question had come to the fore—the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society by the efforts of our country, without help from abroad—the second formulation became obviously inadequate, and therefore incorrect.

What is the defect in this formulation?

Its defect is that it joins two different questions into one: it joins the question of the *possibility* of building socialism by the efforts of one country—which must be answered in the affirmative—with the question whether a country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat exists can consider itself *fully guaranteed* against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the old order, without a victorious revolution in a number of other countries—which must be answered in the

negative. This is apart from the fact that this formulation may give occasion for thinking that the organization of a socialist society by the efforts of one country is impossible—which, of course, is incorrect.

On this ground I modified and corrected this formulation in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924); I divided the question into two—into the question of a *full guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order*, and the question of the *possibility of building a complete socialist society* in one country. This was effected, in the first place, by treating the “complete victory of socialism” as a “full guarantee against the restoration of the old order,” which is possible only through “the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries”; and, secondly, by proclaiming, on the basis of Lenin’s pamphlet *On Cooperation*, the indisputable truth that we have all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society. (See *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*.)*

It was this new formulation of the question that formed the basis for the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference “The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.),” which examines the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection with the stabilization of capitalism (April 1925), and considers that the building of socialism by the efforts of our country is possible and necessary.

This new formulation also served as the basis for my pamphlet *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* published in May 1925, immediately after the Fourteenth Party Conference.

With regard to the presentation of the question of the victory of socialism in one country, this pamphlet states:

“Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the

* This new formulation of the question was substituted for the old one in subsequent editions of the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*.

peasantry (this refers to the building of socialism in one country—*J. St.*). The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism (this refers to the final victory of socialism—*J. St.*).”... “Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddlehead or an incorrigible opportunist.” (See *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.[B.]*.)

On the question of the *victory* of socialism in our country, the pamphlet states:

“We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class” for “under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess all that is needed to build a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts.” (*Ibid.*)

On the question of the *final* victory of socialism, it states:

“The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism.” (*Ibid.*)

Clear, one would think.

It is well known that this question was treated in the same spirit in my pamphlet *Questions and Answers* (June 1925) and in the political report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B.) (December 1925).

Such are the facts.

These facts, I think, are known to all the comrades, including Zinoviev.

If now, nearly two years after the ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at the Fourteenth

Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided question of the victory of socialism in one country—then this peculiar trick of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee, means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions, to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat.

What is meant by the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in one country?

It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Without such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without being sure that socialism will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building socialism without being sure that we can build it completely, without being sure that the technical backwardness of our country is not an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from Leninism.

What is meant by the *impossibility* of the complete, final victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries?

It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution in at least

a number of countries. To deny this indisputable thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from Leninism.

"We are living," says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organization also." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 122.)

"We have before us," says Lenin in another passage, "a certain equilibrium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an unquestionable, an indisputable equilibrium nevertheless. Will it last long? I do not know and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore we must exercise very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the lesson which all the workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner of invasion." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 117.)

Clear, one would think.

Where does Zinoviev stand as regards the question of the victory of socialism in one country?

Listen:

"By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class, in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat." "In order to get a clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the year 1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things: 1) the assured possibility of engaging in building socialism—such a possibility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e., the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society."

What can all this signify?

It signifies that by the final victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands, not a guarantee against intervention and restoration, but the possibility of completely building socialist society. And by the victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev

understands the kind of building socialism which cannot and should not lead to completely building socialism. Building at haphazard, without prospects, building socialism although completely building a socialist society is impossible—such is Zinoviev's position.

To engage in building socialism *without the possibility* of completely building it, *knowing that it cannot be completely built*—such are the absurdities in which Zinoviev has involved himself.

But this is a mockery of the question, not a solution of it!

Here is another extract from Zinoviev's reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress:

"Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: 'Is it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies, to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?' And he answers: 'On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely build socialism.' (*Kurskaya Pravda*, No. 279, December 8, 1925.) *Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question?*" Zinoviev asks, "*does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?*"*

Thus, according to Zinoviev, to recognize the possibility of completely building socialism in one country means adopting the point of view of national narrow-mindedness, while to deny such a possibility means adopting the point of view of internationalism.

But if that is true, is it at all worth while fighting for victory over the capitalist elements in our economy? Does it not follow from this that such a victory is impossible?

Capitulation to the capitalist elements in our economy—that is what the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us to.

And this absurdity, which has nothing in common with Leninism, is presented to us by Zinoviev as "internationalism," as "100 per cent Leninism!"

* My italics.—J. St.

I assert that on this most important question of building socialism Zinoviev is deserting Leninism and slipping to the standpoint of the Menshevik Sukhanov.

Let us turn to Lenin. Here is what he said about the victory of socialism in one country even before the October Revolution, in August 1915:

"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and *organized socialist production*,* would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." (See Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33.)

What is meant by Lenin's phrase "having organized socialist production" which I have stressed? It means that the proletariat of the victorious country, having seized power, *can* and *must* organize socialist production. And what does to "organize socialist production" mean? It means completely building a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this clear and definite statement of Lenin's requires no further comment. Otherwise Lenin's call for the seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 would be incomprehensible.

You see that this clear thesis of Lenin's, in comparison with Zinoviev's muddled and anti-Leninist "thesis" that we can engage in building socialism "within the limits of one country," although it is *impossible* to build it completely, is as different from the latter as the heavens from the earth.

The statement quoted above was made by Lenin in 1915, before the proletariat had taken power. But perhaps he modified his views after the experience of taking power, after 1917? Let us turn to Lenin's pamphlet *On Cooperation*, written in 1923.

* My italics.—J. St.

"As a matter of fact," says Lenin, "state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?** This is not yet the building of socialist society, but *it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building.*”* (See Vol. XXVII, p. 392.)

In other words, we can and must build a complete socialist society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary and sufficient for this building.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Compare this classical thesis of Lenin's with the anti-Leninist rebuke Zinoviev administered to Yakovlev, and you will realize that Yakovlev was only repeating Lenin's words about the possibility of completely building socialism in one country, whereas Zinoviev, by attacking this thesis and castigating Yakovlev, deserted Lenin and adopted the point of view of the Menshevik Sukhanov, the point of view that it is impossible to build socialism completely in our country owing to its technical backwardness.

One can only wonder why we took power in October 1917 if we did not count on completely building socialism.

We should not have taken power in October 1917—this is the conclusion to which the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us.

I assert further that in the highly important question of the victory of socialism Zinoviev has gone *counter* to the definite decisions of our Party, as registered in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."

Let us turn to this resolution. Here is what it says about the victory of socialism in one country:

* My italics.—J. St.

"The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the *final victory of socialism*, i.e., the *guarantee against restoration*,* is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries...." "Leninism teaches that the *final victory of socialism*, *in the sense of a full guarantee against the restoration** of bourgeois relationships, is possible only on an international scale...." "But it does not follow* from this that it is impossible to build a *complete socialist society** in a backward country like Russia, without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically." (See the resolution.)

As you see, the resolution interprets the final victory of socialism as a guarantee against intervention and restoration, *in complete contrast* to Zinoviev's interpretation in his book *Leninism*.

As you see, the resolution recognizes the possibility of building a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the "state aid" of countries more developed technically and economically, *in complete contrast* to what Zinoviev said when he rebuked Yakovlev in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.

How else can this be described if not as a struggle on Zinoviev's part *against* the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference?

Of course, Party resolutions are sometimes not free from error. Sometimes they contain mistakes. Speaking generally, one may assume that the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference also contains certain errors. Perhaps Zinoviev thinks that this resolution is erroneous. But then he should say so clearly and openly, as befits a Bolshevik. For some reason or other, however, Zinoviev does not do so. He preferred to choose another path, that of attacking the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference from the rear, while keeping silent about this resolution and refraining from any open criticism of the resolution. Zinoviev evidently thinks that this will be the best way of achieving his purpose. And he has but one purpose, namely—to "improve" the resolution, and to amend Lenin "just a little bit." It scarcely needs proof that Zinoviev has made a mistake in his calculations.

* My italics.—J. St.

What is Zinoviev's mistake due to? What is the root of this mistake?

The root of this mistake, in my opinion, lies in Zinoviev's conviction that the technical backwardness of our country is an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society; that the proletariat cannot completely build socialism owing to the technical backwardness of our country. Zinoviev and Kamenev once tried to raise this argument at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party prior to the April Party Conference. But they received a rebuff and were compelled to retreat, and *formally* they submitted to the opposite point of view, the point of view of the majority of the Central Committee. But although he formally submitted to it, Zinoviev has continued to wage a struggle against it all the time. Here is what the Moscow Committee of our Party says about this "incident" in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in its "Reply" to the Letter of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference:

"Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of the Central Committee, think that we can build socialism, are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; nevertheless, we are making progress and will continue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zinoviev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist position." (See "Reply".)

This document appeared in the press during the first sittings of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Zinoviev, of course, had the opportunity of attacking this document at the congress. It is characteristic that Zinoviev and Kamenev found no arguments against this grave accusation directed against them by the Moscow Committee of our Party. Was this accidental? I think not. The accusation, apparently, hit the mark. Zinoviev and Kamenev "replied" to this accusation by silence, because they had no "card to beat it."

The "New Opposition" is offended because Zinoviev is accused of disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country. But if after a whole year of discussion on the question of the victory of socialism in one country; after Zinoviev's viewpoint has been rejected by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (April 1925); after the Party has arrived at a definite opinion on this question, recorded in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925)—if, after all this, Zinoviev ventures to oppose the point of view of the Party in his book *Leninism* (September 1925), if he then repeats this opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress—how can all this, this stubbornness, this persistence in his error, be explained if not by the fact that Zinoviev is infected, hopelessly infected, with disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It pleases Zinoviev to regard this disbelief of his as internationalism. But since when have we come to regard departure from Leninism on a cardinal question of Leninism as internationalism?

Will it not be more correct to say that it is not the Party but Zinoviev who is sinning against internationalism and the international revolution? For what is our country, the country "that is building socialism," if not the base of the world revolution? But can it be a real base of the world revolution if it is incapable of completely building a socialist society? Can it remain the mighty centre of attraction for the workers of all countries that it undoubtedly is now, if it is incapable of achieving victory at home over the capitalist elements in our economy, the victory of socialist construction? I think not. But does it not follow from this that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction, the dissemination of such disbelief, will lead to our country being discredited as the base of the world revolution? And if our country is discredited the world revolutionary movement will be weakened. How did Messrs. the Social-Democrats try to scare the workers away from us? By preaching that "the Russians will not get anywhere." What are we beating the Social-Democrats with now, when we are attracting a whole series of workers' delegations to our country and thereby strengthening the position of communism all over

the world? By our successes in building socialism. Is it not obvious, then, that whoever disseminates disbelief in our successes in building socialism thereby indirectly helps the Social-Democrats, reduces the sweep of the international revolutionary movement, and inevitably departs from internationalism?...

You see that Zinoviev is in no better position in regard to his "internationalism" than in regard to his "100 per cent Leninism" on the question of building socialism in one country.

That is why the Fourteenth Party Congress rightly defined the views of the "New Opposition" as "disbelief in the cause of socialist construction," as "a distortion of Leninism."

VII

THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

I think that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction is the principal error of the "New Opposition." In my opinion, it is the principal error because from it spring all the other errors of the "New Opposition." The errors of the "New Opposition" on the questions of NEP, state capitalism, the nature of our socialist industry, the role of the cooperatives under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the methods of fighting the kulaks, the role and importance of the middle peasantry—all these errors are to be traced to the principal error of the opposition, to disbelief in the possibility of completely building a socialist society by the efforts of our country.

What is disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It is, first of all, lack of confidence that, owing to certain conditions of development in our country, the main mass of the peasantry *can be drawn* into the work of socialist construction.

It is, secondly, lack of confidence that the proletariat of our country, which holds the key positions in our national economy, *is capable* of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction.

It is from these theses that the opposition tacitly proceeds in its arguments about the paths of our development—no matter whether it does so consciously or unconsciously.

Can the main mass of the Soviet peasantry be drawn into the work of socialist construction?

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* there are two main theses on this subject:

1. "The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat—such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and *political* collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for *economic* collaboration with the proletariat."

2. "Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalization of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organizing millions of small and middle peasants in cooperatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass cooperative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on cooperation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the cooperatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products..."

"It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin."

Are these theses correct?

I think that both theses are correct and incontrovertible for the whole of our construction period under the conditions of NEP.

They are merely the expression of Lenin's well-known theses on the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the inclusion of the peasant farms in the system of socialist development of our country; of his theses that the proletariat must march towards socialism together with the main mass of the peasantry, that the organization of the vast masses of the peasantry in cooperatives is the high road of socialist construction in the countryside, that with the growth of our socialist industry, "for us, the mere growth of cooperation is identical... with the growth of socialism." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 396.)

Indeed, along what path can and must the development of peasant economy in our country proceed?

Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. Peasant economy, if you take the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms, is small commodity economy. And what is peasant small commodity economy? It is economy standing at the crossroads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as it is now doing in capitalist countries, or in the direction of socialism, as it must do here, in our country, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Whence this instability, this lack of independence of peasant economy? How is it to be explained?

It is to be explained by the scattered character of the peasant farms, their lack of organization, their dependence on the towns, on industry, on the credit system, on the character of the state power in the country, and, lastly, by the well-known fact that the countryside follows, and necessarily must follow, the town both in material and in cultural matters.

The capitalist path of development of peasant economy means development through profound differentiation among the peasant-

ry, with large latifundia at one extreme and mass impoverishment at the other. Such a path of development is inevitable in capitalist countries, because the countryside, peasant economy, is dependent on the towns, on industry, on credit concentrated in the towns, on the character of the state power—and in the towns it is the bourgeoisie, capitalist industry, the capitalist credit system and the capitalist state power that hold sway.

Is this path of development of peasant farms obligatory for our country, where the towns have quite a different aspect, where industry is in the hands of the proletariat, where transport, the credit system, the state power, etc., are concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, where the nationalization of the land is a universal law of the country? Of course not. On the contrary. Precisely because the towns do lead the countryside, while we have in the towns the rule of the proletariat, which holds all the key positions of national economy—precisely for this reason the peasant farms in their development must proceed along a different path, the path of socialist construction.

What is this path?

It is the path of the mass organization of millions of peasant farms into cooperatives in all spheres of cooperation, the path of uniting the scattered peasant farms around socialist industry, the path of implanting the elements of collectivism among the peasantry at first in the sphere of *marketing* agricultural produce and *supplying* the peasant farms with the products of urban industry and later in the sphere of agricultural *production*.

And the further we advance the more this path becomes inevitable under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, because cooperative marketing, cooperative supplying, and, finally, cooperative credit and production (agricultural cooperatives) are the only way to promote the welfare of the countryside, the only way to save the broad masses of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

It is said that our peasantry, by its position, is not socialist, and, therefore, incapable of socialist development. It is true, of course, that the peasantry, by its position, is not socialist. But

this is no argument against the development of the peasant farms along the path of socialism, once it has been proved that the countryside follows the town, and in the towns it is socialist industry that holds sway. The peasantry, by its position, was not socialist at the time of the October Revolution either, and it did not by any means want to establish socialism in our country. At that time it strove mainly for the abolition of the power of the landlords and for the ending of the war, for the establishment of peace. Nevertheless, it followed the lead of the socialist proletariat. Why? Because the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the socialist proletariat was at that time the only way of getting out of the imperialist war, the only way of establishing peace. Because there was no other way at that time, nor could there be any. Because our Party was able to hit upon that degree of the combination of the specific interests of the peasantry (the overthrow of the landlords, peace) with, and their subordination to, the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry. And so the peasantry, in spite of its non-socialist character, at that time followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.

The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the peasantry into the channel of this construction. The peasantry is nonsocialist by its position. But it must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist development, for there is not, and cannot be, any other way of saving the peasantry from poverty and ruin except the bond with the proletariat, except the bond with socialist industry, except the inclusion of peasant economy in the common channel of socialist development by the mass organization of the peasantry in cooperatives.

But why precisely by the mass organization of the peasantry in cooperatives?

Because in the mass organization in cooperatives "we have found that degree of the combination of private interest, private trading interest, with state supervision and control of this inter-

est, that degree of its subordination to the general interests" (*Lenin*) which is acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry and which ensures the proletariat the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction. It is precisely because it is advantageous to the peasantry to organize the sale of its products and the purchase of machines for its farms through cooperatives, it is precisely for that reason that it should and will proceed along the path of mass organization in cooperatives.

What does the mass organization of peasant farms in cooperatives mean when we have the supremacy of socialist industry?

It means that peasant small commodity economy *abandons* the old capitalist path, which is fraught with mass ruin for the peasantry, and *goes over* to the new path of development, the path of socialist construction.

This is why the fight for the new path of development of peasant economy, the fight to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction, is the immediate task facing our Party.

The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), therefore, was right in declaring:

"The main path of building socialism in the countryside consists in using the growing economic leadership of socialist state industry, of the state credit institutions, and of the other key positions in the hands of the proletariat to draw the main mass of the peasantry into cooperative organization and to ensure for this organization a socialist development, while utilizing, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements." (See Resolution of the Congress on the Report of the Central Committee.)

The profound mistake of the "New Opposition" lies in the fact that it does not believe in this new path of development of the peasantry, that it does not see, or does not understand, the absolute inevitability of this path under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And it does not understand this because it does not believe in the victory of socialist construction in our country, it does not believe in the capacity of our proletariat to lead the peasantry along the path to socialism.

Hence the failure to understand the dual character of NEP, the exaggeration of the negative aspects of NEP and the treatment of NEP as being mainly a retreat.

Hence the exaggeration of the role of the capitalist elements in our economy, and the belittling of the role of the levers of our socialist development (socialist industry, the credit system, the cooperatives, the rule of the proletariat, etc.).

Hence the failure to understand the socialist nature of our state industry, and the doubts concerning the correctness of Lenin's cooperative plan.

Hence the inflated accounts of differentiation in the countryside, the panic in face of the kulak, the belittling of the role of the middle peasant, the attempts to thwart the Party's policy of securing a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and, in general, the wobbling from one side to another on the question of the Party's policy in the countryside.

Hence the failure to understand the tremendous work of the Party in drawing the vast masses of the workers and peasants into building up industry and agriculture, revitalizing the cooperatives and the Soviets, administering the country, combating bureaucracy, improving and remodelling our state apparatus—work which marks a new stage of development and without which no socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence the hopelessness and consternation in face of the difficulties of our work of construction, the doubts about the possibility of industrializing our country, the pessimistic chatter about degeneration of the Party, etc.

Over there, among the bourgeoisie, all is going on fairly well, but here, among the proletarians, things are fairly bad; unless the revolution in the West takes place pretty soon, our cause is lost—such is the general tone of the "New Opposition" which, in my opinion, is a liquidationist tone, but which, for some reason or other (probably in jest), the opposition tries to pass off as "internationalism."

NEP is capitalism, says the opposition. NEP is mainly a retreat, says Zinoviev. All this, of course, is untrue. In actual fact,

NEP is the Party's policy, permitting a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements and aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements. In actual fact, NEP only began as a retreat, but it aimed at regrouping our forces during the retreat and launching an offensive. In actual fact, we have been on the offensive for several years now, and are attacking successfully, developing our industry, developing Soviet trade, and ousting private capital.

But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism, that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed from?

It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now taking place in our country is simply the restoration of capitalism, simply a "return" to capitalism. This assumption alone can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasantry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition's special forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain the underestimation of the importance of the middle peasant and the doubts concerning Lenin's cooperative plan. This assumption alone can serve to "substantiate" the "New Opposition's" disbelief in the new path of development of the countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist construction.

As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now is not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a double process of development of capitalism and development of socialism—a contradictory process of struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, a process in which the socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state industry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside, where the main

foothold for socialist development is mass cooperation linked up with socialist industry.

The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.

Differentiation in the countryside cannot assume its former dimensions, the middle peasants still constitute the main mass of the peasantry, and the kulak cannot regain his former strength, if only for the reason that the land has been nationalized, that it has been withdrawn from circulation, while our trade, credit, tax and cooperative policy is directed towards restricting the kulaks' exploiting proclivities, towards promoting the welfare of the broad mass of the peasantry and levelling out the extremes in the countryside. That is quite apart from the fact that the fight against the kulaks is now proceeding not only along the old line of organizing the poor peasants against the kulaks, but also along the new line of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the mass of the middle peasants against the kulaks. The fact that the opposition does not understand the meaning and significance of the fight against the kulaks along this second line once more confirms that the opposition is straying towards the old path of development in the countryside—the path of capitalist development, when the kulaks and the poor peasants constituted the main forces in the countryside, while the middle peasants were "melting away."

Cooperation is a variety of state capitalism, says the opposition, citing in this connection Lenin's pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*; and, consequently, it does not believe it possible to utilize the cooperatives as the main foothold for socialist development. Here, too, the opposition commits a gross error. Such an interpretation of cooperation was adequate and satisfactory in 1921, when *The Tax in Kind* was written, when we had no developed socialist industry, when Lenin conceived of state capitalism as the possible basic form of conducting our economy, and when he considered cooperation in conjunction with state capitalism. But this inter-

pretation has now become inadequate and has been rendered obsolete by history, for times have changed since then: our socialist industry has developed, state capitalism never took hold to the degree expected, whereas the cooperatives, which now have over ten million members, have begun to link up with socialist industry.

How else are we to explain the fact that already in 1923, two years after *The Tax in Kind* was written, Lenin began to regard cooperation in a different light, and considered that "cooperation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides with socialism." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 396.)

How else can this be explained except by the fact that during those two years socialist industry had grown, whereas state capitalism had failed to take hold to the required extent, in view of which Lenin began to consider cooperation, not in conjunction with state capitalism, but in conjunction with socialist industry?

The conditions of development of cooperation had changed. And so the approach to the question of cooperation had to be changed also.

Here, for instance, is a remarkable passage from Lenin's pamphlet *On Cooperation* (1923), which throws light on this matter:

"Under state capitalism, cooperative enterprises differ from state capitalist enterprises, firstly, in that they are private enterprises and, secondly, in that they are collective enterprises. Under our present system * cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 396.)

In this short passage two big questions are solved. Firstly, that "our present system" is not state capitalism. Secondly, that cooperative enterprises taken in conjunction with "our system" "do not differ" from socialist enterprises.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Here is another passage from the same pamphlet of Lenin's:

* My italics.—J. St.

"...for us, the mere growth of cooperation (with the 'slight' exception mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the same time we must admit that a radical change has taken place in our whole outlook on socialism." (*Ibid.*)

Obviously, the pamphlet *On Cooperation* gives a new appraisal of the cooperatives, a thing which the "New Opposition" does not want to admit, and which it is carefully hushing up, in defiance of the facts, in defiance of the obvious truth, in defiance of Leninism.

Cooperation taken in conjunction with state capitalism is one thing, and cooperation taken in conjunction with socialist industry is another.

From this, however, it must not be concluded that a gulf lies between *The Tax in Kind* and *On Cooperation*. That would, of course, be wrong. It is sufficient, for instance, to refer to the following passage in *The Tax in Kind* to discern immediately the inseparable connection between *The Tax in Kind* and the pamphlet *On Cooperation* as regards appraisal of the cooperatives. Here it is:

"The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one form of large-scale production to another form of large-scale production. The transition from small-proprietor cooperatives to socialism is a transition from small production to large-scale production, i.e., it is a more complicated transition, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider masses of the population, is capable of pulling up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old, *presocialist** and even precapitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all 'innovations.'" (See Vol. XXVI, p. 337.)

From this quotation it is evident that even during the time of *The Tax in Kind*, when we had as yet no developed socialist industry, Lenin was of the opinion that, *if successful*, cooperation could be transformed into a powerful weapon in the struggle against "presocialist," and, hence, against *capitalist relations*. I think it was precisely this idea that subsequently served as the point of departure for his pamphlet *On Cooperation*.

But what follows from all this?

* My italics.—*J. St.*

From all this it follows that the "New Opposition" approaches the question of cooperation, not in a Marxist way, but metaphysically. It regards cooperation not as a historical phenomenon taken in conjunction with other phenomena, in conjunction, say, with state capitalism (in 1921) or with socialist industry (in 1923), but as something constant and immutable, as a "thing in itself."

Hence the mistakes of the opposition on the question of cooperation, hence its disbelief in the development of the countryside towards socialism through cooperation, hence its turning back to the old path, the path of capitalist development in the countryside.

Such, in general, is the position of the "New Opposition" on the practical questions of socialist construction.

There is only one conclusion: the line of the Opposition, so far as it has a line, its wavering and vacillation, its disbelief in our cause and its consternation in face of difficulties, lead to capitulation to the capitalist elements of our economy.

For, if NEP is mainly a retreat, if the socialist nature of state industry is doubted, if the kulak is almost omnipotent, if little hope can be placed in the cooperatives, if the role of the middle peasant is progressively declining, if the new path of development in the countryside is open to doubt, if the Party is almost degenerating, while the revolution in the West is not very near—then what is there left in the arsenal of the opposition, what can it count on in the struggle against the capitalist elements in our economy? You cannot go into battle armed only with "The Philosophy of the Epoch."

It is clear that the arsenal of the "New Opposition," if it can be termed an arsenal at all, is an unenviable one. It is not an arsenal for battle. Still less is it one for victory.

It is clear that the Party would be doomed "in no time" if it entered the fight equipped with such an arsenal; it would simply have to capitulate to the capitalist elements in our economy.

That is why the Fourteenth Congress of the Party was absolutely right in deciding that "the fight for the victory of socialist

construction in the U.S.S.R. is the main task of our Party"; that one of the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of this task is "to combat disbelief in the cause of building socialism in our country and the attempts to represent our enterprises, which are of a 'consistently socialist type' (*Lenin*), as state capitalist enterprises"; that "such ideological trends, which prevent the masses from adopting a conscious attitude towards the building of socialism in general and of a socialist industry in particular, can only serve to hinder the growth of the socialist elements in our economy and to facilitate the struggle of private capital against them"; that "the congress therefore considers that widespread educational work must be carried on for the purpose of overcoming these distortions of Leninism." (See Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.[B].)

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) lies in the fact that it was able radically to expose the mistakes of the "New Opposition," that it rejected their disbelief and whining, that it clearly and precisely indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, opened before the Party the prospect of victory, and thus armed the proletariat with an invincible faith in the victory of socialist construction.

January 25, 1926

THE PARTY'S THREE FUNDAMENTAL SLOGANS ON THE PEASANT PROBLEM

Reply to Yan-sky

I duly received your letter, of course. I am replying after some delay, for which please forgive me.

1. Lenin says that "*the main question of every revolution is the question of state power.*" (See Vol. XXI, p. 142.) In the hands of which class, or which classes, is power concentrated; which class, or which classes, must be overthrown; which class, or which classes, must take power—such is "the main question of every revolution."

The Party's fundamental strategic slogans, which retain their validity during the whole period of any particular stage of the revolution, cannot be called fundamental slogans if they are not wholly and entirely based on this cardinal thesis of Lenin's.

Fundamental slogans are correct slogans only if they are based on a Marxian analysis of class forces, if they indicate the correct plan of disposition of the revolutionary forces on the front of the class struggle, if they help to bring the masses up to the front of the struggle for the victory of the revolution, to the front of the struggle for the seizure of power by the new class, if they help the Party to form a large and powerful political army from among the broad masses of the people, which is essential for the fulfilment of this task.

During any particular stage of the revolution there may be defeats and retreats, failures and tactical errors, but that does not mean that the fundamental strategical slogan is wrong. Thus, for instance, the fundamental slogan during the *first* stage of our revolution—"together with the whole of the peasantry, against the tsar and the landlords, with the bourgeoisie neutralized, for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution"—was an

absolutely correct slogan, in spite of the fact that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat.

Consequently, the question of the fundamental slogan of the Party must not be confused with the question of the gains or setbacks of the revolution at any particular stage of its development.

It may happen that in the course of the revolution the fundamental slogan of the Party has already led to the overthrow of the power of the old classes, or of the old class, while a number of vital demands of the revolution, arising out of that slogan, have not been achieved, or their achievement has been delayed for a long period of time, or a new revolution may be required for their achievements; but this does not mean that the fundamental slogan was wrong. Thus, for instance, the February Revolution of 1917 overthrew tsardom and the landlords, but did not lead to the confiscation of the estates of the landlords, etc.; but this does not mean that our fundamental slogan during the first stage of the revolution was wrong.

Or another example: the October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie and transferred the power to the proletariat, but did not immediately lead to a) the consummation of the bourgeois revolution in general and b) the isolation of the kulaks in the rural districts in particular—these were delayed for a certain period of time; but this does not mean that our fundamental slogan during the *second* stage of the revolution—"together with the poor peasantry, against capitalism in town and country, with the middle peasantry neutralized, for the power of the proletariat"—was wrong.

Consequently, the question of the fundamental slogan of the Party must not be confused with the question of the time and forms of achieving any particular demand arising out of that slogan.

That is why the strategic slogans of our Party cannot be appraised from the point of view of episodical successes or defeats of the revolutionary movement in any particular period; still less can they be appraised from the point of view of the time or forms of achieving any particular demands that arise out of those slo-

gans. The strategic slogans of the Party can be appraised only from the point of view of a Marxian analysis of the class forces and of the correct disposition of the revolutionary forces on the front of the struggle for the victory of the revolution, for the concentration of power in the hands of the new class.

Your error consists in overlooking this extremely important methodological question, or not understanding it.

2. You write in your letter:

"Is it correct to assert that we were in alliance with the whole of the peasantry *only* up to October? No, it is not. The slogan 'alliance with the whole of the peasantry' was valid before October, *during October and in the first period after October*, inasmuch as the whole of the peasantry was interested in completing the bourgeois revolution."

From this quotation it follows that the strategic slogan of the Party during the *first* stage of the revolution (1905 to February 1917), when the task was to overthrow the power of the tsar and the landlords and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, *did not differ* from the strategic slogan during the *second* stage of the revolution (February 1917 to October 1917), when the task was to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Consequently, you deny the fundamental difference between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution. You commit this error because, evidently, you refuse to understand so simple a matter as that the fundamental theme of a strategic slogan is the question of power during the particular stage of the revolution, the question as to *which* class is being overthrown and into the hands of *which* class power is being transferred. It need hardly be proved that on this point you are basically wrong.

You say that during October and in the first period after October we applied the slogan, "alliance with the *whole* of the peasantry," inasmuch as the whole peasantry was interested in completing the bourgeois revolution. But who told you that the October insurrection and the October Revolution were confined to, or that their main task was the completion of the bourgeois

revolution? Where did you get that from? Do you think that the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected within the framework of the bourgeois revolution? Does not the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat mean going beyond the framework of the bourgeois revolution?

How can you assert that the kulaks (who, of course, are also peasants) could support the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat?

How can you deny that the decree on the nationalization of the land, the abolition of private ownership of land, the prohibition of the purchase and sale of land, etc., in spite of the fact that it cannot be regarded as a socialist decree, was put into effect by us in the midst of a *struggle against* the kulaks, and not in alliance with them?

How can you assert that the kulaks (who are also peasants) could support the decrees of the Soviet government on the expropriation of mills, factories, railways, banks, etc., or the slogan of the proletariat on transforming the imperialist war into a civil war?

How can you assert that the *fundamental* thing in October was not these and similar acts, not the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution?

No one denies that one of the main tasks of the October Revolution was to complete the bourgeois revolution, that without the October Revolution it could not have been completed, just as the October Revolution itself could not have been consolidated unless the bourgeois revolution was completed; and inasmuch as the October Revolution did complete the bourgeois revolution it was bound to meet with the sympathy of all the peasants. All that is undeniable. But can it be asserted on these grounds that completion of the bourgeois revolution was not a *derivative phenomenon* in the course of the October Revolution but its *essence*, its *principal aim*? What then, according to you, has become of the principal aim of the October Revolution, namely, the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the dictatorship

of the proletariat, the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war, the expropriation of the capitalists, etc.?

And if the main theme of a strategic slogan is the fundamental question of every revolution, i.e., the question of the transfer of power from one class to another class, does it not clearly follow from this that the question of the completion of the bourgeois revolution by the proletarian power must not be confused with the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and achieving this proletarian power, i.e., with the question that is the main theme of the strategic slogan during the second stage of the revolution?

One of the greatest achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat is that it completed the bourgeois revolution and swept away all the filth of medievalism. For the rural districts this was of supreme and indeed decisive importance. Failing this the combination of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution, of which Marx spoke in the second half of the past century, could not have been brought about. Failing this the proletarian revolution itself could not have been consolidated.

Moreover, the following important circumstance must be borne in mind. The completion of the bourgeois revolution could not be accomplished at one stroke. Actually, it was spread over a whole period embracing not only a part of 1918, as you assert in your letter, but also a part of 1919 (the Volga provinces and the Urals) and of 1919-20 (the Ukraine). I am referring to the advance of Kolchak and Denikin, when the peasantry as a whole was faced with the danger of the restoration of the power of the landlords and when the peasantry, precisely as a *whole*, was compelled to rally around the Soviet power in order to ensure the completion of the bourgeois revolution and to retain the fruits of that revolution. This complexity and variety of the processes of living reality, this "odd" interweaving of the direct socialist tasks of the proletarian dictatorship with the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, must always be kept in mind if we are correctly to understand the passages you cite from the works of Lenin and the mechanics of translating the Party's slogans into action.

Can it be said that this interweaving proves that the Party's slogan during the *second* stage of the revolution was wrong, and that this slogan did not differ from the slogan during the *first* stage of the revolution? No, it cannot. On the contrary, this interweaving merely confirms the correctness of the Party's slogan in the second stage of the revolution: together with the *poor* peasantry, against the capitalist bourgeoisie in town and country, for the power of the proletariat, etc. Why? Because in order to complete the bourgeois revolution it was necessary in October *first* to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to set up the power of the proletariat, for only such a power is capable of completing the bourgeois revolution; and in order to set up the power of the proletariat in October it was essential to prepare and organize for October an *adequate* political army, an army capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and of setting up the power of the proletariat; and there is no need to prove that *such* a political army could be prepared and organized *only* under the slogan: Alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry against the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is clear that without *such* a strategic slogan, which we carried through from April 1917 until October 1917, we could not have had *such* a political army, and that, therefore, we would not have triumphed in October, we would not have overthrown the power of the bourgeoisie and, consequently, we would not have been able to complete the bourgeois revolution.

That is why the completion of the bourgeois revolution must not be contrasted to the strategic slogan of the second stage of the revolution, the purpose of which was to secure the seizure of power by the proletariat.

There is only one way to avoid all these "contradictions," namely, to recognize that there is a fundamental difference between the strategic slogan of the first stage of the revolution (the bourgeois-democratic revolution) and the strategic slogan of the second stage of the revolution (the proletarian revolution), to recognize that during the first stage of the revolution we marched together with the *whole* of the peasantry for the bourgeois-democratic

revolution and that during the second stage of the revolution we marched together with the *poor* peasantry against the power of capital and for the proletarian revolution.

And this must be recognized because an analysis of the class forces in the first and second stages of the revolution obliges us to do so. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the fact that until February 1917 we carried on our work under the slogan of a revolutionary-*democratic* dictatorship of the proletariat and the *peasantry*, while after February 1917 this slogan was superseded by the slogan of the *socialist* dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry.

You will agree that the substitution of one slogan for another in March and April 1917 could not be explained if your scheme were to be accepted.

This fundamental difference between the two strategic slogans of the Party was pointed out by Lenin as far back as in his pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. He formulated the Party's slogan during the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution as follows:

"The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie." (See Vol. VIII, p. 96.)

In other words: together with the whole of the peasantry against the autocracy—while the bourgeoisie is being neutralized—for a democratic revolution.

As to the Party's slogan in the period of preparation for the socialist revolution, he formulated it as follows:

"The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie." (*Ibid.*)

In other words: together with the poor peasantry and the semi-proletarian sections of the population in general, against the bourgeoisie—while the petty bourgeoisie in town and country is being neutralized—for the socialist revolution.

That was in 1905.

In April 1917, Lenin, describing the political situation at that time as the interweaving of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry with the actual power of the bourgeoisie, said:

"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a *transition* from the *first** stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the *second* stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the *poorest strata** of the peasantry." (See *Lenin's April Theses*—Vol. XX, p. 88.)

At the end of August 1917, when the preparations for the October Revolution were in full swing, Lenin, in a special article entitled *Peasants and Workers*, wrote as follows:

"Only the proletariat and the *peasantry** can overthrow the monarchy—that, in those days (i.e., 1905—*J. St.*), was the fundamental definition of our class policy. And that definition was a correct one. February and March 1917 have corroborated it once again. Only the proletariat, leading the *poor peasantry** (the semiproletarians, as our program calls them), can end the war by a democratic peace, heal the wounds it has caused, and begin to take steps towards socialism, which have become absolutely essential and *urgent*—such is the definition of our class policy now." (See Vol. XXI, p. 111.)

That must not be understood to mean that we *now* have a dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the poor peasantry. That, of course, is not so. We marched towards October under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and in October we put it into effect formally inasmuch as we had a bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and shared the leadership with them, although actually the dictatorship of the proletariat already existed, since we Bolsheviks constituted the majority. The dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the poor peasantry ceased to exist formally, however, after the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' "putsch," after the rupture of the bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, when the leadership passed *wholly* and *entirely*

* My italics.—*J. St.*

into the hands of *one* party, into the hands of our Party, which does not share and cannot share the management of the state with any other party. This is what we call the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Finally, in November 1918, Lenin, casting a retrospective glance at the path the revolution had traversed, wrote:

"Yes, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution *so long* as we march *with* the peasantry *as a whole*. This has been as clear as clear can be to us; we have said it hundreds and thousands of times since 1905, and we have never attempted to skip this necessary stage of the historical process or abolish it by decrees.... But beginning with *April 1917*, *long before the October Revolution*, that is, *long before we assumed** power we publicly declared and explained to the people: the revolution cannot now stop at this stage, for the country has marched forward, capitalism has advanced, ruin has reached unprecedented dimensions, which (whether one likes it or not) will *demand* steps forward, *to socialism*; for there is *no other way* of advancing, of saving the country, which is exhausted by war, and of *alleviating* the sufferings of the toilers and exploited. Things have turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the 'whole' of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the medieval regime (and to that extent, the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). *Then*, with the poor peasants, with the semiproletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including *the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers,** and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one." (See Vol. XXIII, pp. 390-91.)

As you see, Lenin repeatedly emphasized the profound difference between the first strategic slogan, that of the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the second strategic slogan, that of the period of preparation for the October Revolution. The first slogan was: together with *the whole of the peasantry* against the autocracy; the second: together with *the poor peasants* against the bourgeoisie.

The fact that the completion of the bourgeois revolution dragged on for quite a period of time after October and that inasmuch as we were carrying the bourgeois revolution to completion, the "whole" of the peasantry could not but sympathize

* My italics.—J.St.

with us—this fact, as I said above, does not in the least shake the fundamental thesis that we marched towards October and achieved victory in October together with the *poor peasantry*, that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and set up the dictatorship of the proletariat (one of the tasks of which was to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion) together with the *poor peasantry*, against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and with the middle peasantry vacillating.

That is clear, I think.

3. You write further in your letter:

"Is the assertion true that '*we arrived at October under the slogan of alliance with the rural poor and the neutralization of the middle peasant*'? No, it is not true. For the reasons mentioned above, and from the quotations from Lenin, it will be seen that this slogan could arise only when 'the class division among the peasantry had matured' (*Lenin*), i.e., 'in the summer and autumn of 1918.'"

From this excerpt it follows that the Party adopted the policy of neutralizing the middle peasant, not in the period of preparation for October and during October, but after October, and particularly after 1918, when the Committees of Poor Peasants were abolished. That is *entirely wrong*.

On the contrary, the policy of neutralizing the middle peasant did not begin, but *ended* when the Committees of Poor Peasants were abolished, after 1918. The policy of neutralizing the middle peasant was *abandoned* (and not introduced) after 1918. It was after 1918, in March 1919, that Lenin, opening the Eighth Congress of our Party, stated:

"the best representatives of socialism of the old days—when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically and ideologically—spoke of *neutralizing the peasantry*, i.e., of turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum, which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder it, would remain neutral and would not take the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem is perfectly clear to us. *But it is not enough.** We have entered a *phase of socialist construction** in which we must draw up concrete and de-

* My italics.—J. St.

tailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the rural districts, by which we must be guided in order to achieve a stable alliance with the middle peasantry." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 114.)

As you see, this amounts to the very opposite of what you say in your letter; you turn our *actual* Party practice upside down by confusing the *beginning* of neutralization with its *end*.

The middle peasant snivelled and vacillated between revolution and counterrevolution as long as the bourgeoisie was being overthrown and as long as the Soviet power was not consolidated; therefore it was necessary to neutralize him. The middle peasant began to turn towards us when he began to realize that the bourgeoisie had been overthrown "for good," that the Soviet power was being consolidated, that the kulak was being overcome and that the Red Army was beginning to achieve victory on the fronts of the civil war. And it was precisely after this turn of the tide that the third strategic slogan of the Party, announced by Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress, became possible, namely: While *relying* on the poor peasants and establishing a *durable alliance* with the middle peasants, march forward towards socialist construction!

How could you have forgotten this well-known fact?

From your letter it also follows that the policy of neutralizing the middle peasant *during the transition* to the proletarian revolution and in the *first days* after the victory of that revolution is wrong, unsuitable and therefore unacceptable. That is *entirely wrong*. The very opposite is the case. It is precisely while the power of the bourgeoisie is being overthrown and before the power of the proletariat has been consolidated that the middle peasant vacillates and resists most of all. It is precisely in this period that alliance with the poor peasant and neutralization of the middle peasant are necessary.

Persisting in your error, you assert that the question of the peasantry is very important, not only for our country, but also for other countries "which more or less resemble the economic

* My italics.—J. St.

system of pre-October Russia." The latter statement is, of course, true. But here is what Lenin said in his theses on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern regarding the policy of proletarian parties towards the middle peasant in the period when the proletariat is taking power. After defining the poor peasantry, or more precisely, "the toiling and exploited masses in the rural districts," as a separate group consisting of agricultural labourers, semiproletarians, or allotment holders and small peasants, and then proceeding with the question of the middle peasantry as a separate group in the rural districts, Lenin says:

"By 'middle peasants' in the economic sense, are meant small tillers who also hold, either as owners or tenants, small plots of land, but such, firstly, as, under capitalism, provide them as a general rule, not only with a meagre upkeep for their families and households, but also with the possibility of securing a certain surplus, which, at least in good years, may be converted into capital; and, secondly, fairly frequently (for example, one farm out of two or three) resort to the hire of outside labour.... The revolutionary proletariat cannot set itself the task—at least not in the immediate future and in the initial period of the dictatorship of the proletariat—of winning over this stratum, but must confine itself to the task of neutralizing it, i.e., making it neutral in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie."* (See Vol. XXV, pp. 271-72.)

How, after this, can it be asserted that the policy of neutralizing the middle peasant "arose" in our country "only" "in the summer and autumn of 1918," i.e., *after* the decisive successes achieved in consolidating the power of the Soviets, the power of the proletariat?

As you see, the question of the strategic slogan of proletarian parties at the moment of transition to the socialist revolution and the consolidation of the power of the proletariat, as well as the question of the neutralization of the middle peasant, is not as simple as you imagine.

4. From all that has been said above, it is evident that the passages from the works of Lenin you quote can in no way be contrasted to the fundamental slogan of our Party in the second stage of

* My italics.—J. St.

the revolution, since these quotations a) deal, not with the fundamental slogan of the Party *before* October, but with the completion of the bourgeois revolution *after* October and b) do not refute, but confirm the correctness of that slogan.

I have already said above, and I must repeat, that the strategic slogan of the Party during the second stage of the revolution, in the period *before* the seizure of power by the proletariat, the main theme of which is the question of power, cannot be contrasted to the task of carrying the bourgeois revolution to completion, which is effected in the period *after* the proletariat has taken power.

5. You speak of Comrade Molotov's well-known article in *Pravda* entitled "The Bourgeois Revolution in Our Country" (March 12, 1927), which, it appears, "induced" you to apply to me for an explanation. I do not know how you read articles. I, too, have read Comrade Molotov's article and I do not think that it in any way contradicts what I said in my report at the Fourteenth Congress of our Party on our Party's slogans regarding the peasantry.

In his article, Comrade Molotov does not deal with the Party's fundamental slogan in the period of October, but with the fact that, inasmuch as after October the Party carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, it enjoyed the sympathy of all the peasants. But I have already said above that the statement of this fact does not refute, but, on the contrary, confirms the correctness of the fundamental thesis that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat in conjunction with the poor peasantry—the middle peasantry being neutralized—against the bourgeoisie of town and country; that without this we would not have been able to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

The Bolshevik, No. 7-8,
April 15, 1927

THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE POOR PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

Reply to S. Pokrovsky

I think that your letter of May 2 provides neither occasion nor grounds for a reply in detail, point by point, so to speak.

It really offers nothing particularly new as compared with Yan—sky's letter.

I am replying to your letter only because it contains certain elements which savour of an open revival of Kamenev's ideas of the period of April and May 1917. It is only in order to expose these elements of a revival of Kamenev's ideas that I consider it necessary to reply briefly to your letter.

1. You say in your letter that "in fact, during the period from February to October we used the slogan of alliance with the *whole* of the peasantry," that "during the period from February to October the Party upheld and defended its *old* slogan in relation to the peasantry: alliance with the *whole* of the peasantry."

Thus, it appears, firstly, that during the period of preparation for October (April to October 1917) the Bolsheviks did not set themselves the task of drawing a demarcation line between the poor peasants and the well-to-do peasants, but treated the peasantry as an integral unit.

It appears, secondly, that during the period of preparation for October the Bolsheviks did not substitute for the old slogan of "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" a new slogan, namely, "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry," but maintained the old position laid down in Lenin's pamphlet *Two Tactics* in 1905.

It appears, thirdly, that the Bolshevik policy of combating the vacillations and compromising tactics of the Soviets during the

period of preparation for October (March to October 1917), the vacillations of the middle peasants in the Soviets and at the front, the vacillations between revolution and counterrevolution, the vacillations and compromising tactics which assumed a particularly acute character in the July days, when the Soviets, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik compromisers, joined hands with the counterrevolutionary generals in the attempt to isolate the Bolsheviks—it appears that the Bolshevik fight against these vacillations and compromising tactics of certain strata of the peasantry was pointless and absolutely unnecessary.

And finally, it appears that Kamenev was right when, in April and May 1917, he defended the old slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, while Lenin, who regarded this slogan as already out of date and who proclaimed the new slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, was wrong.

One need only formulate these questions to realize the utter absurdity of your whole letter.

But since you are very fond of isolated quotations from Lenin's works, let us turn to quotations.

It does not require much effort to prove that what Lenin regarded as *new* in the agrarian relations in Russia after the February Revolution, from the point of view of the further development of the revolution, was not the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole, but the *cleavage* between the poor peasants and the well-to-do peasants, of whom the former, i.e., the poor peasants, gravitated toward the proletariat, whereas the latter, i.e., the well-to-do peasants, followed the Provisional Government.

Here is what Lenin said on this subject in April 1917, in his polemic against Kamenev and his conceptions:

"It would be impermissible for the proletarian party *now** to place hopes in a community of interests with the peasantry." (See Lenin's speech at the April Conference, 1917, Vol. XX, p. 245.)

* My italics. — J. St.

Further:

"Already, we can discern in the decisions of a number of peasant congresses the idea of postponing the solution of the agrarian question until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; this represents a victory for the well-to-do peasantry,* which inclines towards the Cadets." (See Lenin's speech at the Petrograd City Party Conference, April 1917, Vol. XX, p. 176.)

Further:

"It is possible that the peasantry may seize all the land and the entire power. Far from forgetting this possibility, far from confining myself to the present moment only, I definitely and clearly formulate the agrarian program, taking into account the *new* phenomenon, i.e., the deeper *cleavage** between the agricultural labourers and poor peasants on the one hand, and the well-to-do peasants, on the other." (See Lenin's article written in April, "Letters About Tactics," Vol. XX, p. 103.)

This is what Lenin regarded as *new* and *important* in the new situation in the rural districts *after* the February Revolution.

This was Lenin's starting point in shaping the Party's policy after February 1917.

This was Lenin's starting point when, at the Petrograd City Party Conference in April 1917, he said:

"It was only here, on the spot, that we learned that the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had surrendered its power to the Provisional Government. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies represents the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soldiers; among the latter, the majority are peasants. This is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But this 'dictatorship' has entered into an agreement with the bourgeoisie. And it is here that the '*old*' *Bolshevism* is in need of revision."* (See Vol. XX, p. 176.)

This also was the position Lenin started from when, in April 1917, he wrote:

"Whoever speaks *now* of a 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' only is behind the times, has consequently in effect *gone over* to the side of the petty bourgeoisie and is against the proletarian class struggle. He deserves to be consigned to the archive of

* My italics.—J. St.

'Bolshevik' prerevolutionary antiques (which might be called the archive of "Old Bolsheviks")." (See Vol. XX, p. 101.)

It was on this ground that the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry was born *to replace* the old slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

You might say, as you do in your letter, that this is the Trotsky way of skipping the uncompleted peasant revolution; but that would be just as convincing as a similar argument which Kamenev levelled against Lenin in April 1917.

Lenin took this argument fully into account when he said:

"Trotskyism—'No tsar, but a workers' government.' This is false. There is a petty bourgeoisie, and it cannot be ignored. But it is made up of two sections. The *poor** section is with the working class." (See Vol. XX, p. 182.)

Kamenev's error, and now yours, consists in the inability to discern and emphasize the difference between two sections of the petty bourgeoisie, in this case the peasantry; in the inability to *single out* the poor section of the peasantry from the mass of the peasantry as a whole, and on that basis *to shape* the Party's policy in the conditions of the transition from the first stage of the revolution in 1917 to the second stage; in the inability to *deduce* from this the new slogan, the Party's second strategic slogan, concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

Let us trace in consecutive order the practical history of the slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry" from April to October 1917, as reflected in the works of Lenin.

April 1917:

"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a *transition* from the *first** stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the *second* stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the *poorest strata of the peasantry*."^{*} (See Lenin, "April Theses," Vol. XX, p. 88.)

* My italics.—J. St.

July 1917:

"Only the revolutionary workers, if they are supported by the *poor peasants*,* are capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists and leading the people to win the land without compensation, to complete freedom, to salvation from famine and from the war, and to a just and lasting peace." (See Vol. XXI, p. 77.)

August 1917:

"Only the proletariat, leading the *poor peasantry** (the semiproletarians, as our program calls them), can end the war by a democratic peace, heal the wounds it has caused, and begin to take steps towards socialism, which have become absolutely essential and *urgent*—such is the definition of our class policy now." (See Vol. XXI, p. 111.)

September 1917:

"Only a dictatorship of the proletarians and the *poor peasants** would be capable of breaking the resistance of the capitalists, of displaying really supreme courage and determination in the exercise of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, total and truly heroic support of the masses in the army and among the peasantry." (See Vol. XXI, p. 147.)

September-October 1917, the pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, in which Lenin, in controversy with *Novaya Zhizn*, says:

"Either * all power to the bourgeoisie—which you have long ceased to advocate, and which the bourgeoisie itself dare not even hint at, for it knows that already on April 20-21 the people overthrew such a power with one hitch of the shoulder, and would overthrow it now with thrice that determination and ruthlessness; or * power to the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., a coalition (alliance, agreement) between it and the bourgeoisie, for the petty bourgeoisie does not wish to and *cannot* take power alone and independently, as has been proved by the experience of all revolutions, and as is proved by economic science, which explains that in a capitalist country it is possible to stand for capital and it is possible to stand for labour, but it is impossible to stand in between. In Russia this coalition has for six months tried scores of ways but failed. Or, * finally, all power to the proletarians and the *poor peasants** against the bourgeoisie in order to break its resistance. This has not yet been tried, and you, gentlemen of *Novaya Zhizn*, are dissuading

* My italics.—J. St.

the people from this, you are trying to frighten them with your own fear of the bourgeoisie. No fourth way can be invented." (See Vol. XXI, p. 275.)

Such are the facts.

You, however, "contrive" to *evade* all these facts and events in the history of the preparation for the October Revolution; you "contrive" to *strike off* from the history of Bolshevism the *struggle* the Bolsheviks waged during the period of preparation for October against the *vacillations* and the *compromising tactics* of the "peasant proprietors" who were in the Soviets at that time; you "contrive" to *bury* Lenin's slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and at the same time imagine that this is not a *profanation* of history and Leninism.

From these passages, which could be multiplied, you must see that the Bolsheviks took as their starting point after February 1917 not the peasantry as a whole, but the poor section of the peasantry; that they marched towards October not under the *old* slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but under the *new* slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

From this it is evident that the Bolsheviks carried out this slogan in a fight against the *vacillations* and *compromising tactics* of the Soviets, against the vacillations and compromising tactics of a certain section of the peasantry represented in the Soviets, against the vacillations and compromising tactics of certain parties representing petty-bourgeois democracy and known as Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

From this it is evident that without the new slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry we would have been unable to assemble a sufficiently powerful political army, one capable of overcoming the compromising tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, of neutralizing the vacillations of a certain section of the peasantry, of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, and of thus making it possible to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

From this it is evident that "we marched towards October and achieved victory in October together with the poor peasantry..."

against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and with the middle peasantry vacillating." (See my reply to Yan-sky.)

Thus, it follows that in April 1917, as well as during the whole period of preparation for October, it was Lenin who was right, and not Kamenev; and you, now reviving Kamenev's conceptions, seem to be getting into not very good company.

2. As against all that has been said above you quote Lenin to the effect that in October 1917 we took power with the support of the peasantry *as a whole*. That we took power with a *certain amount* of support from the peasantry as a whole is quite true. But you forgot to add a "detail," namely, that the peasantry *as a whole* supported us in October, and after October, only *in so far* as we carried the bourgeois revolution to completion. That is a very important "detail," which in the present instance settles the issue. It does not befit a Bolshevik to "forget" so important a "detail" and thus confuse so important an issue.

From your letter it is evident that you contrast what Lenin said about the support of the peasantry *as a whole* with the Party's slogan of "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry," which was also advanced by Lenin. But in order to contrast what Lenin said on this subject with the passages we have quoted from the works of Lenin, in order to have grounds for refuting the passages from Lenin on the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry by the passages you quote from Lenin about the peasantry as a whole, two things, at least, must be proved.

First: It must be proved that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was the *main thing* in the October Revolution. Lenin considers that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was a "*by-product*" of the October Revolution, which fulfilled this task "*in passing*." You must first refute this thesis of Lenin's and prove that the *main thing* in the October Revolution was not the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution. Try to prove that, and if you do I shall be ready to admit that from April to October 1917 the

Party's slogan was not dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, but dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

From your letter it is evident that you do not think it possible to assume this more than risky task; you try, however, to prove "in passing" that on one of the most important questions of the October Revolution, the question of peace, we were supported by the peasantry *as a whole*. That, of course, is untrue. It is quite untrue. On the question of peace you have strayed to the viewpoint of the philistine. As a matter of fact the question of peace was for us at that time a question of power, for only with the transfer of power to the proletariat could we count on extricating ourselves from the imperialist war.

You must have forgotten what Lenin said about this—namely, that "the only way to stop the war is to transfer power to another class," and that "'Down With the War' does not mean flinging away your bayonets. It means the transfer of power to another class." (See Lenin's speech at the Petrograd City Party Conference, April 1917, Vol. XX, pp. 181, 178.)

Thus, it is either the one or the other: either you must prove that the *main thing* in the October Revolution was the completion of the bourgeois revolution, or you cannot prove it; in the latter case the obvious conclusion is that the peasantry *as a whole* could support us in the October Revolution only *in so far* as we carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, doing away with the monarchy, and with the property and regime of the big landlords.

Second: You must prove that the Bolsheviks could have secured the support of the peasantry as a whole both during October and after October, in so far as they carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, *without* systematically using the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry during the whole period of preparation for October; *without* a systematic struggle, as it follows from this slogan, against the compromising tactics of the petty-bourgeois parties; *without* systematically exposing the vacillations of certain sections of the peasantry and of

their representatives in the Soviets, as it also follows from this same slogan.

Try to prove that. Indeed, why did we succeed in securing the support of the peasantry as a whole in October and after October? Because we were in a position to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

Why were we able to do this? Because we succeeded in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and replacing it by the power of the proletariat, which alone is able to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

Why did we succeed in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the power of the proletariat? Because we prepared for October under the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry; because, proceeding from this slogan, we waged a systematic struggle against the compromising tactics of the petty-bourgeois parties; because, proceeding from this slogan, we waged a systematic struggle against the vacillations of the middle peasants in the Soviets; because *only with such a slogan* could we overcome the vacillations of the middle peasant, defeat the compromising tactics of the petty-bourgeois parties, and rally a political army capable of waging the struggle to transfer power to the proletariat.

It need hardly be proved that without these preliminary conditions, which determined the fate of the October Revolution, we would not have won the support of the peasantry *as a whole* for the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, either during or after October.

This is how the combination of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution is to be understood.

This is why to contrast the support of the peasantry as a whole for the task of completing the bourgeois revolution during October and after October with the preparations made for the October Revolution under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry means to understand nothing of Leninism.

Your principal error is that you failed to understand either the interweaving during the October Revolution of *socialist tasks*

with the task of carrying the *bourgeois* revolution to completion, or the mechanics of fulfilling the various demands of the October Revolution that followed from the Party's second strategic slogan, the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

Reading your letter one might think that it was we who used the peasantry in the service of the proletarian revolution, but, on the contrary, that it was "the peasantry as a whole," including the kulaks, who used the Bolsheviks in their service. The Bolsheviks' affairs would be in a bad way if they so easily "entered" the service of nonproletarian classes.

Kamenev's conceptions of April 1917—that is what is dragging at your feet.

3. You assert that Stalin does not see the difference between the situation in 1905 and the situation in February 1917. That, of course, is not to be taken seriously. I never said that, and could not have said it. All I said in my letter was that the Party's slogan on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, issued in 1905, was corroborated in the February Revolution of 1917. That, of course, is true. That is exactly how Lenin described the situation in his article "Peasants and Workers" in August 1917:

"Only the proletariat and the peasantry can overthrow the monarchy—that, in those days (i.e., 1905—*J. St.*), was the fundamental definition of our class policy. And that definition was a correct one. *February and March 1917 have corroborated it once again.*"* (See Vol. XXI, p. 111.)

You are simply trying to find fault.

4. You try, furthermore, to show that Stalin contradicts himself; and you do this by contrasting his thesis on the compromising tactics of the middle peasants *before October* with a quotation from his pamphlet *Problems of Leninism*, which speaks of the possibility of building socialism jointly with the middle peasantry *after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated.*

* My italics.—*J. St.*

It does not require much effort to prove that it is utterly unscientific to identify in this way two different phenomena. The middle peasant before October, when the bourgeoisie was in power, and the middle peasant after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated, when the bourgeoisie has already been overthrown and expropriated, when the cooperative movement has developed and the principal means of production are in the hands of the proletariat, are two different things. To identify these two kinds of middle peasants and to put them on an equal footing means to examine phenomena divorced from their historical setting and to lose all sense of perspective. It is something like the Zinoviev manner of mixing up dates and periods when quoting.

If this is what is called "revolutionary dialectics," it must be admitted that Pokrovsky has broken all records for "dialectical" pettifoggery.

5. I shall not deal with the remaining questions, for I think they have been exhaustively dealt with in the correspondence with Yan—sky.

May 20, 1927

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

*On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary
of the October Revolution*

The October Revolution should not be regarded merely as a revolution "within national bounds." It is, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order; for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind, a turn from the old, capitalist, world to the new, socialist, world.

Revolutions in the past usually ended with one group of exploiters replacing another group of exploiters at the helm of government. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the liberation movements of the slaves. Such was the case during the period of the uprisings of the serfs. Such was the case during the period of the well-known "great" revolutions in England, France and Germany. I am not speaking of the Paris Commune, which was the first glorious, heroic, yet unsuccessful attempt on the part of the proletariat to turn history against capitalism.

The October Revolution differs from these revolutions *in principle*. Its aim is not to substitute one form of exploitation for another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters for another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to abolish all exploiter groups, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, to establish the power of the most revolutionary class of all the oppressed classes that have ever existed, to organize a new, classless, socialist society.

It is precisely for this reason that the *victory* of the October Revolution signifies a radical change in the history of mankind, a radical change in the historical destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation movement of the world proletariat, a radical change in the methods of struggle and the forms of

organization, in the way of life and traditions, in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout the world.

This is the basic reason why the October Revolution is a revolution of an international, world order.

This also is the source of the profound sympathy manifested by the oppressed classes of all countries for the October Revolution, which they regard as a token of their own emancipation.

A number of fundamental issues could be noted on which the October Revolution influences the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

1. The October Revolution is remarkable primarily for having caused a breach in the front of world imperialism, for having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one of the biggest capitalist countries and put the socialist proletariat in power.

The class of wage workers, the class of persecuted, the class of the oppressed and exploited has *for the first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of the *ruling* class, setting a contagious example to the proletarians of all countries.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* a new era, the era of *proletarian* revolutions in the countries of *imperialism*.

It took the instruments and means of production from the landlords and capitalists and converted them into public property, thus opposing socialist property to bourgeois property. It thereby exposed the lie of the capitalists that bourgeois property is inviolable, sacred, eternal.

It wrested power from the bourgeoisie, deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights, destroyed the bourgeois state apparatus and transferred power to the Soviets, thus opposing the socialist rule of the Soviets, as *proletarian* democracy, to bourgeois parliamentarism, as *capitalist* democracy. Lafargue was right when he said, as far back as 1887, that on the morrow of the revolution "all former capitalists will be disfranchised."

The October Revolution thereby exposed the lie of the Social-Democrats that it is possible at present to effect a peaceful transition to socialism through bourgeois parliamentarism.

But the October Revolution did not, and could not, stop there. Having destroyed the old, the bourgeois order, it began to build the new, the socialist order. The ten years of the October Revolution have been ten years of the building up of the Party, the trade unions, the Soviets, the cooperative societies, cultural organizations, transport, industry, the Red Army. The indisputable successes of socialism in the U.S.S.R. on the construction front have demonstrated that the proletariat *can* successfully govern the country *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build industry *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully direct the whole of the national economy *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build socialism in spite of the capitalist encirclement.

Menenius Agrippa, the famous Roman senator of ancient times, is not the only one who can lay claim to the old "theory" that the exploited cannot do without the exploiters any more than the head and other parts of the body can do without a stomach. This "theory" is now the cornerstone of the political "philosophy" of Social-Democracy in general, and of the Social-Democratic policy of *coalition* with the imperialist bourgeoisie, in particular. This "theory," which has acquired the character of a prejudice, is now one of the most serious obstacles in the path of the revolutionization of the proletariat in the capitalist countries. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this false "theory" a mortal blow.

Is there still any need to prove that such and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot but have their serious effect on the revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries?

Such generally known facts as the progressive growth of communism in the capitalist countries, the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working class of the U.S.S.R. and, finally, the many workers' delegations that come to the Land of the Soviets, prove beyond a doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution are already beginning to bear fruit.

2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism not only in the centres of its domination, not only in the "mother countries." It has also struck at the rear of imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries.

Having overthrown the landlords and the capitalists, the October Revolution has broken the chains of national and colonial oppression and freed from it, without exception, all the oppressed nations of a vast state. The proletariat cannot emancipate itself without emancipating the oppressed nations. It is a characteristic feature of the October Revolution that it accomplished these national-colonial revolutions in the U.S.S.R. not under the flag of national enmity and conflicts among nations, but under the flag of mutual confidence and fraternal rapprochement of the workers and peasants of the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R.; not in the name of *nationalism*, but in the name of *internationalism*.

It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah nations, slave nations, have for the *first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of nations which are *really* free and *really* equal, thereby setting a contagious example for the oppressed nations of the whole world.

This means that the October Revolution has *ushered in* a new era, the era of *colonial revolutions* which are being conducted in the *oppressed countries* of the world *in alliance* with the proletariat and *under the leadership* of the proletariat.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the world has been divided from time immemorial into inferior and superior races, into blacks and whites, of whom the former are unfit for civilization and are doomed to be objects of exploitation, while the latter are the only vehicles of civilization, whose mission it is to exploit the former.

This legend must now be regarded as shattered and discarded. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is

that it dealt this legend a mortal blow, having demonstrated in practice that liberated non-European nations, drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are not a bit less capable of promoting a *really* progressive culture and a *really* progressive civilization than are the European nations.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the only method of liberating the oppressed nations is the method of *bourgeois nationalism*, the method of nations drawing apart from one another, the method of disuniting nations, the method of intensifying national enmity among the labouring masses of the various nations.

This legend must now be regarded as disproved. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of the *proletarian, internationalist* method of liberating the oppressed nations as being the only correct method; having demonstrated in practice the possibility and expediency of a *fraternal union* of the workers and peasants of the most diverse nations based on principles of *voluntariness* and *internationalism*. The existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the prototype of the future integration of the working people of all countries into a single world economic system, cannot but serve as direct proof of this.

It need hardly be said that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot but have their serious effect on the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries. Such facts as the growth of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed nations in China, Indonesia, India, etc., and the growing sympathy of these nations for the U.S.S.R., unquestionably bear this out.

The era of undisturbed exploitation and oppression of the colonies and dependent countries *has passed away*.

The era of revolutions for emancipation in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the *proletariat* in these countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution, *has begun*.

3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the centres of imperialism as well as in its rear, having weakened the might of imperialism in the "mother countries" and having shaken its domination in the colonies, the October Revolution has thereby jeopardized the very existence of world capitalism *as a whole*.

While the spontaneous development of capitalism in the conditions of imperialism has degenerated—owing to its unevenness, owing to the inevitability of conflicts and armed clashes, owing, finally, to the unprecedented imperialist slaughter—into the process of the decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution and the resultant secession of a vast country from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate this process, washing away, bit by bit, the very foundations of world imperialism.

More than that. While shaking imperialism, the October Revolution has at the same time created—in the first proletarian dictatorship—a powerful and open *base* for the world revolutionary movement, a base such as the world revolutionary movement *never possessed* before and on which it now can rely for support. It has created a powerful and open *centre* of the world revolutionary movement, such as the world revolutionary movement *never possessed* before and around which it now can rally and organize a *united revolutionary front of the proletarians and of the oppressed peoples of all countries against imperialism*.

This means, firstly, that the October Revolution inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from which the latter will never recover. It is precisely for this reason that capitalism will never recover the "equilibrium" and "stability" that it possessed before October.

Capitalism may become partly stabilized, it may rationalize production, turn over the administration of the country to fascism, temporarily hold down the working class; but it will never recover the "tranquility," the "assurance," the "equilibrium" and the "stability" that it flaunted before; for the crisis of world capi-

talism has reached the stage of development where the flames of revolution must inevitably break out, now in the centres of imperialism, now in the periphery, reducing to naught the capitalist patchwork and daily bringing nearer the fall of capitalism. Exactly as in the popular story "When it pulled its tail out of the mud, its beak got stuck; when it pulled its beak out, its tail got stuck."

This means, secondly, that the October Revolution has so much raised the strength, the relative weight, the courage and the fighting preparedness of the oppressed classes of the whole world as to compel the ruling classes to reckon with them as a new, important factor. Now the labouring masses of the world can no longer be regarded as a "blind mob," groping, without prospects, in the dark; for the October Revolution has created a beacon which illuminates their path and opens up perspectives for them. Whereas formerly there was no *world-wide* open forum from which the aspirations and strivings of the oppressed classes could be expounded and formulated, now such a forum exists in the first proletarian dictatorship.

There is hardly room for doubt that the destruction of this forum would for a long time cast over the social and political life of the "advanced countries" the gloom of unbridled, black reaction. It cannot be denied that the very existence of a "Bolshevik state" puts a curb upon the dark forces of reaction, thus helping the oppressed classes in their struggle for liberation. This really explains the savage hatred which the exploiters of all countries entertain for the Bolsheviks.

History repeats itself, though on a new basis. Just as formerly, during the period of the downfall of *feudalism*, the word "Jacobin" evoked dread and abhorrence among the aristocrats of all countries, so now, in the period of the decline of *capitalism*, the word "Bolshevik" evokes dread and abhorrence among the bourgeois in all countries. And conversely, just as formerly Paris was the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising *bourgeoisie*, so now Moscow is the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of

the rising *proletariat*. Hatred for the Jacobins did not save feudalism from collapse. Can there be any doubt that hatred for the Bolsheviks will not save capitalism from its inevitable downfall?

The era of the "stability" of capitalism *has passed away*, carrying away with it the legend of the indestructibility of the bourgeois order.

The era of the collapse of capitalism *has begun*.

4. The October Revolution should not be regarded merely as a revolution in the domain of economic and social-political relations. It is at the same time a revolution in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working class. The October Revolution was born and gained strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of imperialism and of proletarian revolutions. Hence it marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism, the victory of the Third International over the Second International.

The October Revolution has cut an impassable furrow between Marxism and Social-Democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of Social-Democratism.

Formerly, *before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, Social-Democracy, while refraining from openly repudiating the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but doing nothing, absolutely nothing, that would contribute to the realization of this idea, could flaunt the banner of Marxism, and it is perfectly obvious that this behaviour of Social-Democracy created no danger whatever for capitalism. Then, in that period, Social-Democracy was formally identified, or almost completely identified, with Marxism.

Now, *after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, when it became patent to all *whither* Marxism leads and *what* its victory may signify, Social-Democracy is no longer able to flaunt the banner of Marxism, can no longer flirt with the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat without creating a certain

amount of danger for capitalism. Having long ago broken with the spirit of Marxism, it has found itself compelled to discard also the banner of Marxism; it has openly and unambiguously taken a stand against the offspring of Marxism, against the October Revolution, against the first dictatorship of the proletariat in the world.

Now it must dissociate itself, and actually has dissociated itself, from Marxism; for under present conditions one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, unless one wages a revolutionary struggle against one's own bourgeoisie, unless one creates the conditions for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one's own country.

A chasm has opened between Social-Democracy and Marxism. Henceforth, the *only* vehicle and bulwark of Marxism is Leninism, communism.

But matters did not end there. The October Revolution went further than drawing a demarcation line between Social-Democracy and Marxism; it cast Social-Democracy into the camp of the downright defenders of capitalism *against* the first proletarian dictatorship in the world. When Messrs. Adler and Bauer, Wels and Levy, Longuet and Blum abuse the "Soviet regime" and extol parliamentary "democracy," these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will continue to fight *for* the restoration of the capitalist order in the U.S.S.R., *for* the preservation of capitalist slavery in the "civilized" states.

Present-day Social-Democratism is an *ideological prop* of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said that the present-day Social-Democratic politicians are "*real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement*, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class," that in the "civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" they would inevitably range themselves "on the side of the 'Versaillese' against the 'Communards.'"

It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to Social-Democratism in the labour movement. That is

why the era of dying capitalism is also the era of dying Social-Democratism in the labour movement.

The great significance of the October Revolution lies also in the fact that it marks the inevitable victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism in the world labour movement.

The era of the domination of the Second International and of Social-Democratism in the labour movement *has come to an end.*

The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International *has begun.*

Pravda, No. 255,
November 6-7, 1927

ON THE GRAIN FRONT

*Excerpt From a Talk to Students
of the Institute of Red Professors,
the Communist Academy
and the Sverdlov University,
on May 28, 1928*

Question: What is to be considered as the underlying cause of our difficulties in the matter of the grain supply? What is the way out of these difficulties? What, in connection with these difficulties, are the conclusions to be drawn as regards the rate of development of our industry, particularly from the point of view of the ratio between the light and heavy industries?

Answer: At first sight it might appear that our grain difficulties are of a fortuitous nature, the result merely of faulty planning, the result merely of a number of mistakes committed in the sphere of economic coordination.

But that might appear so only at first sight. Actually the causes of the difficulties lie much deeper. That faulty planning and mistakes in economic coordination have played a considerable part—that there cannot be the slightest doubt. But to attribute everything to faulty planning and chance mistakes would be a gross error. It would be an error to belittle the role and importance of planning. But it would be a still greater error to exaggerate the part played by the planning principle, in the belief that we have already reached a stage of development when it is possible to plan and regulate everything.

It must not be forgotten that in addition to elements which lend themselves to planning there are elements in our national economy which do not as yet lend themselves to planning; and that, moreover, there are hostile classes which cannot be overcome simply by the planning of the State Planning Commission.

That is why I think that we must not reduce everything to mere chance, to mistakes in planning, etc.

Well, then, what is the underlying cause of our difficulties on the grain front?

The underlying cause of our grain difficulties is that the increase in the production of grain for the market is not keeping pace with the increase in the demand for grain.

Industry is growing. The number of workers is growing. Towns are growing. And, lastly, the regions producing industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc.) are growing, creating a demand for grain. All this leads to a rapid increase in our requirements as regards grain—grain available for the market. But the production of grain for the market is increasing at a disastrously slow rate.

It cannot be said that we have had a smaller amount of grain stocks at the disposal of the state this year than last year, or the year before. On the contrary, we have had far more grain in the hands of the state this year than in previous years. Nevertheless, we are faced with difficulties as regards the grain supply.

Here are a few figures. In 1925-26 we managed to purchase 434,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount 123,000,000 poods were exported. Thus, there remained in the country 311,000,000 poods of grain. In 1926-27 we purchased 596,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount 153,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country 443,000,000 poods. In 1927-28 we purchased 576,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount 27,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country 549,000,000 poods.

In other words, this year, by April 1, the grain supplies available to meet the requirements of the country amounted to 100,000,000 poods more than last year, and 230,000,000 poods more than the year before. Nevertheless, we are experiencing difficulties on the grain front this year.

I have already said in one of my reports that the capitalist elements in the rural districts, and primarily the kulaks, had taken advantage of these difficulties, in order to disrupt the Soviet economic policy. You know that the Soviet Government adopted a number of measures with the object of putting a stop to the anti-Soviet action of the kulaks. I will not therefore dwell

on this matter here. In the present case it is another question that interests me. I have in mind the reasons for the slow increase in the production of grain available for the market; the question as to why the increase in the production of grain for the market in our country is slower than the increase in the demand, in spite of the fact that our crop area and the gross production of grain have already reached the prewar level.

Indeed, is it not a fact that the grain crop area has already reached the prewar mark? Yes, it is a fact. Is it not a fact that already last year the gross production of grain was equal to the prewar output, i.e., 5,000,000,000 poods? Yes, it is a fact. How, then, is it to be explained that, in spite of these facts, the amount of grain we are producing for the market is only one half, and the amount we are exporting is only about one-twentieth of what it was in prewar times?

The reason is primarily and chiefly the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October Revolution, the change from large-scale landlord and large-scale kulak farming, which provided the largest proportion of marketed grain, to small- and middle-peasant farming, which provides the smallest proportion of marketed grain. The mere fact that before the war there were fifteen to sixteen million individual peasant farms, whereas, at present there are 24,000,000 to 25,000,000 peasant farms, shows that now the basis of our agriculture is essentially small-peasant farming, which provides a *minimum* amount of grain for the market.

The strength of large-scale farming, irrespective of whether it is landlord, kulak or collective farming, lies in the fact that large farms are able to employ machinery, scientific methods, fertilizers; to increase the productivity of labour; and thereby produce a maximum quantity of grain for the market. On the other hand, the weakness of small-peasant farming lies in the fact that it lacks, or almost lacks, these opportunities, and as a result it is semiconsuming farming, yielding little grain for the market.

Take, for instance, the collective farms and the state farms. They market 47.2 per cent of their gross output of grain. In

other words, they supply for the market a larger proportion of their output than did landlord farming in prewar days. But what about the small- and middle-peasant farms? They market only 11.2 per cent of their total output of grain. The difference, as you see, is quite striking.

Here are a few figures illustrating the structure of grain production in the past, in the prewar period, and at present, in the post-October period. These figures were supplied by Comrade Nemchinov, a member of the Collegium of the Central Statistical Board. These figures may not be absolutely accurate, as Comrade Nemchinov explains in his memorandum; they permit of only approximate calculations. But they are quite adequate to enable us to understand the difference between the prewar period and the post-October period in regard to the structure of grain production in general, and of the production of market grain in particular.

	Gross Grain Production		Market Grain (i.e., not consumed in the rural districts)		Percentage of market grain
	Millions of poods	Per cent	Millions of poods	Per cent	
<i>Prewar</i>					
1. Landlords .	600	12.0	281.6	21.6	47.0
2. Kulaks .	1,900	38.0	650.0	50.0	34.0
3. Middle and poor peasants .	2,500	50.0	369.0	28.4	14.7
<i>Total</i> .	5,000	100.0	1,300.6	100.0	26.0
<i>Postwar (1926-27)</i>					
1. State farms and collective farms .	80.0	1.7	37.8	6.0	47.2
2. Kulaks .	617.0	13.0	126.0	20.0	20.0
3. Middle and poor peasants .	4,052.0	85.3	466.2	74.0	11.2
<i>Total</i> . .	4,749.0	100.0	630.0	100.0	13.3

What does this table show?

It shows, firstly, that the production of the overwhelming proportion of grain products has passed from the hands of landlords and kulaks into the hands of small and middle peasants. This means that the small and middle peasants, having completely emancipated themselves from the yoke of the landlords, and having, in the main, broken the strength of the kulaks, have thereby obtained the opportunity of considerably improving their material conditions. This is the result of the October Revolution. Here we see the effect, primarily, of the decisive gain which accrued to the great bulk of the peasantry as a result of the October Revolution.

It shows, secondly, that in our country the principal holders of grain available for the market are the small and, primarily, the middle peasants. This means that not only in respect to gross output of grain, but also in respect to the production of grain for the market, the U.S.S.R. has become, as a result of the October Revolution, a land of small-peasant farming, and the middle peasant has become the "central figure" in agriculture.

It shows, thirdly, that the abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the reduction of kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and the change to small-peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its output available for the market, in the absence, in the sphere of grain growing, of any more or less developed large-scale socialized farming (collective farms and state farms), was bound to lead, and in fact has led, to a sharp reduction in the output of grain for the market as compared with prewar times. It is a fact that the amount of marketed grain in our country is now half of what it was before the war, although the gross output of grain has reached the prewar level.

That is the underlying cause of our difficulties on the grain front.

That is why our difficulties in the sphere of grain purchases must not be regarded as merely fortuitous.

No doubt the situation has been aggravated to some extent by the fact that our trading organizations took upon themselves

the unnecessary task of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns, and this was bound to reduce to a certain extent the state's grain reserves. But there are no grounds whatever to doubt that the underlying cause of our difficulties on the grain front is not this particular circumstance, but the slow development of the output of our agriculture for the market, accompanied by a rapid increase in the demand for marketable grain.

What is the way out of this situation?

Some people see the way out of this situation in a return to kulak farming, in the development and extension of kulak farming. These people dare not advocate a return to landlord farming, for they realize, evidently, that such talk is dangerous in our times. All the more eagerly, therefore, do they urge the necessity of the utmost development of kulak farming in the interest of the Soviet power. These people think that the Soviet power can simultaneously rely on two opposite classes—the class of the kulaks, whose economic principle is the exploitation of the working class, and the class of the workers, whose economic principle is the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of reactionaries.

There is no need to prove that these reactionary "plans" have nothing in common with the interests of the working class, with the principles of Marxism, with the tasks of Leninism. All talk to the effect that the kulak is "no worse" than the urban capitalist, that the kulak is no more dangerous than the urban Nepman, and that, therefore, there is no reason to "fear" the kulaks now—all such talk is sheer liberal chatter which lulls the vigilance of the working class and of the great bulk of the peasantry. It must not be forgotten that in industry we can oppose to the small urban capitalist our large-scale socialist industry, which produces nine-tenths of the total output of manufactured goods, while in the sphere of agriculture we can oppose to large-scale kulak farming only the still weak collective farms and state farms, which produce but one-eighth the amount of grain produced by the kulak farms. To fail to understand the significance of large-scale kulak farming in the rural districts, to fail to understand

that the relative weight of the kulaks in the rural districts is a hundredfold greater than that of the small capitalists in urban industry, is to lose one's senses, to break with Leninism, to desert to the side of the enemies of the working class.

What, then, is the way out of the situation?

1. The way out lies, firstly, in the transition from the small, backward and scattered peasant farms to amalgamated, large-scale socialized farms, equipped with machinery, armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing a maximum of grain for the market. The solution lies in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, socialized farming.

Lenin called on the Party to organize collective farms from the very first days of the October Revolution. From that time onward the propaganda of the idea of collective farming has not ceased in our Party. However, it is only recently that the call for collective farms has met with mass response. This is to be explained primarily by the fact that the widespread development of cooperative organizations in the rural districts paved the way for a radical change in the attitude of the peasants in favour of the collective farms, and the existence of a number of collective farms already yielding from 150 to 200 poods per dessiatin, of which from 30 to 40 per cent represents a marketable surplus, is strongly attracting the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants toward the collective farms.

Of no little importance in this connection is also the fact that only recently has it become possible for the state to lend substantial financial assistance to the collective-farm movement. We know that this year the state has granted twice the amount of money it did last year in aid of the collective farms (more than 60,000,000 rubles). The Fifteenth Party Congress was absolutely right in stating that the conditions have already ripened for a mass collective-farm movement and that the stimulation of the collective-farm movement is one of the most important means of increasing the output of grain for the market in the country.

According to the figures of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain by the collective farms in 1927 amounted

to no less than 55,000,000 poods, with an average marketable surplus of 30 per cent. The widespread movement for the creation of new collective farms and for the expansion of the old collective farms that started at the beginning of this year should considerably increase the grain output of the collective farms by the end of the year. Our task is to maintain the present rate of development of the collective-farm movement, to combine the collective farms into larger units, to get rid of sham collective farms, replacing them by genuine ones, and to establish a system whereby the collective farms will deliver to the state and cooperative organizations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty of being deprived of state subsidies and credits. I think that if these conditions are adhered to within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the collective farms about 100,000,000 poods of grain for the market.

The collective-farm movement is sometimes contrasted to the cooperative movement, apparently on the assumption that collective farms are one thing, and cooperative societies another. That, of course, is wrong. Some even go so far as to contrast collective farms to Lenin's cooperative plan. Needless to say, such contrasting has nothing in common with the truth. In actual fact, the collective farms are a form of cooperatives, the most striking form of producers' cooperatives. There are marketing cooperatives, there are supply cooperatives, and there are also producers' cooperatives. The collective farms are an inseparable and integral part of the cooperative movement in general, and of Lenin's cooperative plan in particular. To carry out Lenin's cooperative plan means to raise the peasantry from the level of marketing and supply cooperatives to the level of producers' cooperatives, of collective-farm cooperatives, so to speak. This, by the way, explains why our collective farms began to arise and develop only as a result of the development and consolidation of the marketing and supply cooperatives.

2. The way out lies, secondly, in expanding and strengthening the old state farms, and in organizing and developing new, large state farms. According to the figures of the Central Statistical

Board, the gross output of grain in the existing state farms amounted in 1927 to no less than 45,000,000 poods with a marketable surplus of 65 per cent. There is no doubt that, given a certain amount of state support, the state farms could considerably increase the production of grain.

But our task does not end there. There is a decision of the Soviet Government, on the strength of which new large state farms (from 10,000 to 30,000 dessiatins each) are being organized in districts where there are no peasant holdings; and in five or six years these state farms should yield about 100,000,000 poods of grain for the market. The organization of these state farms has already begun. The task is to put this decision of the Soviet Government into effect at all costs. I think that, provided these tasks are fulfilled, within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the old and new state farms 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 poods of grain for the market.

3. Finally, the way out lies in systematically increasing the yield of the small and middle individual peasant farms. We cannot and should not lend any support to the individual large kulak farms. But we can and should assist the individual small- and middle-peasant farms, helping them to increase their crop yields and drawing them into the channel of cooperative organization. This is an old task; it was proclaimed with particular emphasis as early as 1921 when the tax in kind was substituted for the surplus-appropriation system. This task was reaffirmed by our Party at its Fourteenth and Fifteenth congresses. The importance of the task is now emphasized by the difficulties on the grain front. That is why this task must be fulfilled with the same persistence as the first two tasks, the task with regard to collective farms and the task with regard to state farms.

All the available data indicate that the yield of peasant farms can be increased 15 to 20 per cent in the course of a few years. At present no less than 5,000,000 wooden ploughs are in use in our country. The substitution of modern ploughs for these would alone lead to a very considerable increase in the grain output of the country. This is apart from supplying the peasant farms with

a certain minimum of fertilizers, selected seed, small machines, etc. The contract system, the system of signing contracts with whole villages for supplying them with seed, etc., on the condition that in return they unfailingly deliver a certain quantity of grain products—this system is the best method of raising the yield of peasant farms and of drawing the peasants into the cooperative organizations. I think that if we work persistently in this direction we can, within three or four years, obtain additionally from the small and middle individual peasant farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of grain for the market.

Thus, if all these tasks are fulfilled, the state can in three or four years' time have at its disposal 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 additional poods of marketable grain—a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre within the country as well as abroad.

Such, in the main, are the measures which must be taken in order to solve the difficulties on the grain front.

Our task at present is to combine these basic measures with current measures to improve planning in the sphere of supplying the rural districts with goods, relieving our trading organizations of the duty of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns.

Should not, in addition to these measures, a number of other measures be adopted—measures, say, to reduce the rate of development of our industry, the growth of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand for grain which at present is outstripping the increase in the production of grain for the market? No, not under any circumstances! To reduce the rate of development of industry would mean to weaken the working class; for every step forward in the development of industry, every new factory, every new works, is, as Lenin expressed it, "a new stronghold" of the working class, which strengthens its position in the fight against the petty-bourgeois element, in the fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development of industry; we must at the first opportunity speed it up in order to pour goods into

the rural districts and obtain from them more grain, in order to supply agriculture, primarily the collective farms and state farms, with machines, in order to industrialize agriculture and to increase the proportion of its output for the market.

Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater "caution," retard the development of heavy industry and make light industry, which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of our industry as a whole? Not under any circumstances! That would be suicidal; it would undermine our whole industry, including light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of industrializing our country, it would transform our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system of economy.

In this respect we proceed from the well-known guiding principles which Lenin set forth at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and which are absolutely binding for the whole of our Party. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern:

"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—this, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry."

Or again:

"We are exercising economy in all things, even in schools. This must be so, because we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed as an independent country." (Vol. XXVII, p. 349.)

These directives given by Lenin must never be forgotten.

How will the measures proposed affect the alliance between the workers and the peasants? I think that these measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

Indeed, if the collective farms and the state farms develop at increased speed; if, as a result of direct assistance given to the small and middle peasants, the yield of their farms increases and the cooperative societies embrace wider and wider masses of the peasantry; if the state obtains the hundreds of millions of

poods of additional marketable grain required for the purposes of manoeuvring: if, as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks are curbed and gradually overcome—is it not clear that the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the alliance of workers and peasants will thereby be smoothed out more and more; that the need for emergency measures in the purchase of grain will disappear; that the large masses of peasantry will turn more and more to collective forms of farming and that the fight to overcome the capitalist elements in the rural districts will assume an increasingly mass and organized character?

Is it not clear that the cause of the alliance between the workers and the peasants can only benefit by these measures?

It must only be borne in mind that the alliance of workers and peasants under the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be viewed as an ordinary alliance. It is a special form of class alliance between the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry, which sets itself the object: (a) of strengthening the position of the working class; (b) of ensuring the leading role of the working class within this alliance; (c) of abolishing classes and class society. Any other conception of the alliance of workers and peasants is opportunism, menshevism, S.-R.-ism—anything you like, but not Marxism, not Leninism.

How can the idea of the alliance of the workers and the peasants be reconciled with Lenin's well-known thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Is there not a contradiction here? The contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one. Actually there is no contradiction here at all. In the same speech at the Third Congress of the Comintern in which Lenin characterized the peasantry as "the last capitalist class," in that same speech Lenin reiterates his arguments for the need of an alliance between the workers and the peasants, declaring that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and the state power." It is clear that Lenin, at any rate, saw no contradiction in this.

How are we to understand Lenin's thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Does it mean that the peasantry consists of capitalists? No, it does not.

It means, firstly, that the individual peasantry is a special class, which bases its economy on the private ownership of the implements and means of production and which, for that reason, differs from the class of proletarians, who base economic life on the collective ownership of the implements and means of production.

It means, secondly, that the individual peasantry is a class which supplies from its midst, engenders and nourishes, capitalists, kulaks and all kinds of exploiters in general.

Is not this circumstance an insuperable obstacle to the organization of an alliance of the workers and the peasants? No, it is not. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be regarded as an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the working class with the labouring masses of the peasantry. Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against the kulaks. Such an alliance cannot be a durable one unless the poor peasants are organized as the bulwark of the working class in the rural districts. That is why the alliance between the workers and the peasants under the present conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected only in accordance with Lenin's well-known slogan: Rely on the poor peasant, establish a firm alliance with the middle peasant, do not for a moment relax the fight against the kulak. For only by applying this slogan can the bulk of the peasantry be drawn into the channel of socialist construction.

You see, therefore, that the contradiction between Lenin's two formulas is only an imaginary, a seeming contradiction. Actually, there is no contradiction between them at all.

LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT*

Reply to Comrade S.

Comrade S.,

It is not true that Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant," which he advanced in his well-known article on Pitirim Sorokin, is, as is alleged, a slogan of the "period of the Committees of Poor Peasants," a slogan of "the end of the period of the so-called neutralization of the middle peasantry." *This is absolutely untrue.*

The Committees of Poor Peasants were formed in June 1918. By the end of October 1918, our forces had already gained the upper hand over the kulaks in the rural districts, and the middle peasants had turned to the side of the Soviet power. It was on the basis of this turn that the decision of the Central Committee was taken to abolish the dual power of the Soviets and the Committees of Poor Peasants, to hold new elections for the volost and village Soviets, to merge the Committees of Poor Peasants with the newly-elected Soviets and, consequently, to dissolve the Committees of Poor Peasants. This decision was formally approved, as is well known, on November 9, 1918, by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. I have in mind the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets of November 9, 1918, on the village and volost Soviet elections and the dissolution of the Committees of Poor Peasants in the Soviets.

But when did Lenin's article, "Valuable Admissions by Pitirim Sorokin," appear, the article in which he substituted the

* Slightly abridged.—*J. St.*

slogan of agreement with the middle peasant for the slogan of neutralizing the middle peasant? It appeared on November 21, 1918, i.e., nearly two weeks *after* the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets had been adopted. In this article Lenin plainly says that the policy of agreement with the middle peasant is dictated by the *turn* in our direction on the part of the middle peasant.

Here is what Lenin says:

"Our task in the rural districts is to destroy the landlord and smash the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak profiteer. For this purpose we can rely firmly *only* on the semiproletarians, the 'poor peasants.' But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He vacillated, is vacillating and will continue to vacillate. The task of influencing the vacillators *is not identical* with the task of overthrowing the exploiter and defeating the active enemy. The task at the present moment is to learn to come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant, for it is precisely now that *a turn in our direction on the part of the middle peasantry is inevitable*,* owing to the causes above enumerated." (Vol. XXIII, p. 294.)

What follows from this?

It follows from this that Lenin's slogan refers, not to the *old* period, not to the period of the Committees of Poor Peasants and the neutralization of the middle peasant, but to the *new* period, the period of agreement with the middle peasant. Thus, it reflects, not the *end* of the old period, but the *beginning* of a new period.

But your assertion regarding Lenin's slogan is not only wrong from the formal point of view, not merely, so to speak, chronologically; it is wrong in substance.

It is known that Lenin's slogan regarding agreement with the middle peasant was proclaimed as a new slogan by the whole Party at the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919). It is known that the Eighth Party Congress was the congress which laid the foundation of our policy of a durable alliance with the middle peasant. It is known that our program, the program of the

* My italics.—J. St.

C.P.S.U.(B.), was adopted also at the Eighth Congress of the Party. It is known that that program contains special points dealing with the Party's attitude towards the various groups in the rural districts: the poor peasants, the middle peasants, and the kulaks. What do these points in the program of the C.P.S.U.(B.) say regarding the social groups in the rural districts and regarding our Party's attitude towards them? Listen:

"In all its work in the rural districts the R.C.P. continues, as hitherto, to *rely on the proletarian and semiproletarian strata of the rural population*; it organizes primarily these strata into an independent force by establishing Party nuclei in the villages, forming organizations of poor peasants, special types of trade unions of rural proletarians and semiproletarians, etc., bringing them closer to the urban proletariat and wresting them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and the small-proprietor interests.

"With respect to the kulaks, to the village bourgeoisie, the policy of the R.C.P. is *resolutely to combat their exploiting proclivities, to suppress their resistance to the Soviet policy*.

"With respect to the middle peasants, the policy of the R.C.P. is to draw them gradually and systematically, into the work of socialist construction. The Party sets itself the task of separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of the working class by carefully attending to their needs, of combating their backwardness by measures of ideological influence—not by any measures of repression—and of striving in all cases where their vital interests are involved to reach *practical agreements with them*, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying out socialist reforms."* (Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), stenographic record, p. 351.)

Try to find the slightest, even verbal, difference between these points of the program and Lenin's slogan! You will not find any difference, for there is none. More than that. There cannot be the slightest doubt that Lenin's slogan not only does not contradict the decisions of the Eighth Congress on the middle peasant, but, on the contrary, it is a most apt and exact formulation of these decisions. And it is a fact that the program of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was adopted in March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Party, which specially discussed the question of the middle peasant, while Lenin's article against Pitirim Sorokin, which pro-

* All italics mine.—J.St.

claimed the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant, appeared in the press in November 1918, four months before the Eighth Congress of the Party.

Is it not clear that the Eighth Congress of the Party *fully and entirely confirmed* the slogan which Lenin proclaimed in his article against Pitirim Sorokin as a slogan by which the Party must be *guided* in its work in the rural districts *during the whole of the present period of socialist construction*?

What is the salt of Lenin's slogan?

The salt of Lenin's slogan is the fact that here Lenin grasps with remarkable precision the *triune* task of Party work in the rural districts and expresses it in a single condensed formula: (a) *rely* on the poor peasant; (b) come to *agreement* with the middle peasant, and (c) do not for a moment relax the *fight* against the kulak. Try to take from this formula any one of its parts as a basis for work in the rural districts at the present time and forget about the other parts, and you will inevitably find yourself in a blind alley.

Is it possible in the present phase of socialist construction to reach a real and durable agreement with the middle peasant without relying on the poor peasant and without fighting the kulak?

It is impossible.

Is it possible, under the present conditions of development, to carry on a successful fight against the kulak without relying on the poor peasant and without reaching agreement with the middle peasant?

It is impossible.

How can this triune task of Party work in the rural districts be most aptly expressed in one all-embracing slogan? I think that Lenin's slogan is the most apt expression of this task. It must be admitted that you cannot express it more aptly than Lenin....

Why is it necessary to emphasize the expediency of Lenin's slogan *particularly at the present time*, particularly *under the present conditions* of work in the rural districts?

Because, particularly at the present time we see a tendency on the part of certain comrades to break up this *triune* task of

Party work in the rural districts into parts and to sever these parts from one another. This is fully borne out by the experience of our grain-purchasing campaign in January and February this year.

Every Bolshevik knows that agreement must be reached with the middle peasant. But not everybody understands how this agreement is to be reached. Some think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the fight against the kulak, or by slackening this fight; because, they say, the fight against the kulak may frighten away a section of the middle peasantry, its well-to-do section.

Others think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the work of organizing the poor peasants, or by slackening this work; because, they say, the organization of the poor peasants means singling out the poor peasants, and this may frighten the middle peasants away from us.

The result of these deviations from the correct line is that such people forget the Marxian thesis that the middle peasantry is a vacillating class, that agreement with the middle peasantry can be durable only if a determined fight is carried on against the kulaks and if the work among the poor peasants is intensified; that unless these conditions are adhered to, the middle peasantry may swing to the side of the kulaks, whom it may regard as a force.

Remember what Lenin said at the Eighth Party Congress:

"We must define our attitude to a class which *has no definite and stable position.** The proletariat, in its mass, is for socialism; the bourgeoisie, in its mass, is opposed to socialism; to define the relation between these two classes is easy. But when we pass to a stratum like the middle peasantry, we find that *it is a class that vacillates*. The middle peasant is partly a property owner, partly a toiler. He does not exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he had to defend his position under the greatest difficulties; he suffered the exploitation of the landlords and the capitalists; he has borne everything; yet at the same time he is a property owner. For that reason our attitude toward this vacillating class presents enormous difficulties." (Eighth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.), stenographic record, p. 300.)

* My italics.—*J. St.*

But there are other deviations from the correct line, no less dangerous than those already mentioned. In some cases the fight against the kulak is indeed carried on, but it is carried on in such a clumsy and senseless manner that the blows fall on the middle and poor peasants. As a result, the kulak escapes unscathed, a rift is made in the alliance with the middle peasant, and a section of the poor peasants temporarily falls into the clutches of the kulak who is fighting to undermine Soviet policy.

In other cases attempts are made to transform the fight against the kulaks into expropriation of the kulaks, and grain purchasing into appropriation of surpluses, forgetting that under present conditions expropriation of the kulaks is folly and the surplus-appropriation system means, not an alliance with, but a fight against, the middle peasant.

What is the reason for such deviations from the Party line?

The reason is: failure to understand that the triple task of Party work in the rural districts is a *single* and *indivisible* task; failure to understand that the task of fighting the kulak *cannot be separated* from the task of reaching agreement with the middle peasant, and that these two tasks cannot be separated from the task of converting the poor peasant into a bulwark of the Party in the rural districts.*

* From this it follows that deviations from the correct line create a twofold danger to the alliance of the workers and peasants: a danger from the side of those who want, for instance, to transform the temporary emergency measures in connection with the grain-purchasing campaign into a permanent or long-term policy of the Party; and the danger from the side of those who want to take advantage of the discontinuance of emergency measures in order to give the kulak a free hand, to proclaim complete freedom of trade, trade not regulated by the state. Hence, in order to ensure that the correct line is pursued the fight must be waged on two fronts.

I want to take this opportunity to observe that our press does not always follow this rule and sometimes betrays a certain one-sidedness. In some cases, for instance, the press exposes those who want to transform the temporary emergency measures in connection with the grain-purchasing campaign into a permanent line of our policy and thus endanger the bond with the peasants. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time our

What must be done to make sure that these tasks are not separated from one another in the course of our current work in the rural districts?

We must, at least, issue a guiding slogan that will combine all these tasks in one general formula and, consequently, prevent these tasks from being separated from each other.

Is there such a formula, such a slogan in our Party arsenal?

Yes, there is. That formula is Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant."

That is why I think that this slogan is the most expedient and all-embracing slogan, that it must be brought to the forefront *precisely at the present time, precisely under the present conditions* of our work in the rural districts.

You regard Lenin's slogan as an "Opposition" slogan and in your letter you ask: "*How is that this Opposition slogan was printed in 'Pravda' for May 1, 1928. . . How can the fact be explained that this slogan appeared on the pages of 'Pravda,' the organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.—is this merely*

press fails to pay sufficient attention to and properly expose those who endanger the bond from the other side, who succumb to the petty-bourgeois element, demand a slackening of the fight against the capitalist elements in the rural districts and the establishment of complete freedom of trade, trade not regulated by the state, and thus undermine the bond with the peasants from the other end. That is bad. That is one-sidedness.

It also happens that the press exposes those who, for instance, deny the possibility and expediency of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farms which at the present stage are the basis of agriculture. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time the press does not expose those who belittle the importance of the collective farms and the state farms and who fail to see that the task of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farms must be supplemented by the practical task of expanding the construction of collective and state farms. That is one-sidedness.

In order to ensure that the correct line is pursued the fight must be waged *on two fronts*, and all one-sidedness must be abandoned.

a technical misprint, or is it a compromise with the Opposition on the question of the middle peasant?"

This certainly sounds very formidable. But be careful "at the turns," Comrade S.; otherwise you may, in your zeal, arrive at the conclusion that we must *prohibit* the printing of our program, which fully confirms Lenin's slogan (this is a fact!), and which in the main was drawn up by Lenin (who was certainly not in the opposition!), and which was adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party (also not in the opposition!). More respect for the well-known points in our program on the social groups in the rural districts. More respect for the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress on the middle peasantry!

As for your phrase "a compromise with the Opposition on the question of the middle peasant," I do not think it is worth the trouble to refute it; no doubt you wrote it in the heat of the moment.

You seem to be disturbed by the fact that both Lenin's slogan and the Program of the C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party speak of *agreement* with the middle peasant, whereas in his speech in opening the Eighth Congress Lenin spoke of a *durable alliance* with the middle peasant. Evidently, you think there is something in the nature of a contradiction in this. Perhaps you are even inclined to believe that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is something in the nature of a departure from the policy of *alliance* with the middle peasant. That is wrong, Comrade S. That is a serious error on your part. Only those who are able to read the letter of a slogan, but are unable to grasp its meaning, can think like that. Only those who are ignorant of the history of the slogan of alliance, of agreement with the middle peasant, can think like that. Only those can think like that who are capable of believing that Lenin, who, in his opening speech at the Eighth Congress, spoke about the policy of a "durable alliance" with the middle peasant, *departed* from his own position by saying in another speech *at the same congress*, and in the Party program which was adopted by the Eighth Congress, that we now need a policy of "agreement" with the middle peasant.

What is the point then? The point is that both Lenin and the Party, represented by the Eighth Congress, make *no distinction whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." The point is that everywhere, in all his speeches at the Eighth Congress, Lenin places the *sign of equality* between the concept "alliance" and the concept "agreement." The same must be said about the resolution of the Eighth Congress, "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry," in which the *sign of equality* is placed between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." And since Lenin and the Party regard the policy of agreement with the middle peasant, not as a casual and transient one, but as a *long-term* policy, they had, and have, every reason to call the policy of agreement with the middle peasant a policy of durable alliance with him and, conversely, to call the policy of durable alliance with the middle peasant a policy of agreement with him. One has only to read the stenographic record of the Eighth Congress of the Party and the resolution of that Congress on the middle peasant to be convinced of this.

Here is a passage from Lenin's speech at the Eighth Congress:

"Owing to the inexperience of Soviet workers and to the difficulties of the problem, the blows which were intended for the kulaks very frequently fell on the middle peasantry. Here we have sinned exceedingly. The experience we have gained in this respect will enable us to do everything to avoid this in the future. That is the task now facing us, not theoretically, but practically. You all know well that the problem is a difficult one. We have no material values to offer the middle peasant; and he is a materialist, a practical man who demands definite, material values, which we are not now in a position to offer and with which the country will have to dispense, perhaps, for several months of severe struggle—the struggle which is now promising to end in complete victory. But there is a great deal we can do in our administrative work: we can improve our administrative machinery and correct a host of abuses. The line of our Party, which has not done enough towards arriving at *a bloc*, an *alliance*, an *agreement** with the middle peasantry can and must be straightened out and corrected." (Eighth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.), stenographic record, p. 20.)

* My italics.—J.S.

As you see, Lenin makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

And here are excerpts from the resolution of the Eighth Congress, "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry."

"To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend to them, to any degree, the measures that are directed against the kulaks, means to grossly violate, not only all the decrees of the Soviet Government and its whole policy, but also all the fundamental principles of communism, which point to an *agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry during the period of the resolute struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, as one of the conditions for the painless transition to the abolition of all forms of exploitation.

"The middle peasantry, which possesses comparatively strong economic roots, owing to the backwardness of agricultural technique compared with industry even in the most advanced capitalist countries, let alone Russia, will continue to exist for a fairly long time after the beginning of the proletarian revolution. That is why the tactics of the Soviet workers in the rural districts, as well as of the active Party workers, must be based on the assumption that the *period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry *will be a long one*.

"...An absolutely correct policy pursued by the Soviet Government in the rural districts thus ensures *an alliance and agreement* between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry....

"...The policy of the workers' and peasants' government and of the Communist Party must continue to be conducted in this *spirit of agreement* between the proletariat, together with the poor peasantry, and the middle peasantry." * (*Eighth Congress of the R. C. P. (B.)*, stenographic record, pp. 370-72.)

As you see, the resolution also makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

It will not be superfluous to observe that no mention is made in the resolution of the Eighth Congress of "a durable alliance" with the middle peasant. Does that mean, however, that the resolution thereby *departs* from the policy of "durable alliance" with the middle peasant? No, it does not. It only means that the resolution places the sign of equality between the concept

* All italics mine.—J. St.

"agreement," "collaboration" and the concept "durable alliance." For it is obvious: there can be no "alliance" with the middle peasant without an "agreement" with him; and the alliance with the middle peasant cannot be "durable" unless there is a "long-term" agreement and collaboration with him.

Such are the facts.

Either one thing or another: either Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party departed from Lenin's statement about a "durable alliance" with the middle peasant, or this frivolous assumption must be abandoned and it must be admitted that Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party made no distinction whatever between the concept "agreement" and the concept "durable alliance."

Thus, he who does not want to be a victim of sheer pedantry, he who wants to grasp the true meaning of Lenin's slogan, which speaks of relying on the poor peasantry, of reaching agreement with the middle peasantry and of fighting the kulaks, cannot fail to understand that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is a policy of *durable alliance* with him.

The mistake you made is that you failed to understand the fraudulent trick of the Opposition and fell a prey to their provocation; you walked into the trap the enemy set for you. The Opposition frauds noisily assure us that they are in favour of Lenin's slogan of agreement with the middle peasant; but at the same time they drop the provocative hint that "agreement" with the middle peasant is one thing, and a "durable alliance" with him is something different. In this way they want to kill two birds with one stone: firstly, to conceal their real attitude to the middle peasant, which is not one of agreement with the middle peasant, but of "*disagreement* with the middle peasant" (see the well-known speech of the Oppositionist Smirnov, which I quoted at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference); and, secondly, to catch the simpletons among the Bolsheviks with the *alleged* difference between "agreement" and "alliance," to muddle them up completely and to push them away from Lenin.

And how do certain of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the Opposition frauds, instead of exposing them as deceiving the Party about their true position, they swallow the bait, walk into the trap, and allow themselves to be pushed away from Lenin. The Opposition is making a lot of noise about Lenin's slogan; the members of the Opposition pretend to be adherents of Lenin's slogan; therefore, I must dissociate myself from this slogan, otherwise I may be confused with the Opposition, otherwise I may be accused of "compromising with the Opposition"—such is the logic of these comrades!

And this is not the only instance of the fraudulent tricks played by the Opposition. Take, for instance, the slogan of self-criticism. Bolsheviks cannot but know that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the foundations of our Party activities: it is a means of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, the soul of the Bolshevik method of training cadres. The Opposition makes a lot of noise protesting that they, the Opposition, invented the slogan of self-criticism, that the Party stole this slogan from them, and thereby capitulated to the Opposition. By acting in this way the Opposition is trying to gain at least two ends:

firstly, to conceal from the working class and to deceive it about the fact that an abyss divides the "self-criticism" of the Opposition, whose purpose is to *destroy* the Party spirit, from Bolshevik self-criticism, whose purpose is to *strengthen* the Party spirit;

secondly, to catch certain simpletons and to induce them to dissociate themselves from the Party slogan of self-criticism.

And how do some of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the Opposition frauds and upholding the slogan of Bolshevik self-criticism, they walk into the trap, dissociate themselves from the slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the Opposition and capitulate to it, mistakenly believing that they are dissociating themselves from the Opposition.

A host of such instances might be cited.

But in our work we cannot dance to anybody's tune. Still less can we allow ourselves to be guided in our work by what the members of the Opposition say about us. We must pursue our own path, brushing aside both the fraudulent attempts of the Opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks who have fallen victims to the provocation of the Opposition. Remember the words quoted by Marx: "Follow your own path, and let people say what they like!"

Written: June 12, 1928

Pravda, No. 152,
July 3, 1928

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

*Speech Delivered at the Plenum
of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow
Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*

October 19, 1928

I think, comrades, that we must first rid our minds of trivialities, of personal matters, and the like, in order to solve the problem of the Right deviation which interests us today.

Is there a Right opportunist danger in our Party? Are there any objective factors favourable to the development of such a danger? How should this danger be fought? These are the questions that now confront us.

But we shall never solve the problem of the Right deviation unless we purge this problem of all the trivialities and irrelevant elements which encumber it and which prevent us from understanding its essence.

Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of the Right deviation is a fortuitous one. He contends that this is not a matter of a Right deviation, but of petty squabbles, personal intrigue, etc. Let us assume for a moment that petty squabbles and personal intrigue do play some part in this, as they do in all struggles. But to explain everything by petty squabbles and to fail to see the essence of the problem because of them, is to depart from the correct, Marxian path.

A large, solid organization of long standing, such as the Moscow organization undoubtedly is, could not be agitated from top to bottom and excited by the efforts of a few squabblers or intriguers. No, comrades, such miracles do not happen. Nor do I need to dwell on the fact that the strength and power of the Moscow organization cannot be evaluated so lightly. Obviously, more profound causes have been at work here, causes which have nothing to do with petty squabbles and intrigue.

Fruntov is also wrong, for although he admits the existence of a Right danger, he does not think it worth while for serious, busy people to concern themselves with it seriously. In his opinion, the question of the Right deviation is a subject for noise-makers, not for serious people. I quite understand Fruntov: he is so absorbed in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to think about the perspectives of our development. But that does not mean that we must convert the narrow, purely business approach of certain of our Party workers into a dogma of our work of construction. A healthy business approach is a good thing; but if it loses perspective in the work and fails to subordinate the work to the basic line of the Party, it becomes a drawback. And yet it should not be difficult to understand that the question of the Right deviation is a question of the basic line of our Party; it is the question as to whether the perspectives of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth Congress are right or wrong.

The comrades who in discussing the problem of the Right deviation concentrate on the question of the individuals representing the Right deviation are also wrong. Show us who are the Rights and the conciliators, they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. That is not the proper way of presenting the question. Individuals, of course, are of some importance. Nevertheless, the question is not one of individuals, but of the conditions, of the situation that give rise to the Right danger in the Party. Individuals can be removed, but it does not mean that we have thereby cut the roots of the Right danger in our Party. Therefore, the question of individuals does not solve the problem, although it is undoubtedly of interest.

In this connection I cannot help recalling an incident which occurred in Odessa at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven Denikin out of the Ukraine, were crushing the last remnants of his armies in the district of Odessa. A number of Red Army men searched high and low for the "Entente" in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture it—

the "Entente"—the war would be over. (*Loud laughter.*) It is conceivable that our Red Army men might have captured some representatives of the Entente in Odessa, but that, of course, would not have settled the question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was Denikin's last terrain, but in world capitalism.

The same can be said of certain of our comrades who in the question of the Right deviation concentrate on the individuals representing that deviation, forgetting about the conditions that give rise to it.

That is why we must first of all be clear about the conditions that give rise to the Right, and also to the "Left" (Trotskyite), deviation from the Leninist line.

Under capitalist conditions the Right deviation in communism is a tendency, an inclination, not yet formulated, it is true, and perhaps not yet consciously realized, but nevertheless a tendency on the part of a section of the Communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marxism in the direction of Social-Democracy. When certain groups of Communists deny the expediency of the slogan "class against class" in election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist Party nominating its own candidates (Great Britain), or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight against "Left" Social-Democracy (Germany), etc., etc., it shows that there are individuals in the Communist parties who are striving to adapt communism to Social-Democratism.

A victory of the Right deviation in the Communist parties in capitalist countries would mean the ideological defeat of the Communist parties and an enormous accession of strength to Social-Democratism. And what does an enormous accession of strength to Social-Democratism mean? It means the strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for Social-Democracy is the main prop of capitalism in the working class.

Hence, a victory of the Right deviation in the Communist parties in capitalist countries would add to the conditions necessary for the *preservation* of capitalism.

Under the conditions of Soviet development, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but its roots had not yet been torn up, the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination, not yet formulated, it is true, and perhaps not yet consciously realized, but nevertheless a tendency on the part of a section of Communists to depart from the general line of our Party towards bourgeois ideology. When certain groups of our Communists strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress and deny the need for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the rural districts; or demand a contraction of our industry in the belief that the present rate of development is fatal for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the collective farms and state farms in the belief that such subsidies are money thrown to the winds; or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods of self-criticism in the belief that self-criticism undermines our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realizing it, to adapt our socialist construction to the tastes and needs of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

A victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean an enormous accession of strength to the capitalist elements in our country. And what does an accession of strength to the capitalist elements in our country mean? It means weakening the proletarian dictatorship and multiplying the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

Hence, a victory of the Right deviation in our Party would add to the conditions necessary *for the restoration of capitalism in our country*.

Do we have in our Soviet country any of the conditions that would make the restoration of capitalism *possible*? Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are developing our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are linking the peasant economy with it. But

we have not yet torn up the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? They are imbedded in the system of commodity production, in small production in the towns, and particularly in the rural districts.

As Lenin said, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and *small production engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, and even a predominant character in our country, and since it *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, we therefore have in our country some of the conditions which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Have we the necessary means and forces in our Soviet country to abolish, to eliminate the *possibility* of restoring capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this fact that proves the correctness of Lenin's thesis on the *possibility* of building a complete socialist society in the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to strengthen our key positions for the purpose of industrializing the country, to develop industry at a rapid rate, to electrify the country, to place the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis, to organize the masses of the peasantry into cooperative societies and to increase the yield of their farms, gradually to amalgamate the individual peasant farms into collective farms, to develop state farms, to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn up the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy,

The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only in electricity that we have such a basis. Communism is the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the country will remain a small-peasant country, and that we must clearly realize. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on the world scale but also within the country. Everybody knows that. We have realized it, and we shall see to it that the economic basis is transformed from a small-peasant basis into a large-scale industrial basis. Only when the country has been electrified, when industry, agriculture and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be fully victorious." (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47.)

It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not torn up the roots of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism than for communism. It may happen that you cut down a tree but fail to tear up the roots; your strength does not suffice for this. Hence the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that beside the possibility of the restoration of capitalism there is also the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country, because we can eliminate the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism, we can tear up the roots of capitalism and secure the final victory over capitalism in our country, if we intensify the work of electrifying the country, if we place our industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in our country.

And finally, it follows that we cannot build socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the grounds that the countryside will "automatically follow" the lead of the towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But this does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to take the peasant countryside in tow and lead it all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, "to place the economy of the country, *including*

agriculture,* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production."

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that "NEP fully guarantees the *possibility** of building the foundations of socialist economy"? No, it does not. On the contrary, the two statements fully coincide. Lenin does not say that NEP gives us socialism ready made. Lenin merely says that NEP guarantees the *possibility* of building the foundations of socialist economy. There is a great difference between the *possibility* of building socialism and the *actual building of socialism*. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes that the country be electrified and industry, agriculture and transport placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale production, as a condition for the final victory of socialism in our country.

But this condition for the building of socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialize the country, build up a powerful industry, organize the millions of peasants into cooperative societies, place agriculture on a new technical basis, amalgamate the individual peasant farms into big collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intense work of construction on the part of the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. And until that is accomplished—and it cannot be accomplished all at once—we shall remain a small-peasant country, where small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements which arise on the basis of small production "encircle the proletariat on every side with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere,

* My italics.—J. St.

which permeates and corrupts the proletariat and causes constant relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby causing in the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of wavering.

That is the root and the basis of all sorts of vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of the Party.

That is why the Right and "Left" deviations in our Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter.

Where does the danger of the *Right*, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down in the development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farms and state farms be kept in the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of restoring capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the "*Left*" (Trotskyite) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of restoring capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about the Thermidorianism of our Party.

From the words of Lenin that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," the "*Left*" deviation draws the

false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. at all; that nothing can be done with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is antiquated; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of superindustrialization, even at the cost of a rupture with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as doomed.

Hence the adventurism in the policy of the "Left" deviation. Hence, its "superhuman" leaps in the sphere of policy.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the "Left" deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to conditions facilitating the restoration of capitalism.

You see, therefore, that both dangers, the "Left" and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the "Left," lead to the same result, although from different directions.

Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion one is as bad as the other.

The difference between these deviations from the point of view of successfully combating them consists in the fact that the danger of the "Left" deviation is at the present moment more obvious to the Party than the danger of the Right deviation. The intense struggle that has been waged against the "Left" deviation for several years has, of course, not been wasted on the Party. It stands to reason that the Party has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite deviation and cannot now be easily deceived by "Left" phrases.

As for the danger of the Right deviation, which existed before, but which now stands out more distinctly because of the growth of the petty-bourgeois element resulting from last year's grain-purchasing crisis, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain

sections of the Party. That is why our task must be—while not relenting in the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite danger one iota—to lay the emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyite danger.

The question of the Right deviation might not have been as acute as it is now were it not for the fact that it is associated with the *difficulties* accompanying our development. But the whole point is that the existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties accompanying our development and hinders our efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very reason that the Right danger hinders the efforts to overcome the difficulties, the question of overcoming the Right danger has assumed particularly great importance for us.

A few words about the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time of economic decline, or stagnation, and in such cases efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing in common with difficulties of that kind. The characteristic feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties of *expansion*, difficulties of growth. When we speak about difficulties we usually mean, by what per cent must industry be *expanded*, by what per cent must the crop area be *enlarged*, by how many poods must the crop yield be *increased*, etc., etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should constitute nothing particularly dangerous to the Party.

But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to exert all efforts, it is necessary to display firmness and endurance, and since not everybody can display sufficient firmness and endurance—perhaps as a result of fatigue and jaded nerves, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and agitation—we get these vacillations and wavering, a tendency to adopt the

line of least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial development, about making concessions to the capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome the difficulties we must first defeat the Right danger, we must first overcome the Right deviation, which is hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying to shake the Party's will to fight against the difficulties.

I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against the Right deviation, not a verbal, or a paper fight. There are people in our Party who to soothe their conscience are quite willing to cry: Fight the Right danger! in the same way as priests cry, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah!" But they will not do a thing, not a single practical thing, to organize the fight against the Right deviation as it should be organized, and to really overcome this deviation. We call this tendency a *conciliationist* tendency towards the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation. It is not difficult to understand that the fight against this conciliationist tendency is an integral part of the general fight against the Right deviation, against the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the Right opportunist deviation without conducting a systematic fight against the conciliationist tendency which takes the opportunists under its wing.

The question as to who are the representatives of the Right deviation is undoubtedly of interest, although it is not of decisive importance. We came across representatives of the Right danger in our lower Party organizations during the grain-purchasing crisis last year, when a number of Communists in the volosts and villages opposed the Party's policy and pursued a policy of forming a bond with kulak elements. As you know, such people were excluded from the Party last spring, which matter was specially referred to in a well-known document of the Central Committee of our Party in February this year.

But it would be wrong to say that there are no such people left in the Party. If we go higher up, to the uyezd and gubernia Party organizations, or if we dig deeper into our Soviet and cooperative organizations, we shall without difficulty find representatives of the Right danger and the conciliationist tendency. We know of "letters," and "declarations," and other documents written by a number of functionaries in the Party and Soviet apparatus, in which the drift towards the Right deviation is distinctly expressed. You know that these letters and documents were referred to in the stenographic record of the July Plenum of the Central Committee.

If we go higher still, and ask about the members of the Central Committee, we shall have to admit that there are certain, very insignificant, it is true, elements of a conciliatory attitude towards the Right danger even there. The stenographic record of the July Plenum of the Central Committee gives direct proof of this.

Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there any deviations in the Political Bureau? In the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor "Left" deviations nor advocates of a conciliatory attitude towards those deviations. This must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop to the malicious gossip spread by enemies of the Party and by the oppositionists of all kinds to the effect that there is a Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation, in the Political Bureau of our Central Committee.

Were there vacillations and wavering in the Moscow organization, or in its leading body, the Moscow Committee? Yes, there were. It would be absurd to assert now that there was no wavering and no vacillations there. The frank speech Penkov made is direct proof of this. Penkov is by no means the least important man in the Moscow organization and in the Moscow Committee. You heard him openly and straightforwardly confess that he had been wrong on a number of important questions of our Party policy. This does not mean, of course, that the Moscow Committee as a whole was infected with the spirit of vacillation. No,

it does not mean that. A document like the appeal of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow organization in October this year proves beyond any doubt that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming the vacillations of certain of its members. I have no doubt that the leadership of the Moscow Committee will be able completely to straighten out the situation.

Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that the district organizations interfered in this matter and demanded that an end be put to the mistakes and vacillations of certain leaders of the Moscow organization. I do not think that this dissatisfaction is in any way justified. What is there wrong about district *actives* of the Moscow organization demanding that an end be put to mistakes and vacillations? Is not our work governed by the slogan—self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact that self-criticism increases the activity of the Party rank and file and of the proletarian rank and file in general? What is there wrong, or dangerous, in the fact that the district *actives* proved equal to the situation?

Did the Central Committee act rightly in interfering in this matter? I think it did. Berzin thinks that the Central Committee acted too rigorously in demanding the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the district organization was opposed. That is absolutely wrong. Let me remind Berzin of certain incidents in 1919 or 1920, when several members of the Central Committee who were guilty of certain, in my opinion, not very serious errors in respect of the Party line, were, on Lenin's suggestion, subjected to exemplary punishment, one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other almost paying the penalty of expulsion from the Central Committee.

Was Lenin right in acting the way he did? I think he was absolutely right. The situation in the Central Committee then was not what it is now. Half the members of the Central Committee followed Trotsky, and there was instability in the Central Committee. The Central Committee today is acting much more mildly. Why? Is it because we want to be more gentle than Lenin? No, that is not the point. The point is that the position of the

Central Committee is more stable now than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford to act more mildly.

Nor is Sakharov right in asserting that the intervention of the Central Committee was belated. Sakharov is wrong because he evidently does not know that, properly speaking, the Central Committee began to intervene in February of this year. Sakharov can convince himself of this if he desires. It is true that the intervention of the Central Committee did not immediately secure the required results. But it would be strange to blame the Central Committee for that.

Conclusions:

1) the Right danger is a serious danger in our Party, for it is rooted in the social and economic conditions of our country;

2) the danger of the Right deviation is aggravated by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome unless the Right deviation and the conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation are overcome;

3) in the Moscow organization there have been vacillations and wavering, there have been elements of instability;

4) the leadership of the Moscow Committee, with the help of the Central Committee and the district *actives*, took all measures to put an end to these vacillations;

5) there can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee will succeed in overcoming the mistakes observable in the past;

6) our task is to put a stop to the internal struggle, to strengthen the unity of the Moscow organization, and carry through the nuclei elections successfully on the basis of unrestricted self-criticism. (*Applause.*)

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)*

*Speech Delivered at the Plenum
of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*
April 1929

(Stenographic Record)

Comrades, I shall not comment on the matter of personal feelings, although personal feelings played a rather conspicuous part in the speeches of some of the comrades from Bukharin's group. I shall make no comment on this subject because personal feelings are a trivial matter, and it is not worth while speaking of trivial matters. Bukharin spoke of letters he had written to me. He read some of these letters and from their content one could gather that although we were still friends some time ago, now we differ politically. The same mood could be detected in the speeches of Uglanov and Tomsky: What is happening, they seemed to suggest, how is it that we, old Bolsheviks, should suddenly be at odds and have no respect for each other.

I think that these moans and lamentations are not worth a brass farthing. Our organization is not a family group nor is it an association based on personal friendship; it is the political party of the working class. We cannot tolerate that interests of personal friendship should be placed higher than the interests of our cause.

Things have come to a sad pass, comrades, if the only reason why we are called old Bolsheviks is that we are just *old*. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are *old*, but because they are eternally young, never-aging revolutionaries. If an old Bolshevik has swerved from the path of the revolution, or degenerated and failed politically, then, be he even one hundred years old, he has no right to call himself an old Bolshevik; he has no right to demand that the Party should respect him.

* The present text of this speech contains over 30 pages which had not been published heretofore.—*Ed.*

Moreover, questions of personal friendship should not be placed on one level with political questions, for, as the saying goes—friendship is all very well, but duty comes first. We are all of us the servants of the working class, and if the interests of personal friendship clash with the interests of the revolution, then personal friendship must come second. For Bolsheviks this is the only possible attitude.

I shall not comment either on the subject of insinuations and veiled accusations of a personal nature that were contained in the speeches of the comrades from Bukharin's opposition. Evidently these comrades are attempting to conceal the underlying political reason for our differences behind a cloak of insinuations and ambiguities. They are seeking to substitute petty political scheming for politics. Tomsky's speech is indeed typical in this respect. His was the speech of a typical trade union politician attempting to substitute petty political scheming for politics. However, this subterfuge will get them nowhere.

Let us now turn to our business.

I ONE OR TWO LINES?

Do we have one common, general line or do we have two lines? This, comrades, is the basic question.

When he spoke here Rykov said that we have one general line and that if we do have some "insignificant" divergencies, it is merely due to the existence of "slight differences" in the interpretation of the general line.

Is this correct? Unfortunately it is not. And it is not merely incorrect, but it is absolutely contrary to the truth. If we really have only one line, and are separated only by slight differences, then why did Bukharin so eagerly canvass the former Trotskyites who are led by Kamenev, in an effort to set up with them a factional bloc directed against the Central Committee and its Political Bureau? Is it not true that Bukharin spoke there of a "fatal" line of the Central Committee, of Bukharin's, Tomsky's

and Rykov's fundamental disagreement with the Central Committee of the Party, of the need to make a drastic change in the composition of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

If there is only one line, why is it that Bukharin conspired with former Trotskyites against the Central Committee, and why is it that Rykov and Tomsky aided him in this undertaking?

If there is only one general line, is it admissible that one section of the Political Bureau, which is supporting one, common, general line, should seek to undermine the other section which is supporting the selfsame general line?

Is such a fluctuating policy admissible if we have one, common, general line?

If there is only one line, then how are we to account for Bukharin's statement of January 30, which was plainly and overtly aimed against the Central Committee and its general line?

If there is only one line, then how are we to account for the statement of the group of three (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) of February 9 where, in a cynical and grossly slanderous manner, they accuse the Party of carrying out a policy—(a) of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, (b) of promoting bureaucracy, (c) of bringing about the disintegration of the Comintern?

Perhaps these declarations are just ancient history? Perhaps it is conceded now that these declarations were due to a mistake? Perhaps Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky are prepared to take back these declarations which are unquestionably groundless and hostile to the Party? If this is the case, let them say so frankly and honestly. Then everyone will understand that we have only one line and are separated only by slight differences. But, as the speeches of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky indicate, they would not do that, and they not only would not do it now, but moreover have no intention of repudiating these declarations in the future, and they state that their point of view as set forth in the declarations remains unchanged.

Then where, pray, is one, common, general line?

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin group, the Party line consists in the furthering of a policy of

feudal-military exploitation of the peasantry, then is it at all conceivable that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky really wish to join us in the furthering of this fatal policy, instead of combating it? This is absurd, indeed.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in the fostering of bureaucracy, then is it at all conceivable that Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in the fostering of bureaucracy within the Party, instead of combating it? This is nonsense, indeed.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in furthering the disintegration of the Comintern, then is it at all conceivable that Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in the prosecution of this policy instead of combating it? How are we to believe such nonsense?

No, comrades, there must be something wrong with Rykov's assertion that we have one, common line. Whichever way you look at it, if we bear in mind the facts I have just set forth regarding the declarations and conduct of the Bukharin group, there is something amiss with the business of one, common line.

If there is only one line, then how are we to explain the policy of resigning adopted by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky? Is it at all conceivable that there being a common general line, one section of the Political Bureau should systematically refuse to implement the repeated decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and continue to sabotage party work for six whole months? If we really have only one, common, general line then what is the meaning of this disruptive policy of resigning that is being methodically carried on by one section of the Political Bureau?

From the history of our Party we know of cases when a policy of resigning was being practised. It will be recalled, for instance, that on the day after the October Revolution some comrades led by Kamenev and Zinoviev refused the posts to which they had been assigned, and demanded a change in the policy of the Party. It will be recalled that these comrades sought to justify their position by proclaiming the necessity of forming a coalition

government which would include Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and this in opposition to the Central Committee of our Party which sought to form a purely Bolshevik government. But at that time the policy of resigning had some justification, because it was based on the existence of two different lines, one of which was in favour of forming a purely Bolshevik government, and the other, in favour of a coalition government jointly with Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. That was perfectly comprehensible. But we see no logic, no logic whatsoever, when the Bukharin opposition on the one hand proclaims the unity of the general line, and on the other carries on a policy of resigning, as Zinoviev and Kamenev did during the October Revolution.

Either one thing or the other—either there is one line only, and in that case the policy of resigning of Bukharin and his friends is incomprehensible and inexplicable, or we have two lines, and in that case the policy of resigning is perfectly comprehensible and explicable.

If there is only one line, how are we to explain the fact that three members of the Political Bureau—Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky—deemed it possible, when voting at a meeting of the Political Bureau, to *abstain* when the main theses on the five-year plan and the peasant question were being adopted? Is it at all imaginable that when there is but one general line, some of the comrades should refrain from voting on essential questions of our economic policy? No, comrades, such miracles must be ruled out.

Finally, if there is only one line, and we are separated only by slight differences, why did the comrades from the Bukharin opposition, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, reject the compromise proposed by a commission of the Political Bureau on February 7 of this year? Is it not a fact that this compromise gave the Bukharin group a perfectly acceptable way out of the blind alley into which it had walked of its own accord?

Here is the text of the compromise proposed by the majority of the Central Committee on *February 7* of this year:

"After an exchange of views in the Commission it was ascertained that:

"1) Bukharin admits that his negotiations with Kamenev were a political error;

"2) Bukharin admits that the assertions contained in his 'declaration' of January 30, 1929, alleging that the Central Committee is carrying out a policy of 'military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry,' that the Central Committee is bringing about the disintegration of the Comintern and is promoting bureaucracy within the Party—that these assertions were made on the spur of the moment, during heated polemics, that he is not maintaining these assertions any longer, and considers that he does not differ with the Central Committee on these questions;

"3) Bukharin recognizes, therefore, that close cooperation in the work of the Political Bureau is possible and necessary;

"4) Bukharin drops his resignation from *Pravda* as well as from the Comintern;

"5) Consequently, Bukharin withdraws his declaration of January 30.

"On the basis of the aforementioned, the Commission decided that it would not submit its draft resolution containing a political appraisal of Bukharin's errors to the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, and requested the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to withdraw from circulation pertinent documents (stenographic records of speeches, etc.).

"The Commission requests the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C.C.C. to take steps for creating proper conditions for Bukharin's normal work as editor-in-chief of *Pravda* and secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern."

Why did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise if it is true that we have only one line, and if we are divided by only slight differences? Is it not perfectly obvious that Bukharin and his friends should have been extremely eager to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau, and thus put an end to the tension existing within the Party and create an atmosphere conducive to unity and cooperation in the Political Bureau?

They speak of the unity of the Party, of the collective system of work of the Political Bureau. But is it not obvious that persons who support genuine unity and value the collective system in work should have accepted the compromise? Why, then, have Bukharin and his friends rejected this compromise?

Is it not obvious that if we had only one line, then the declaration of the group of three of February 9 could not have materi-

alized, nor would we have had Bukharin's and his friends' refusal to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

No, comrades, if we bear in mind the facts that have just been set forth, then there must indeed be something amiss with the business of your one, common line.

It turns out that in reality we have not one line, but two lines, one of them being the line of the Central Committee and the other, the line of Bukharin's group.

In his speech Rykov made an untrue statement when he declared that we have only one general line. He sought thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the Party line, for the purpose of secretly undermining the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely in attempting to keep differences in the background, to gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise one's own position and to prevent the Party from obtaining a clear picture of the situation.

Why does opportunism pursue such a policy? Because it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smokescreen of idle talk about Party unity. In his speech at the present Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist position.

Would you care to hear Lenin's definition of the opportunist in general, as given in one of his articles? This definition is important for us not only because of its general significance, but also because it fits Rykov perfectly.

This is what Lenin says about the peculiar features of opportunism and of opportunists:

"When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget a feature that is characteristic of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its vagueness, diffuseness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, will always evade formulating an issue clearly and decisively, he will always seek a middle course, he will always wriggle like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view and try to 'agree' with both and to reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, good and pious suggestions, and so on and so forth." (Vol. VI, p. 320.)

There you have a true portrait of the opportunist who dreads everything that is clear and unambiguous and who strives to gloss over the actual state of affairs, to keep in the background the actual differences in the Party.

Yes, comrades, one must be able to face the facts no matter how unpleasant they may be. God forbid that we should become contaminated with the fear of the truth. Bolsheviks, incidentally, are different from all other political parties because they do not fear the truth and are not afraid of facing the truth no matter how bitter it may be. And in this particular instance, the truth is that in effect we have not got one, common line. There is one line, the Party line, the revolutionary, Leninist line. But in addition there is another line, the line of Bukharin's group, which is combating the Party line by means of anti-Party declarations, by means of resignations, slander and stealthy undermining activities against the Party, by means of negotiations carried on behind the scenes with former Trotskyites for the purpose of setting up an anti-Party bloc. This second line is the opportunist line.

This is a fact that no amount of diplomatic verbiage or artful statements about the existence of a single line, etc., etc., can help to disguise.

II

CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DIFFERENCES

What are our differences? What are they connected with?

They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the differences in our Party are of a fortuitous nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is absolutely wrong. The differences in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

The principal mistake Bukharin's group makes is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them

and does not want to see them. That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, completely evaded the question of the class changes in our country, that they did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our differences are connected with this very intensification of the class struggle? They talked about everything, about philosophy and about theory, but not a word did they say about the class changes which determine the orientation and the practical activity of our Party at the present moment.

How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not. Political leaders cannot forget essentials. The explanation is that they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the essentials, they have overlooked the class changes, which a political leader has no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with the new class changes in our country. I refer to such slogans as the slogan of *self-criticism*; the slogan of intensifying the *fight against bureaucracy and of purging the Soviet apparatus*; the slogan of *training new cadres and Red experts for our economy*; the slogan of *strengthening the collective-farm and state-farm movement*; the slogan of *an offensive against the kulaks*; the slogan of *reducing costs of production and radically improving the methods of trade union work*; the slogan of *purging the Party*, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed overwhelming and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party at the present moment.

The whole thing began when, in connection with the Shakhty trial, we raised in a new way the question of new cadres for our economy, of training Red experts from the ranks of the working class to take the place of the old experts.

What did the Shakhty trial reveal? It revealed that the bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed; that it was organizing and would continue to organize wrecking activities to hamper our economic development; that our economic, trade union and, to a certain extent, our Party organizations had failed to notice the undermining operations of our class enemies, and that it was therefore necessary to exert all our efforts and resources to reinforce and improve our organizations, to develop and heighten their class vigilance.

In this connection the slogan of *self-criticism* acquired greater urgency. Why? Because we cannot improve our economic, trade union and Party organizations, we cannot advance the cause of building socialism and curb the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost, unless we place the work of our organizations under the control of the masses. It is a fact that wrecking has been and is going on not only in the coal fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, in the war industries, in the People's Commissariat of Transport, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism.

Further, in connection with the grain-purchasing difficulties, in connection with the active opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, we have stressed the question of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, of organizing the grain-purchasing campaign by bringing pressure to bear on the kulak and well-to-do elements.

What did the grain-purchasing difficulties reveal? They revealed that the kulak was not asleep, that the kulak was growing, that he was busy undermining the policy of the Soviet Government, while our Party, Soviet and cooperative organizations—at all events, some of them—either failed to see the enemy, or adapted themselves to him instead of fighting him.

Hence the new emphasis placed on the slogan of self-criticism, on the slogan of verifying and improving our Party organizations and the cooperative and purchasing organizations generally.

Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism, there arose the slogan of systematically reducing costs of production, of tightening labour discipline, of developing socialist emulation, etc. These tasks called for a thorough revision of the methods of the trade unions and the Soviet apparatus, for radical measures to put new life into these organizations and for purging them of bureaucratic elements.

Hence the emphasis placed on the slogan of fighting bureaucracy in the trade unions and in the Soviet apparatus.

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet, economic, trade union and cooperative organizations, that it is possible to purge them of the foulness of bureaucracy, without sharpening up the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements exist not only in the economic, cooperative, trade union and Soviet organizations, but in the organizations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the guiding force of all these organizations, it is obvious that purging the Party is an essential condition for really putting new life into and improving all the other organizations of the working class. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans of a casual nature? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not casual. *They are necessary links in the single, continuous chain which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements of capitalism.*

They are connected, primarily, with the period of the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism. What is the reconstruction of national economy on the basis of socialism? It is the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of the national economy along the whole front. It is a most important advance of the working class of our country toward the building of socialism. But in order to carry out this reconstruction we must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres

of socialist construction—the economic and Soviet cadres as well as trade union cadres, Party cadres as well as cooperative cadres; we must set all our organizations in order, purge them of foulness; we must stimulate the activity of the vast masses of the working class and the peasantry.

Further, these slogans are connected with the resistance of the capitalist elements of our national economy to the socialist offensive. The so-called Shakhty trial cannot be regarded as a fortuitous incident. "Shakhtists" are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. Wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals are one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism. Wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are connected with international capital. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet regime.

As for the capitalist elements in the rural districts, there is still less reason to regard the attacks of the kulaks on the Soviet price policy, which have been proceeding for over a year, as being of a fortuitous nature. Many people are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 the kulak gave his grain of his own accord, whereas since 1927 he no longer gives his grain of his own accord. But there is nothing surprising in that. Formerly the kulak was still relatively feeble; he was unable to organize his farming properly; he lacked capital to improve his farm and so he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all his surplus grain to the market. But now, after a number of good harvests, since he has been able to build up his farm, since he has succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital, he is in a position to manoeuvre on the market, he is able to set aside wheat and rye, the currency of currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring to the market meat, oats, barley and other secondary products. It would be ridiculous now to hope that the kulak can be made to part with his wheat and rye voluntarily.

It is this that lies at the root of the resistance which the kulak is offering to the policy of the Soviet regime.

And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of town and country to the socialist offensive represent? It represents a regrouping of the forces of the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances must necessarily lead to an intensification of the class struggle. But if we are to break the resistance of the class enemies and clear the road for the advance of socialism, we must, besides everything else, set all our organizations in order, purge them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres and mobilize the vast masses of the working class and the labouring strata of the rural population against the capitalist elements of town and country.

It was on the basis of these class changes that our Party's present slogans arose.

The same must be said about the class changes in capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous to think that the stabilization of capitalism has remained unchanged. Still more ridiculous would it be to assert that the stabilization is gaining in strength, that it is becoming secure. As a matter of fact capitalist stabilization is being undermined and shaken month after month and day after day. The intensification of the struggle for foreign markets and raw materials, the increase of armaments, the growing antagonism between America and Great Britain, the growth of socialism in the U.S.S.R., the swing to the left of the working class in the capitalist countries, the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European countries, the growing revolutionary movement in the colonies, including India, the growth of communism in all countries of the world—all these are facts which indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist countries..

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against Social-Democracy, and primarily against its "Left" wing, which is the social buttress of capitalism.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight in the Communist parties against the Right elements who are the agents of Social-Democratic influence.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against conciliation with the Right deviation, which is the refuge of opportunism in the Communist parties.

Hence the slogan of purging the Communist parties of Social-Democratic traditions.

Hence the so-called new tactics of communism in the trade unions.

Some comrades do not understand the meaning and significance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always understand that, unless these slogans are put into effect, the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class battles is out of the question, victory over Social-Democracy is out of the question, and the selection of real leaders of the communist movement, capable of leading the working class into the fight against capitalism, is impossible.

Such, comrades, are the class changes in our country and in the capitalist countries, from which arose the present slogans of our Party in its internal policy as well as in Comintern policy.

Our Party sees these class changes. It understands the significance of the new tasks and it mobilizes forces for their fulfilment. That is why it is facing events fully armed. That is why it does not fear the difficulties confronting it, for it is prepared to overcome them.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see these class changes and fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is because it does not understand them that it is in a state of utter confusion, is ready to flee from difficulties, to retreat in the face of the difficulties, to surrender the positions.

Have you ever seen fishermen when a storm is brewing on a great river—say the Yenisei? I have seen them many a time. In the face of a storm one group of fishermen will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows and boldly head the boat to meet the storm: "Cheer up, lads, hold tight to the tiller, cut the waves, we'll pull her through!"

But there is another type of fishermen—those who, on sensing a storm, lose heart, begin to snivel and demoralize their own ranks: "Oh dear, a storm is brewing: lie down, lads, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes, let's hope she'll make the shore somehow." (*General laughter.*)

Is any proof needed that the line and conduct of Bukharin's group is as like the line and conduct of the second group of fishermen, who retreat in panic in the face of difficulties as are two peas in a pod?

We say that in Europe conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, that this circumstance dictates to us the new tasks of intensifying the fight against the Right deviation in the Communist parties and of driving the Right deviationists out of the Party; of intensifying the fight against conciliationism which screens the Right deviation; of intensifying the fight against Social-Democratic traditions in the Communist parties, etc., etc. But Bukharin answers that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority of the Central Committee want to "pick" him (i.e., Bukharin) "to pieces."

We say that the class changes in our country dictate to us new tasks which call for a systematic reduction of costs of production and improvement of labour discipline in industry; that these tasks cannot be carried out without a radical change in the methods of work of the trade unions. But Tomsky answers that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority of the Central Committee want to "pick" him (i.e., Tomsky) "to pieces."

We say that the reconstruction of the national economy dictates to us the new tasks of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic apparatus, of purging this apparatus of rotten and alien elements, of wreckers, etc., etc. But Rykov answers that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee want to "pick" him (i.e., Rykov) "to pieces."

Is this not ridiculous, comrades? Is it not obvious that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky cannot see anything but their own navels?

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see the new class changes and fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. And, indeed, it is because it fails to understand them that it is compelled to limp along in the tail of events and to retreat in the face of difficulties.

Therein lies the root of our differences.

III

DIFFERENCES ON COMINTERN QUESTIONS

I have already said that Bukharin does not see and does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern, the tasks of driving the Rights out of the Communist parties, of curbing the conciliationist tendency and of purging the Communist parties of Social-Democratic traditions — tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully corroborated by our differences on Comintern questions.

How did our differences in this sphere begin?

They began with Bukharin's theses at the Sixth Congress on the international situation. As a rule, theses are first examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.). In this case, however, that condition was not observed. The theses, signed by Bukharin, were sent to the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the same time as they were distributed to the foreign delegations at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was obliged to introduce about twenty amendments to the theses.

This created a rather awkward situation for Bukharin. But who was to blame for that? Why was it necessary for Bukharin to distribute the theses to the foreign delegations before they had been examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Could the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) refrain from introducing amendments when the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came about

that from the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) there issued what were practically new theses on the international situation, which the foreign delegations began to oppose to the old theses signed by Bukharin. Obviously, this awkward situation would not have arisen had not Bukharin been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the foreign delegations.

I would like to draw attention to the four principal amendments which the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced to Bukharin's theses. I would like to draw attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate more clearly the character of the differences on Comintern questions.

The first question is the question of the nature of the stabilization of capitalism. According to Bukharin's theses it appeared that nothing new was taking place at the moment to shake capitalist stabilization, but that, on the contrary, capitalism was *reconstructing itself* and that, on the whole, it was maintaining itself more or less *securely*. Obviously, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) could not agree with such a characterization of what is called the Third Period, i.e., the period we are now passing through. The delegation could not agree with it because such a characterization of the Third Period might give our critics ground for saying that we have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist "recovery," i.e., the point of view of Hilferding, a point of view which we Communists cannot adopt. Owing to this, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced an amendment which pointed out that capitalist stabilization was not secure and could not be secure, that it was being shaken and would continue to be shaken by the march of events, owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism.

This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the Sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilization being shaken or is it becoming more secure? It is on this that the whole line of the Communist parties in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we in a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, a period merely of gathering forces, or are we in a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a

period of preparation of the working class for impending class battles? It is on this that the tactical line of the Communist parties depends. The amendment of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which was subsequently adopted by the Congress, was a good one for the very reason that it clearly indicated the line based on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge.

The second question is the question of the fight against Social-Democracy. In Bukharin's theses it was stated that the fight against Social-Democracy is one of the fundamental tasks of the Sections of the Comintern. That, of course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the fight against Social-Democracy may be carried on successfully, a special stress must be placed on fighting the so-called "Left" wing of Social-Democracy, that "Left" wing which, by playing with "Left" phrases and thus adroitly deceiving the workers, is retarding their mass defection from Social-Democracy. It is obvious that unless the "Left" Social-Democrats are smashed it will be impossible to overcome Social-Democracy as a whole. Yet in Bukharin's theses the question of "Left" Social-Democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was a great defect. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was therefore obliged to introduce to Bukharin's theses an amendment to this effect, and this amendment was subsequently adopted by the Congress.

The third question is the question of the conciliationist tendency in the Sections of the Comintern. Bukharin's theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, but not a word was said about fighting the tendency of conciliation with the Right deviation. That, of course, was a great defect. The point is that when war is declared on the Right deviation, the Right deviationists usually disguise themselves as conciliators and place the Party in an awkward position. In order to forestall this manoeuvre of the Right deviationists we must insist on a determined fight against the conciliationist tendency. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) considered it necessary to introduce to Bukharin's theses an amendment to this effect, and this amendment was subsequently adopted by the Congress.

The fourth question is the question of Party discipline. In Bukharin's theses no mention was made of the necessity of maintaining iron discipline in the Communist parties. That also was a defect of no little importance. Why? Because in a period when the fight against the Right deviation is being intensified, in a period when the slogan of purging the Communist parties of opportunist elements is being carried into effect, the Right deviationists usually organize themselves into a faction, set up their own factional discipline and disrupt and destroy the discipline of the Party. In order to protect the Party from the factional sorties of the Right deviationists we must insist on iron discipline in the Party and on the unconditional subordination of Party members to this discipline. Without that there can be no question of waging a serious fight against the Right deviation. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced to Bukharin's theses an amendment to this effect, and this amendment was subsequently adopted by the Sixth Congress.

Could we refrain from introducing these amendments to Bukharin's theses? Of course not. In olden times it was said with reference to the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but we love truth more. The same might be said of Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party and the Comintern more. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) found itself obliged to introduce these amendments to Bukharin's theses.

That, so to speak, was *the first stage of our differences* on Comintern questions.

The second stage of our differences is connected with what is known as the Wittorf and Thaelmann case. Wittorf was formerly the secretary of the Hamburg organization, and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, taking advantage of the fact that Wittorf had been close to Comrade Thaelmann, although Comrade Thaelmann was in no way implicated in Wittorf's crime, converted the Wittorf case into a Thaelmann case, and set out to overthrow the leadership of the German Communist Party. No doubt you know from

the press that the conciliators Ewert and Gerhardt succeeded for a time in winning over a majority of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party against Comrade Thaelmann. And what followed? They removed Thaelmann from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption and published a "corresponding" resolution without the knowledge and sanction of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Thus, instead of carrying out the directions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to fight the conciliationist tendency, instead of fighting the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency, they, in fact, grossly violated these directions; they fought the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist Party, fought Comrade Thaelmann, with the object of *screening* the Right deviation and of *consolidating* the conciliationist tendency in the ranks of the German Communists.

Yet instead of swinging the tiller over and correcting the course, instead of upholding the validity of the violated directions of the Sixth Congress and calling the conciliators to order, Bukharin proposes in his well-known letter *to sanction* the conciliators' coup, to surrender the German Communist Party to the conciliators, and to revile Comrade Thaelmann in the press again by issuing another statement declaring him to be guilty. And this is supposed to be a "leader" of the Comintern! Who ever heard of "leaders" like that?

The Central Committee discussed Bukharin's proposal and rejected it. Bukharin, of course, did not like this. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth Congress were adopted not to be violated but to be carried out. If the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency and to keep the leadership in the hands of the main core of the German Communist Party, headed by Comrade Thaelmann, and if it occurred to the conciliators Ewert and Gerhardt to upset that decision, it was Bukharin's duty to call the conciliators to order and not to allow them to retain the leadership in the German Communist Party. It is Bukharin, who "forgot" the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame.

The third stage of our differences is connected with the question of the fight against the Rights in the German Communist Party, with the question of smashing the Brandler and Thalheimer faction, and of the expulsion of the leaders of that faction from the German Communist Party. The "position" taken up by Bukharin and his friends on that cardinal question was that they persistently avoided taking part in settling it. As a matter of fact, it was the fate of the German Communist Party that was being decided. Yet Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, nevertheless persistently hindered matters by systematically keeping away from the meetings of the bodies which had the question under consideration. For the sake of what? Presumably, for the sake of remaining "clean" in the eyes of the Comintern as well as in the eyes of the Rights in the German Communist Party. For the sake of being able subsequently to say: "Not we, the Bukharinites, secured the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer from the Communist Party, but they, the majority of the Central Committee." And this is what is called fighting the Right danger!

Finally, *the fourth stage of our differences*. This stage is connected with Bukharin's demand before the November Plenum of the Central Committee that Neumann be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thaelmann, who, it was alleged, had criticized in one of his speeches Bukharin's report at the Sixth Congress, be called to order. We, of course, could not agree with Bukharin, since there was not a single document in our possession supporting his demand. Bukharin promised to submit documents against Neumann and Thaelmann but never submitted a single one. Instead of presenting documents he distributed to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) copies of the speech delivered by Humbert-Droz at the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern as an opportunist speech. By distributing Humbert-Droz's speech to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and by recommending it as material against Thaelmann, Bukharin wanted to prove the justice of his demand for

the recall of Neumann and for calling Comrade Thaelmann to order. As a matter of fact, he thereby showed that he identified himself with the position taken up by Humbert-Droz, a position which the E.C.C.I. regards as opportunist.

These, comrades, are the main points of our differences on Comintern questions.

Bukharin believes that by conducting a struggle against the Right deviation and the tendency of conciliation with the Right deviation in the Sections of the Comintern, by purging the German and Czechoslovakian Communist parties of Social-Democratic elements and traditions, and by expelling the Brandlers and the Thalheimers from the Communist parties, we are "disintegrating" the Comintern, "ruining" the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by carrying out such a policy and by placing a special stress on the fight against the Right deviation and the tendency of conciliation with it, we are strengthening the Comintern, purging it of opportunists, bolshevizing its Sections and helping the Communist parties to prepare the working class for the impending revolutionary battles, for the Party is strengthened by purging itself of foulness.

You see that these are not merely slight differences in the ranks of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), but rather serious divergencies on fundamental questions of Comintern policy.

IV

DIFFERENCES ON INTERNAL POLICY

I have already spoken of the class changes and the class struggle in our country. I have said that Bukharin's group is afflicted with blindness and fails to see these changes, fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. I have said that this has caused confusion among the Bukharin opposition, has made them fearful of difficulties and ready to yield to them.

It cannot be said that the mistakes of the Bukharin group are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are connected with the

stage of development we have already passed through and which is known as the period of *restoration* of the national economy, during which construction proceeded peacefully, automatically, so to speak; during which the class changes now taking place did not exist; during which the intensification of the class struggle which we now observe was not yet in evidence.

But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct from the old period, from the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of construction, the period of the *reconstruction* of the whole national economy on the basis of socialism. This new period gives rise to new class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organizations.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the specific features of this new period and does not understand that new methods of struggle are needed. Hence its blindness, its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties.

a) THE CLASS STRUGGLE

What is the theoretical basis for the blindness and bewilderment of Bukharin's group?

I think that the theoretical basis for this blindness and bewilderment is Bukharin's incorrect, non-Marxian approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Bukharin's non-Marxian theory that the kulaks will grow into socialism, his failure to understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The well-known passage from Bukharin's book, *The Path to Socialism*, on the kulak growing into socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with a number of omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate how far Bukharin has departed from the Marxian theory of the class struggle.

Listen:

"The main network of our cooperative peasant organizations will consist of cooperative nuclei, not of a kulak, but of a 'toiler' type, nuclei which will grow into the system of our general state organs and thus become *links in the single chain of socialist economy*. On the other hand, the *kulak cooperative nests will, similarly, through the banks, etc., grow into the same system*; but they will be to a certain extent alien bodies, similar, for instance, to the concessionaire enterprises."⁴

In quoting this passage from Bukharin's pamphlet, some comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the last phrase about the concessionaires. Rosit, apparently desiring to help Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted from his seat that Bukharin was being misquoted. And yet, the salt of this whole passage lies precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For if concessionaires are placed on a par with the kulaks, and the kulaks are growing into socialism—what follows? The only thing that follows is that the concessionaires are also growing into socialism; that not only the kulaks, but the concessionaires too are growing into socialism. (*General laughter.*)

That is what follows.

Rcsit: Bukharin says, "alien bodies."

Stalin: Bukharin says not "alien bodies," but "to a certain extent alien bodies." Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are "to a certain extent" alien bodies in the system of socialism. But the very point of the mistake Bukharin makes is that he says that kulaks and concessionaires, being "to a certain extent" alien bodies, nevertheless grow into socialism.

This is the nonsense to which Bukharin's theory leads.

Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires who grow into socialism—such is the absurdity Bukharin has got into.

No, comrades, this is not the kind of "socialism" we want. Let Bukharin have it.

Hitherto, we Marxist-Leninists thought that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working

* My italics.—J. St.

class, on the other, there is an *irreconcilable* antagonism of interest. This is exactly what the Marxian theory of the class struggle rests on. But now, according to Bukharin's theory that the capitalists will *peacefully grow* into socialism, all this is turned topsy-turvy; the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism.

Rosit: That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

Stalin: But the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of the class struggle.

Rosit: Yes, that is the whole point.

Stalin: But according to Bukharin the capitalists grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How is it that you cannot understand this, Rosit? Against whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the sharpest form of class struggle if the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concessionaire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, for the suppression of which class is it needed?

Rosit: The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, the growing into presumes the class struggle.

Stalin: I see that Rosit has sworn to do Bukharin a good turn. But his service is really like that of the bear in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is hugging him to death. It is not without reason that the proverb says, "An obliging bear is more dangerous than an enemy." (*Loud laughter.*)

Either one thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have assumed power and have organized their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which

case only one thing remains: to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

Either one thing or the other:

Either Marx's theory of the class struggle, or the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism;

Either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, or the theory of harmony of class interests.

We can understand "Socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these "Socialists" are really anti-Socialists, bourgeois liberals. But we cannot understand a man who wishes to be a Marxist, and yet preaches the theory that the capitalist class will grow into socialism.

In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin says the *same thing* as Bukharin.

This is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable slander against Lenin.

Here is the text of this passage from Lenin:

"of course, in our Soviet Republic, the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain terms." (Vol. XXVII, p. 405.)

You see that there is not a word here about the capitalist class growing into socialism. All that is said is that we have "permitted" the Nepmen, i.e., the bourgeoisie, "on certain terms" to participate in the collaboration between the workers and the peasants.

What does that mean? Does it mean that we have thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepmen growing into socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost all sense of shame can interpret this passage from Lenin in that way. All that it means is that *at present* we do not destroy the bourgeoisie, that *at present* we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on certain terms, i.e., provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which

have the object of increasingly restricting the capitalists and of gradually squeezing them out of national economic life.

Can the capitalists be squeezed out and the roots of capitalism destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, they cannot.

Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice of capitalists growing into socialism prevails? No, they cannot. Such theory and practice can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the Marxian theory of the class struggle.

But the passage from Lenin is wholly and entirely based on the Marxian theory of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between Bukharin's theory that the kulaks will grow into socialism and Lenin's theory of the dictatorship as a fierce class struggle? Obviously, there is not, nor can there be, anything in common between them.

Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the class struggle must *subside* and *pass away* so that the abolition of classes may be brought about. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes can be abolished only by means of a stubborn class struggle, which under the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes *ever fiercer* than it was before the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The abolition of classes," says Lenin, "requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of the power of capital, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes more fierce." (Vol. XXIV, p. 315.)

That is what Lenin says about the abolition of classes.

The abolition of classes *by means of the fierce class struggle of the proletariat*—such is Lenin's formula.

The abolition of classes *by means of the subsidence of the class struggle and the capitalists growing into socialism*—such is Bukharin's formula.

What can there be in common between these two formulas?

Bukharin's theory that the kulaks will grow into socialism is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory propounded by Kautsky Socialism.

That is the basis of all the errors committed by Bukharin and his friends.

It might be said that it is not worth while dwelling too much on Bukharin's theory that the kulaks will grow into socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, but cries out against Bukharin. That is wrong, comrades! As long as that theory was kept out of view it was not worth while paying attention to it—there are all kinds of stupid things in what some comrades write. Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently the situation has changed. The petty-bourgeois wave, which has been running high in recent years, has begun to inspire this anti-Marxist theory and brought it into actuality. Now it cannot be said that it is being kept out of view. Now, Bukharin's queer theory is aspiring to become the banner of the Right deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. That is why we cannot now ignore this theory. That is why we must demolish it as a wrong and harmful theory, so as to help our Party comrades to fight the Right deviation.

b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Bukharin's second mistake, which flows from his first mistake, consists in his wrong, non-Marxian approach, to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the socialist policy of the Soviet Government.

What is the point we are discussing? Is it that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of this, they are increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist construction would already be on the verge of collapse.

The point is that socialism is conducting a successful offensive against the capitalist elements. Socialism is growing *faster* than the capitalist elements, and, as a result, the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*; and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, the capitalist elements realize that they are in mortal danger and are increasing their resistance.

And they are still able to increase their resistance not only because world capitalism is supporting them, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate forces to resist the growth of socialism.

It is on this basis that, *at the present stage of development and with the present relation of forces*, the intensification of the class struggle and the increase in the resistance of the capitalist elements of town and country is taking place.

The mistake Bukharin and his friends make is that they fail to understand this simple and obvious truth. The mistake they make is that they approach the matter not in a Marxian, but in a philistine way, and try to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of fortuitous causes: the "incompetence" of the Soviet apparatus, the "imprudent" policy of local comrades, the "absence" of flexibility, "excesses," etc., etc.

Here, for instance, is a passage from Bukharin's pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxian approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

"Here and there the class struggle in the rural districts breaks out in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, the outbreaks are provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have crept into the organs of the Soviet government, begin to shoot village correspondents, it is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form of the struggle is rebellion.—*J. Stalin*.) However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. As *this apparatus*

improves, as all the lower units of the Soviet government become stronger, as the local, village Party and Young Communist League organizations improve and become stronger, *such phenomena*, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally *disappear leaving no trace.*" *

Thus it follows that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes relating to the state of the Soviet apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our local organizations.

It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty district, our apparatus had been a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

It follows that until last year, when grain purchases proceeded spontaneously and the class struggle had not assumed particularly acute forms, our local organizations were good, even ideal; but that since last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed exceptionally acute forms, our organizations suddenly became bad and utterly incompetent.

This is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. This is not science, but sorcery.

What is the actual reason for the intensification of the class struggle?

There are two reasons.

First, our advance, our offensive, the growth of the socialist forms of economy in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding squeezing out of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula; "Who will win?" Shall we

* My italics.—J. St,

floor them, the capitalists—engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight—or will they floor us?

Second, the fact that the capitalist elements do not want to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realize that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are still growing in absolute number; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly throw up from their ranks capitalists and little capitalists, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will reduce the capitalist elements and squeeze them out, and they, the dying classes, will still carry on their resistance.

This is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country.

The mistake Bukharin and his friends make is that they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists with the growth of their relative importance. But there are absolutely no grounds for such an identification. There are no such grounds because the fact that the capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they have become stronger than we are. The very opposite is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because they have become stronger than we, but because socialism is growing faster than they, and they are becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are compelled to resist with all the forces and all the means in their power.

Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the class struggle and the resistance of the capitalists at the present historical moment.

What should be the policy of the Party in view of this situation?

The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the rural districts, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their preparedness to mobilize for the fight against the capitalist elements in town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, for the very fact that it facilitates the mobilization of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What is the harm in the Bukharin theory that the capitalists will grow into socialism and in the Bukharin conception of the question of the intensification of the class struggle?

It is that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilization preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilizes the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet power.

c) THE PEASANTRY

The third mistake Bukharin makes is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, the peasant question is one of the most important questions of our policy. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. The poor peasant is the *support* of the working class, the middle peasant is the *ally*, the kulak is the *class enemy*—such is our attitude to these respective social groups. All this is obvious and generally understood.

Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his definition of the peasantry this differentiation is omitted, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch which is defined as the countryside. According to him the kulak is not a kulak, nor is the middle peasant a middle peasant, and the countryside presents a uniform picture of destitution. That is exactly what he said in his speech here: Can

our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, leading a half-starved existence. Obviously, such a conception of the peasantry is radically wrong and incompatible with Leninism.

Lenin said that the individual peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is a class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry carrying on small commodity production, will breed capitalists in its ranks, and cannot help breeding them, constantly and continuously.

This is of decisive importance in the question of our Marxian attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. This means that we need, not *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry.

Thus you see that Lenin's thesis that the peasantry is the last capitalist class, not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for this alliance as an alliance between the working class and the bulk of the peasantry directed against capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist elements in the rural districts in particular.

Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be durable only if it is based on the struggle against these very capitalist elements which the peasantry breeds in its midst.

The mistake Bukharin makes is that he does not understand and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets the social groups in the rural districts, he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all he sees is one uniform mass of middle peasants.

This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "Left," Trotskyite, deviation,

which sees no other social groups in the rural districts except the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which loses sight of the middle peasants.

What is the difference between Trotskyism and Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? The fact that Trotskyism is *opposed* to the policy of *durable* alliance with the mass of the middle peasantry, while the Bukharin group is in favour of *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry. There is no need to prove that both these positions are wrong and that they are worthy of each other.

Leninism unquestionably stands for a durable alliance with the great bulk of the peasantry, for an alliance with the middle peasants; not any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as will guarantee the *leading role* of the working class, as will *consolidate* the dictatorship of the proletariat and *facilitate the abolition of classes*.

"Agreement between the working class and the peasantry," says Lenin, "may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in mind that, from the point of view of the working class, an agreement can be permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures intended for the purpose of abolishing classes, then agreement between the working class and the peasantry is of course a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet government, all the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe." (Vol. XXVI, p. 387.)

And further:

"At present," says Lenin, "the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the peasantry mean? It means, first, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we wandered away from this radical and main course we should cease to be Socialists and should find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies of the proletariat." (*Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.)

This, then, is Lenin's point of view on the question of the alliance with the great bulk of the peasantry, of the alliance with the middle peasants.

The mistake Bukharin's group commits on the question of the middle peasant is that it fails to perceive the dual nature, the dual

position of the middle peasant between the working class and the capitalists. "The middle peasant is a vacillating class," said Lenin. Why? Because, on the one hand, the middle peasant is a toiler, which brings him close to the working class; but on the other hand he is a property owner, which brings him close to the kulak. Hence the vacillations of the middle peasant. And this is true not only theoretically. These vacillations manifest themselves in practice, daily and hourly.

"As a toiler," says Lenin, "the peasant gravitates towards socialism, and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i. e., back to the 'habitual,' old, 'time-hallowed' capitalism." (Vol. XXIV, p. 314.)

That is why the alliance with the middle peasant can be durable only if it is directed against the capitalist elements, against capitalism in general, if it guarantees the leading role of the working class in that alliance, if it facilitates the abolition of classes.

Bukharin's group forgets these plain and intelligible things.

d) NEP AND MARKET RELATIONS

The fourth mistake Bukharin makes is on the question of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharin's mistake is that he fails to see the dual nature of NEP, he sees only one side of NEP. When we introduced NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War Communism, against the regime and system which precluded *any and every form* of freedom for private trade. We considered, and still consider, that NEP implies *a certain measure* of free private trade. Bukharin remembers this aspect of the matter. That is very good.

But Bukharin is mistaken when he thinks that this is the only aspect of NEP. Bukharin forgets that NEP has another aspect. The point is that NEP by no means implies *complete* freedom for private trade, the *free* play of prices in the market. NEP is freedom for private trade within *certain* limits, within *certain* boundaries, *with the proviso that the role of the state as the regulator of the market is guaranteed*. That, precisely, is the second aspect

of NEP. And this aspect of NEP is more important for us than the first. There is no free play of prices in the market in our country as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the main, determine the price of grain. We determine the price of manufactured goods. We strive to carry out a policy of reducing costs of production and reducing prices of manufactured goods, while striving to stabilize the price of agricultural products. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist countries?

From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, both its aspects must be retained: the first, which is directed against the regime of War Communism, and the object of which is to guarantee a *certain* degree of freedom for private trade; and the second, which is directed against *complete* freedom for private trade, and the object of which is to guarantee the role of the state as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic Policy disappears.

Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP only from the "Left," from people who want to abolish *all* freedom of trade. This is not true. This is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, in our local and central organizations now who does not understand the necessity and expediency of preserving a *certain degree* of freedom of trade.

The danger from the Right, from those who want to abolish the role of the state as regulator of the market, who want to "emancipate" the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the danger of disrupting NEP from the Right is much more real at the present time.

It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois element is working precisely in this direction, in the direction of disrupting NEP from the Right. It should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the profiteers and merchants, which many of our comrades often yield to, bombard NEP from precisely this quarter. The fact that Bukh-

arin does not see this second, and very real, menace to NEP undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element.

Bukharin proposes to "normalize" the market and to "manipulate" grain-purchasing prices according to districts, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on the role of the state as the regulator of the market and proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois element, which is disrupting NEP from the Right.

Let us for a moment assume that we followed Bukharin's advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain, let us say, in the autumn, at the beginning of the grain-purchasing period. But since there are always people on the market, all sorts of profiteers and grain merchants, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with the profiteers, for they buy just a mere ten million of poods while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those who hold grain will continue to hold it in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, towards the spring, when the state's real need for grain mainly begins, we would again have to raise the price of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and weaker strata of the rural population who are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food—the very grain which they sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such operations obtain any really useful results in the way of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, for there will always be profiteers and grain merchants able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to catch up with the profiteers and grain merchants.

But from this it follows that having started on the path of raising grain prices we should have to continue further and further without any guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain.

But the matter does not end there.

Firstly, having raised *purchasing* prices of grain we would next have to raise the price of agricultural raw materials as well, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the price of agricultural products.

Secondly, after raising the grain-purchasing prices we would not be able to maintain low retail prices of bread in the towns, and, consequently, we would have to raise the *selling* price of bread. And since we cannot and must not injure the workers, we should rapidly have to increase wages. But this is bound to lead to a rise in the price of manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there would be a drainage of resources from the towns into the countryside to the detriment of industrialization.

In the end we should have to adjust the prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural products, not on the basis of *falling*, or at any rate, stabilized prices, but on the basis of *rising* prices, both of grain and of manufactured goods.

In other words, we should have to pursue a policy of *raising the prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural products.

It is not difficult to understand that such "manipulation" of prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the regulating role of the state in the market, and to the complete release of petty-bourgeois anarchy.

Who would profit by this?

Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural products would be necessarily beyond the reach of the working class and the poor and weaker strata of the rural population. It would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen and the other wealthy classes.

This, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar bond, a bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban population. The workers and the poor strata of the rural population would have every right to ask us: Whose government are you: a workers' and peasants' government or a kulak and Nepmen's government?

A rupture with the working class and the poor strata of the rural population and a bond with the wealthy strata of the urban

and rural population—that is what Bukharin's "normalization" of the market and "manipulation" of grain prices according to districts must lead to.

Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path.

How far Bukharin has muddled all conceptions of NEP and how firmly he has become a captive of the petty-bourgeois element is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of trade turnover between town and country, between the state and the peasantry. He is indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has become the purveyor of goods for the peasantry and that the peasantry is becoming the purveyor of grain for the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules of NEP, almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On what grounds?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that the state, state industry, is the purveyor of goods, without middlemen, for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the purveyor of grain for the industry, for the state also without middlemen?

What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxian policy, in the fact that the peasantry *has already become* the purveyor of cotton, beets and flax for the needs of state industry, and that state industry has become the purveyor of manufactured goods, seed and implements of production for these branches of agriculture?

The contract system is here the principal method of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between town and country. But is the contract system contrary to the principles of NEP?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to this contract system, the peasantry *is becoming* the state's purveyor not only of cotton, beets and flax, but also of grain?

If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, conducted by means of preliminarily concluded agreements as to price and quality of goods (the contract system) be regarded as trade turnover?

Is it so difficult to understand that these new, mass forms of trade turnover between town and country based on the contract system have indeed sprung up from the NEP, that they mark a big step forward on the part of our organizations as regards the strengthening of the planned, socialist management of our national economy?

Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these plain and intelligible things.

e) THE SO-CALLED "TRIBUTE"

The fifth mistake Bukharin makes (I am speaking of his principal mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party line on the question of "the scissors" between town and countryside, on the question of the so-called "tribute."

What is the position set forth in the well-known resolution of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 1929) on the question of "the scissors"? The resolution points out that in addition to the ordinary taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry is paying to the state, it also pays a certain supertax in the form of an overcharge on consumer goods, and in the form of low prices received for agricultural produce.

Is it true that the supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other designation do we have for this supertax? We also call it "the scissors," "drainage" of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up industrial development.

Is this "drainage" really necessary? Everybody agrees that it is, as a temporary measure, if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. Indeed, we must at all cost maintain a rapid growth of our industry, for this growth is necessary not solely for our industrial production, but primarily for our agriculture, for our peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilizers,

Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the first opportune moment, in the coming years. But we cannot abolish it right now.

Now, as you see, this supertax obtained by means of "the scissors" is in fact "something like a tribute." Not a tribute, but "something like a tribute." It is "something like a tribute" which we are paying for our backwardness. We need this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry and to do away with our backwardness.

But does this mean that the levying of this additional tax is tantamount to exploiting the peasantry? No, it does not. The very nature of the Soviet power precludes any form of exploitation of the peasantry by the state. It has been plainly stated in the speeches of our comrades at the July Plenum that under the Soviet regime, the exploitation of the peasantry by the socialist state is *ruled out* because the constant rise in the welfare of the working peasantry is one of the laws upon which the development of the Soviet society is predicated, and this rules out all possibilities of exploiting the peasantry.

Is this additional tax bearable for the peasantry? Yes, it is. Why?

Firstly, because the levying of this additional tax is effected under conditions of a constant improvement of the material condition of the peasantry.

Secondly, because the peasants have their own private husbandry, the income whereof enables them to meet the additional tax, and in this they differ from the industrial workers who have no private husbandry, but who nonetheless devote all their energies to the cause of industrialization.

Thirdly, because this additional tax is being reduced each year.

Are we right in calling this additional tax "something like a tribute"? Yes, unquestionably we are. By our choice of words we are pointing out to our comrades that this additional tax is detestable and unwelcome, and that its subsistence for any considerable length of time should not be tolerated. This definition

of the additional tax on the peasantry amounts to a plain statement of the fact that we are levying it not because we want to, but because we are forced to, and that we, Bolsheviks, must take all necessary measures in order to abolish this additional tax at the first opportune moment, as soon as possible.

Such is the essence of the question of "the scissors," "the drainage," "the supertax," of the thing that the above-mentioned documents designate as "something like a tribute."

At first, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky tried to wrangle over the word "tribute," and accused the Party of implementing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. But now even the blind can see that this was just an unscrupulous attempt at gross slander against our Party. They are now themselves forced into tacit recognition of the fact that their chatter about military-feudal exploitation was a miserable failure.

Either one thing, or the other:

Either the Bukharinites recognize the inevitability, at the present time, of "the scissors" and "the drainage" of resources from agriculture into industry, and by the same token they are forced to admit that their accusations are of a slanderous nature, and that the Party is entirely right;

Or they deny the inevitability, at the present time, of "the scissors" and "the drainage," but in that case let them say it frankly, so that the Party may classify them as adversaries of the industrialization of our country.

I could, incidentally, quote some passages from a number of Bukharin's, Rykov's and Tomsky's speeches, in which they recognize without any reservations the inevitability, at the present time, of "the scissors" and "the drainage" of resources from agriculture into industry. And this, indeed, is equivalent to an acceptance of the formula "something like a tribute."

Well then, has their point of view with regard to "the drainage," and the subsistence of "the scissors" at the present time, remained unchanged? Let them say it frankly.

Bukharin: The drainage is necessary, but "tribute" is not a fitting word. (*General laughter.*)

Stalin: Consequently, we do not differ on the essence of the question; consequently, "the drainage" of resources from agriculture into industry, the so-called "scissors," the additional tax, "something like a tribute"—are all necessary though temporary means for industrializing our country at the present time.

Very well. Then what is the point at issue? Why all the tumult? They do not like the word "tribute" nor the words "something like a tribute," because they believe that this expression is not commonly used in Marxian literature?

Well then, let us discuss the word "tribute."

I assert, comrades, that this word has for a long time been in use in our Marxian literature, in Comrade Lenin's writings, for example. This may surprise some people who do not read Lenin's works, but it is nonetheless a fact, comrades. Bukharin made frantic attempts to prove that "tribute" is an unsuitable word to use in Marxian literature. He was indignant and surprised at the fact that the Central Committee of the Party, and Marxists in general, take the liberty of using the word "tribute." But can there be anything surprising in this, if we have ample evidence that this word has for a long time been in use in his writings by no less a Marxist than Comrade Lenin himself. Or perhaps, from Bukharin's viewpoint, Lenin did not qualify as a Marxist? Well, you should be straightforward about it, dear comrades.

Take for example the article "Left-Wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (May, 1918), which was written by no less a Marxist than Lenin himself, and read the following passage:

"The petty bourgeois who hoards his "thousands" is an enemy of state capitalism; he wants to employ his thousands just for himself alone, against the poor classes, in utter disregard of any kind of state control; yet the sum total of these thousands amounts to many billions that supply a base for profiteering, and which undermine our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that out of this total, a sum amounting to 200 vanishes owing to petty profiteering, all kinds of pilfering and tricks practised by small property owners in their efforts to "evade" Soviet decrees and regulations. Every conscious worker would say: If, for the sake of achieving better order and organization, I had to give up 300 out of 1,000, I would willingly give

up 300 instead of 200, because to reduce this "tribute" later on, to, say, 100 or 50, will be an easy matter under the Soviet regime, once we have achieved organization and order and once we have completely overcome the efforts of small property owners to undermine our state monopoly. (Vol. XXII, p. 515.)

This is perfectly clear, I believe. Should we, therefore, qualify Lenin as an advocate of military-feudal exploitation of the working class? You may try, dear comrades.

A voice in the audience: Nevertheless the term "tribute" has never been used when it concerns the middle peasant.

Stalin: Do you believe by any chance that the middle peasant is closer to the Party than the working class? You are some Marxist. (*General laughter.*) If we, the Party of the working class, can speak of "tribute" when it concerns the working class, why can we not say it when it concerns the middle peasantry, which, after all, is merely an ally?

Some pedantic minds might suspect that the word "tribute" in Lenin's article "Left-Wing' Childishness" is just a slip of the tongue. A check-up on this point will, however, show that the suspicions of those pedantic minds are entirely groundless. Take another article, or rather a pamphlet, written by Lenin: "*The Tax in Kind*" (April 1921) and read page 324 (Vol. XXVI, p. 324). You will see that the passage regarding "the tribute" quoted above is repeated by Lenin word for word. Or take Lenin's article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (Vol. XXII, p. 448, March-April 1918), and you will see that in it too, Lenin speaks of the "tribute (but now without quotation marks) which we are paying for our backwardness in the matter of organizing accounting and control from below on a nation-wide scale."

As you see, the word "tribute" is very far from being a fortuitous element in Lenin's writings. Comrade Lenin uses this word to stress the temporary nature of "the tribute," to stimulate the energy of the Bolsheviks, and to set it going in a direction that will permit, at the first opportune moment, the abolition of this "tribute," the price the working class has to pay for our backwardness and our "muddling."

As you see, when I use the expression "something like a trib-

ute" I find myself in rather good Marxist company, in the company of Comrade Lenin.

Bukharin said here that Marxists should not tolerate the use of the word "tribute" in their writings. What kind of Marxists was he speaking about? If Bukharin had in mind such pseudo Marxists as Slepkov, Maretsky, Petrovsky, Rosit, etc., who have much more in common with liberals than with Marxists, then his indignation is perfectly justified. If, on the other hand, he has in mind true Marxists, Comrade Lenin, for example, then, actually, as far as they are concerned the word "tribute" has been in usage for a long time, while Bukharin, who is not familiar with Lenin's writings, is wide of the mark.

But this does not fully dispose of the question of the "tribute." The point is that it was no accident that Bukharin and his friends took exception to the word "tribute" and began to speak of military-feudal exploitation of the peasants. Their outcry about military-feudal exploitation was undoubtedly an expression of their extreme discontent with the Party policy toward the kulaks, which is being applied by our organizations. Discontent with the Leninist policy of the Party in its leadership of the peasantry, discontent with our grain-purchasing policy, with our policy of developing collective and state farms to the utmost, and lastly, the desire to "unfetter" the market and to establish complete freedom of private trade,—there you have the underlying reason for Bukharin's screams about military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

In the whole history of our Party I cannot recall another single instance of the Party being accused of carrying on a policy of military-feudal exploitation. This anti-Party weapon was not borrowed from a Marxian arsenal. From where, then, was it borrowed? From the arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional-Democrats. When the Cadets wish to provoke a clash between the peasantry and the working class, they say as a rule: You, Messrs. the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry about the "tribute," he is just singing to the tune of Messrs. Milyukovs, and is following in the footsteps of the enemies of the people,

f) THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND THE NEW FORMS OF THE BOND

Finally, as to the question of the rate of development of industry and of the new forms of the bond between town and country. This is one of our most important points of difference. The importance of this question is that it is the converging point of all the threads of our *practical* differences on the economic policy of the Party.

What are the new forms of the bond, what do they signify from the point of view of our economic policy?

They signify, firstly, that besides the old forms of the bond between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the *personal* requirements of the peasantry (cotton textile, footwear, and manufactured goods in general), we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry will satisfy the *productive* requirements of peasant farming (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilizers, etc.).

Whereas formerly we satisfied *mainly* the personal requirements of the peasants, hardly touching the productive requirements of their farms, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasants, we must exert all our efforts to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc., which have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis.

As long as it was a question of *restoring* agriculture and of the peasants assimilating the landlords' and kulaks' land, we could be content with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is a question of *reconstructing* agriculture, this is not enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry to reorganize agricultural production on the basis of a new technique and collective labour.

Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the re-equipment of our industry, we must seriously begin to re-equip agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new and improved machinery and new and im-

proved cadres. We are building new factories and plants and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the iron and steel industry, the chemical industry and the machine-building industry. On this basis new towns are springing up, new industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are expanding. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old methods of tillage practised by our forefathers, the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour.

Take the mere fact that before the revolution there were nearly 16,000,000 peasant households, and now there are no less than 25,000,000! What does this indicate if not that agriculture is assuming a more and more scattered, fragmentary character. And the characteristic feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable sufficiently to employ technique, machines, tractors and scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with a small output for the market.

Hence, the insufficient output of agricultural products for the market.

Hence, the danger of a rift between town and country, between industry and agriculture.

Hence, the necessity for increasing, whipping up the rate of development of agriculture to that of our industry.

And so, in order to avoid the danger of a rift, we must begin thoroughly to re-equip agriculture on the basis of modern technique. But in order to re-equip it we must gradually amalgamate the scattered individual peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collective farms, we must develop the old and new state farms, we must systematically employ the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of machine-and-tractor stations which help the peasantry to assimilate the new technique and to collectivize labour—in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual peasant farms to the

basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socialized type is capable of making full use of scientific knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing the development of our agriculture with seven-league strides.

This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Nothing of the kind. Individual poor-and middle-peasant farming plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so for some time. This is precisely why we must continue to assist individual poor- and middle-peasant farms which have not yet amalgamated into collective farms.

But this does mean that individual peasant farming alone is *no longer* adequate. This is shown by our grain-purchasing difficulties. That is why the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must be *supplemented* by the widest possible development of collective forms of farming and of state farms.

That is why we must bridge the way for individual poor- and middle-peasant farming to collective, socialized forms of farming through the use of the contract system on a mass scale, through the use of machine-and-tractor stations and by the fullest development of the cooperative movement in order to help the peasants to transfer their small, individual farming to the lines of collective labour.

Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem. Failing this it will be impossible to save the weaker strata of the peasantry from ruin and distress.

Finally, they signify that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction: we must develop our iron and steel, chemical and machine-building industries; we must build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc.

There is no need to prove that it is impossible to develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop machine-and-tractor stations without inducing the great bulk of the peasantry, with the aid of the contract system applied on a mass scale, to

adopt collective forms of farming, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

But it will be impossible to supply the rural districts with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the development of our industry. Hence, the speedy development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

Such is the meaning and significance of the new forms of the bond.

Bukharin's group is obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an admission only *in words*, with the intention, under cover of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, of smuggling in something which is the *very opposite*. Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the bond. Bukharin's starting point is not the speedy rate of development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction of agriculture, but the development of individual peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the "normalization" of the market and permission for the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete freedom for private trade. Hence his distrustful attitude to the collective farms which manifested itself in his speech at the July Plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to the July Plenum of the Central Committee. Hence his disapproval of every and any form of emergency measures against the kulaks during grain-purchasing campaigns.

We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures as the devil shuns holy water.

We know that Bukharin still fails to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord.

That has been proved by our two years' experience of grain-purchasing campaigns.

But what if, in spite of everything, there will not be enough grain marketed? To this Bukharin replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import about 50,000,000 poods of grain, i.e., to the value of about 100,000,000 rubles in foreign

currency. But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be given to imports of grain—thus, evidently, relegating imports of equipment for industry to the background.

It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture is not the speedy rate of development of industry, but the development of individual peasant farming, including also kulak farming, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices in the market.

Thus we have two different plans of economic policy.

The Party's Plan:

1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction).
2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).
3. For this we must expand the development of collective farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale the contract system and machine and tractor stations as means of establishing a *bond* between industry and agriculture in the sphere of *production*.
4. As for the present grain-purchasing difficulties, we must admit the necessity for temporary emergency measures that are bolstered up by the popular support of the middle- and poor-peasant masses, as one of the means of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining from them the maximum grain surplus necessary to be able to dispense with imported grain and to save foreign currency for the development of industry.
5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials; but alone it is no longer adequate—the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must therefore be *supplemented* by the development of collective farms and state farms, by the contract system applied on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of machine-and-tractor stations, in order to facilitate the squeezing out of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms to large-scale collective farming, to collective labour.

6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of metallurgy, chemicals, machine building, of tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture.

Conclusion: *The key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the speedy rate of development of our industry.*

Bukharin's Plan:

1. "Normalize" the market; permit the free play of prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the price of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread.

2. The utmost development of individual peasant farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate of development of collective farms and state farms (Bukharin's theses of July and his speech at the July Plenum).

3. Grain purchasing on the spontaneity principle, precluding under all circumstances even the partial application of emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the middle- and poor-peasant masses.

4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 100,000,000 rubles worth of grain.

5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to pay for imports of grain and equipment for industry, to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, the rate of development of our industry—otherwise our agriculture will simply "mark time," or will even "directly decline."

Conclusion: *The key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the development of individual peasant farming.*

This is how it works out, comrades.

Bukharin's plan is a plan to *reduce* the rate of development of industry and to *undermine* the new forms of the bond.

Such are our divergencies.

Sometimes a question is being asked: Have we not been late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing collective farms, state farms, etc.?

Some people assert that the Party was at least two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy "Lefts" who have no conception of the economy of the U.S.S.R. can talk like that.

What do people imply when they say that we were late in this matter? If they imply that we should have foreseen the need for collective farms and state farms, then we can say that we began this at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot be the slightest doubt that already then—at the time of the October Revolution—the Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms. For that matter, we may refer to our program, which was adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms and state farms is recognized there with perfect clarity.

But the mere fact that the top leadership of our Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms was not enough to carry into effect and organize a *mass movement* for collective farms and state farms. Therefore, the question was not one of foreseeing, but of *carrying out* the plan of collective-farm and state-farm development. But in order to carry out such a plan a number of conditions are required which did not exist before, and which came into existence only very recently.

That is the point, comrades.

In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective farms and state farms, it was necessary, first of all, that the Party leadership should be supported in this course by the *mass* of the Party membership. As you know, our Party has over 1,000,000 members. It was therefore necessary to convince the large masses of the Party membership of the correctness of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first point.

Further, it was necessary that a mass movement should arise among the peasants in favour of collective farms, that the peasants—far from fearing the collective farms—should themselves join the collective farms and become convinced by experience of the advantage of collective farming over individual farming.

This is a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. That is the second point.

Further, it was necessary that the state should possess the material resources required to finance the collective-farm development, to finance the collective farms and state farms. And this, dear comrades, requires hundreds and hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the third point.

Finally, it was necessary that industry should be developed sufficiently to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc. That is the fourth point.

Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

It must not be forgotten that we are a *ruling* party, *not an opposition* party. An opposition party can issue slogans—I mean fundamental practical slogans of the movement—in order to carry them into effect after it comes into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties.

In the case of a ruling party, however, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational slogans, but something much more important, for they have the force of *practical decision*, the *force of law*, and must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue a practical slogan and then defer carrying it out. That would be deceiving the masses. Before issuing a practical slogan, especially so serious a slogan as transferring the vast masses of the peasantry to the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the slogan to be carried out directly; finally, these conditions must be created, organized. That is why it was not enough merely for the Party leadership to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. That is why we also need the conditions to enable us to *realize, to carry out*, our slogans, immediately.

Was the *mass* of the Party membership ready for the utmost development of collective farms and state farms, say, two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious turn of the

mass of the Party membership towards the new forms of the bond began only with the first serious grain-purchasing difficulties. It required these difficulties for the mass of the Party membership to become conscious of the full necessity of accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, and primarily, of the collective farms and state farms, and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Was there any serious movement among the vast masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or state farms two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the peasantry was hostile to the state farms and contemptuously called the collective farms "Kommunia," regarding them as something utterly useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard the state farms and collective farms as a source of assistance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to supply machines and tractors, and collective farming will develop at a rapid rate.

What was the cause of this change of attitude among certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? What helped to bring it about?

In the first place, the development of the cooperative societies and the cooperative movement. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of the cooperative societies, particularly of agricultural cooperative societies, which produced a change in the mentality of the peasantry in favour of the collective farms, we would not have had that urge towards the collective farms which is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry.

An important part in this was played by the existence of well-organized collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, collective, farms.

An important part in this was also played by the existence of well-organized state farms, which helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming. I need not mention other factors

with which you are all familiar. This is another condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Further, can it be asserted that we were able two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot be asserted. You know very well that we even lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of industry without which industrialization in general is impossible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take these resources from industry, which is the basis for the industrialization of the country, and transfer them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective farms and state farms.

Finally, can it be asserted that two or three years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying agriculture with large quantities of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our task was to create the *minimum industrial basis* required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture *in the future*. It was on the creation of such a basis that our scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? Now we have the industrial basis for agriculture. At all events, this industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective farms and state farms were created only recently.

That is how matters stand, comrades:

That is why it cannot be said that we were late in developing the new forms of the bond.

g) BUKHARIN AS A THEORETICIAN

Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed by the theoretician of the Right opposition, Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians of our Party. This is true, of course. But the trouble is that not all is well

with his theorizing. This is evident if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I have just analyzed. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern questions, mistakes on questions of the class struggle, of the intensification of the class struggle, on the peasantry, on NEP, on the new forms of the bond—these mistakes could not possibly have been fortuitous. No, these mistakes are not fortuitous. Bukharin's mistakes flowed from the wrong theoretical line he pursued, from the gaps in his theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxian theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can become a Marxian theoretician.

Reference is made to a letter in which Comrade Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read the letter.

"Of the younger members of the Central Committee," says Lenin, "I should like to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. In my opinion, they are the most outstanding people (of the youngest forces), and regarding them the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only a very valuable and important theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded as the favourite of the whole Party; *but it is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxian, for there is something scholastic in him (he has never studied, and, I think, he has never fully understood dialectics).*"* (Stenographic record of the July Plenum, 1926, Part IV, p. 66.)

Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. A theoretician about whom it was said: "It is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxian." This is how Lenin characterized Bukharin's theoretical complexion.

You can well understand, comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn. And, if Bukharin understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, that he still has much to learn, that he is a theoretician who has not yet assimilated dia-

* My italics.—J. St,

lectics—and dialectics is the soul of Marxism—if he understood that, he would be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. The trouble is that Bukharin is wanting in modesty. The trouble is that not only is he wanting in modesty, but he even presumes to teach our teacher Lenin on a number of questions, primarily, on the question of the state. And this is Bukharin's misfortune.

Allow me in this connection to refer to the well-known theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the state. This is important in order to expose Bukharin's inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin, as well as the roots of his theoretical unsoundness on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc.

As you know, an article by Bukharin appeared in 1916 in the magazine *Internatsional Molodyozhy*, signed *Nota Bene*; this article was in fact directed against Comrade Lenin. In this article Bukhavin wrote:

"...It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between the Socialists and the Anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to organize the new social production as centralized production, i.e., technically the most progressive method of production; whereas decentralized anarchist production would mean retrogression to old technique, to the old form of enterprises....

"...Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasize its hostility to the state in principle.... The present war has shown how deeply the state idea has penetrated the souls of the workers."

Lenin replied in a well-known article, published in 1916, criticizing Bukharin's views. He said:

"This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists *towards the state*. But he replies *not to this* question, but to *another*, namely, the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists towards the economic foundation of future society. This, of course, is a very important and necessary question to discuss. But that does not mean that the *main* point of difference in the attitude of the

Socialists and Anarchists towards the state can be ignored. The Socialists are in favour of utilizing the modern state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they also urge the necessity of utilizing the state for the peculiar form of transition from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is *also* a state. The Anarchists want to 'abolish' the state, to 'blow it up' ("sprengen"), as Comrade *Nota Bene* expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists—unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject rather incompletely—hold that the state will 'wither away,' will gradually 'fall asleep' *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated....

"In order to 'emphasize' our 'hostility' to the state 'in principle,' we must indeed understand it 'clearly.' This clarity, however, our author lacks. His remark about the 'state idea' is entirely muddled. It is un-Marxian, and unsocialistic. The point is not that 'the state idea' has clashed with the repudiation of the idea of the state, but that the opportunist policy (i. e., an opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i. e., with the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude to the bourgeois state and towards utilizing the state against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow it). These are entirely different things." (Vol. XIX, p. 296.)

I think the point at issue is clear, and it is also clear that Bukharin landed in a semi-anarchistic puddle.

Sten: At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated the necessity for "blowing up" the state. Bukharin, while committing anarchist errors, was approaching a formulation of the question.

Stalin: No, that is not what we are concerned with at present. What we are concerned with is the attitude towards the state in general. The point is that in Bukharin's opinion the working class should be hostile *in principle* to *any kind* of state, including the working-class state.

Sten: Lenin then only spoke about utilizing the state; he said nothing in his criticism of Bukharin regarding the "blowing up" of the state.

Stalin: You are mistaken, the "blowing up" of the state is not a Marxian formula, it is an anarchistic formula. Let me assure you that the point here is that, in the opinion of Bukharin (and of the Anarchists), the workers should emphasize their hos-

tility, as a matter of principle, to any kind of state, and, therefore, to the state of the transition period, to the working-class state as well.

Try to explain to our workers that the working class must become imbued with hostility, as a matter of principle, to the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a state.

Bukharin's position as set forth in his article in *International Molodyozhy* is that he repudiates the state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Bukharin here overlooked a "trifle," namely, the whole transition period, during which the working class cannot do without its own state if it really wants to suppress the bourgeoisie and build socialism. That is the first point.

The second point is that it is not true that Comrade Lenin at that time did not deal in his criticism with the theory of "blowing up," of "abolishing" the state in general. Lenin not only dealt with this theory, as is evident from the passages I have quoted, but he criticized and demolished it as an anarchist theory, and opposed to it the theory of *forming* and *utilizing* a new state after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the state of the proletarian dictatorship.

Finally, the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state must not be confused with the Marxian theory of the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state or the "breaking up," the "smashing" of the *bourgeois* state machine. There are persons who are inclined to confuse these two different concepts in the belief that they express the same idea. But this is wrong: Lenin proceeded precisely from the Marxian theory of "smashing" the *bourgeois* state machine and the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state when he criticized the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state in general.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous if, for the sake of greater clarity, I quote a passage from a manuscript on the state written by Comrade Lenin, evidently at the end of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily seen that:

a) in criticizing Bukharin's semi-anarchistic errors on the question of the state, Lenin proceeded from the Marxist theory of the "withering away" of the proletarian state and the "smashing" of the bourgeois state machine;

b) although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed it, "is nearer to the truth than Kautsky," nevertheless, "instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he helps them with his mistakes."

Here is the text of the manuscript.

"Of extremely great importance on the question of the state is the letter of Engels to Bebel dated March 18-28, 1875.

"Here is the most important passage in full:

"... 'The free people's state is transformed into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a despotic government. *The whole talk about the state should be dropped*, especially since the Commune which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. The "people's state" has been thrown in our faces by the Anarchists to the point of disgust, although already Marx's book against Proudhon and later the *Communist Manifesto* directly declare that *with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state will dissolve of itself (sich auflöst)* and disappear. As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's state: so long as the proletariat still uses (Engels' italics) the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would therefore propose to replace the word *state* (Engels' italics) everywhere by the word "community" (*Gemeinwesen*); a good old German word which can very well represent the French word *commune*.'

"This is, perhaps, the most remarkable, and certainly, the most pronounced passage, so to speak, in the works of Marx and Engels 'against the state.'

"1. 'The whole talk about the state should be dropped.'

"2. 'The Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word.' (What was it, then? A transitional form from the state to no state, obviously!)

"3. The 'people's state' has been 'thrown in our faces' (*in die Zähne geworfen*, literally—thrown in our teeth) by the Anarchists too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious mistake made by their German friends; but they regarded it, and of course, *in the circumstances that then existed*, correctly regarded it as a far less serious mistake than that made by the Anarchists. This N. B.!!)

"4. The state will 'disintegrate ("dissolve") (*Nota Bene*) of itself and disappear' (compare later "will wither away") 'with the introduction of the socialist order of society....'

"5. The state is a 'temporary institution,' which is used 'in the struggle, in the revolution' (used by the *proletariat*, of course)...

"6. The state is not used in the interests of *freedom*, but for *holding down* (*Niederhaltung* is not suppression in the proper sense of the word, but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) the *adversaries of the proletariat*.

"7. When there will be freedom, there will be no state.

"8. 'We' (i. e., Engels and Marx) would propose to replace the word 'state' *everywhere* (in the program) by the word 'community' (*Gemeinwesen*), 'commune'!!!

"This shows to what extent Marx and Engels were vulgarized and defiled, not only by the opportunists, but also by Kautsky.

"The opportunists have not understood a single one of these *eight* rich ideas!!

"They have taken *only* what is practically necessary for the present time: to utilize the political struggle, to utilize the *present* state to educate, to train the proletariat, to 'wrest concessions.' That is correct (as against the Anarchists), but that is only one hundredth part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically.

"In his propagandist works, and publications generally, Kautsky has completely ignored (or forgotten? or not understood?) points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and the '*zerbrechen*' of Marx (in his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 or 1913, Kautsky [see below, pp. 45-47] completely dropped into opportunism on this question).

"What distinguishes us from the Anarchists is (α) the use of the state *now* and (β) during the proletarian *revolution* (the "dictatorship of the proletariat")—points of extreme and immediate importance in practice. (But it is these very points that Bukharin *forgot!*)

"What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more profound, 'more permanent' truths regarding (αα) the 'temporary' nature of the state, (ββ) the *harm* of 'chatter' about it now, (γγ) the not entirely state character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, (δδ) the contradiction between the state and freedom, (εε) the more correct idea (concept, program term) 'community' instead of state, (ζζ) 'smashing' (*zerbrechen*) of the bureaucratic-military machine.

"It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, and the official program and Kautsky indirectly repudiate it, by not saying anything about it in their day-to-day agitation and tolerating the renegacy of Kolb and Co.

"In August 1916, Bukharin was written to: 'allow your ideas about the state to mature.' *Without*, however, allowing them to mature, he broke into

print, as '*Nota Bene*' and did it in such a way that, instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he *helped them* with his mistakes!! Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer to the truth than Kautsky."

Such is the brief history of the theoretical controversy on the question of the state.

The matter, it seems, should be clear: Bukharin made semi-anarchist mistakes—it is time to correct those mistakes and proceed further in the footsteps of Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts that it was not he who was mistaken, but Lenin; that it was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, Lenin was compelled to follow in the footsteps of Bukharin.

You do not believe this, comrades? Well, listen further. After the controversy in 1916, nine years later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, and *a year after the death of Lenin*—namely, in 1925—Bukharin published an article in the symposium *Revolutsia Prava*, entitled "The Theory of the Imperialist State," which previously had been rejected by the editors of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (i.e., by Lenin). In a *footnote* to this article Bukharin bluntly declares that not Lenin was right in this controversy, but he, Bukharin. That may seem incredible, comrades; but it is a fact.

Listen to the text of this footnote:

"V.I. (i. e., Lenin) wrote a short article containing criticism of the article in *Internatsional Molodoyozhy*. The reader will easily see that I had not made the mistake attributed to me, for I clearly saw the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other hand, from Ilyich's article it will be seen that at that time he was *wrong about the thesis on 'blowing up' the state* (bourgeois state, of course), *and confused that question with the question of the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat*.* Perhaps I should have enlarged on the question of the dictatorship more at that time. But in justification I may say that *at that time* there was such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the Social-Democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the question of *blowing up* that machine.

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"When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at that time V. I. was in hiding) her first words were: 'V. I. asked me to tell you that he has no disagreements with you now over the question of the state.' Studying this question, *Ilyich came to the same conclusion** regarding 'blowing up,' but he developed this theme, and later the theory of the dictatorship, to such an extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical thought in this field.

That is what Bukharin writes about Lenin *a year after* Lenin's death.

Here you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied pretentiousness of a half-educated theoretician.

Very likely Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Lenin had certain reasons for believing that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, was to be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxian theory of the state.

Hitherto we have regarded ourselves, and we continue to regard ourselves, as Leninists. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that's what happens when we have to deal with Bukharin's puffed-up pretentiousness.

It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, as it were; that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But that does not seem to be the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's *mistakes* and Bukharin's *correctness* was reproduced recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maresky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against the boldness of Maresky.

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Very likely Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Lenin had certain reasons for believing that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, was to be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxian theory of the state.

Hitherto we have regarded ourselves, and we continue to regard ourselves, as Leninists. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that's what happens when we have to deal with Bukharin's puffed-up pretentiousness.

It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, as it were; that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But that does not seem to be the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's *mistakes* and Bukharin's *correctness* was reproduced recently, namely, in 1927, i. e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against the boldness of Maretsky.

* My italics.—J.St.

Obviously Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxian theory of the state is not Lenin, but Bukharin.

Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical twists and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin.

And after all this the man has the presumption to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical position of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical position of our Party.

And this is said by the very Bukharin who is making (and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical and practical mistakes, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky, who only the other day was seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and was paying them visits by the back door.

Is this not funny, comrades?

b) A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OR A TWO-YEAR PLAN

Permit me now to pass on to Rykov's speech. While Bukharin tried to provide the theoretical grounds for the Right deviation, Rykov attempted in his speech to put it on the basis of practical proposals and to frighten us with "horrors" drawn from our difficulties in the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Rykov did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch upon them. But in doing so he made at least two serious mistakes.

In his draft resolution on the Five-Year Plan, which was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, Rykov says that "the central idea of the Five-Year Plan is to increase the productivity of labour of the people." In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political Bureau rejected this absolutely false position, Rykov defended it here in his speech.

Is it true that the central idea of the Five-Year Plan in the *Land of Soviets* is to increase the productivity of labour? No, it is not true. It is not *any kind* of increase in the productivity of

labour of the people that we need. What we need is a *specific* increase in the productivity of labour of the people, namely, an increase that will guarantee the *systematic supremacy of the socialist sector of national economy over the capitalist sector*. A Five-Year Plan which overlooks this central idea is not a five-year plan, but five-year rubbish.

Every society, capitalist and precapitalist society included, is interested in increasing the productivity of labour in general. The difference between *Soviet* society and every other society lies in the very fact that it is interested not in any kind of increase of productivity of labour, but in such an increase as will guarantee the supremacy of socialist forms of economy over other forms, and primarily, over capitalist forms of economy, and will thus guarantee that the capitalist forms of economy will be overcome and eliminated. But Rykov forgot this really central idea of the Five-Year Plan of development of *Soviet* society. That is his first theoretical mistake.

His second mistake is that he does not distinguish, or does not want to understand the distinction—from the point of view of trade turnover—between, let us say, a collective farm and all kinds of individual enterprises, including individual capitalist enterprises. Rykov assures us that from the point of view of trade turnover on the grain market, from the point of view of obtaining grain, he does not see any difference between a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy grain from a collective farm, or from a private holder, or from an Argentine grain merchant. It is absolutely wrong. It is a repetition of the well-known statement of Frumkin who some time ago assured us that it was a matter of indifference to him where and from whom we bought grain, from a private dealer or from a collective farm.

That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, of justification of the machinations of the kulak on the grain market. That this defence is conducted from the point of view of trade turnover does not alter the fact that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the machinations of the kulak on the grain market.

If from the viewpoint of trade turnover there is no difference between collective and noncollective forms of economy, is it worth while developing collective farms, granting them privileges and devoting ourselves to the difficult task of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It is obvious that Rykov has taken a wrong stand. That is his second theoretical mistake.

But this is in passing. Let us examine the practical questions raised in Rykov's speech.

Rykov said here that in addition to the Five-Year Plan we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a two-year plan for the development of agriculture. He justified this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the grounds of the difficulties experienced in agriculture. He said: the Five-Year Plan was a good thing and he was in favour of it; but if at the same time we drew up a two-year plan for agriculture it would be still better—otherwise agriculture would bog down.

On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong with this proposal. But upon closer scrutiny we find that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in order to point out that the Five-Year Plan was unrealistic, a plan merely on paper. Could we agree to that? No, we could not. We said to Rykov: If you are dissatisfied with the Five-Year Plan with regard to agriculture, if you think that the funds we are assigning in the Five-Year Plan for developing agriculture are inadequate, then tell us openly what your additional proposals are, what additional investments do you propose—we are ready to include these additional investments in agriculture into the Five-Year Plan. And what did we find? We found that Rykov had no additional proposals to make about additional investments in agriculture. The question, therefore, is: why the parallel two-year plan for agriculture?

We also said to him: In addition to the Five-Year Plan there are yearly plans which are part of the Five-Year Plan. Let us include into the first two yearly plans the concrete additional proposals for developing agriculture that you have to make, that is, if you have any such proposals to make. And what did we

find? We found that Rykov had no concrete proposals for additional appropriations to make.

We then realized that Rykov's proposal for a two-year plan was not made for the purpose of developing agriculture, but stemmed from a desire to point out that the Five-Year Plan was unrealistic, a plan merely on paper, from a desire to discredit the Five-Year Plan. For "conscience" sake, for appearances' sake, a Five-Year Plan; but for work, for practical purposes, a two-year plan—that was Rykov's strategy. Rykov brought the two-year plan on the scene in order subsequently, during the practical work of carrying out the Five-Year Plan, to oppose it to the Five-Year Plan, modify the Five-Year Plan and adapt it to the two-year plan by paring down and curtailing the appropriations for industry.

It was on these grounds that we rejected Rykov's proposal for a parallel two-year plan.

I) THE QUESTION OF THE CROP AREA

Rykov tried to frighten the Party by asserting that the crop area throughout the U.S.S.R. is showing a steady tendency to diminish. Moreover, he threw out the hint that the policy of the Party was responsible for the diminution of the crop area. He did not say outright that we are faced with deterioration of agriculture, but the impression left by his speech is that something like deterioration is taking place.

Is it true that the crop area is showing a steady tendency to diminish? No, it is not. Rykov quoted average figures of the crop area for the country. But the method of using average figures, if it is not corrected by figures for the individual districts, cannot be regarded as a scientific method.

Rykov has probably read Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia*. If he has read it he ought to remember how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists for using the method of average figures showing the expansion of the crop area and ignoring the figures for the individual districts. It is strange that Rykov should now repeat the mistakes of the bourgeois

economists. Now, if we examine the changes in the crop area according to districts, i.e., if we approach the matter scientificaly, it will be seen that in certain districts the crop area is expanding *steadily*, while in others it *sometimes* diminishes, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions, and that, moreover, there are no facts to indicate that there is a *steady* diminution of the crop area anywhere, even in a single important grain-growing district.

Indeed, there has recently been a decrease in the crop area in districts which have been affected by frost or drought, in certain regions of the Ukraine, for instance.

A voice: But not the whole Ukraine.

Schlichter: In the Ukraine the crop area has increased 2.7 per cent.

Stalin: I am referring to the steppe regions of the Ukraine. In other districts, for instance, in Siberia, the Volga regions, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, which were not affected by unfavourable climatic conditions, the crop area has been steadily expanding.

How is it that in certain districts the crop area is steadily expanding, while in others it sometimes diminishes? It cannot really be asserted that the Party has one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or midlands of the U.S.S.R. That would be absurd, comrades. Obviously climatic conditions play no unimportant part, in this.

It is true that the kulaks are reducing their crop areas irrespective of climatic conditions. There, if you like, the policy of the Party, which is to support the poor- and middle-peasant masses *against* the kulaks, is "to blame." But what if it is? Did we ever pledge ourselves to pursue a policy which would satisfy all social groups in the rural districts, including the kulaks? And, moreover, how can we pursue a policy which would satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited—that is, if we are at all bent on pursuing a Marxian policy? What, then, is there strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, which is intended to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in the rural districts, the kulaks begin partly to reduce the area of their crops? What else would you expect?

Perhaps this policy is wrong? Then let it be said outright. Is it not strange that people who call themselves Marxists are so frightened as to claim that the partial reduction of crop areas by the kulaks signifies a *general* decrease of the crop area, forgetting that apart from the kulaks there are also poor and middle peasants whose crop area is expanding, that there are collective farms and state farms whose crop area is growing at an increasing rate?

Finally, I will mention another error which Rykov made in his speech regarding the crop area. Rykov complained here that in certain places, namely, where the collective-farm movement is particularly pronounced, the tilled area of the individual poor and middle peasants is beginning to diminish. That is true. But what is wrong with that? How could it be otherwise? If the poor-and middle-peasant farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and are changing over to collective farming, is it not obvious that the growth in size and numbers of collective farms is bound to result in a certain decrease of the area of individual tillage of the poor and middle peasants? What would you have?

The collective farms now own over 2,000,000 hectares of land. At the end of the Five-Year Plan period, the collective farms will own more than 25,000,000 hectares. At whose expense is the tilled area of the collective farms expanding? At the expense of area tilled by individual poor and middle peasants. But what would you have? How else is the individual farming of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious that in a large number of regions the tilled area of the collective farms will expand at the expense of individual tillage?

Strange that people will not understand such elementary things.

J) THE GRAIN-PURCHASING CAMPAIGN

A pack of fables has been told here about our grain difficulties. But the main features of our present, temporary, grain difficulties have been overlooked.

First of all, it has been forgotten that this year we harvested about 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 poods of rye and wheat—I refer to the gross harvest—less than last year. Could this fail to affect our grain purchases? Of course it was bound to affect them.

Perhaps the policy of the Central Committee is responsible for this? No, the policy of the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. It is due to the serious failure of the crops in the steppe regions of the Ukraine (frost and drought), and to a partial failure of the crops in the North Caucasus, the Central Chernozem Region, and, finally, in the Northwestern Region.

This is the principal reason why our grain purchasing (rye and wheat) in the Ukraine by April 1 last year totalled 200,000,000 poods, while this year the total barely reached 26,000,000-27,000,000 poods.

This also explains the drop in the wheat and rye purchases in the Central Chernozem Region to about one eighth and in the North Caucasus to one fourth.

In certain regions in the East, grain purchases this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, and, of course, did not compensate, for the grain deficit in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and in the Central Chernozem Region.

It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years the Ukraine and the North Caucasus provide about one half of the total grain purchased in the U.S.S.R.

Strange that Rykov lost sight of this fact.

Finally, the second circumstance which is of paramount importance in our temporary grain-purchasing difficulties. I refer to the resistance of the kulak elements in the rural districts to the grain-purchasing policy of the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance. But to ignore it means to ignore the most important factor in the grain-purchasing campaign. What does the experience of the grain-purchasing campaigns of the past two years show? It shows that the well-to-do sections of the rural districts who hold considerable grain surpluses and who play an important role in the grain market, refuse to deliver

voluntarily the necessary quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet government. In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing industrial crops, we require about 500,000,000 poods of grain annually. We are able to purchase 300,000,000 to 350,000,000 poods of grain which is delivered voluntarily. The remaining 150,000,000 have to be secured by exerting organized pressure on the kulaks and the well-to-do strata of the rural population. That is what the experience of the grain-purchasing campaigns of the past two years shows.

What has occurred during these two years? Why these changes? Why was the amount of grain delivered voluntarily adequate in former years, and why is it inadequate this year? The reason is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do elements have grown, the series of good harvests has not been without benefit to them, they have become stronger economically; they have accumulated a little capital and now are in a position to manoeuvre in the market; they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of higher prices, and trade in other products.

Grain should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity. Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, grain, under our present conditions, is a commodity which everybody will take and without which it is impossible to exist. The kulak knows this and holds back his grain, and other grain holders are infected by his example. The kulak knows that grain is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that a surplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the kulak are a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking the grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, but we also destroy a means whereby the kulaks may become economically and politically strong.

What must be done to obtain these grain surpluses? We must, first of all, abolish the harmful and dangerous attitude of waiting

for the spontaneous delivery of grain. Grain purchases must be organized. The poor- and middle-peasant masses must be mobilized against the kulaks, and their public support for the measures adopted by the Soviet government for increasing the grain purchases must be organized. The significance of the Urals-Siberian method of purchasing grain, which is based on the principle of self-imposed obligations, lies precisely in the fact that it helps to mobilize the labouring strata of the rural population against the kulaks for the purpose of increasing the grain purchases. Experience has shown that this method produces good results. Experience has shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well-to-do strata of the rural population and thereby help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilize for this purpose the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically and organize them into a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the rural districts. Certain comrades fail to realize the importance of this latter factor. Yet it is one of the most important results, if not the most important result, of the Urals-Siberian method of grain purchasing.

It is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the employment of emergency measures against the kulaks, which calls forth comical wailings of Bukharin and Rykov. But what is wrong with that? Why should we not, sometimes, under certain conditions, employ emergency measures against our class enemy, against the kulaks? Why is it regarded as permissible to arrest urban profiteers by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhansk Territory, but not permissible to take the surplus grain from the kulaks who are profiteering and trying to seize the Soviet government by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants—by methods of public compulsion, and at prices at which the poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our grain-purchasing organizations? What is the logic of this? Has our Party ever declared that it is *on principle* opposed to the employment of emergency measures against profiteers and kulaks? Have we no laws against profiteering?

Evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are *on principle* opposed to the employment of any emergency measures against the kulaks. But that is bourgeois-liberal policy, not Marxian policy. Surely you know that after the introduction of NEP, Lenin even expressed himself in favour of a return to the Committees of Poor Peasants policy, under certain conditions of course. And what indeed is the partial employment of emergency measures against the kulaks? Not even a drop in the ocean compared with the Committees of Poor Peasants policy.

The adherents of Bukharin's group hope to persuade the class enemy voluntarily to forego his interests and voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses. They hope that the kulak, who has grown stronger, who is profiteering, who is able to hold out by selling other products and who conceals his grain surpluses—they hope that this kulak will give us his grain surpluses voluntarily at our purchase prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanism of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes are?

Do they know with what derision the kulaks treat our people and the Soviet government at village meetings called to assist the grain purchases? Have they heard of facts like the one, for instance, that happened in Kazakhstan, when one of our agitators tried for two hours to persuade the holders of grain to deliver that grain for supplying the country, and a kulak stepped forward with pipe in his mouth and said: "Do us a little dance, young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of grain."

Voice: The swine!

Stalin: Try to persuade people like that.

Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from that truth. The Urals-Siberian method is a good one for the very reason that it helps to rouse the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, it helps to smash the resistance of the kulaks and compels them to deliver the grain surpluses to the organs of the Soviet government.

The most fashionable word just now among Bukharin's group is the word "excesses," as applied to grain purchases. That word

has become the most popular article among them, since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: We, of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to bear on the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the "horrors" of these excesses; they read letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear on the kulaks must be abandoned.

This is the way it works out, if you please: *because* excesses are committed in carrying out a correct policy, *that correct policy must be abandoned*. That is the usual trick of the opportunists; on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, abandon that line and adopt an opportunist line. Moreover, the members of Bukharin's group very carefully hush up the fact that there is another kind of excess, more dangerous and more harmful—namely, the excess in the direction of merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation to the wealthy strata of the rural population, in the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviationists.

Of course, we are all opposed to those excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to affect the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt on this point. But we are most emphatically opposed to the attempts to use the chatter about excesses, which Bukharin's group so zealously indulges in, in order to scuttle the revolutionary policy of our Party and substitute to it the opportunist policy of Bukharin's group. No, that trick won't work here.

Point out at least one political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must combat excesses. But ought we *for this reason* decry the line itself, which is the only correct line?

Take a measure like the introduction of the seven-hour day.

There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in recent years. Who does not know that this measure, which in itself is a most revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of the seven-hour day?

Do the members of the Bukharin opposition understand what a puddle they are landing into in playing up the excesses committed during the grain-purchasing campaign?

k) FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVE AND IMPORTS OF GRAIN

Lastly, a few words about our imports of grain and our reserve of foreign currency. I have already mentioned the fact that Rykov and his close friends had several times raised the question of importing grain from abroad. At first Rykov suggested that it was necessary to import some 80,000,000-100,000,000 poods of grain. This would have required some 200,000,000 rubles' worth of foreign currency. Later, he raised the question of importing 50,000,000 poods, that is, for 100,000,000 rubles' worth of foreign currency. We rejected this suggestion, as we had come to the conclusion that it was preferable to bring pressure to bear on the kulaks and wring out of them their rather substantial surplus of grain, rather than expend foreign currency earmarked for imports of equipment for our industry.

Now Rykov executes an about-face. Now he asserts that capitalists are offering us grain on credit, but it is we who refuse to buy it. He said that he had seen several telegrams which indicate that capitalists are willing to sell us grain on credit. And he is trying to make it appear that we have in our ranks persons who are opposed to buying grain on credit just because of a mere whim or for some other inexplicable reasons.

This is all nonsense, comrades. It would be absurd to imagine that capitalists in the West have suddenly taken pity on us, that they are willing to give us tens of millions of poods of grain

practically free of charge or on very long-term credit. This is nonsense, comrades.

What are the actual facts? The actual facts are that for the past six months various capitalist groups have been probing our strength, probing our financial possibilities, our financial soundness, our endurance. They are approaching our commercial representatives in Paris, Czechoslovakia, America and Argentina with offers of grain on very short-term credit, not exceeding three, or, at the most, six months. Their object is not so much to sell us grain on credit, as to find out whether our situation is really very difficult, whether our financial possibilities are really exhausted, or, whether our financial position is solid, whether we are not apt to bite at the bait they have thrown out.

There is a heated debate going on now in capitalist countries on the subject of our financial possibilities. Some say that we are already bankrupt, and that the fall of Soviet power is a matter of but a few months, if not weeks. Others say that this is not true, that Soviet power is firmly rooted, has financial possibilities and sufficient grain.

At the present time our task is to hold out with firmness and fortitude, not to be tempted by deceptive offers of grain on credit, and to show the capitalist world that we will manage without importing grain. This is not just my personal opinion. This is the opinion of the majority of the Political Bureau.

For this reason we have decided to decline the offer of philanthropists of the Nansen type, to import into the U.S.S.R. 1,000,000 dollars' worth of grain on credit.

For the same reason we have answered in the negative to all those emissaries of the capitalist world in Paris, America and Czechoslovakia, who were offering us a small quantity of grain on credit.

For the very same reason we have decided to exercise the utmost economy in grain consumption, and a higher degree of efficiency in our grain-purchasing campaigns.

By doing this, we sought to achieve a twofold aim: on the one hand to do without importing grain and thus keep our foreign

currency assets for imports of equipment, and, on the other, to show our enemies that we stand on firm ground and will not be tempted by proffers of alms.

Was this policy correct? I believe that it was the only correct policy. It was correct not only because we found here, within our own country, new means of obtaining grain. It was correct, besides, because having managed without grain imports, and having brushed off the emissaries of the capitalist world, we have strengthened our international position, improved our financial standing and exploded all idle chatter regarding "the impending collapse" of Soviet power.

Some days ago we held certain preliminary talks with representatives of German capitalists. They are promising us a 500,000,000 credit, and it looks as though they actually realize the necessity of granting us a credit so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

A few days ago we had the visit of a delegation of British Conservatives who, too, realize the necessity of recognizing the stability of Soviet power and the expediency of granting us a credit so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

I believe that these new possibilities of obtaining credits, in the first place from the Germans, and then from one group of British capitalists, would not have materialized had we not shown the necessary degree of endurance I have spoken of earlier.

Consequently, the point is not that we are refusing some chimerical grain on chimerical long-term credit because of an alleged whim. The point is that we must be able to size up our enemies, to discern their actual motives, and be capable of such endurance as is necessary for the strengthening of our position in international affairs.

That, comrades, is the reason why we have decided to do without imports of grain.

As you see, the problem of grain imports is far from being as simple as Rykov would have us believe. The problem of grain imports is a matter that concerns our position in international affairs.

V

PROBLEMS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions relating to our differences in the sphere of theory as well as in the sphere of the policy of the Communist International and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Rykov's declaration concerning the existence of a *single* line does not correspond to the real state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent that actually we have not one, but *two* lines. One line, which is the general line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The other line, which is the line of Bukharin's group. This second line has not quite crystallized yet, partly because of the startling confusion of views which reigns within the ranks of Bukharin's group, and, partly, because owing to its insignificant role in the Party, it, this second line, tries to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, as you have seen this line exists, and it exists as a line which is *distinct* from the Party line, a line *opposed* to the general Party line on almost all questions of our policy. This second line is the line of *Right deviation*.

Let us now turn to the problems of Party leadership.

a) THE FACTIONALISM OF BUKHARIN'S GROUP

Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our Party, that the Bukharin group is not an opposition. This is not true, comrades. The debates at the Plenum have supplied ample evidence that Bukharin's group constitutes a new opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists in attempts to revise the Party line; this group seeks to reconsider the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, which is nothing but the line of the Right deviation.

Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute a factional group. This is untrue, comrades. Bukharin's group has

all the characteristics of a faction. It stands out with its own program, its factional secrecy, its policy of resigning, its organized struggle against the Central Committee. What more would you have? Why hide the truth about the factionalism of Bukharin's group, when it is self-evident? The very reason why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission have called this Plenary Meeting, was to tell all the truth about our differences. And the truth is, that Bukharin's is a factional group. And it is not just factional, but—I would venture to say—the most repulsive and the pettiest of all the factional groups that ever existed in our Party.

We have evidence of this if only from the fact that it is now attempting to take advantage for its factional aims of such an insignificant and petty affair as the trouble in Ajaria. Indeed, what does the so-called "revolt" in Ajaria amount to in comparison with the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that if we were to compare the two, then the "revolt" in Ajaria does not amount even to a drop in the ocean. Have there been any instances of Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be admitted, comrades, that there have been no such instances. Just the contrary, the opposition groups which existed at the time of this serious revolt helped the Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make use of it against the Party.

Well, and how is Bukharin's group acting now? You have already had evidence that it is attempting to utilize against the Party the microscopic "revolt" in Ajaria in the pettiest and most offensive way. What is this if not the most extreme degree of factional blindness and degeneration?

Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances should occur in our outlying districts which have common borders with capitalist countries. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy which would satisfy all classes of our society, the rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. Apparently, it is being demanded of

us that there should be no discontented elements. Have the comrades from Bukharin's group gone out of their minds by any chance?

How can anybody demand of us, of people who are furthering the proletarian dictatorship and carrying on the struggle against the capitalist world inside as well as outside of our country, that there should be no discontented elements in our country, and that disturbances should not sometimes occur in certain outlying regions which have common borders with hostile countries; how can anybody demand that of us? Why then is there a capitalist encirclement, if not to enable international capital to concentrate all its efforts on organizing demonstrations of discontented elements in our border districts against the Soviet regime? Who, except impotent liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people a typically liberal blindness and narrowmindedness?

b) LOYALTY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Rykov was trying to persuade us that Bukharin's attitude toward the Central Committee of our Party is that of a most "impeccable" and "loyal" Party member.

I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykov's word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to supply facts.

Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenev's group which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations about the setting up of a factional bloc, about changing the policy of the Central Committee, about changing the composition of the Political Bureau, about taking advantage of the crisis in grain purchasing for attacking the Central Committee. The question arises: where is Bukharin's "loyal" and "impeccable" attitude toward his Central Committee?

Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a *complete* violation of loyalty to his Central Committee, to his Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau? If this is called loyalty to

the Central Committee, then what is the word for betrayal of one's Central Committee?

Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty; but why should he not try to examine his own conscience and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most dishonest manner the basic rules of loyalty to his Central Committee when he conducts secret negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central Committee, thereby betraying his Central Committee?

Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and asserted that the rules of collective leadership were being violated by the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

Evidently our Plenum must bear with everything. It must even bear with this shameless, hypocritical assertion. A person must indeed have lost all sense of shame to make bold to speak in this way at the Plenum against the majority of the Central Committee.

In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership if a situation has developed where the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its forces to drive onward and is urging the Bukharin group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, and Bukharin's group is not only not helping its Central Committee, but on the contrary, is hampering it in every possible way, is thrusting spokes in its wheels, is threatening to resign, is coming to terms with enemies of the Party, with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, except hypocrites, can deny that Bukharin, who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Party, and who is betraying his Central Committee, does not want to and will not implement collective leadership in the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, except the blind, can fail to see that if Bukharin still chatters about collective leadership in the Central Committee—pointing an accusing finger at the majority of the Central Committee—he is doing this with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct.

It should be noted that this is not the first time that Bukharin has violated the basic rules of loyalty and collective leadership by his conduct toward the Central Committee of the Party. The history of our Party knows of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, in the period of the Brest Litovsk peace, Bukharin, being in the minority on the question of peace, was busily canvassing the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were the enemies of our Party, and was secretly negotiating with them and was attempting to set up a bloc with them against Lenin and the Central Committee. What agreement he was trying to reach at the time with Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—we, unfortunately, do not know to this day. But we do know that at the time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were planning to imprison Lenin and overthrow the Soviet regime.... But the most amazing thing is that while he was busily canvassing the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and was conspiring with them against the Central Committee, Bukharin continued, just as he is doing now, to clamour about the necessity of collective leadership.

The history of our Party knows too of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, Bukharin, who had behind him the majority in the Moscow Regional Committee of our Party and the support of a group of "Left" Communists, was urging all the Party members to give a vote of no confidence to the Central Committee of the Party, refuse to submit to its decisions and raise the question of splitting the Party. That was during the Brest Litovsk peace, after the Central Committee had already decided that it was necessary to accept the peace terms of Brest Litovsk.

These are the facts about Bukharin's loyalty and collective leadership.

Rykov spoke here about the necessity of a collective system of work. At the same time he pointed an accusing finger at the majority of the Political Bureau, asserting that he and his close friends are in favour of the collective system of work, while the majority of the Political Bureau are against it. However, Rykov was unable to cite a single fact in support of his assertion.

Just for the sake of refuting this false assertion, let me cite a

few facts, a few examples which will show you how Rykov adheres to the collective system of work.

First example. You heard the story about the export of gold to America. Many of you may believe that this gold was shipped to America by decision of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee, or with the consent of the Central Committee, or with its knowledge. Yet this is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have not been in any way involved in this business. There is a ruling which prohibits the export of gold without the approval of the Central Committee. But this ruling has been violated. Who was it that authorized the shipment? It so happens that this shipment of gold was authorized by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is this what we call the collective system of work?

Second example. This concerns negotiations with a big American bank whose property was nationalized after the October Revolution, and which now is demanding that we should indemnify it for its losses. The Central Committee has learned that an official of our State Bank has been discussing with that bank terms of indemnification.

Settlement of private claims is, as you are aware, a very important question inseparably connected with our foreign policy. One might think that these negotiations were initiated with the approval of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee. Yet, this is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have not been in any way involved in this business. Subsequently, upon learning about these negotiations, the Central Committee decided to stop them. But still, a question arises: Who authorized these negotiations? It so happens that they were authorized by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is this what we call the collective system of work?

Third example. This concerns the supplying of agricultural machinery to kulaks and middle peasants. The point is that the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R., which is under the chairmanship of

one of Rykov's deputies for the R.S.F.S.R., has decided to *reduce* the deliveries of farm machinery to the middle peasants and *increase* the deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry, i.e., to the kulaks. Here is the text of this anti-Party, anti-Soviet ruling of the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.:

"In the Kazakh and Bashkir A.S.S.R., the Siberian and Lower Volga territories, the Middle Volga and Urals regions, the proportion of deliveries of farm machinery set forth in this paragraph shall be *increased* by 20% for the upper strata of the peasantry and *decreased* by 30% for the middle peasants."

There you have it: at a time when the Party is intensifying the offensive against the kulaks and is organizing the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks, the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R. passes a decision to *reduce* the volume of deliveries of farm machinery to the middle peasants and *increase* the volume of deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry.

And it is suggested that this is a Leninist, communist policy.

Subsequently, when the Central Committee learned about this incident, it annulled the decision of the EKOSO. But who was it that authorized this anti-Soviet ruling? It was authorized by one of Rykov's deputies, with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is this what we call a collective system of work?

I believe that these examples supply sufficient evidence of the way Rykov and his deputies practise the collective system of work.

c) THE FIGHT AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATION

Bukharin spoke here of the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, "were being picked to pieces" by the organizations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three members of the Political Bureau—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—to "civil execution" by criticizing their errors in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were "compelled" to keep silent.

That is nonsense, comrades. These are the false words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its

fight against the Right deviation. According to Bukharin, even though he and his friends have become entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose these mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it will please Bukharin and his friends to abandon their mistakes.

Is not Bukharin asking too much? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilized against the Right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this, after all not so difficult, step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky are "absent" in the fight against the Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the "civil execution" of the three members of the Political Bureau is a poorly concealed attempt on the part of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the Right deviation?

The fight against the Right deviation must not be regarded as a secondary duty of our Party. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive duties of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward—if we in this General Staff should tolerate the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviationists, who are trying to demobilize the Party, to demoralize the working class, to adapt our policy to the tastes of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our socialist construction—if we should tolerate all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we want to send the revolution

downhill, demoralize our socialist construction, flee from difficulties, surrender our positions to the capitalist elements?

Does Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution?

Does Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?

Compared with this, what is the value of this pitiful talk about the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau?

No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the Party with liberal chatter about "civil execution." The Party demands that they should wage a determined struggle against the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands this of the Bukharin group in order to help to mobilize the working class, to break down the resistance of the class enemies and to make sure that the difficulties of our socialist construction will be overcome.

Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or they will not, in which case they will have only themselves to blame.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

And now to conclude.

I am submitting the following proposals:

1. We must first of all condemn the views of the Bukharin group. We must condemn the views of this group as set forth in the declarations and speeches of its individual members, and clearly state that such views are incompatible with the Party line and fully coincide with the position of the Right deviation.

2. We must condemn the secret negotiations of Bukharin with Kamenev's group as a particularly striking example of the disloyalty and factionalism of Bukharin's group.

3. We must condemn the policy of resigning that was being practised by Bukharin and Tomsky, as a gross violation of the basic rules of Party discipline.

4. Bukharin and Tomsky must be relieved from their posts and warned that in the event of the slightest attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central Committee, the latter will be forced to exclude them both from the Political Bureau.

5. We must take appropriate measures forbidding individual members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, when speaking publicly, to deviate in any way from the line of the Party and the decisions of the Central Committee or of its bodies.

6. We must take appropriate measures so that press organs, both Party and Soviet, newspapers as well as periodicals, should fully conform to the line of the Party and the decisions of its leading bodies.

7. We must adopt special provisions, including even exclusion from the Central Committee and from the Party, for persons who attempt to violate the confidential nature of the decisions of the Party, its Central Committee and Political Bureau.

8. We must distribute the text of the resolution of the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission concerning the internal questions of the Party to all the local Party organizations and to the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Conference, without publishing it in the press for the time being.

I believe such should be the way out of this situation.

Some comrades insist that Bukharin and Tomsky should be immediately excluded from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. I cannot agree with these comrades. I believe that for the time being we can do without resorting to such extreme measures.

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE

*On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary
of the October Revolution*

The past year witnessed a great *change* on all fronts of socialist construction. The change expressed itself, and is still expressing itself, in a determined *offensive* of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already brought us a number of decisive *successes* in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction of our national economy.

We may, therefore, conclude that our Party has made good use of the retreat effected during the first stages of the New Economic Policy in order to organize the *change* in the subsequent stages and to launch a *successful offensive* against the capitalist elements.

When the NEP was introduced Lenin said:

"We are now retreating, going back, as it were; but we are doing this, retreating first, in order to prepare for a longer leap forward. It was only on this condition that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy ... in order to start a resolute advance after our retreat." (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62.)

The results of the past year show beyond a doubt that in its work the Party is successfully carrying out this decisive advice of Lenin.

* * *

If we take the results of the past year in the sphere of economic construction, which is of decisive importance for us, we will find that the *successes* of our offensive on this front, our *achievements* during the past year, may be summed up under three main heads.

I

IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR

There can hardly be any doubt that one of the most important facts in our construction during the past year is that we have succeeded in bringing about a *decisive change* in the sphere of productivity of labour. This change has found expression in a growth of the *creative initiative* and intense *labour enthusiasm* of the vast masses of the working class on the front of socialist construction. This is our first fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The growth of the creative initiative and labour enthusiasm of the masses has been stimulated by three main factors:

- a) the fight—by means of *self-criticism*—against bureaucracy, which shackles the labour initiative and labour activity of the masses;
- b) the fight—by means of *socialist emulation*—against the labour-shirkers and disrupters of proletarian labour discipline;
- c) the fight—by the introduction of the *uninterrupted week**—against routine and inertia in industry.

As a result we have a tremendous achievement on the labour front in the form of labour enthusiasm and emulation among the millions of the working class in all parts of our vast country. The significance of this achievement is truly inestimable, for only the labour enthusiasm and zeal of the millions can guarantee the progressive increase of labour productivity without which the final victory of socialism over capitalism in our country is inconceivable.

"In the last analysis," says Lenin, "productivity of labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of the new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. Capitalism

* The arrangement of work at an enterprise or institution in such a way that all workers or employees get a day off every fifth day but not all of them on the same day so that the enterprise or institution as a whole works without interruption.—Tr.

can be utterly vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that socialism creates a new and much higher productivity of labour." (Vol. XXIV, p. 342.)

Proceeding from this Lenin considered that:

"We must become imbued with the labour enthusiasm, the will to work, the persistence upon which the early salvation of the workers and peasants, the salvation of the national economy now depends. (Vol. XXV, p. 477.)

That is the task Lenin set our Party.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully carrying out this task and is resolutely overcoming the obstacles that stand in its path.

Such is the position regarding our Party's first important achievement during the past year.

II

IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Inseparably connected with the first achievement of the Party is its second achievement. This second achievement of the Party consists in the fact that during the past year we have in the main successfully solved the *problem of accumulation* for capital construction in heavy industry; we have *accelerated* the development of the production of means of production and have created the prerequisites for transforming our country into a *metal* country.

This is our second fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The problem of light industry presents no exceptional difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important.

It is *more difficult* because its solution demands colossal investments, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot be developed without huge long-term loans.

It is *more important* because, unless we develop heavy industry, we can build no industry whatever, we cannot carry out any industrialization.

And as we have never received, nor are we receiving, either long-term loans or credits, the acuteness of the problem becomes more than obvious.

It is precisely for this reason that the capitalists of all countries refuse us loans and credits, for they assume that, left to our own resources, we cannot cope with the problem of accumulation, that we are bound to fail in the task of reconstructing our heavy industry, and will at last be compelled to come to them cap in hand and sell ourselves into bondage.

But what conclusions can be drawn from the results of our work during the past year? The significance of the results of the past year lies in the fact that they have completely shattered the anticipations of Messieurs the capitalists.

The past year has shown that in spite of the open and covert financial blockade of the U.S.S.R. we did not sell ourselves into bondage to the capitalists; that, with our own resources, we successfully solved the problem of accumulation and laid the foundation for heavy industry. Even the most inveterate enemies of the working class cannot deny this now.

Indeed, since, in the first place, capital investments in large-scale industry last year amounted to over 1,600,000,000 rubles (of which about 1,300,000,000 rubles were invested in heavy industry), and capital investments in large-scale industry this year will amount to over 3,400,000,000 rubles (of which over 2,500,000,000 rubles will be invested in heavy industry); and since, in the second place, the gross output of large-scale industry last year showed an increase of 23 per cent, including a 30 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry, and the increase in the gross output of large-scale industry this year should be 32 per cent, including a 46 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry—is it not obvious that the problem of accumulation for the building up of heavy industry no longer presents insuperable difficulties?

How can anyone doubt that in developing our heavy industry, we are advancing at an accelerated pace, exceeding our former speed and leaving behind our "traditional" backwardness?

Is it surprising after this that the estimates of the five-year plan were exceeded during the past year, and that the *optimum* variant of the five-year plan, which the bourgeois scribes regarded as "wild fantasy," and which horrified our Right opportunists (Bukharin's group), has actually turned out to be a *minimum* variant?

"The salvation of Russia," says Lenin, "lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—this, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry.... Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without heavy industry we shall be doomed as an independent country.... Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we cannot provide them, then we are doomed as a civilized state—let alone as a socialist state." (Vol. XXVII, p. 349.)

These are the blunt terms in which Lenin formulated the problem of accumulation and the task of our Party in building up heavy industry.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task, resolutely overcoming all obstacles in its path.

This does not mean, of course, that industry will not encounter any more serious difficulties. The task of building up heavy industry involves not only the problem of accumulation. It also involves the problem of cadres, the problem

a) of *enlisting* tens of thousands of Soviet-minded technicians and experts for the work of socialist construction, and

b) of *training* new Red technicians and Red experts from among the working class.

While the problem of accumulation may in the main be regarded as solved, the problem of cadres still awaits solution. And the problem of cadres is now—when we are engaged in the

technical reconstruction of industry—the key problem of socialist construction.

"What we chiefly lack," says Lenin, "is culture, administrative ability.... Economically and politically the *New Economic Policy* ensures us every possibility of building the foundations of socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of educated forces of the proletariat and its vanguard." (Vol. XXVII, p. 207.)

It is obvious that Lenin refers here primarily to the problem of "educated forces," the problem of the cadres required for economic construction in general, and for the building and management of industry in particular.

But from this it follows that, in spite of important achievements in the sphere of accumulation, which is of vital significance for heavy industry, the problem of building heavy industry cannot be regarded as fully solved until we have solved the problem of cadres.

Hence, it is the duty of our Party to grapple with the problem of cadres in all seriousness and to conquer this fortress at all costs.

Such is the position regarding our Party's second achievement during the past year.

III

IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURAL CONSTRUCTION

Finally, about the third achievement of our Party during the past year, an achievement organically connected with the two former achievements. I have in mind the *radical change* that has taken place in the development of our agriculture from small, backward, *individual* farming to large-scale, advanced *collective* agriculture, to cultivation of the land in common, to machine-and-tractor stations, to artels or collective farms based on modern technique, and, finally, to giant state farms, equipped with hundreds of tractors and harvester combines.

The achievement of the Party in this field consists in the fact that we have succeeded in *turning* the bulk of the peasantry in a large number of regions away from the old, *capitalist* path of development—which benefited only a small group of the rich, the capitalists, while the vast majority of the peasants were doomed to ruin and utter poverty—to the new *socialist* path of development, which squeezes out the rich, the capitalists, and arms the middle and poor peasants with modern equipment, with modern implements, with tractors and agricultural machinery, thus enabling them to climb out of poverty and bondage to the kulaks on to the highroad of cooperative, collective cultivation of the land.

The achievement of the Party consists in the fact that we have succeeded in bringing about this *radical change* within the masses of the peasantry and in having secured the following of the broad masses of the poor and middle peasants in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the desperate resistance of all the retrograde forces, from kulaks and priests to philistines and Right opportunists.

Here are a few figures.

In 1928, the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,425,000 hectares with a grain output for the market of more than 6,000,000 centners (over 36,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 1,390,000 hectares with a grain output for the market of about 3,500,000 centners (over 20,000,000 poods).

In 1929 the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,816,000 hectares with a grain output for the market of about 8,000,000 centners (nearly 47,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 4,262,000 hectares with a grain output for the market of about 13,000,000 centners (nearly 78,000,000 poods).

In the coming year, 1930, according to the plan, the crop area of the state farms will probably amount to 3,280,000 hectares with a grain output of 18,000,000 centners (approximately 110,000,000 poods) available for the market, and the crop area of the collective farms will certainly amount to 15,000,000 hec-

tares with a grain output of 49,000,000 centners (approximately 300,000,000 poods) available for the market.

In other words, in the coming year, 1930, the grain output of the state farms and collective farms available for the market will amount to over 400,000,000 poods or more than 50 per cent of the marketable grain output of the *whole* of agriculture (grain sold outside of the rural districts).

It must be admitted that such an impetuous speed of development is *unequalled* even in our socialized, large-scale industry, which in general is noted for the outstanding speed of its development.

It is obvious that our young large-scale socialist agriculture (the collective farms and state farms) has a great future before it and that its development will be truly miraculous.

This unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to a variety of causes, of which the following at least should be mentioned.

It is due, *first of all*, to the fact that our Party carried out Lenin's policy of educating the masses by consistently leading the masses of the peasantry up to collective farming through the spread of the cooperative movement. It is due also to the fact that the Party waged a successful struggle against those who tried to run ahead of the movement and force the development of collective farming by means of decrees (the "Left" phrasemongers) as well as against those who tried to drag the Party back and remain at the tail end of the movement (the Right blockheads). Had it not pursued such a policy the Party would not have been able to transform the collective-farm movement into a real mass movement of the peasantry.

"When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realized that our constructive work would encounter greater difficulties in the countryside; that here one must proceed more gradually; that to attempt to introduce common cultivation of the land by decrees and legislation would be the height of folly; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We,

therefore, confined ourselves to that which was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the revolution, namely, in no case to endeavour to outrun the development of the masses, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggles, a progressive movement grew up." (Vol. XXIII, p. 252.)

The reason why the Party achieved a great victory on the front of collective-farm development is that in regard to tactics it followed to the letter this advice of Lenin.

Secondly, this unprecedented success in agricultural construction is due to the fact that the Soviet government paid proper heed to the growing needs of the peasants for new implements, for modern technique; it correctly recognized that the old methods of farming leave the peasantry in a hopeless position and, having taken all this into account, it came to their aid in good time by organizing machine-hiring stations, tractor columns and machine-and-tractor stations; by organizing common cultivation of the land, by establishing collective farms, and finally, by having the state farms give every assistance to peasant farming.

For the first time in the history of mankind a government appeared, the government of the Soviets, which has proved by deeds its readiness and ability to give systematic and lasting assistance to the labouring masses of the peasantry in the sphere of *production*.

Is it not obvious that the masses of labouring peasants, suffering, as they do, from a long lack of equipment were bound to reach out eagerly at this assistance and join the collective-farm movement?

And it will not be surprising if henceforth the old slogan of the workers, "face to the village," will, as it seems likely, be supplemented by the new slogan of the collective-farm peasants, "face to the town."

Finally, this unprecedented success in collective-farm development is due to the fact that the matter was taken in hand by the advanced workers of our country. I refer to the workers' brigades, tens and hundreds of which are scattered in the principal regions

of our country. It must be acknowledged that of all existing and potential propagandists of the collective-farm movement among the peasant masses, the worker propagandists are the best. What is there surprising in the fact that the workers have succeeded in convincing the peasants of the advantages of large-scale collective farming over individual small farming, the more so as the existing collective farms and state farms are striking examples of these advantages?

Such was the basis for our achievement in collective-farm development, an achievement which, in my opinion, is the most important and decisive of all our achievements in recent years.

All the arguments of "science" against the possibility and expediency of creating large grain factories of 40,000 to 50,000 hectares each have collapsed and crumbled into dust. Practice has refuted the objections of "science," and has once again shown that not only has practice to learn from "science" but that "science" also would do well to learn from practice.

Large grain factories do not take root in capitalist countries. But ours is a socialist country. This "slight" difference must not be overlooked.

In capitalist countries large grain factories cannot be organized, for there exists private ownership of land, and the organization of such grain factories would entail the purchase of quite a number of plots of land or the payment of absolute ground rent, which would necessarily impose a heavy burden on production. In our country, on the other hand, neither absolute ground rent, nor the sale and purchase of land exist, for in our country there is no private ownership of land, and this necessarily creates favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

In capitalist countries the purpose of large-scale farming is to obtain the maximum of profit, or, at all events, obtain a profit equal to the so-called average rate of profit, failing which, in fact, there would be no incentive to invest capital in grain production. In our country, on the contrary, the large grain farms,

which are state enterprises, need neither a maximum of profit, nor the average rate of profit for their development; they can limit themselves to a minimum of profit, and sometimes even forego profits altogether, which again creates favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Finally, under capitalism large grain farms do not enjoy special credit privileges or special taxation privileges, whereas under the Soviet system, which is designed to support the socialist sector, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

Esteemed "science" forgot all this.

The assertions of the Right opportunists (Bukharin's group) that

a) the peasants would not join the collective farms;

b) the speedy development of collective farming would only arouse mass discontent and drive a wedge between the peasantry and the working class;

c) the "highroad" of socialist development in the rural districts is *not* the collective farms, *but* the cooperative societies;

d) the development of collective farming and the offensive against the capitalist elements in the rural districts may deprive the country of grain altogether.

All these assertions have collapsed and crumbled to dust as old bourgeois-liberal rubbish.

Firstly, the peasants have joined the collective farms; they have joined in whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts.

Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement is not weakening the bond, but, on the contrary, is strengthening it by putting it on a new, production basis. Now even the blind can see that if there is any serious dissatisfaction among the great bulk of the peasantry it is not because of the collective-farm policy of the Soviet government, but because the Soviet government is unable to keep pace with the growth of the collective-farm movement in supplying the peasants with machines and tractors.

Thirdly, the controversy about the "highroad" of socialist development in the rural districts is a scholastic controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals of the type of Eichen-

wald and Slepkov. It is obvious that, as long as there was no mass collective-farm movement, the "highroad" was the lower forms of the cooperative movement—supply and marketing cooperatives; but when the higher form of the cooperative movement—the collective farm—appeared, the latter became the "highroad" of development.

The highroad (without quotation marks) of socialist development in the rural districts is Lenin's cooperative plan, which embraces all forms of agricultural cooperation, from the lowest (supply and marketing) to the highest (productive collective farms). To contrast collective farms to cooperative societies is to make a mockery of Leninism and to acknowledge one's own ignorance.

Fourthly, now even the blind can see that without the offensive against the capitalist elements in the rural districts, and without the development of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we would not have achieved the decisive successes of this year in the matter of grain purchases nor could the state have accumulated, as it already has done, an emergency reserve of grain totalling tens of millions of poods.

Moreover, it can now be confidently asserted that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective farms and state farms is accelerated, there is not the slightest ground for doubt that in about three years' time our country will be one of the world's largest grain producers, if not the largest.

What is the *new* feature of the present collective-farm movement? The new and decisive feature of the present collective-farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, as was formerly the case, but in whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts, and even whole areas.

And what does that mean? It means that *the middle peasant has joined the collective-farm movement*. And that is the basis of the radical change in the development of agriculture which represents

the most important achievement of the Soviet power during the past year.

Trotskyism's Menshevik "conception" that the working class is incapable of leading the great bulk of the peasantry in the work of socialist construction is collapsing and being smashed to smithereens. Now even the blind can see that the middle peasant has turned towards the collective farm. Now it is obvious to all that the five-year plan of industry and agriculture is a five-year plan of building a socialist society, that those who do not believe in the possibility of building socialism in our country have no right to greet our five-year plan.

The last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.—"the sacred principle of private property"—is collapsing and crumbling to dust. Large masses of peasants, whom they regarded as material that would fertilize the soil for capitalism, are abandoning the lauded banner of "private property" and are taking to the path of collectivism, the path of socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is crumbling.

This, by the way, explains the desperate efforts of the capitalist elements in our country to rouse all the forces of the old world against advancing socialism—efforts which have led to the intensification of the class struggle. Capital does not want "to grow into" socialism.

This also explains the furious howl against Bolshevism which has been raised recently by the watchdogs of capital, by the Struves, Hessens, Milyukovs, Kerenskys, Dans, Abramoviches and their ilk. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is disappearing—that is no joke for them.

There is no other explanation for the violent rage of our class enemies and the frenzied howling of the lackeys of capital except the fact that our Party has actually achieved a decisive victory on the most difficult front of socialist construction.

"Only if we succeed," said Lenin, "in proving to the peasants in practice the advantages of common, collective, cooperative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of cooperative or

artel farming, will the working class, which holds the state power, be really able to convince the peasant of the correctness of its policy and to secure the real and durable following of the millions of peasants." (Vol. XXIV, p. 579.)

That is how Lenin put the question as to the ways of winning the millions of peasants to the side of the working class, of the methods of transferring the peasants to the path of collective-farm construction.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task and is resolutely overcoming every obstacle standing in its path.

"In a communist society," said Lenin, "the middle peasants will be on our side only when we alleviate and ameliorate their economic conditions. If tomorrow we could supply 100,000 first-class tractors, provide them with fuel, provide them with drivers—you know very well that this at present is sheer fantasy—the middle peasant would say: 'I am for the *kommunia*' (i.e., for communism). But in order to do that we must first defeat the international bourgeoisie, we must compel them to give us these tractors, or so develop our productive forces as to be able to provide them ourselves. That is the only correct way to pose this question." (Vol. XXIV, p. 170.)

That is how Lenin put the question as to the ways and means of arming the middle peasant with modern technique, of winning him to the side of communism.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully coping with this task too. We know that by the spring of the coming year, 1930, we shall have over 60,000 tractors in the fields, a year later we shall have over 100,000 tractors, and two years after, over 250,000 tractors. We are now able to accomplish and even to exceed what was considered "fantasy" several years ago.

And that is why the middle peasant has turned towards the "*kommunia*."

Such is the position with regard to our Party's third achievement.

Such are the fundamental achievements of our Party during the past year.

CONCLUSIONS

We are advancing full steam ahead along the path of industrialization—to socialism, leaving behind the agelong “Russian” backwardness.

We are becoming a country of metal, a country of automobiles, a country of tractors.

And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the esteemed capitalists, who boast so much of their “civilization,” try to overtake us! We shall see which countries may then be “classified” as backward and which as advanced.

November 3, 1929

Pravda, No. 259,
November 7, 1929

PROBLEMS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R.

*Speech Delivered at the Conference of Marxist
Students of the Agrarian Question
December 27, 1929*

Comrades! The main fact of our social and economic life at the present time, a fact which is attracting general attention, is the enormous growth of the collective-farm movement.

The characteristic feature of the present collective-farm movement is that not only are separate groups of poor peasants joining the collective farms, as has been the case hitherto, but that the mass of the middle peasants are also joining the collective farms. This means that the collective-farm movement has been transformed from a movement of separate groups and sections of the labouring peasants into a movement of millions and millions of the bulk of the peasantry. This, by the way, explains the tremendously important fact that the collective-farm movement, which has assumed the character of a mighty and growing *antikulak* avalanche, is sweeping the resistance of the kulak from its path, is shattering the kulak class and clearing the road for extensive socialist construction in the rural districts.

But while we have reason to be proud of the *practical* successes achieved in socialist construction, the same cannot be said with regard to our *theoretical* work in the sphere of economics in general, and of agriculture in particular. Moreover, it must be admitted that theoretical thought is not keeping pace with our practical successes, that there is a certain gap between our practical successes and the development of theoretical thought. Yet our theoretical work must not only keep pace with practical work but must keep ahead of it and equip our practical workers for their fight for the victory of socialism.

I will not dwell at length here on the importance of theory. You are well aware of its importance. You know that theory, pro-

viding it is genuine theory, gives practical workers the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in their work, faith in the victory of our cause. All this is, and necessarily must be, immensely important in our work of socialist construction. The unfortunate thing is that we are beginning to limp precisely in this sphere, in the sphere of the elaboration of the theoretical problems of our economy.

How else can we explain the fact that in our social and political life various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories on problems of our economy are still current? How can we explain the fact that these theories and would-be theories are not yet meeting with a proper rebuff? How can we explain the fact that a number of fundamental theses of Marxist-Leninist political economy, which are the most effective antidote to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, are beginning to be forgotten, are not popularized in our press, are for some reason not placed in the foreground? Is it so difficult to understand that unless a merciless fight against bourgeois theories is carried on on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, it will be impossible to achieve complete victory over our class enemies?

The new practice is giving rise to a new approach to the problems of the economy of the transition period. The problems of the New Economic Policy, of classes, of the rate of construction, of the bond with the peasantry, of Party policy, are now presented in a new way. If we are not to lag behind practice we must immediately begin to work on all these problems in the light of the new situation. Unless we do this it will be impossible to overcome the bourgeois theories which are clogging the minds of our practical workers. Unless we do this it will be impossible to eradicate these theories which are acquiring the tenacity of prejudices. For only by combating bourgeois prejudices in the field of theory is it possible to consolidate the position of Marxism-Leninism.

Permit me now to characterize at least a few of these bourgeois prejudices which are called theories, and to demonstrate their unsoundness in the light of certain cardinal problems of our construction.

I

THE THEORY OF "EQUILIBRIUM"

You know, of course, that the so-called theory of the "equilibrium" between the sectors of our national economy is still current among Communists. This theory has, of course, nothing in common with Marxism. Nevertheless, this theory is advocated by a number of people in the camp of the Right deviators.

This theory is based on the assumption that to begin with we have a socialist sector—which is one compartment, as it were—and that in addition we also have a nonsocialist or, if you like, capitalist sector—which is another compartment. These two "compartments" move on different rails and glide peacefully forward, without touching each other. Geometry teaches that parallel lines do not meet. But the authors of this remarkable theory believe that these parallel lines will meet eventually, and that when they do, we will have socialism. This theory overlooks the fact that behind these so-called "compartments" there are classes, and that these compartments move as a result of a fierce class struggle, a life-and-death struggle, a struggle on the principle of "who will win?"

It is not difficult to see that this theory has nothing in common with Leninism. It is not difficult to see that, objectively, the purpose of this theory is to defend the position of individual peasant farming, to arm the kulak elements with a "new" theoretical weapon in their struggle against the collective farms, and to destroy confidence in the collective farms.

Nevertheless, this theory is still current in our press. And it cannot be said that it is meeting with a serious rebuff, let alone a crushing rebuff, on the part of our theoreticians. How can this incongruity be explained except by the backwardness of our theoretical thought?

And yet, all that is needed is to take from the treasury of Marxism the theory of reproduction and set it up against the theory of the equilibrium of the sectors, and it will wipe out the latter without leaving a trace of it. Indeed, the Marxian theory of

reproduction teaches that modern society cannot develop without accumulating from year to year; and accumulation is impossible unless there is expanded reproduction from year to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our large-scale, centralized, socialist industry is developing according to the Marxian theory of expanded reproduction; for it is growing in volume from year to year, it has its accumulations and is advancing with seven-league strides:

But our large-scale industry does not constitute the whole of our national economy. On the contrary, small-peasant farming still predominates in our national economy. Can we say that our small-peasant farming is developing according to the principle of expanded reproduction? No, we cannot. Not only is there no annual expanded reproduction in the bulk of our small-peasant farming, but, on the contrary, it is seldom able to achieve even simple reproduction. Can we advance our socialized industry at an accelerated rate as long as we have an agricultural base, such as is provided by small-peasant farming, which is incapable of expanded reproduction, and which, in addition, is the predominant force in our national economy? No, we cannot. Can Soviet power and the work of socialist construction rest for any length of time on two *different* foundations: on the most large-scale and concentrated socialist industry, and the most scattered and backward, small-commodity peasant farming? No, they cannot. Sooner or later this would be bound to end in the complete collapse of the whole national economy.

What, then, is the solution? The solution lies in enlarging the agricultural units, in making agriculture capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus transforming the agricultural basis of our national economy.

But how are the agricultural units to be enlarged?

There are two ways of doing this. There is the *capitalist* way, which is to enlarge the agricultural units by introducing capitalism in agriculture—a way which leads to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. We reject this way as incompatible with the Soviet economic system.

There is a second way: the *socialist* way, which is to introduce collective farms and state farms in agriculture, the way which leads to the amalgamation of the small-peasant farms into large collective farms, employing machinery and scientific methods of farming, and capable of developing further, for such agricultural enterprises can achieve expanded reproduction.

And so, the question stands as follows: either one way or the other, either *back*—to capitalism, or *forward*—to socialism. There is no third way, nor can there be.

The “equilibrium” theory is an attempt to indicate a third way. And precisely because it is based on a third (nonexistent) way, it is utopian and anti-Marxian.

You see, therefore, that all that was needed was to set up Marx's theory of reproduction against this theory of “equilibrium” between the sectors, and it has wiped out the latter without leaving a trace of it.

Why, then, do our Marxist students of the agrarian question not do this? In whose interest is it that the ridiculous theory of “equilibrium” should have currency in our press while the Marxian theory of reproduction is consigned to oblivion?

II

THE THEORY OF “SPONTANEITY” IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Let us now take the second prejudice in political economy, the second bourgeois type of theory. I have in mind the theory of “spontaneity” in socialist construction—a theory which has nothing in common with Marxism, but which is being zealously advocated by our comrades from the Right camp.

The authors of this theory assert approximately the following: There was a time when capitalism existed in our country, industry developed on a capitalist basis, and the rural districts followed the capitalist town automatically, spontaneously, changing in the image of the capitalist town. Since *this* is what happened under capitalism, why should it not happen under the Soviet

economic system as well, why should not the rural districts, small-peasant farming, automatically follow the socialist town and change spontaneously in the image of the socialist town? On these grounds the authors of this theory assert that the rural districts can follow the socialist town spontaneously. Hence, the question arises: Is it worth our while bothering about organizing state farms and collective farms; is it worth while breaking lances over this if the rural districts can follow the socialist town without our interference?

Here you have another theory which, objectively, seeks to supply the capitalist elements in rural districts with a new weapon for their struggle against the collective farms.

The anti-Marxian nature of this theory is beyond all doubt.

Is it not odd that our theoreticians have not yet taken the trouble to explode this queer theory which is clogging the minds of our practical workers on the collective farms?

There is no doubt that the leading role of the socialist town in relation to the countryside where individual small-peasant farming predominates, is of great and inestimable value. It is indeed upon this that the role of industry in transforming agriculture is based. But is this factor sufficient to cause the countryside where small-peasant farming predominates, to follow spontaneously the towns in socialist construction? No, it is not sufficient.

Under capitalism the countryside followed the towns spontaneously because capitalist economy in the towns and the individual small-commodity economy of the peasant are, basically, economies of *the same type*. Of course, small-peasant commodity economy is not yet capitalist economy. But it is, basically, the same type of economy as capitalist economy, for it rests on the private ownership of the means of production. Lenin was a thousand times right when, in his notes on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, he referred to the "commodity-capitalist tendency of the peasantry" as opposed to the "*socialist* tendency of the proletariat."* This explains why "small production engenders

* Lenin's italics.—J. St.

capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale." (*Lenin.*)

Would it be right to say that basically small-commodity peasant economy is the same type of economy as socialist production in the towns? Obviously, it would not, unless we break with Marxism. Otherwise Lenin would not have said that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism."

Consequently, the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction is a rotten anti-Leninist theory.

Consequently, in order that the countryside, where small-peasant farming predominates, may follow the socialist town, it is necessary, apart from everything else, to *introduce* in the countryside large-scale socialist farming in the form of state farms and collective farms as the base of socialism, which—with the socialist town in the lead—will be able to *draw in their wake* the bulk of the peasantry.

Consequently, the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction is an anti-Marxian theory. The socialist town can *lead* the countryside in which small-peasant farming predominates, only by *introducing* collective farms and state farms and by transforming the countryside after a new socialist pattern.

It is odd that the anti-Marxian theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction has not yet met with a proper rebuff from our agrarian theoreticians.

III

THE THEORY OF THE "STABILITY" OF SMALL-PEASANT FARMING

Let us now take the third prejudice in political economy, the theory of the "stability" of small-peasant farming. Everybody is familiar with the argument of bourgeois political economy that the well-known Marxian thesis on the advantages of large-scale production over small production applies only to industry, and

not to agriculture. Social-Democratic theoreticians like David and Herz, who advocate this theory, have tried to "base" their arguments on the fact that the small peasant has endurance and patience, that he is ready to bear every hardship so as to hold on to his little plot of land, and that, as a consequence, small-peasant farming displays stability in the struggle against large-scale production in agriculture.

It is not difficult to see that this kind of "stability" is worse than any instability. It is not difficult to see that this anti-Marxian theory has only one aim: to eulogize and strengthen the capitalist system which is bringing ruin to millions of small peasants. And it is precisely because this theory pursues this aim that it has been so easy for Marxists to shatter it.

But this is not the point just now. The point is that our practice, our reality, is providing new arguments against this theory, whereas our theoreticians, strangely enough, either will not, or cannot, make use of this new weapon against the enemies of the working class. I have in mind our practice in abolishing private ownership of land, our practice in nationalizing the land, our practice which liberates the small peasant from his slavish attachment to his little plot of land and thereby helps the change from *small-peasant farming* to *large-scale collective farming*.

Indeed, what is it that has tied, still ties and will continue to tie the small peasant of Western Europe to his small-commodity farming? Primarily, and mainly, the fact that he owns his little plot of land, the existence of private ownership of land. For years he saved up money in order to buy a little plot of land; he bought it, and of course he does not want to part with it, preferring to endure any privation, preferring to sink into barbarism and abject poverty rather than part with his little plot of land, the basis of his individual farm.

Can it be said that this factor, in this form, continues to operate in our country under the Soviet system, too? No, it cannot be said. It cannot be said because there is no private ownership of land in our country. And precisely because there is no private ownership of land in our country, our peasants do not display

that slavish attachment to a plot of land which is prevalent in the West. And this circumstance cannot but help to effect the change from small-peasant farming to collective farming.

This is one of the reasons why the *big* farms, the collective farms in our country, where the land is nationalized, are able so easily to demonstrate their *superiority* over the *small-peasant* farms.

This is the great revolutionary significance of the Soviet agrarian laws which abolished absolute rent, abolished the private ownership of land and decreed the nationalization of the land.

But it follows from this that we now have at our command a new argument against the bourgeois economists who proclaim the stability of small-peasant farming in its struggle against large-scale farming.

Why, then, is this new argument not sufficiently utilized by our agrarian theoreticians in their struggle against all and sundry bourgeois theories?

When we nationalized the land we proceeded, as a matter of fact, from the theoretical premises laid down in the third volume of *Capital*, in Marx's well-known book, *Theories of Surplus Value*, and in Lenin's works on the agrarian problem which represent an extremely rich treasury of theoretical thought. I am referring to the theory of ground rent in general, and the theory of absolute ground rent in particular. It is now clear that the theoretical principles laid down in these works have been brilliantly confirmed by practice in our work of socialist construction in town and country.

One can only wonder why the antiscientific theories of "Soviet" economists like Chayanov should have currency in our press, while Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's works of genius dealing with the theory of ground rent and absolute ground rent should not be popularized and brought into the foreground, should be consigned to oblivion.

You, no doubt, remember Engels' well-known work, *The Peasant Question*. You, of course, remember the circumspection

with which Engels approaches the question of transferring the small peasants to the path of cooperative farming, to the path of collective farming. Permit me to quote the passage in question from Engels:

"We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the cooperative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain *on his small holding for a protracted length of time* to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision."*

You see with what circumspection Engels approaches the question of the transition of individual peasant farming to collectivism. How are we to explain this circumspection displayed by Engels, which at first sight seems exaggerated? What did he proceed from? Obviously, he proceeded from the existence of private ownership of land, from the fact that the peasant has "his holding" which he will find it hard to part with. Such is the peasantry in the West. Such is the peasantry in capitalist countries where private ownership of land exists. Naturally, great circumspection is needed there.

Can it be said that such a situation exists in our country, in the U.S.S.R.? No, it cannot. It cannot be said because here we have no private ownership of land which chains the peasant to his individual farm. It cannot be said because in our country the land is nationalized, and this facilitates the transition of the individual peasant to collectivism.

This is one of the reasons for the comparative ease and rapidity with which the collective-farm movement has of late been developing in our country.

It is to be regretted that our agrarian theoreticians have not yet attempted to bring out this difference between the condition of the peasantry in our country and in the West with sufficient clarity. And yet this would be of the utmost value not only for us in the Soviet Union, but for Communists in all countries. For

* My italics.—J. St.

it is not a matter of indifference to the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries whether socialism will have to be built there, from the first day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, on the basis of the nationalization of the land or without this basis.

In my recent article ("A Year of Great Change"), I advanced certain arguments to prove the superiority of large-scale farming over small farming; in this I had in mind big state farms. It is self-evident that all these arguments fully and entirely apply to the collective farms, which are also large economic units. I am speaking not only of developed collective farms which have machines and tractors at their disposal, but also of collective farms in their embryonic stage, which represent, as it were, the manufacture period of collective-farm development and are based on peasant farm implements. I am referring to the embryonic collective farms which are now being formed in the regions of solid collectivization, and which are based upon the simple pooling of the peasants' implements of production.

Take, for instance, the collective farms of the Khoper district in the former Don Region. Outwardly, the technique of these collective farms scarcely differs from that of the small-peasant farms (few machines, few tractors). And yet the simple pooling of the peasant implements of production within the collective farms has produced results of which our practical workers have never dreamt. What are these results? The fact that the transition to collective farming has brought about an increase of the crop area by 30, 40 and 50 per cent. How are these "dizzying" results to be explained? By the fact that the peasants, who were powerless under the conditions of individual labour, have been transformed into a mighty force once they pooled their implements and became united in collective farms. By the fact that it became possible for the peasants to till waste and virgin soil, which is difficult to break up by individual labour. By the fact that the peasants were enabled to avail themselves of virgin soil. By the fact that waste land, isolated plots, field boundaries, etc., etc., could now be cultivated.

The question of cultivating waste land and virgin soil is of the utmost importance for our agriculture. You know that the pivot of the revolutionary movement in Russia in the old days was the agrarian question. You know that one of the aims of the agrarian movement was to do away with the shortage of land. At that time there were many who thought that this shortage of land was absolute, i.e., that no more free land suitable for cultivation was available in Russia. And what was the actual situation? Now it is quite clear that scores of millions of hectares of free land were and still are available in the U.S.S.R. But the peasants were quite unable to till this land with their wretched implements. And precisely because they were unable to till virgin and waste land, they longed for "soft soil," for the soil which belonged to the landlords, for soil which could be tilled with the aid of peasant implements by individual labour. That was at the bottom of the "land shortage." It is not surprising, therefore, that our Grain Trust, which is equipped with tractors, is now able to place under cultivation about twenty million hectares of free land, land unoccupied by peasants and unfit for cultivation by individual labour with the aid of small-peasant implements.

The significance of the collective-farm movement in all its phases—both in its initial and in its more developed phase when it is equipped with tractors—lies, for one thing, in the fact that it is now possible for the peasants to till waste and virgin soil. That is the secret of the tremendous expansion of the crop area attending the transition of the peasants to collective labour. That is one of the reasons for the superiority of the collective farms over individual peasant farms.

It goes without saying that the superiority of the collective farms over the individual peasant farms will become even more incontestable when our machine-and-tractor stations and tractor columns come to the aid of the embryonic collective farms in the regions of solid collectivization, and when the collective farms will be in a position to own tractors and harvester combines.

IV

TOWN AND COUNTRY

There is a prejudice, cultivated by bourgeois economists, concerning the so-called "scissors." Against this prejudice a merciless war must be declared, as well as against all other bourgeois theories which, unfortunately, are currently circulated in the Soviet press. I have in mind the theory which alleges that the October Revolution brought the peasantry fewer advantages than the February Revolution; that, in fact, the October Revolution brought no advantages to the peasantry.

At one time this prejudice was boosted in our press by a "Soviet" economist. This "Soviet" economist, it is true, later renounced his theory. (*Interjection*: "Who was it?") It was Groman. But this theory was taken up and used against the Party by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. And there are no grounds for claiming that it is not current even now in "Soviet" public circles.

This is a very important question, comrades. It touches upon the problem of the relations between town and country. It touches upon the problem of abolishing the antithesis between town and country. It touches upon the very urgent question of the "scissors." I think, therefore, that we ought to examine this strange theory.

Is it true that the October Revolution brought no advantages to the peasants? Let us turn to the facts.

I have before me the table worked out by Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, which I quoted in my article "On the Grain Front." According to this table the landlords in prerevolutionary times "produced" no less than 600,000,000 poods of grain. Hence, the *landlords* were then the holders of 600,000,000 poods of grain.

The *kulaks*, as shown in this table, at that time "produced" 1,900,000,000 poods of grain. That represented a very great power, which the *kulaks* possessed at that time.

The *poor* and *middle* peasants, as shown in the same table, produced 2,500,000,000 poods of grain.

That was the situation in the old countryside, the countryside prior to the October Revolution.

What changes have taken place in the countryside since the October Revolution? I quote the figures from the same table. Take, for instance, the year 1927. How much did the *landlords* produce in that year? Obviously, they produced nothing and could not produce anything because they had been wiped out by the October Revolution. You will realize that that must have been a great relief to the peasantry; for the peasantry was liberated from the yoke of the landlords. That, of course, was a great gain for the peasantry, obtained as a result of the October Revolution.

How much did the *kulaks* produce in 1927? Six hundred million poods of grain instead of 1,900,000,000. Thus, during the period following the October Revolution the *kulaks* had lost more than two thirds of their power. You will realize that this was bound to improve the condition of the poor and middle peasants.

And how much did the *poor* and *middle* peasants produce in 1927? Four thousand million poods, instead of 2,500,000,000 poods. Thus, after the October Revolution the poor and middle peasants began to produce 1,500,000,000 poods more grain than in prerevolutionary times.

These are facts which show that the October Revolution brought colossal gains to the poor and middle peasants.

That is what the October Revolution brought to the poor and middle peasants.

How, after this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no advantages to the peasants?

But that is not all, comrades. The October Revolution abolished private ownership of land, did away with the sale and purchase of land, decreed the nationalization of the land. What does this mean? It means that now the peasant has no need to buy land in order to produce grain. Formerly he was saving up for years in order to buy land; he got into debt, went into bondage, just for the sake of a piece of land. The expenses which the purchase of land involved naturally was added to the cost of production of grain. Now, the peasant does not have to do that. He can produce

grain now without buying land. Consequently, the hundreds of millions of rubles that formerly were spent by the peasants for the purchase of land now remain in their pockets. Does this improve the condition of the peasants or not? Obviously it does.

Further. Until recently, the peasant was compelled to dig the soil with the aid of obsolete implements by individual labour. Everyone knows that individual labour, equipped with obsolete, now unsuitable, means of production, does not yield the results required to enable one to lead a tolerable existence, systematically to improve one's material position, to develop one's culture and to get out on to the highroad of socialist construction. Today, after the accelerated development of the collective-farm movement, the peasants are able to combine their labour with that of their neighbours, to unite in collective farms, to break up virgin soil, to cultivate waste land, to obtain machines and tractors and thereby double or even treble the productivity of their labour. And what does this mean? It means that today the peasant, by joining the collective farm, is able to produce much more than formerly with the same expenditure of labour. It means, therefore, that grain will be produced much more cheaply than was the case until quite recently. It means, finally, that, with stable prices, the peasant can obtain much more for his grain than he has obtained up to now.

How, after all this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no gains to the peasantry?

Is it not clear that those who utter such falsehoods obviously slander the Party and the Soviet power?

But what follows from all this?

It follows that the question of "the scissors," the question of closing "the scissors," must now be approached in a new way. It follows that if the collective-farm movement grows at the present rate, "the scissors" will be closed in the near future. It follows that the question of the relations between town and country is now put on a new basis, that the antithesis between town and country will be washed away at an accelerated pace.

This circumstance, comrades, is of very great importance for our whole work of construction. It modifies the psychology of the

peasant and turns him towards the town. It creates the basis for the elimination of the antithesis between town and country. It creates the basis on which the slogan of the Party—"face the village"—will be supplemented by the slogan of the peasant collective farmers: "face the town."

Nor is there anything surprising in this, for the peasant is now receiving from the town machines, tractors, agronomists, organizers and, finally, direct assistance in fighting and overcoming the kulaks. The old type of peasant, with his savage mistrust of the town, which he regarded as a plunderer, is passing into the background. His place is being taken by the new peasant, by the collective-farm peasant, who looks to the town with the hope of receiving real assistance *in production*. The place of the old type of peasant who is afraid of sinking to the status of the rural poor and is stealthily (for he may be deprived of the franchise) rising to the position of a kulak, is being taken by the new peasant, with new prospects—prospects of joining a collective farm and thereby emerging from poverty and ignorance on to the highroad of economic and cultural progress.

That's the turn things are taking, comrades.

It is all the more regrettable, comrades, that our agrarian theoreticians have not taken all measures to explode and root out all bourgeois theories which seek to discredit the gains of the October Revolution and the growing collective-farm movement.

V

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

The collective farm as a *type* of economy, is one of the forms of socialist economy. There can be no doubt whatever about that.

One of the speakers at this Conference tried to discredit the collective farms. He asserted that the collective farms, as economic organizations, have nothing in common with the socialist form of economy. I must say, comrades, that such a definition of the collective farms is absolutely wrong. There can be no doubt that this definition has nothing in common with the true state of affairs.

What determines the type of an economy? Obviously, the relations between people in the process of production. How else can the type of an economy be determined? But is there in the collective farms a class of people who own the means of production and a class of people who are deprived of these means of production? Is there an exploiting class and an exploited class in the collective farms? Doesn't the collective farm represent the socialization of the principal means of production on land which belongs to the state? What grounds are there for asserting that the collective farms, as a type of economy, do not represent one of the forms of socialist economy?

Of course, there are contradictions in the collective farms. Of course, there are survivals of individualistic and even of kulak mentality in the collective farms, which have not yet disappeared, but which are bound to disappear in the course of time as the collective farms become stronger, as they are provided with more machines. But can it be denied that the collective farms as a whole, with all their contradictions and shortcomings, the collective farms as an *economic* fact, represent, in the main, a new path of development of the countryside, the *socialist* path of development of the countryside as *opposed* to the kulak, *capitalist* path of development? Can it be denied that the collective farms (I am speaking of real, not of sham collective farms) represent, under our conditions, a base and a nucleus of socialist construction in the countryside—a base and a nucleus which have grown up in desperate fights against the capitalist elements?

Is it not clear that the attempts of some comrades to discredit the collective farms and represent them as a bourgeois form of economy are devoid of all foundation?

In 1923 we did not yet have a mass collective-farm movement. Lenin, in his pamphlet, *On Cooperation*, had in mind all forms of cooperation, its lower forms (marketing and supply cooperatives) and its higher forms (collective farms). What did he say at that time about cooperation, about cooperative enterprises? Here is a passage from Lenin's pamphlet, *On Cooperation*:

"Under our present system, cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but *they do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class." (Vol. XXVII, p. 396.)

Hence, Lenin takes the cooperative enterprises not by themselves, but in connection with our present system, in connection with the fact that they function on land which belongs to the state, in a country where the means of production belong to the state; and, regarding them in this light, Lenin declares that cooperative enterprises do not differ from socialist enterprises.

This is what Lenin says about cooperative enterprises in general.

Is it not clear that there is all the more ground for saying the same about the collective farms in our period?

This, by the way, explains why Lenin regarded the "mere growth of cooperation" under our conditions as "equivalent to the growth of socialism."

As you see, the speaker I have just referred to, in trying to discredit the collective farms, committed a grave mistake against Leninism.

This mistake led him to another mistake—about the class struggle in the collective farms. The speaker portrayed the class struggle in the collective farms in such vivid colours that one might think the class struggle in the collective farms does *not differ* from the class struggle in the absence of collective farms. Indeed, one might think that in the collective farms it tends to be fiercer. Incidentally, the speaker mentioned is not the only one who has erred in this matter. Idle talk about the class struggle, squealing and shrieking about the class struggle in the collective farms, is now characteristic of all our noisy "Lefts." The most comical thing about this squealing is that the squealers "see" the class struggle where it does not exist, or hardly exists, but fail to see it where it does exist and is glaringly manifest.

* My italics. —J. St.

Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective farms? Yes, there are. There are bound to be elements of the class struggle in the collective farms as long as there still remain survivals of individualistic, or even kulak, psychology, as long as there still exists a certain degree of material inequality. Can it be said that the class struggle in the collective farms is equivalent to the class struggle in the absence of collective farms? No, it cannot. The mistake our "Left" phrasemongers make lies precisely in not seeing the difference.

What is the class struggle *in the absence* of collective farms, *prior to* the establishment of collective farms? It is a fight against the kulak who *owns* the implements and means of production and who keeps the rural poor *in bondage* with the aid of those implements and means of production. It is a life-and-death struggle.

But what does the class struggle mean with the collective farms *in existence*? It means, firstly, that the kulak has been defeated and deprived of the implements and means of production. It means, secondly, that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective farms on the basis of the socialization of the principal implements and means of production. It means, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms, some of whom have not yet rid themselves of individualistic and kulak survivals and are striving to turn the inequality, which exists to some extent in the collective farms, to their own advantage, while the others want to eliminate these survivals and this inequality. Is it not clear that only the blind can fail to see the difference between the class struggle with the collective farms in existence and the class struggle in the absence of collective farms?

It would be a mistake to believe that once collective farms exist we have all that is necessary for building socialism. It would be all the more a mistake to believe that the members of the collective farms have already become socialists. No, a great deal of work has still to be done to remould the peasant collective farmer, to set right his individualistic psychology and to transform him into a real worker of a socialist society. And the more rapidly the collective farms are provided with machines, the

more rapidly they are supplied with tractors, the more rapidly will this be achieved. But this does not in the least belittle the enormous importance of the collective farms as a lever for the socialist transformation of the rural districts. The great importance of the collective farms lies precisely in that they represent the principal base for the employment of machinery and tractors in agriculture, that they constitute the principal base for remoulding the peasant, for changing his psychology in the spirit of socialism. Lenin was right when he said:

"The task of remoulding the small farmer, of remoulding his whole psychology and habits is a task of generations. Only the material basis, technique, the employment of tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, electrification on a mass scale, can solve this problem in relation to the small farmer, can cure, so to speak, his whole psychology." (Vol. XXVI, p. 239.)

Who can deny that the collective farms are indeed the only form of socialist economy which will open to the vast masses of the small individual peasants the way to large-scale mechanized production, to machines and tractors—which are the levers of economic progress, the levers of the socialist development of agriculture?

Our "Left" phrasemongers have forgotten all that.

And our speaker has forgotten about it, too.

VI

THE CLASS CHANGES AND THE TURN IN THE PARTY'S POLICY

Finally, the question of the class changes in our country and the socialist offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The characteristic feature in the work of our Party during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet power,

a) have developed an offensive along the whole front against the capitalist elements in the countryside;

b) that this offensive, as you know, has brought about and is bringing about very palpable, *positive* results.

What does this mean? It means that we have passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class. This means that we have made, and are still making, one of the decisive turns in our whole policy.

Until recently the Party adhered to the policy of *restricting* the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks. As you know, this policy was proclaimed as far back as the Eighth Party Congress. It was again announced at the time of the introduction of the NEP and at the Eleventh Congress of our Party. We all remember Lenin's well-known letter regarding Preobrazhensky's thesis (1922), in which Lenin again urged the necessity of pursuing this policy. Finally, this policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. And it was this policy that we were pursuing until recently.

Was this policy correct? Yes, it was absolutely correct at the time. Could we have undertaken such an offensive against the kulaks five years or three years ago? Could we then have counted on success in such an offensive? No, we could not. That would have been the most dangerous adventurism. It would have been playing a very dangerous game at offensive. We would certainly have failed, and our failure would have strengthened the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we still lacked a wide network of state and collective farms in the rural districts which could be used as strongholds in a determined offensive against the kulaks. Because at that time we were not yet able to *substitute* for the capitalist production of the kulaks the socialist production of the collective farms and state farms.

In 1926-27, the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did their utmost to impose upon the Party the policy of an immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party refused to embark on that dangerous adventure, for it knew that serious people cannot afford to play at offensives. An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It should not be confused with declamations

against the kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of bickering with the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did their utmost to impose upon the Party. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would be mere declamation, bickering, empty noise, anything but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must properly prepare for it and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent them from rising to their feet again. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken such an offensive five years or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.

Indeed, in 1927, the kulaks produced over 600,000,000 poods of grain, about 130,000,000 poods of which they marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much did our collective farms and state farms produce at that time? About 80,000,000 poods, of which about 35,000,000 poods were available for trade (marketable grain). Judge for yourselves, could we have then *substituted* for kulak output and kulak marketable grain the output and marketable grain of our collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not.

What would it have meant to launch a determined offensive against the kulaks under such conditions? It would have meant inviting failure, strengthening the position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That is why we could not and should not have undertaken a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time, in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition.

But today? What is the position? Today, we have an adequate material base which enables us to strike at the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class, and to *substitute* for their output the output of the collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 the grain produced on the collective farms and state farms amounted to no less than 400,000,000 poods

(200,000,000 poods less than the gross output of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective farms and state farms supplied more than 130,000,000 poods of grain for the market (i.e., more than the kulaks in 1927). And finally, you know that in 1930 the gross output of the collective farms and state farms will amount to no less than 900,000,000 poods of grain (i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), and their output of grain for the market to no less than 400,000,000 poods (i.e., incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).

This is the position today, comrades.

This is the change that has taken place in the economy of our country.

Now, as you see, we have the material base which enables us to *substitute* for kulak output the output of the collective farms and state farms. This indeed is the reason why our determined offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success.

That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive and not futile declamations against the kulaks.

That is the reason why we have recently passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating the kulaks as a class*.

Well, what about the policy of expropriating the kulaks? Can we permit the expropriation of kulaks in the regions of solid collectivization? This question is asked in various quarters. A ridiculous question! We could not permit the expropriation of the kulaks as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, as long as we were unable to launch a determined offensive against the kulaks, as long as we were unable to substitute for kulak output the output of the collective farms and state farms. At that time the policy of not permitting the expropriation of the kulaks was necessary and correct. But now? Now the situation is different. Now we are able to carry on a determined offensive against the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class and substitute for their output the output of the collective farms and

state farms. Now, the kulaks are being expropriated by the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, by the masses who are putting solid collectivization into practice. Now, the expropriation of the kulaks in the regions of solid collectivization is no longer just an administrative measure. Now, the expropriation of the kulaks is an integral part of the formation and development of the collective farms. Consequently it is now ridiculous and foolish to discourse on the expropriation of the kulaks. You do not lament the loss of the hair of one who has been beheaded.

There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: whether the kulaks should be permitted to join the collective farms. Of course not, for they are sworn enemies of the collective-farm movement.

VII CONCLUSIONS

These, comrades, are six cardinal problems which the theoretical work of our Marxist students of the agrarian question must not ignore.

The importance of these problems lies, firstly, in the fact that a Marxist analysis of them provides the means of eradicating all and sundry bourgeois theories which sometimes—to our shame—are circulated by our own comrades, by Communists, and which clog the minds of our practical workers. And these theories should have been eradicated and discarded long ago. For only in a merciless fight against these and other similar theories can the theoretical ideas of the Marxist students of the agrarian question develop and become strong.

The importance of these problems lies, finally, in the fact that they give a new aspect to the old problems of the economics of the transition period.

Today the problems of the NEP, of classes, of collective farms, of economy of the transition period, are presented in a new way.

The mistake of those who interpret the NEP as a retreat, and only as a retreat, must be exposed. As a matter of fact, even when the New Economic Policy was being introduced, Lenin said that it was not only a retreat, but also the preparation for a new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The mistake of those who think that the NEP is necessary only as a link between town and country must be exposed. It is not just any kind of link between town and country that we need. What we need is a link that will ensure the victory of socialism. And if we adhere to the NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we will cast it to the devil. Lenin said that the NEP had been introduced in earnest and for a long time. But he never said that it had been introduced for all time.

We must also raise the question of popularizing the Marxian theory of reproduction. We must elaborate the problem of the structure of the balance sheet of our national economy. What the Central Statistical Board published in 1926 as the balance sheet of national economy is not a balance sheet, but a juggling with figures. Nor is the manner in which Bazarov and Groman treat the problem of the balance sheet of national economy suitable. The structure of the balance sheet of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. must be worked out by the revolutionary Marxists if the latter have any desire at all to devote themselves to the problems of the economy of the transition period.

It would be a good thing for our Marxist economists to appoint a special group to study the new aspects of the problems of the economy of the transition period at its present stage of development.

THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS

The article, "The Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class," in No. 16 of *Krasnaya Zvezda*, while unquestionably correct on the whole, contains two inaccuracies in formulation. I think it is necessary to correct these inaccuracies.

1. The article states:

"During the period of economic restoration we pursued the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in town and country. With the beginning of the reconstruction period we passed from the policy of restricting these elements to a policy of squeezing them out."

This thesis is wrong. The policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of squeezing them out are not two different policies. They are one and the same policy. The squeezing out of the capitalist elements in the rural districts is an inevitable result and a *component* part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements, the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks. The squeezing out of the capitalist *elements* in the rural districts is not synonymous with the squeezing out of the kulaks as a *class*. Squeezing out the capitalist elements in the rural districts means squeezing out and overcoming *individual sections* of the kulaks who cannot hold out against the pressure of taxation, against the system of restrictive measures of the Soviet power. It is obvious that the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the rural districts, must inevitably lead to the squeezing out of individual sections of the kulaks. That is why the squeezing out of individual sections of the kulaks must be regarded as an inevitable result and a component part

of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the rural districts.

We pursued this policy not only during the period of economic restoration, but also during the period of reconstruction, and also in the period following the Fifteenth Congress (December 1927), and during the period of the Sixteenth Party Conference (April 1929), just as well as in the period following that Conference, right down to the summer of 1929, when solid collectivization began and when we effected the *turn* towards the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a *class*.

If we examine the most important documents of our Party, beginning, say, with the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925 (see the resolution on the report of the Central Committee), and ending with the Sixteenth Conference in April 1929 (see the resolution, "Ways of Bringing About the Progress of Agriculture"), it becomes perfectly obvious that the thesis on "restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks," or "restricting the growth of capitalism in the rural districts," is always *accompanied* by the thesis on "squeezing out the capitalist elements in the rural districts," on "overcoming the capitalist elements in the rural districts."

What does that mean?

It means that the Party *does not draw a line* between squeezing out the capitalist elements in the rural districts and the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the rural districts.

The Fifteenth Party Congress, and the Sixteenth Conference too, are entirely based on the policy of "restricting the exploiting propensities of the rural bourgeoisie" (resolution of the Fifteenth Congress, "Work in the Rural Districts"); on the policy of "adopting new measures which would restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside" (*ibid.*); on the policy of "resolutely restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks" (resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on the five-year plan); on the policy of "an offensive against the kulaks" in the sense of "proceeding to further, more systematic and persistent restriction of the kulaks

and private traders" (*ibid.*); on the policy of "a more determined economic squeezing out" of "the elements of private capitalist economy" in town and country (resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on the report of the Central Committee).

Hence (a) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in representing the policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of squeezing them out as two different policies. The facts show that here we have one general policy of restricting capitalism, and the squeezing out of individual sections of the kulaks is a component part and result of this policy.

Hence (b) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in maintaining that the squeezing out of the capitalist elements in the rural districts began only in the period of reconstruction, in the period of the Fifteenth Congress. Actually, this process went on before the Fifteenth Congress, during the period of economic restoration, and after the Fifteenth Congress, in the reconstruction period. In the period of the Fifteenth Congress the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks was merely tightened up by new and supplementary measures, as a consequence of which the process of squeezing out individual sections of the kulaks was bound to become intensified.

2. The article states:

"The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class follows entirely from the policy of squeezing out the capitalist elements and is a continuation of that policy at a new stage."

This thesis is inexact and therefore wrong. Of course, the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class could not have dropped from the skies. The whole preceding period of restricting and, hence, of squeezing out the capitalist elements in the rural districts had prepared the ground for its promotion. But that still does not mean that it does not *radically* differ from the policy of restricting (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements in the rural districts; that it is, so to speak, a *continuation* of the policy of restriction. Such an assertion by our author amounts to a denial of the fact that a *radical change* in the development of the rural

districts began in the summer of 1929. To say that is to deny that during this period we effected a *turn* in the policy of our Party in the rural districts. To say that is to provide a certain ideological shelter for the Right elements in our Party who are now clutching at the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress in their opposition to the Party's *new* policy, just as at one time Frumkin clutched at the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress in his opposition to the policy of setting up collective farms and state farms.

What did the Fifteenth Congress proceed from when it proclaimed the intensification of the policy of restricting (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements in the rural districts? From the consideration that, notwithstanding this restriction of the kulaks, the kulaks *as a class must still*, for some time, *be allowed to exist*. It was *for this reason* that the Fifteenth Congress allowed the law which permitted the renting of land to remain in force, knowing very well that the bulk of the renters were kulaks. It was *for this reason* that the Fifteenth Congress allowed the law which permitted the hiring of labour in the rural districts to remain in force, demanding that it be strictly observed. It was *for this reason* that the Party proclaimed once again that the expropriation of the kulaks was impermissible. Do these laws and these decisions contradict the policy of *restricting* (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements in the rural districts? Certainly *not*. Do these laws and these decisions contradict the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class? Certainly they *do!* Hence, these laws and these decisions must now be laid aside in the districts of solid collectivization, the area of which is extending daily and hourly. In point of fact, they have already been set aside by the very march of the collective-farm movement in the districts of solid collectivization.

Consequently, can the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class be regarded as a *continuation* of the policy of restricting (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements in the rural districts? Obviously, not.

The author of the above-mentioned article forgets that the kulak class, as a class, cannot be squeezed out by means of

taxation and all sorts of other restrictions while the instruments of production are *left* in the hands of that class and it enjoys the right of freely using land, while the law which permits the hiring of labour in the rural districts, the law which permits the renting of land and the ban on the expropriation of the kulaks *remain* in operation. The author forgets that under the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks we can count only on squeezing out individual sections of the kulaks, which does not contradict, but, on the contrary, presumes the *preservation* of the kulaks as a class for the time being. For the purpose of squeezing out the kulaks as a class, the policy of restricting and squeezing out individual sections of the kulaks is not enough. In order to squeeze out the kulaks as a class we must *break down* the resistance of that class in open battle and *deprive* it of the means of production that are necessary for its existence and development (the free use of land, instruments of production, the renting of land, the right to hire labour, etc.).

This, indeed, is the *turn* towards the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Without this, all talk of squeezing out the kulaks as a class is idle chatter, pleasing and profitable only to the Right deviationists. Without this, serious collectivization, let alone solid collectivization of the rural districts, is inconceivable. This has been grasped quite well by the poor and middle peasants in our rural districts who are routing the kulaks and realizing solid collectivization. This has, apparently, not yet been grasped by some of our comrades.

Hence, the present policy of our Party in the rural districts is not a *continuation* of the old policy, but a *turn* from the old policy of *restricting* (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements in the rural districts to the new policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class.

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18,
January 21, 1930

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

Problems of the Collective-Farm Movement

Everybody is now talking about the successes achieved by the Soviet power in the sphere of the collective-farm movement. Even our enemies are compelled to admit that important successes have been achieved. And these successes are great indeed.

It is a fact that by February 20, this year, 50 per cent of the peasant farms of the U.S.S.R. had been collectivized. This means that by February 20, 1930, we had *exceeded* the five-year plan for collectivization more than twice over.

It is a fact that by February 28, this year, the collective farms *had already* stored more than 3,600,000 tons of seed for the spring sowing, i.e., more than 90 per cent of the plan, or about 220,000,000 poods. It must be admitted that the storing of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone—after the grain purchasing plan had been successfully fulfilled—is a tremendous achievement.

What does all this show?

It shows that *the radical turn of the rural districts towards socialism may already be regarded as guaranteed.*

There is no need to prove that these successes are of tremendous importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class as the leading force of our country, and, finally, for the Party itself. Apart from the direct practical results, these successes are of tremendous importance for the internal life of the Party itself; for the education of our Party. They inject into our Party a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. They arm the working class with confidence in the triumph of our cause. They bring to our Party new reserves numbering millions of men.

Hence, the task of our Party: to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for the purpose of advancing further.

But successes also have their seamy side; especially when they are achieved with comparative "ease," "unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes sometimes engender a spirit of conceit and arrogance: "We can achieve anything!" "We can win hands down!" People are often intoxicated by such successes, they become dizzy with success, they lose all sense of proportion, they lose the faculty of understanding realities, they reveal a tendency to overestimate their own strength and to underestimate the strength of the enemy; reckless attempts are made to settle all the problems of socialist construction "in two ticks." In such cases care is not taken to *consolidate* the successes achieved and systematically to *utilize* them for the purpose of advancing further. Why should we consolidate successes? We shall anyhow reach the complete victory of socialism "in two ticks," "We can achieve anything." "We can win hands down."

Hence, the task of the Party: to wage a determined struggle against this frame of mind, which is dangerous and harmful to the cause, and to drive it out of the Party.

It cannot be said that this dangerous and harmful frame of mind is really widespread in the ranks of our Party. But this frame of mind nevertheless exists in our Party, and, moreover, there are no grounds for asserting that it will not spread. And if this frame of mind acquires the rights of citizenship among us, there can be no doubt that the cause of the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of that movement being disrupted may become real.

Hence, the task of our press: systematically to expose this, or any similar anti-Leninist frame of mind.

A few facts.

1. The success of our collective-farm policy is due, among other things, to the fact that this policy rests on the *voluntary* character of the collective-farm movement, and that it *allows for the diversity of conditions* existing in the various parts of the

U.S.S.R. Collective farms cannot be set up by force. To do so would be stupid and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rely on the active support of the great bulk of the peasantry. Methods of collective-farm construction which are being applied in developed districts cannot be mechanically introduced in the backward districts. To do so would be stupid and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the idea of collectivization at one blow. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm construction we must carefully take into account the diversity of conditions prevailing in the various districts of the U.S.S.R.

In the collective-farm movement the grain-growing districts are in the lead. Why?

Because, firstly, it is in those districts that we have the largest number of firmly established state farms and collective farms, thanks to which the peasants have been able to convince themselves of the power and importance of the new technique, of the power and importance of the new, collective organization of farming.

Because, secondly, those districts have already had two years of schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the grain-purchasing campaigns, which could not but facilitate the development of the collective-farm movement.

And, finally, because those districts have been most plentifully supplied during the last few years with the best forces from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these exceptionally favourable conditions exist in other districts, too, for instance, in the grain-importing districts, such as our northern regions, or in the districts of still backward nationalities, such as, let us say, Turkestan?

No, that cannot be said.

It is obvious that the principle of allowing for the diverse conditions of the various districts of the U.S.S.R., coupled with the voluntary principle, is one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement.

But what really happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of allowing for local peculiarities are not violated in a number of districts? No

unfortunately, that cannot be said. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern districts of the grain-importing belt, where there are, comparatively, fewer favourable conditions for the immediate organization of collective farms than in the grain-growing districts, not infrequently efforts are made to *substitute* for preparatory work in organizing collective farms the bureaucratic decreeing of a collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, the formation of collective farms on paper—of farms which do not yet exist, but regarding the “existence” of which there is a pile of boastful resolutions.

Or, take certain districts in Turkestan, where there are even fewer favourable conditions for the immediate organization of collective farms than in the northern regions of the grain-importing belt. We know that in a number of districts in Turkestan attempts have already been made to “overtake and outstrip” the advanced districts of the U.S.S.R. by the method of threatening to resort to military force, by the method of threatening to deprive the peasants who do not as yet want to join the collective farms of irrigation water and of manufactured goods.

What is there in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev* “policy” and the Party’s policy which rests on the voluntary principle and allows for local peculiarities in collective-farm construction? Obviously, they have not, nor can they have, anything in common.

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of a collective-farm movement, these unseemly threats against the peasants? Nobody, but our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To the strengthening of our enemies and the discrediting of the idea of the collective-farm movement.

Is it not obvious that the authors of these distortions, who think they are “Lefts,” are, in fact, bringing grist to the mill of Right opportunism?

* A character in A. Chekhov’s story of the same name.—Tr.

2. One of the greatest merits of our Party's political strategy is the fact that it is able at any given moment to pick out the *main link* in the movement, and by grasping this link to pull the whole chain towards one common goal and thus achieve the solution of the problem. Can we say that the Party has already chosen the main link of the collective-farm movement in the system of collective-farm development? Yes, we can and should say that.

What is this main link?

Perhaps it is the *association for the joint cultivation* of the land? No, it is not. The associations for the joint cultivation of the land, in which the means of production are not yet socialized, represent an already superseded stage in the collective-farm movement.

Perhaps it is the *agricultural commune*? No, it is not the commune. The communes are still isolated phenomena in the collective-farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for making the agricultural communes, in which not only production but distribution also is socialized, the *predominant* form.

The main link in the collective-farm movement, its *predominant* form at the present moment, the link which we must now grasp, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel* the principal means of production, chiefly those used in grain growing, are socialized: labour, the use of the land, machines and other implements, draught animals, farm buildings. But in the artel, household land (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), dwellings, a certain part of the dairy cattle, small livestock, poultry, etc., are *not socialized*.

The artel is the *main link of the collective-farm movement* because it is the most rational form for solving the grain problem. And the grain problem is the *main link in the whole system of agriculture* because, unless that problem is solved, it is impossible to solve either the problem of livestock raising (large and small livestock), or the problem of industrial and special crops which provide the basic raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural artel is at the present moment the *main link in the system of the collective-farm movement*.

It is from this that the "Model Rules" for collective farms—the final text of which is being published today*—proceeds.

It is from this, too, that our Party and Soviet functionaries should proceed; it is their duty to make a thorough study of these Rules and carry them out to the full.

This is the Party's line at the present moment.

Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without infractions and distortions? No, unfortunately, it cannot. We know that in a number of districts in the U.S.S.R., where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is far from being at an end, and where the artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel form and to organize agricultural communes from the outset. The artel is not yet consolidated, but they are already "socializing" dwellings, small livestock and poultry; and this sort of "socialization" degenerates into bureaucratic decrees that remain on paper, for the conditions which would make such socialization necessary do not yet exist. One might think that the grain problem has already been solved in the collective farms, that it is already a superseded stage, that the main task at the present moment is not to solve the grain problem, but to solve the problem of livestock and poultry farming. The question arises: Who benefits by this blockhead "work" of lumping together the various forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits by this stupid and harmful precipitancy? Irritating the peasant collective farmer by "socializing" dwellings, all the dairy cattle, all the small livestock and the poultry when the grain problem is still *unsolved*, when the artel form of collective farming is *not* yet *consolidated*—is it not obvious that such a "policy" can please and benefit only our sworn enemies?

One such overzealous "socializer" even went so far as to issue an order to an artel calling for "the registration within three days of every head of poultry in every household," for the appointment of special "commanders" to register and supervise, "to take over the key position in the artel," "to be in command of the battle for

* *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

socialism, without quitting their posts," and—of course—to keep a tight grip on the artel.

What is this—a policy of leading the collective farm, or a policy of *disintegrating* and *discrediting it*?

And what about those "revolutionaries"—save the mark—who begin the work of organizing an artel by removing the church bells. Remove the church bells—how r-r-revolutionary indeed!

How could such blockhead exercises in "socialization," such ludicrous attempts to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps—attempts aiming at getting away from classes and the class struggle, but which in practice bring grist to the mill of our class enemies—occur in our midst?

They could occur only in the atmosphere of our "easy" and "unexpected" successes on the front of collective-farm development.

They could occur only as a result of the blockhead frame of mind in the ranks of a section of our Party: "We can achieve anything!" "We can win hands down!"

They could occur only because certain of our comrades became dizzy with success, and for a moment lost the capacity of clear thinking and sober vision.

In order to straighten out the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm development *we must put an end to this frame of mind.*

This is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to lose contact with the masses. But neither must one rush ahead, because to rush ahead is to lose the masses and isolate oneself. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and against those who rush on ahead.

Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading the movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES

As may be seen from the newspapers, Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" and the well-known decision of the Central Committee on "Measures to Combat the Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement" have evoked a wide response among the practical workers in the collective-farm movement. In this connection I have recently received a number of letters from comrades, members of collective farms, asking for a reply to the questions raised in them. It was my duty to reply to the letters in private correspondence; but that proved to be impossible, for more than half the letters received did not have any return addresses (the writers forgot to send their addresses). However, the questions raised in these letters are of tremendous political interest for all our comrades. Moreover, I could not, of course, leave unanswered the letters of those comrades who forgot to send their addresses. In view of this I found myself faced with the necessity of replying to the collective-farm comrades publicly, i.e., in the press, taking from their letters all the questions necessary for the purpose. I did this all the more willingly as I was directed to do this by a special decision of the Central Committee.

First question. What is the root of the mistakes in the peasant question?

Answer. The wrong approach to the middle peasant. The use of coercion in the economic relations with the middle peasant. The proneness to forget that the economic bond with the masses of middle peasants must not be built on measures of coercion but

on agreement with the middle peasant, on an alliance with the middle peasant. The proneness to forget that the basis of the collective-farm movement at the present moment is the alliance of the working class and the poor peasants with the middle peasants against capitalism in general, and against the kulaks in particular.

As long as the offensive was directed against the kulaks in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well. But when certain of our comrades, intoxicated by success, began imperceptibly to slip from the path of offensive against the kulak to the path of fighting the middle peasant; when, in the pursuit of high percentages of collectivization, they began to employ coercion against the middle peasant, depriving him of electoral rights, "dekulakizing" and expropriating him, the offensive began to assume distorted forms, the united front with the middle peasant began to be undermined, and, naturally, the kulak received the opportunity to try to get on to his feet again.

It was forgotten that coercion, which is necessary and useful in the fight against our class enemies, is impermissible and disastrous when exerted against the middle peasant, who is our ally.

It was forgotten that cavalry charges, which are necessary and useful in solving military problems, are unsuitable and fatal as a means of solving the problems of collective-farm development, which, moreover, is being organized in alliance with the middle peasant.

This is the root of the mistakes in the peasant question.

Here is what Lenin says about economic relations with the middle peasant:

"We must particularly stress the truth that here, by the very nature of the case, coercive methods can accomplish nothing. The economic task here is an entirely different one. Here there is not that upper layer which can be cut off, leaving the foundations and the building intact. That upper layer which in the cities was represented by the capitalists does not exist here. *Here coercion would ruin the whole cause.... Nothing is more stupid than the very idea of applying coercion in economic relations with the middle peasant,*" (Vol. XXIV, p. 168.).

Further:

"Coercion applied to the middle peasantry would cause untold harm. This stratum is a numerous one, it consists of millions of individuals. Even in Europe, where it nowhere achieves such strength, where technology and culture, city life and railroads are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasant." (Vol. XXIV, p. 167.)

Clear, one would think.

Second question. What are the principal mistakes in the collective-farm movement?

Answer. There are at least three such mistakes.

1. The Leninist principle that the formation of collective farms must be voluntary has been violated. The basic instructions of the Party and the Model Rules of the agricultural artels which provide that the formation of collective farms must be voluntary have been violated.

Leninism teaches that the peasants must be brought round to adopt collective farming voluntarily, by convincing them of the advantage of common, collective farming over individual farming. Leninism teaches that the peasants can be convinced of the advantage of collective farming only if it is *demonstrated* and *proved* to them in practice, by experience, that the collective farm is better than the individual farm, that it is more profitable than the individual farm, and that the collective farm offers the poor and middle peasant a way out of poverty and want. Leninism teaches that unless these conditions are observed the collective farms cannot be stable. Leninism teaches that every attempt to impose collective farming by force, every attempt to set up collective farms by coercion, can only produce negative results, can only turn the peasants away from the collective-farm movement.

And, indeed, as long as this basic rule was observed, the collective-farm movement scored success after success. But certain of our comrades, intoxicated by success, began to neglect this rule, began to display excessive haste, and in pursuit of high percentages of collectivization began to set up collective farms

by coercion. It is not surprising that the negative consequences of this "policy" soon became apparent. The collective farms which had sprung up in such haste began to dissolve just as rapidly as they had sprung up, and a section of the peasants who only yesterday had the greatest confidence in the collective farms, began to turn away from them.

This is the first and principal mistake in the collective-farm movement.

Here is what Lenin says about the principle that the formation of collective farms must be voluntary:

"Our task now is to pass to *common cultivation* of the land, to *large-scale common farming*. But there must be no coercion on the part of the Soviet government; there is no law that makes it compulsory. The agricultural *commune* must be established *voluntarily*, the transition to *common cultivation* of the land must be only *voluntary*, there must not be the slightest coercion in this respect on the part of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, nor is it permitted by law. If any of you have observed any such coercion, you must know that it is an abuse, that it is a violation of the law, which we are doing our utmost to correct, and shall correct."* (Vol. XXIV, p. 43.)

Further:

"Only if we succeed in *proving* to the peasants in practice the advantages of common, collective, cooperative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of cooperative or artel farming, will the working class, which holds the state power, be really able to convince the peasant of the correctness of its policy and to secure the real and durable following of the millions of peasants. It is therefore impossible to exaggerate the importance of every measure intended to encourage cooperative, artel forms of agriculture. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed throughout remote rural districts.... Only when it is *proved in practice*, by *experience* comprehensible to the peasants, that the transition to the cooperative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken."* (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80.)

Finally, one more passage from Lenin's works:

"While encouraging cooperative associations of every kind, including agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives of the Soviet

* My italics.—J.St.

government must not resort to the *slightest compulsion* in the creation of such associations. Only such associations are valuable as are started by the peasants themselves on their own free initiative and the advantages of which have been tested by them in practice. *Excessive haste in this respect is harmful*, since it may only tend to aggravate the aversion of the middle peasants to innovations. Representatives of the Soviet government who take the liberty of resorting even to indirect, not to mention direct, compulsion in order to get the peasants to join communes must be called to strict account and removed from work in the rural districts."* (Vol. XXIV, p. 174.)

Clear, one would think.

It goes without saying that the Party will carry out these directions of Lenin with the utmost rigour.

2. The Leninist principle that allowances must be made for the diversity of conditions in the various districts of the U.S.S.R. has been violated in regard to collective-farm development. It has been forgotten that the most diverse regions exist in the U.S.S.R., with different forms of economy and levels of culture. It has been forgotten that among them there are advanced, average and backward regions. It has been forgotten that the pace of the collective-farm movement and the methods of collective-farm development *cannot be identical* in these far from identical regions.

Lenin says:

"It would be a mistake were we to stereotype decrees for all parts of Russia, were the Bolshevik-Communists, the Soviet officials in the Ukraine and the Don, to extend these decrees to other regions wholesale without discrimination.... We shall in no case bind ourselves to uniform stereotypes; we shall not decide once and for all that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, is wholly applicable to every border region." (Vol. XXIV, pp. 125-26.)

Further, Lenin says:

"It would be absolutely absurd to apply the same stereotype to Central Russia, the Ukraine and Siberia, to squeeze them into the same mould." (Vol. XXVI, p. 243.)

Finally, Lenin makes it mandatory for the Communists of the Caucasus to

* My italics—J. St.

"understand the singularity of their position, of the position of their republics, as distinct from the position and conditions of the R.S.F.S.R.; to understand the necessity of not copying our tactics, but of thoughtfully varying them in accordance with the difference in the concrete conditions." Vol. XXVI, p. 191.)

Clear, one would think.

Acting on these directions of Lenin, the Central Committee of our Party, in its decision, "The Rate of Collectivization" (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930), divided up the regions of the U.S.S.R., from the point of view of the rate of collectivization, into three groups, of which the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and the Lower Volga may, in the main, complete the process of collectivization by the spring of 1931; the other grain-producing regions (the Ukraine, the Central Chernozem Region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, etc.) may complete it, in the main, by the spring of 1932; and the remaining regions may extend the process of collectivization to the end of the five-year plan period, i.e., until 1933.

But what happened in practice? It so happened that certain of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, managed to forget both Lenin's directions and the decision of the Central Committee. Officials in the Moscow region, in the feverish pursuit of inflated collectivization figures, began to orientate their staffs towards completing the collectivization by the spring of 1930, although they had no less than three years at their disposal (to the end of 1932). In the Central Chernozem Region, not desiring to "lag behind the others," they began to orientate their staffs towards completing the process of collectivization by the first half of 1930, although they had no less than two years at their disposal (to the end of 1931). And the Transcaucasians and Turkestanians, in their zeal "to overtake and outstrip" the advanced regions, set out to complete the process of collectivization in "the shortest possible period," although they had fully four years at their disposal (to the end of 1933).

In view of such quickfire "tempo" of collectivization, the districts which were less prepared for the collective-farm

movement, in their zeal to "outstrip" the more prepared districts, naturally found themselves obliged to resort to intense administrative pressure, and tried to compensate for the factors that were lacking for a rapid rate of development of the collective-farm movement by their own administrative zeal. The results are well known. Everybody knows the muddle which resulted in those regions, and which subsequently had to be straightened out by the intervention of the Central Committee.

This is the second mistake in the collective-farm movement.

3. The Leninist principle that it is not permissible to skip an incomplete form of a movement was violated in regard to collective-farm development. The Leninist principle that we must not run ahead of the development of the masses, that we must not decree the movement of the masses, that we must not isolate ourselves from the masses, but move together with the masses and lead them forward, lead them up to our slogans and help them to become convinced by their own experience of the correctness of our slogans—was violated.

"...When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realized that our constructive work would encounter greater difficulties in the countryside; that here one must proceed more gradually; that *to attempt to introduce common cultivation of the land by decrees* and legislation would be the *height of folly*; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to that which was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the revolution, namely, in no case to endeavour *to outrun the development of the masses*, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggles, a progressive movement grew up."* (Vol. XXIII, p. 252.)

Proceeding from these directions of Lenin, the Central Committee, in its well-known decision on "The Rate of Collectivization" (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930), ruled

a) that the principal form of the collective-farm movement at the present time is the agricultural artel;

* My italics.—*J.St.*

b) that consequently it is necessary to draw up model rules for the agricultural artel as the principal form of the collective-farm movement;

c) that "decreeing" the collective-farm movement from above and "playing at collectivization" must not be permitted in our practical work.

This means that at present we must steer our course not towards the commune, but towards the agricultural artel, as the principal form of collective-farm development; that we must not allow any attempts to skip the agricultural artel and to pass straight to the commune, and that the mass movement of the peasants to join collective farms, must not be supplanted by "decreeing" collective farms or "playing at collective farms."

Clear, one would think.

But what happened in practice? It so happened that certain of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, managed to forget completely both Lenin's directions and the decision of the Central Committee. Instead of organizing a mass movement in favour of the agricultural artel, these comrades began to "transfer" the individual peasants straight to the rules that obtain in the commune. Instead of consolidating the artel form of the movement, they began to "socialize" by compulsory measures the small livestock, poultry, dairy cattle in personal use, and dwelling houses.

The results of this haste, which is impermissible for a Leninist, are now known to all. As a rule, of course, they failed to create durable communes; but, on the other hand, they lost a number of agricultural artels. True, "good" resolutions remained. But what is the use of them?

This is the third mistake in the collective-farm movement.

Third question. How could these mistakes arise, and how must the Party correct them?

Answer. They arose out of our rapid successes in the collective-farm movement. Sometimes success makes people dizzy. It sometimes engenders excessive conceit and arrogance. This may very easily happen to the representatives of a Party which holds

power, especially in the case of our Party, the strength and prestige of which is almost immeasurable. Here, cases of communist vanity, against which Lenin fought so fiercely, may very easily occur. Here, belief in the omnipotence of decrees, resolutions and orders is quite possible. Here, there is a real danger of the revolutionary measures of the Party being transformed into empty, bureaucratic decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in one corner or another of our vast country. I have in mind not only local workers, but even certain Regional Committee members, and even certain members of the Central Committee.

"Communist vanity," says Lenin, "is characteristic of a man who, while still a member of the Communist Party, not having yet been combed out of it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees." (Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51.)

This is the soil from which sprang the mistakes in the collective-farm movement, the distortions of the Party line in the matter of collective-farm development.

Wherein lies the danger of these mistakes and distortions if they are allowed to continue, if they are not eliminated quickly and without a trace?

The danger here is that these mistakes lead us straight to the discrediting of the collective-farm movement, to disagreement with the middle peasants, to the disorganization of the poor peasants, to confusion in our ranks, to the weakening of our entire socialist construction, to the restoration of the kulaks.

In short, these mistakes have a tendency to push us off the path of consolidating the alliance with the bulk of the peasantry, the path of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the path of a rupture with these masses, to the path of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This danger was already evident in the latter half of February, at the very moment when a section of our comrades, blinded by their previous successes, galloped away from the path of Leninism. The Central Committee of the Party realized this danger and intervened without delay, instructing Stalin to warn these reckless comrades in a special article on the collective-farm move-

ment. Some people think that the article "Dizzy With Success" was written on Stalin's personal initiative. That is nonsense, of course. It is not for the purpose of permitting anybody, whoever it may be, to exercise his personal initiative in matters of this kind that we have our Central Committee. It was a reconnaissance in depth undertaken by the Central Committee. And when the depth and extent of the mistakes were ascertained, the Central Committee was quick in striking at these mistakes with all the force of its prestige, and issued its celebrated decision of March 15, 1930.

It is difficult to halt and divert to the right path people who are galloping at a furious pace and rushing headlong towards a precipice. But our Central Committee is called the Central Committee of the Leninist Party precisely for the reason that it is able to overcome difficulties even greater than these. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

It is difficult in such cases for whole sections of the Party to stop their onrush, to turn to the right path in time and to reform their ranks while on the march. But our Party is called the Party of Lenin precisely for the reason that it possesses sufficient flexibility to overcome such difficulties. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

The main thing is to have the courage to admit one's mistakes and to have the strength to correct them in the shortest possible time. The fear of admitting the mistakes committed after the intoxication by recent successes, fear of self-criticism, unwillingness to correct mistakes quickly and decisively—that is the main difficulty. All that is needed is to overcome this difficulty, to cast aside inflated figures and bureaucratic office maximalism, to switch our attention over to the tasks of the organizational and economic development of the collective farms, and these mistakes will be eliminated without leaving a trace. There is no reason whatever to doubt that, in the main, the Party has already overcome this dangerous difficulty.

"All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished," says Lenin, "did so because they grew conceited, failed to see where their strength lay, and feared to speak of their weaknesses. But we shall not perish, for we do

, not fear to speak of our weaknesses and will learn to overcome them."* (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61.)

These words of Lenin must not be forgotten.

Fourth question. Is not the fight against distortions of the Party line a step backward, a retreat?

Answer. Of course not! Only those who regard the continuation of mistakes and distortions as an offensive, and the fight against errors as a retreat, can speak of this as a retreat. To wage an offensive by piling up mistakes and distortions—that would be a fine "offensive," indeed.

We proposed the agricultural artel as the principal form of the collective-farm movement at the present moment and provided appropriate model rules as a guide in the work of collective-farm development. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We proposed the consolidation of the bond in the sphere of production, between the working class and poor peasants on the one hand and the middle peasants on the other, as the basis for the collective-farm movement at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We advanced the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class as the principal slogan in our practical work in the rural districts at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

In January 1930, we decided on a definite rate of collectivization of agriculture in the U.S.S.R., dividing up the regions of the U.S.S.R. into a number of groups and determining the rate of development for each group. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

Where, then, is the Party's "retreat"?

We want those who have made mistakes and are responsible for distortions to retreat from their mistakes. We want the blockheads to retreat from their blockheadedness to the position of Leninism. We want this, because only if this is done shall we be able to continue the *real* offensive against our class enemies. Does this mean that we are taking a step backward? Of course not!

* My italics.—J.St.

It merely means that we want to conduct a *proper* offensive and not engage in a muddleheaded pretense at offensive.

Is it not obvious that only cranks and "Left" distortionists can regard this line of the Party as a retreat?

Those who are chattering about a retreat fail to understand at least two things.

a) They do not know the laws of an offensive. They do not understand that when an offensive is being prosecuted, *unless* the positions already captured *are consolidated*, the offensive is doomed to failure.

When can an offensive be successful, in the military sphere, let us say? When the people concerned do not confine themselves to a headlong advance, but try at the same time to *consolidate* the captured positions, to *regroup* their forces in accordance with the changed situation, to *bring up* the services and *move up* reserves. Why is all this necessary? In order to be protected against surprises, in order to close up breaches in the line which may be caused in every offensive, and thus to prepare for the complete rout of the enemy. The mistake the Polish army made in 1920, if we take only the military aspect of the matter, was that it neglected this rule. This, among other reasons, is why, after a headlong advance to Kiev, it was forced to retreat just as hastily back to Warsaw. The mistake the Soviet forces made in 1920, again if we take only the military aspect of the matter, was that in their advance on Warsaw they repeated the mistake of the Poles.

The same must be said about the laws of an offensive on the front of the class struggle. It is impossible to conduct a successful offensive with the object of eliminating the class enemies *unless we consolidate* the positions already captured, *unless we regroup* our forces, supply the front with *reserves*, bring up the *services*, etc.

The whole point is that the blockheads do not understand the laws of an offensive. The whole point is that the Party does understand them and applies them in practice.

b) They do not understand the class nature of the offensive. They shout about an offensive. But an offensive against *which* class, in alliance with *which* class? We are conducting an offensive

against the capitalist elements in the countryside in alliance with the middle peasants, for only such an offensive can bring us victory. But what if, owing to the excessive ardour of individual sections of the Party, the offensive begins to swerve from the right path and its spearhead is turned against our ally, against the middle peasant? Is it *any kind* of offensive we want, and not an offensive against a definite class in alliance with a definite class? Don Quixote also imagined that he was attacking enemies when he attacked windmills. But we know that he only got a bruised head from this imaginary offensive.

Evidently, our "Left" distortionists are envious of the laurels of Don Quixote.

Fifth question. Which is the principal danger, the Right or the "Left"?

Answer. The principal danger at the present time is the Right danger. The Right danger has been, and still is, the principal danger.

Does not this thesis contradict the well-known thesis in the decision of the Central Committee of March 15, 1930, to the effect that the mistakes and distortions of the "Left" distortionists are now the principal hindrance to the collective-farm movement? No, it does not. The fact of the matter is that the mistakes of the "Left" distortionists in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are of a kind which create favourable conditions for strengthening and consolidating the Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these mistakes put the line of the Party in a false light—consequently, they help to discredit the Party—and, therefore, facilitate the struggle of the Right elements against the Party leadership. Discrediting the Party leadership is the elementary basis on which alone the fight of the Right deviationists against the Party can be waged. The "Left" distortionists, their mistakes and distortions, provide the Right deviationists with this basis. Therefore, if we are to combat Right opportunism successfully we must overcome the mistakes of the "Left" opportunists. Objectively, the "Left" distortionists are the allies of the Right deviationists.

Such is the peculiar connection between "Left" opportunism and Right deviationism.

And it is this connection that explains the fact that certain "Lefts" so often talk about a bloc with the Rights. This also explains the peculiar phenomenon that a section of the "Lefts," who only yesterday were "conducting" a reckless offensive and tried to collectivize the U.S.S.R. in a matter of two or three weeks, are today lapsing into a state of passivity, are throwing up the sponge and are completely vacating the field in favour of the Right deviationists, thereby pursuing a line of real retreat (without quotation marks!) in the face of the kulaks.

The distinguishing feature of the present situation is that the fight against the mistakes of the "Left" distortionists is a prerequisite for and a peculiar form of the successful struggle against Right opportunism.

Sixth question. What significance is to be attached to the fact that a section of the peasants have withdrawn from the collective farms?

Answer. The withdrawal of a section of the peasants signifies that of late a number of unstable collective farms sprang up, which are now getting rid of their wavering elements. This means that sham collective farms will disappear, while the firmly established collective farms will remain and become stronger. I think that this is quite a normal phenomenon. Some comrades yield to despair over this, they become panic-stricken and convulsively clutch at inflated percentages of collectivization. Others gloat over this fact and prophesy the "collapse" of the collective-farm movement. Both, however, are profoundly mistaken. Both are very far removed from a Marxian understanding of the nature of the collective-farm movement.

In the first place, it is the so-called dead souls that are leaving the collective farms. It is not so much a withdrawal, as the exposure of a vacuum. Do we need dead souls? Of course not. In my opinion the North Caucasians and the Ukrainians are perfectly justified in dissolving the collective farms which consist of dead souls and in organizing really live and really

stable collective farms. The collective-farm movement will only benefit thereby.

In the second place, it is the alien elements, elements which are openly hostile to our cause, that are leaving the collective farms. Obviously, the sooner these elements are ejected the better for the collective-farm movement.

Finally, it is the wavering elements, those who cannot be regarded either as alien elements or as dead souls, that are leaving. These are the peasants whom we have been unable to convince of the correctness of our cause *today*, but whom we shall certainly convince *tomorrow*. The withdrawal of these peasants is a serious, although temporary, loss to the collective-farm movement. That is why the struggle for the wavering elements in the collective farms is now one of the most urgent tasks of the collective-farm movement.

It follows, therefore, that the withdrawal of a section of the peasants from the collective farms is not only an unfavourable phenomenon. It follows, that, inasmuch as this withdrawal rids the collective farms of dead souls and of downright alien elements, it is a beneficial process of invigoration and consolidation of the collective farms.

A month ago it was estimated that over 60 per cent of the farms in the grain-growing regions were collectivized. It is now clear that, as far as real and at all stable collective farms are concerned, this figure was obviously exaggerated. If, after the withdrawal of a section of the peasants, the collective-farm movement stabilizes at 40 per cent of all farms in the grain-growing regions—and that is certainly an attainable figure—it will be a great achievement for the collective-farm movement at the present moment. I am taking the average figure for the grain-growing regions, knowing very well that there are certain districts where solid collectivization has been achieved, covering from 80 to 90 per cent of the farms in the given districts. Forty per cent collectivization in the grain-growing regions will mean that by the spring of 1930 we shall have fulfilled the original five-year plan of collectivization *twice over*.

Who can dare deny the *decisive* character of this *historical* achievement in the socialist development of the U.S.S.R.?

Seventh question. Are the wavering peasants acting properly in leaving the collective farms?

Answer. No, they are not acting properly. In leaving the collective farms they are acting contrary to their own interests, for only the collective farms offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance. By leaving the collective farms they place themselves in a worse position, for they deprive themselves of the privileges and benefits which the Soviet government offers the collective farms. The mistakes and distortions committed in the collective farms are no excuse for leaving them. Mistakes must be rectified by joint efforts, and that implies staying in the collective farms. It will be all the easier to rectify them, since the Soviet government will combat them with all its might.

Lenin says:

"the small-farming system under commodity production *cannot* save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses." (Vol. XX, p. 122.)

Lenin says:

"There is no escape from poverty for the small farm." (Vol. XXIV, p. 540.)

Lenin says:

"If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin." (Vol. XX, p. 417.)

Lenin says:

"Only by collective, cooperative, artel labour will it be possible to emerge from the impasse into which the imperialist war has driven us." (Vol. XXIV, p. 537.)

Lenin says:

"It is essential to adopt joint cultivation on large model farms. Without that there can be no escape from the chaos, from the truly desperate condition, in which Russia finds herself." (Vol. XX, p. 418.)

What does all this signify?

It signifies that the collective farms are the *sole* means by which the peasants can escape from poverty and ignorance.

It is obvious that the peasants are not acting properly in leaving the collective farms.

Lenin says:

"Of course, from all the activities of the Soviet government you know what *tremendous significance* we attach to the communes, artels, and all organizations generally that aim at transforming and gradually assisting the transformation of small, individual, peasant farming into social, cooperative or artel farming."* (Vol. XXIV, p. 579.)

Lenin says:

"The Soviet government gave direct *preference* to communes and cooperative associations by putting them *in the forefront*."* (Vol. XXIII, p. 399.)

What does this mean?

This means that the Soviet government will give the collective farms privileges and preference over individual farms. It means that it will give the collective farms privileges in respect of land, the supply of machines, tractors, seed grain, etc., in respect of tax alleviation and in respect of credits.

Why does the Soviet government give privileges and preference to the collective farms?

Because the collective farms are the only means of saving the peasants from destitution.

Because preferential assistance to the collective farms is the most effective form of assistance to the poor and middle peasants.

A few days ago the Soviet government decided to *exempt* from taxation *for two years* all socialized draught animals in the collective farms (horses, oxen, etc.), all cows, pigs, sheep and poultry both in the collective possession of the collective farms and in the individual possession of the collective farmers.

In addition, the Soviet government decided to *prolong the term* of payment of arrears on credits granted to collective farmers until the end of the year, and to *waive* all fines and court penalties imposed prior to April 1 in the case of all peasants who have joined collective farms.

* My italics. — J.St.

Lastly, it decided to grant credits to the collective farms in the present year to the amount of 500,000,000 rubles.

These privileges will assist the peasants who are members of collective farms. These privileges will assist those peasants, members of collective farms, who withstood the wave of withdrawals from the collective farms, who have become steeled in the fight against the enemies of the collective farms, who have defended the collective farms and have kept the great banner of the collective-farm movement flying. These privileges will assist the poor and middle peasants, members of collective farms, who now comprise the main core of our collective farms, who will consolidate and mould our collective farms, and who will win over to the side of socialism millions and millions of peasants. These privileges will assist those peasants, members of collective farms, who now represent the principal force of the collective farms and who fully deserve to be called heroes of the collective-farm movement.

These privileges *will not be enjoyed* by the peasants who left the collective farms.

Is it not obvious that the peasants who leave the collective farms are making a mistake?

Is it not obvious that only by rejoining the collective farms can they ensure these privileges for themselves?

Eighth question. What about the communes, should they not be dissolved?

Answer. No, they should not, and there is no reason why they should be dissolved. I have in mind real communes and not those which exist only on paper. In the grain-growing regions of the Soviet Union there are a number of excellent communes that deserve to be encouraged and supported. I have in mind the old communes which have survived years of trial, which have become steeled in the fight and have fully justified their existence. They should not be dissolved; instead, they should be reorganized into artels.

The organization and administration of communes is a complicated and difficult matter. Large and well-established communes can exist and develop only if they possess experienced cadres and tried leaders. A hasty transition from the rules of the artel to the

rules of the commune may only repel the peasants from the collective-farm movement. That is why this matter must be treated with great caution and without any haste. The artel is a simpler affair and more easily understood by the large mass of the peasants. That is why the artel is the most widespread form of the collective-farm movement at the present time. Only as the agricultural artels become firmly rooted and strong will the ground be prepared for a mass movement of the peasants towards the communes. But this will not happen very soon. That is why the commune, which represents a higher form, can become the principal element in the collective-farm movement only in the future.

Ninth question. What about the kulaks?

Answer. So far we have spoken about the middle peasant. The middle peasant is an ally of the working class and our policy towards him must be a friendly one. The case of the kulak is different. The kulak is an enemy of the Soviet government. There is not and cannot be peace between him and us. Our policy towards the kulaks is to eliminate them as a class. That, of course, does not mean that we can eliminate them at one stroke. But it does mean that we shall proceed in such a way as to surround and eliminate them.

Here is what Lenin says about the kulaks:

"The kulaks are the most brutal, callous and savage exploiters, who in the history of other countries have time and again restored the power of the landlords, tsars, priests and capitalists. The kulaks are more numerous than the landlords and capitalists. Nevertheless, the kulaks are a minority of the people.... These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want suffered by the people in the war; they have raked in thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by screwing up the prices of grain and other products. These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the peasants who have been ruined by the war, at the expense of the hungry workers. These leeches sucked the blood of the toilers and grew richer as the workers in the cities and factories starved. These vampires have been gathering and are gathering the landed estates into their hands; they keep on enslaving the poor peasants." (Vol. XXIII, pp. 206-07.)

We tolerated these bloodsuckers, spiders and vampires and pursued the policy of restricting their exploiting proclivities. We

tolerated them because we had no substitute for the kulak farms, for kulak production. We are now in a position to substitute, and more than substitute, for their farms our collective farms and state farms. There is no need to tolerate these spiders and blood-suckers any longer. To tolerate any longer these spiders and blood-suckers, who are setting fire to collective farms, murdering active collective-farm workers and attempting to disrupt the sowing campaign, would mean to go against the interests of the workers and the peasants.

That is why the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class must be pursued with all the persistence and consistency of which Bolsheviks are capable.

Tenth question. What is the immediate practical task of the collective farms?

Answer. The immediate practical task of the collective farms is to get the sowing done, to fight for the largest possible extension of the crop area, to fight for the proper organization of the sowing.

All other tasks of the collective farms must now be adapted to the task of sowing.

All other work in the collective farms must now be subordinated to the work of organizing the sowing.

This means that the stability of the collective farms and of their active non-Party members, the ability of the collective-farm leaders and the Bolshevik nucleus among them, will be tested not by bombastic resolutions and pompous messages of greetings, but by the actual work of correctly organizing the sowing.

But in order to fulfil this practical task with honour the attention of the collective-farm executives must be directed towards the *economic* problems of collective-farm development, towards the *internal* problems of building up the collective farms.

Until recently, collective-farm executives were mainly concerned with chasing after high figures of collectivization and refused to see the difference between real collectivization and collectivization on paper. This passion for figures must now be

abandoned. The attention of the executives must now be concentrated on consolidating the collective farms, on the organizational moulding of the collective farms, on organizing the practical work of the collective farms.

Until recently, the attention of collective-farm executives was concentrated on the organization of large collective-farm units, on the organization of the so-called "giants"; and not infrequently these "giants" developed into huge red-tape headquarters, devoid of economic roots in the villages. Window-dressing thus swallowed up practical work. This passion for window-dressing must now be abandoned. Attention must now be concentrated on the organizational and economic work of the collective farms in the villages. When this work begins to yield good results the "giants" will spring up as a matter of course.

Until recently, little attention was paid to enlisting the middle peasants for leading positions in the collective farms. Yet there are efficient managers among the middle peasants who are capable of becoming excellent executives in collective farms. This defect in our work must now be removed. Our duty now is to enlist the best of the middle peasants for leading positions in the collective farms and to give them the opportunity to develop their abilities in this sphere.

Until recently, insufficient attention was paid to work among peasant women. The past period has shown that work among peasant women is the weakest spot in our activity. This defect must now be removed resolutely and for good.

Until recently, the Communists in a number of regions assumed that they could solve all the problems of collective-farm development by their own efforts. On this assumption, they paid insufficient attention to enlisting non-Party people for responsible work in the collective farms, to promoting non-Party workers to leading positions in the collective farms, to organizing large groups of active non-Party people in the collective farms. The history of our Party has shown, and the period just elapsed in collective-farm development has demonstrated once more, that such a course is fundamentally wrong. If Communists were to shut

themselves up in their shells and wall themselves off from non-Party people, they would ruin the whole cause. One of the reasons why the Communists succeeded in covering themselves with glory in the fight for socialism and why the enemies of communism were beaten was that the Communists knew how to enlist the best elements among non-Party people for the cause, that they drew their forces from among the broad strata of non-Party people and knew how to surround the Party with large numbers of active non-Party people. This defect in our work among those who are not members of the Party must now be removed, resolutely and for good.

To remove these defects in our work, to eradicate them completely means, in fact, to place the *economic* work in the collective farms on a sound basis.

Hence:

1. The proper organization of the sowing—that is the task.
2. The concentration of attention on the economic problems of the collective-farm movement—that is the means necessary for the fulfilment of the task.

Pravda, No. 92,
April 3, 1930

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES

*Speech Delivered at the First All-Union
Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry*

February 4, 1931

Comrades! The deliberations of your conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions—I am somewhat familiar with them—you approve the control figures of industry for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in the habit of fulfilling their pledges. But what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. And this is a very big task. More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only promise to fulfil our five-year plan in four years—that is a settled matter, and no more resolutions are needed on that score—*it means that you promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive branches of industry.*

It is good that the conference gives a promise to fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience." We know that promises are not always kept. In the beginning of 1930, also, a promise was given to fulfil the plan for the year. At that time it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31 to 32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the full. Actually, the increase in industrial output in 1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask ourselves: will not the same thing occur again this year? The directors and managing staffs of our industries now promise to increase the industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee have we that this promise will be kept?

What is needed to fulfil the control figures, to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure the fulfilment of the five-year

plan not in four, but, as regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are needed for this.

First, real or, as we term it, "objective" possibilities.

Second, the willingness and ability to direct our enterprises in such a way as to realize these possibilities.

Did we have the "objective" possibilities last year for completely fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable facts testify to this. The facts are that in March and April of last year industrial output showed an increase of 31 per cent as compared with the previous year. Why then did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? What was lacking? *The ability to make use of the available possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the factories, mills and mines properly was lacking.*

We had the first condition: the "objective" possibilities for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because we lacked the ability to manage the factories properly, the plan was not carried out in full. Instead of 31 to 32 per cent increase we had only 25 per cent.

Of course, a 25 per cent *increase* is a big thing. Not a single capitalist country *increased* its production in 1930, nor are there any that are *increasing* production now. All capitalist countries without exception show a sharp *decline* in production. Under such circumstances a 25 per cent *increase* is a big step forward. But we could have achieved more. We had all the necessary "objective" conditions for this.

Thus, what guarantee is there that what happened last year will not happen again this year; that the plan will be fulfilled, that proper advantage will be taken of the available possibilities; that your promise will not to some extent remain a promise on paper?

In the history of states and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when every opportunity for success and victory was on hand, but these opportunities

were wasted because the leaders failed to notice them, did not know how to take advantage of them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil the control figures for 1931?

Yes, we have these possibilities.

What are these possibilities? What are the necessary factors that make these possibilities real?

First of all, adequate *natural resources* in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for example, which represent a combination of wealth that cannot be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain—what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a year or two we will have our own rubber as well. As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. We have even more than enough.

What else is needed?

A government capable and willing to utilize these immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. Have we such a government? We have. True, our work in utilizing natural resources is sometimes accompanied by friction among our own executives. For instance, last year the Soviet government had to contend with a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating a second coal and metal base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles and shall soon have this base.

What else is needed?

That this government should enjoy the *support* of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will find no other government in the world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet government. There is no need for me to enlarge on the growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock work, the campaign for challenge plans. All these facts,

which clearly demonstrate the support which the vast masses give the Soviet government, are well known.

What else is needed to fulfil and overfulfil the control figures for 1931?

A *system* which is free of the incurable diseases of capitalism and which is greatly superior to capitalism. Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses—such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of national economy. We are free of the incurable diseases of capitalism. This is what distinguishes us from capitalism; this is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism.

See how the capitalists are trying to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages to a minimum. They are reducing the prices of raw materials as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and consumer goods to any appreciable degree. This means that they want to overcome the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, at the expense of the workers and peasants, at the expense of the toilers. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions accumulate which lead to a new, and even more severe crisis.

The superiority of our system lies in that we have no crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production; for we are conducting a planned economy. Nor is this all. We are a land of the most concentrated industry in the world. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past consisted in the fact that this industry was based upon scattered and small-peasant farming. That was the case in the past; it is no longer the case now. Soon,

perhaps within a year, we will become the land of agriculture run on the largest scale in the world. This year, the state farms and collective farms—and these are forms of large-scale agriculture—have already supplied half of all the grain available for the market. And that shows that our system, the Soviet system, affords opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.

What else is needed to advance with seven-league strides?

A *Party* sufficiently solid and united to direct the efforts of all the best members of the working class to *one purpose*, one sufficiently experienced not to be dismayed by difficulties, and systematically to pursue a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a Party? Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is; for it has resulted in important successes. This is now admitted not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known "honourable" gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in England, Poincaré in France, fume and rave against our Party! Why do they fume and rave in this way? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is achieving success after success.

Such, comrades, are the objective possibilities which should help us to fulfil the control figures for 1931, which should enable us to fulfil the five-year plan in four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus we have the first condition for the fulfilment of the plan—the "objective" possibilities.

Have we the second condition, the ability to take advantage of these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills and mines efficiently run? Is everything in order in this respect?

Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, as Bolsheviks, we must say this frankly and openly.

What does management of production mean? There are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik approach to the question of industrial management. There are many people among us who think that management is synonymous with signing papers

and orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how Mother Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: "Don't bother your head with science, don't go into details, let others do that, it is not your business—your business is to sign papers." It must be admitted to our shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a few who exercise their managing functions by signing papers. But as for going into the details of the business, learning technique, becoming master of the business—why, that is out of the question.

How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter Civil War, who have solved the vast problem of building up a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry to the path of socialism—how is it that in the matter of industrial management we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to manage production. And so, many business executives chose this line of least resistance. We, too, in the centre, bear a share of the blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers—the experts—carry on production, and you, Communists, do not interfere with the technique of the business; but while not interfering, study technique, study the art of management tirelessly, in order, later on, to become, together with the experts who are loyal to us, true leaders of industry, true masters of the business." Such was the slogan. But how did it work out? The second part of this formula was cast aside, for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first part of the formula was vulgarized: noninterference was interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once warned us that all was not well in this field. The Shakhty case was the first grave warning. The

Shakhty case showed that the Party organizations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business executives were disgracefully backward in regard to the knowledge of technology; that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, were more prone to engage in wrecking activities, especially as they were constantly being besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad.

The second warning was the "Industrial Party" trial.

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy is furiously resisting the socialist offensive. This alone, however, is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth of wrecking activities.

How is it that sabotage has assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. Had we handled the business of industrial management differently, had we started much earlier to learn the technique of the business, to master technique, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of production, the wreckers could not have done so much damage.

We must ourselves become experts, masters of the business; we must turn to technical science—such was the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first warning nor even the second brought about the necessary change. It is time, it is high time that we turned towards technique. It is time we cast aside the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of noninterference in technique, and ourselves become specialists, experts, complete masters of our economy.

It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man management? We do not have it and will not have it until we have mastered technique. Until there are among us Bolsheviks a sufficient number of people thoroughly familiar with technique, economics and finance, we will not have real one-man management. You can write as many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as you please, but, unless you master the technique, economics and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, to become the masters of the business ourselves. This is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that one-man management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today; but tomorrow we will. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire to do so.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the prerevolutionary poet: "You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia." Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: "You are abundant," so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: "You are poor and impotent," so you can be beaten and

plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence, you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty—therefore you are right; hence, we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed.

This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

But we have other, still more serious and more important obligations. They are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. This is a fitting definition. But this imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish a working-

class state, we were the first to start building socialism. By the fact that we are doing work which, if successful, will change the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, may say: This is my vanguard, this is my shock brigade, this is my working-class state, this is my fatherland; they are promoting their cause, which is *our* cause, and they are doing this well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not live up to the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want utterly to disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international.

As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to economic management during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output as compared with the prewar level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished more had we tried hard during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance which separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to take proper advantage of these possibilities. And that depends on us. *Only on us!* It is time we learned to take advantage of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten policy of noninterference in production. It is time to adopt a new policy, a policy adapted to the present times—the policy of *interfering in everything*. If you are a factory manager, then interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must

master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything. And a business executive who does not want to study technique, who does not want to master technique, is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have swung the middle peasants to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we will develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we will do that if we really want to.

NEW CONDITIONS—NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

*Speech Delivered
at a Conference of Business Executives
June 23, 1931*

Comrades! The materials presented to this conference show that as regards the fulfilment of the plan our industry presents a rather motley picture. Some branches of industry have increased output during the past five months 40 to 50 per cent as compared with last year. Other branches have increased output not more than 20 to 30 per cent. And, finally, there are certain branches that show a very small increase, only 6 to 10 per cent, and even less. Among the latter we must include coal mining and the iron and steel industry. The picture, as you see, is a motley one.

How is this to be explained? What is the reason for the fact that certain branches of industry are lagging behind others? Why is it that certain branches of industry show an increase of only 20 to 25 per cent while coal mining and the iron and steel industry show even a smaller increase and are trailing behind other branches?

The reason is that lately the conditions of development of industry have radically changed; new conditions demanding new methods of management have arisen; but some of our business executives, instead of changing their methods, are still continuing in the old way. Hence, the new conditions of development of industry demand new methods of work; but some of our business executives do not see this and do not realize that they must now adopt new methods of management.

That is the reason why certain of our industries are lagging behind.

What are these new conditions of development of our industry? How did they arise?

We can enumerate at least six such new conditions.

Let us examine them.

I LABOUR POWER

First of all, there is the question of the supply of *labour power* for our factories. Formerly, the workers themselves usually came to the factories and mills to seek work—hence, to some extent, things were left to take their own course in this sphere. And things could be allowed to take their own course because there was unemployment, there was class differentiation among the rural population, there was poverty and fear of starvation, which drove people from the countryside to the towns. You remember the formula: “The flight of the muzhik from the countryside to the towns?” What compelled the peasant to flee from the countryside to the towns? The fear of starvation, unemployment, the fact that the village was like a stepmother to him, and he was ready to flee from his village to the devil himself, if only he could find some sort of work.

Such, or nearly such, was the state of affairs in the recent past.

Can it be said that the same conditions prevail now? No, it cannot. On the contrary, conditions have now radically changed. And because conditions have changed we no longer have a spontaneous influx of labour power.

What, in point of fact, has changed during this period? Firstly, we have done away with unemployment—hence we have abolished a powerful element which strongly influenced the “labour market.” Secondly, we have cut at the root of class differentiation in the countryside—hence we have abolished mass destitution which drove the peasant from the countryside to the towns. And, finally, we have supplied the rural districts with tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines; we have smashed the kulak, we have organized collective farms and have given the peasants the opportunity to live and work like human beings. The countryside can no longer be regarded as a stepmother to the peasant. And precisely because it can no longer be regarded as a stepmother, the peasant is beginning to settle down

in the countryside; we no longer have the "flight of the muzhik from the countryside to the towns" nor a spontaneous influx of labour power.

As you see, we now have an entirely new situation and new conditions in regard to the supply of labour power for our factories.

What follows from this?

It follows, first, that we must no longer count on a spontaneous influx of labour power. This means that we must pass from the "policy" of waiting for the spontaneous influx to the policy of *organized* recruiting of workers for industry. But there is only one way of achieving this—that of contracts concluded between industrial enterprises and the collective farms and collective farmers. As you are aware, certain industrial enterprises and collective farms have already adopted this method; and experience has shown that this practice yields important advantages both for the collective farms and for the industrial enterprises.

It follows, secondly, that we must proceed immediately to *mechanize* the heavier processes of labour and develop this mechanization to the utmost (timber industry, building industry, coal mining, loading and unloading, transport, iron and steel industry, etc.). This, of course, does not mean that we must abandon manual labour entirely. On the contrary, manual labour will continue to play an important part in production for a long time to come. But it does mean that mechanization of labour processes is the *new* and *decisive* factor, without which we shall be unable to maintain either our tempo or the new scale of production.

There are still quite a number of our business executives who do not "believe" either in mechanization or in contracts with collective farms. These are the executives who fail to understand the new conditions, who do not want to work in the new way and sigh for the "good old times" when labour power "flocked" to industrial enterprises "of their own accord." Needless to say, such business executives are as remote from the new tasks in economic construction, which are imposed by the new conditions, as the

sky from the earth. Evidently they think that the difficulties in the supply of labour power are of a fortuitous nature and that the shortage of labour power will disappear of its own accord, so to speak. This is a delusion, comrades. The difficulties in the supply of labour power cannot disappear of themselves. They will disappear only as a result of our own efforts.

Hence, the task is to recruit labour power in an organized way, by concluding contracts with the collective farms, and to mechanize labour.

This is the position with regard to the first new condition of development of our industry.

Let us turn to the second condition.

II WAGES

I have just spoken about the organized recruiting of workers for our factories. But recruiting workers is only part of the job. In order to ensure the necessary labour power for our factories we must see to it that the workers remain in the factories and that the latter have a more or less permanent personnel. It need hardly be proved that without a permanent labour force who have more or less mastered the technique of production and have become accustomed to the new machinery it will be impossible to make any headway, impossible to fulfil the production plans. Unless this is achieved, we shall have to keep on training new workers and to spend half the time on training them instead of making use of this time for production. What is actually happening now? Can it be said that our factories have a more or less permanent labour force? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. On the contrary, we still have a heavy turnover of labour power in our factories. Moreover, in a number of factories the turnover of labour power is not shrinking, but, on the contrary, is increasing and becoming more marked. At any rate, you will find few factories where the personnel does not change at least to the extent of 30 to 40 per

cent of the total in the course of a half year, or even in one quarter.

Formerly, during the period of restoration of our industry, when its technical equipment was not very complex and the scale of production not very large, it was more or less possible to "tolerate" this so-called turnover of labour power. Now it is another matter. Conditions have changed radically. Now, in the period of intensive reconstruction, when the scale of production has become gigantic and technical equipment has become extremely complex, the heavy turnover of labour power has become the plague of production, which is disorganizing our factories. To "tolerate" the heavy turnover of labour power now would mean disintegrating our industry, it would mean wrecking the opportunities of fulfilling production plans and ruining the opportunities of improving the quality of the articles produced.

What is the cause of the heavy turnover of labour power?

The cause is the wrong structure of wages, the wrong wage scales, the "Leftist" practice of wage equalization. In a number of our factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. The consequence of wage equalization is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "visitor" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to "earn a little" and then go off to "seek his fortune" elsewhere. The consequence of wage equalization is that the skilled worker is obliged to wander from factory to factory until he finds one where his skill is properly appreciated.

Hence, the "general" drift from factory to factory; hence, the heavy turnover of labour power.

In order to put an end to this evil we must abolish wage equalization and discard the old wage scales. In order to put an end to this evil we must draw up wage scales that will take into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. We cannot tolerate a situation where a

rolling-mill hand in a steel mill earns no more than a sweeper. We cannot tolerate a situation where a locomotive driver earns only as much as a copying clerk. Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and unskilled labour would exist even under socialism, even after classes had been abolished; that only under communism would this difference disappear and that, consequently, even under socialism "wages" must be paid according to work performed and not according to needs. But the equalitarians among our business executives and trade union officials do not agree with this and believe that under our Soviet system this difference has already disappeared. Who is right, Marx and Lenin, or the equalitarians? We must take it that it is Marx and Lenin who are right. But if that is so, it follows that whoever draws up wage scales on the "principle" of wage equalization, without taking into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, breaks with Marxism, breaks with Leninism.

In every branch of industry, in every factory, in every shop, there is a leading group of more or less skilled workers whom it is our immediate and urgent duty to retain in industry if we really want to secure for the factories a permanent labour force. These leading groups of workers are the essential element in production. By retaining them in the factory, in the shop, we can retain the whole personnel and put an end to the heavy turnover of labour power. But how can we retain them in the factories? We can retain them only by promoting them to higher positions, by raising the level of their wages, by introducing a system of wages that will give the worker his due according to qualification.

And what does promoting them to higher positions and raising their wage level imply as far as unskilled workers are concerned? It implies, apart from everything else, opening up prospects for the unskilled worker and giving him an incentive to rise higher, to rise to the category of a skilled worker. You know yourselves that we now need hundreds of thousands and even millions of skilled workers. But in order to build up cadres of skilled workers, we must provide an incentive for the unskilled workers, provide for them a prospect of advancement, of rising to

a higher position. And the more boldly we do this the better; for this is the principal means of putting an end to the heavy labour turnover. To economize in this matter would be criminal, it would be going against the interests of our socialist industry.

But that is not all.

In order to retain the workers in the factories we must still further improve the supply of food and consumer goods for the workers and improve their housing conditions. It cannot be denied that a good deal has been accomplished during the last few years in the sphere of housing construction and as regards improving the supply of food and consumer goods for the workers. But what has been accomplished is altogether inadequate compared with the rapidly growing requirements of the workers. It will not do to plead that there were fewer houses before than there are now and that therefore we can rest content with the results achieved. Nor will it do to plead that workers' supplies were far worse before than they are now and therefore we can be satisfied with the present situation. Only those who are rotten to the core can content themselves with references to what existed in the past. We must proceed, not from the past, but from the growing requirements of the workers today. We must realize that the conditions of life of the workers have radically changed in our country. The worker today is not what he was before. The worker today, our Soviet worker, wants to have all his material and cultural needs satisfied: in respect of food, housing conditions, cultural and all other requirements. He has a right to this, and it is our duty to secure these conditions for him. True, our worker does not suffer from unemployment; he is free from the yoke of capitalism; he is no longer a slave, but the master of his job. But this is not enough. He demands that all his material and cultural requirements be met, and it is our duty to fulfil his demand. Do not forget that we ourselves are now presenting certain demands to the workers—we demand labour discipline, intense effort, emulation, shock work. Do not forget that the vast majority of workers have accepted these demands of the Soviet government with great enthusiasm and are fulfilling them

heroically. Do not be surprised, therefore, if, while fulfilling the demands of the Soviet government, the workers in their turn demand that the Soviet government should fulfil its pledge further to improve their material and cultural condition.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to the heavy turnover of labour power, to do away with wage equalization, to organize wages properly and to improve the living conditions of the workers.*

This is the position with regard to the second new condition of development of our industry.

Let us turn to the third condition.

III THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK

I have said that it is necessary to put an end to the heavy turnover of labour power, to retain the workers in the factories. But retaining the workers in the factories is not all; the matter does not end there. It is not enough to put an end to the heavy turnover of labour power. We must place the workers in conditions that will enable them to work efficiently, to increase their productivity and to improve the quality of the products. Consequently, we must so organize work in the factories as to bring about an increase in labour productivity from month to month, from quarter to quarter.

Can it be said that the present organization of labour in our factories meets the modern requirements of production? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. At all events, there are still a number of factories where work is organized abominably, where instead of order and coordination of work there is disorder and confusion, where instead of responsibility for the work there is absolute irresponsibility, absolute *lack of personal responsibility*.

What does lack of personal responsibility mean? It means complete lack of responsibility for work that is entrusted to anyone, lack of responsibility for machinery and tools. Naturally, when there is no personal responsibility we cannot expect a tangible

increase in productivity of labour, an improvement in the quality of the goods, the exercise of care in handling machinery and tools. You know what lack of personal responsibility led to on the railways. It is leading to the same result in industry. We have abolished the system under which there was lack of personal responsibility on the railways and have thus improved their work. We must do the same in industry in order to raise its work to a higher level.

Formerly, we could "manage" somehow or other with bad organization of labour, which gets on quite nicely without personal responsibility, without every man being responsible for the job entrusted to him. Now it is a different matter. Conditions have entirely changed. With the present vast scale of production and the existence of giant enterprises, lack of personal responsibility has become the plague of industry which is jeopardizing all our achievements in our factories in the sphere of production and organization.

How is it that lack of personal responsibility has become the rule in a number of our factories? It entered the factories as the illegitimate companion of the uninterrupted working-week. It would be wrong to assert that the uninterrupted week necessarily leads to lack of personal responsibility in production. If work is properly organized, if every one is made responsible for a definite job, if definite groups of workers are assigned to machines, if the shifts are properly organized so that they are equal in quality and skill—given such conditions, the uninterrupted week leads to a tremendous increase in labour productivity, to an improvement in quality of work and to the eradication of the system under which there is a lack of personal responsibility. Such is the case on the railways, for example, where the uninterrupted week is in force, but where the system under which there was no personal responsibility has been done away with. Can it be said that the position in regard to the uninterrupted week is equally satisfactory in industrial enterprises? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. The fact of the matter is that a number of our factories adopted the uninterrupted week

far too hastily, without the necessary preparations, without properly organizing shifts so that they are more or less equal in quality and skill, without making each worker responsible for a definite job. The result is that the uninterrupted week, left to itself, has given rise to a lack of personal responsibility. The result is that in a number of factories we have the uninterrupted week on paper, in words, and lack of personal responsibility, not on paper, but in actual operation. The result is that there is no sense of responsibility for the job, machines are handled carelessly and break down frequently, and there is no incentive for increasing the productivity of labour. It is not for nothing that the workers say: "We could raise the productivity of our labour and bring about real improvement; but who is going to appreciate it if nobody is responsible for anything?"

It follows from this that some of our comrades were a little too hasty in introducing the uninterrupted week, and in their hurry distorted it and transformed it into a system under which personal responsibility is eliminated.

There are two ways of putting an end to this situation and of doing away with lack of personal responsibility: either change the method of enforcing the uninterrupted week so that it does not result in lack of personal responsibility, as was done on the railways, or, where the conditions do not favour this, abandon the nominal uninterrupted week, temporarily adopt the interrupted, six-day week, as was recently done in the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and then set about creating the conditions that will permit of a return, should the need arise, to a real, not nominal, uninterrupted week; and eventually return to the uninterrupted week, but not to lack of personal responsibility.

There is no other way.

There can be no doubt that our business executives understand this very well. But they keep silent. Why? Because, evidently, they fear the truth. But since when have Bolsheviks begun to fear the truth? Is it not true that in a number of factories the uninterrupted week has resulted in lack of personal responsibility and has thus been distorted to the extreme? The question

is: who wants such an uninterrupted week? Who can dare assert that the preservation of this nominal and distorted uninterrupted week is more important than the proper organization of work, than increased productivity of labour, than a genuine uninterrupted week, than the interests of our socialist industry? Is it not clear that the sooner we bury the nominal uninterrupted week the sooner will we achieve a proper organization of work?

Some comrades think that we can do away with the lack of personal responsibility by means of incantations and glib speeches. At any rate, I know a number of business executives who in their fight against lack of personal responsibility confine themselves to speaking at meetings now and again, hurling curses at the lack of personal responsibility, evidently in the belief that after such speeches lack of personal responsibility will disappear of its own accord, spontaneously so to speak. They are grievously mistaken if they think that lack of personal responsibility can be done away with by speeches and incantations. No, comrades, lack of personal responsibility will never disappear of itself. We alone can and must put an end to it; for it is we who are at the helm and we are answerable for everything, including the lack of personal responsibility. I think that it would be far better if our business executives, instead of making speeches and incantations, spent a month or two at some mine or factory, studied every detail, however "minute," of the organization of work, put an end to lack of personal responsibility at these places and then applied the experience gained at this enterprise to other enterprises. That would be far better. That would be really fighting against lack of personal responsibility, fighting for the proper, Bolshevik organization of work, for the proper distribution of forces in the factories.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to lack of personal responsibility, to improve the organization of work and to secure the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises.*

This is the position with regard to the third new condition of development of our industry.

Let us turn to the fourth condition.

IV

**A WORKING-CLASS INDUSTRIAL
AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA**

The situation has also changed in regard to the administrative staff of industry generally, and in regard to the engineering and technical personnel in particular.

Formerly, the main source of supply for our industry was the coal and iron and steel base in the Ukraine. The Ukraine supplied metal to all our industrial regions: the South, Moscow and Leningrad. It also supplied coal to the principal enterprises in the U.S.S.R. I leave out the Urals because it played an unimportant part in comparison with the Donets Basin. Accordingly, we had three main centres for training people for leading posts in industry: the South, the Moscow district and the Leningrad district. Naturally, under those conditions we could somehow manage with the very small engineering and technical forces that our country could possibly possess at that time.

Such was the situation in the recent past.

But the situation is now entirely different. Now it is obvious, I think, that if we maintain the present rate of development and gigantic scale of production the Ukrainian coal and iron and steel base will not suffice. As you are aware, the supply of Ukrainian coal and metal is already inadequate, in spite of the increase in their output. As you are aware, we have been obliged, as a result of this, to create a new coal and iron and steel base in the East—in the Urals-Kuzbas region. As you are aware, our work to create this base has been not without success. But that is not enough. We must proceed to create an iron and steel industry in Siberia itself to satisfy its own growing requirements. And we are already creating it. Besides this, we must create a new base for nonferrous metals in Kazakhstan and Turkestan. Finally, we must develop extensive railroad construction. That is dictated by the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a whole—by the interests of the border republics as well as of the centre.

But it follows from this that we can no longer manage our industry with the very small engineering, technical and administrative staffs with which we managed it formerly. It follows that the old centres for training engineering and technical forces are no longer adequate, that we must create a network of new centres—in the Urals, in Siberia and in Central Asia. We must now ensure the supply of three times, five times the number of engineering, technical and administrative staffs for industry if we really intend to carry out the program of the socialist industrialization of the U.S.S.R.

But we do not need just *any kind* of administrative, engineering and technical forces. We need *such* administrative, engineering and technical forces as are capable of understanding the policy of the working class of our country, are capable of assimilating that policy and are ready to carry it out conscientiously. And what does this mean? This means that our country has entered a phase of development in which the *working class must create its own industrial and technical intelligentsia*, one that is capable of upholding the interests of the working class in production as the interests of the ruling class.

No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia. There are no grounds for believing that the working class of the U.S.S.R. can manage without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

The Soviet government has taken this fact into account and has opened wide the doors of all the higher educational institutions in every branch of national economy to members of the working class and labouring peasantry. You know that tens of thousands of working class and peasant youths are now attending higher educational institutions. Formerly, under capitalism, the higher educational institutions were the monopoly of the scions of the rich—today, under the Soviet system, the working class and peasant youth predominate in these institutions. There is no doubt that our educational institutions will soon be turning out thousands of new technicians and engineers, new leaders for our industries.

But that is only one side of the matter. The other side is that the industrial and technical intelligentsia of the working class will be recruited not only from among those who have passed through the institutions of higher learning, but also from among practical workers in our factories, from the skilled workers, from among the working-class cultural forces in the mills, factories and mines. The initiators of socialist emulation, the leaders of shock brigades, those who inspire in practice labour enthusiasm, the organizers of work in the various sections of our construction—such is the new stratum of the working class that, together with the comrades who have passed through the institutions of higher learning, must form the core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core of the administrative staffs of our industry. It is our duty not to discourage these "rank-and-file" comrades who show initiative, but boldly to promote them to responsible positions; to give them the opportunity to display their organizing abilities and the opportunity to supplement their knowledge; to create suitable conditions for their work, not stinting money for this purpose.

Among these comrades not a few are non-Party people. But that should not prevent us from boldly promoting them to responsible positions. On the contrary, it is particularly these non-Party comrades who must receive our special attention, who must be promoted to responsible positions so that they may see for themselves that the Party appreciates capable and gifted workers.

Some comrades think that only Party members may be placed in leading positions in the mills and factories. This is the reason why they not infrequently shove aside non-Party comrades who possess ability and initiative and promote Party members instead, although they may be less capable and show no initiative. Needless to say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such a "policy," so-called. It need hardly be proved that such a "policy" can only discredit the Party and repel the non-Party workers from it. Our policy is by no means to transform the Party into an exclusive caste. Our policy is to create an atmosphere of "mutual confidence," of "mutual control" (*Lenin*) between Party

and non-Party workers. One of the reasons why our Party is strong among the working class is that it pursues such a policy.

Hence, the task is *to see to it that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.*

This is the position with regard to the fourth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us turn to the fifth condition.

V

SYMPTOMS OF A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THE OLD INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

The question of our attitude towards the old, bourgeois, industrial and technical intelligentsia is also presented in a new light.

About two years ago the more highly skilled section of the old technical intelligentsia was infected with the disease of wrecking. More than that, at that time wrecking was a sort of fad. Some engaged in wrecking, others shielded the wreckers, others again washed their hands of what was going on and remained neutral, while still others vacillated between the Soviet regime and the wreckers. Of course, the majority of the old technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally. But we are not speaking of the majority now, but of the more highly skilled section of the technical intelligentsia.

What gave rise to the wrecking movement? What fostered it? The intensification of the class struggle in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet government's policy of offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country, the resistance of the latter to the policy of the Soviet government, the complexity of the international situation and the difficulties attending collective-farm and state-farm development. While the activities of the militant section of the wreckers were augmented by the interventionist designs of the imperialists in capitalist countries and by the grain difficulties within our country, the vacillations of the other section

of the old technical intelligentsia towards the active wreckers were encouraged by utterances that were current among the Trotskyite-Menshevik windbags to the effect that "nothing will come of the collective farms and state farms," that "the Soviet power is degenerating anyhow and will shortly collapse," that "the Bolsheviks by their policy are themselves facilitating intervention," etc., etc. Besides, if even certain old Bolsheviks among the Right deviationists could not resist the "epidemic" and swerved away from the Party at that time, it is not surprising that a section of the old technical intelligentsia who had never breathed the spirit of Bolshevism, should, with the help of God, also vacillate.

Naturally, under such circumstances, the Soviet government could pursue only one policy towards the old technical intelligentsia—the policy of *smashing* the active wreckers, *separating* the neutrals and *enlisting* those who were loyal.

That was a year or two ago.

Can we say that the situation is exactly the same now? No, we cannot. On the contrary, an entirely new situation has arisen. To begin with, there is the fact that we have routed and are successfully overcoming the capitalist elements in town and country. Of course, this cannot evoke joy among the old intelligentsia. Very probably they still express sympathy for their defeated friends. But sympathizers, still less those who are neutral or who vacillate, are not in the habit of voluntarily agreeing to share the fate of their more active friends when the latter have suffered severe and irreparable defeat.

Further, we have overcome the grain difficulties; and not only have we overcome them but we are now exporting a larger quantity of grain than has ever been exported since the existence of the Soviet power. Consequently, this "argument" of the vacillators is also eliminated.

Furthermore, even the blind can now see that as regards the front of collective-farm and state-farm development we have gained a definite victory and achieved tremendous successes.

Consequently, the most important "stock in trade" of the old intelligentsia has gone by the board. As for the hopes of the

bourgeois intelligentsia for foreign intervention, it must be pointed out that, for the time being at least, they have proved to be a house built on sand. Indeed, for six years intervention has been promised, but not a single attempt at intervention has been made. It may as well be acknowledged that our sapient bourgeois intelligentsia has simply been led by the nose; not to mention the fact that the conduct of the active wreckers at the famous trial in Moscow was enough to discredit, and actually did discredit, the whole idea of wrecking.

Naturally, these new circumstances could not but influence our old technical intelligentsia. The new situation was bound to bring about, and actually has brought about, a new attitude on the part of the old technical intelligentsia. This, in fact, explains why we are observing definite signs of a change of attitude towards the Soviet regime on the part of a certain section of the intelligentsia who formerly sympathized with the wreckers. The fact that not only this section of the old intelligentsia, but even certain wreckers of yesterday, a considerable number of yesterday's wreckers, are beginning in many factories and mills to work hand in hand with the working class—this fact shows without a doubt that a change of attitude among the old technical intelligentsia has already begun. This, of course, does not mean that there are no longer any wreckers in the country. No, it does not mean that, Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we have classes and as long as we are surrounded by capitalist countries. But it does mean that since a large section of the old technical intelligentsia who formerly sympathized, in one way or another, with the wreckers have now turned to the side of the Soviet regime, the active wreckers have become few in number, are isolated and are compelled to lie low for the time being.

But it follows from this that we must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia accordingly. Whereas during the height of the wrecking activities our attitude towards the old technical intelligentsia was mainly expressed by the policy of routing them, now, when these intellectuals are turning to the side of the Soviet regime, our attitude towards them must be

expressed mainly in the policy of enlisting them and solicitude for them. It would be wrong and undialectical to continue our former policy under the new, changed conditions. It would be stupid and unwise to regard practically every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal and wrecker. We have always regarded and still regard "expert-baiting" as a harmful and disgraceful phenomenon.

Hence, the task is *to change our attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old school, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to display more boldness in enlisting their cooperation.*

This is the position with regard to the fifth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us now turn to the last condition.

VI BUSINESS ACCOUNTING

The picture would be incomplete if I did not deal with one more new condition. I refer to the sources of capital accumulation for our industry, for our national economy; I refer to the need for a faster rate of accumulation.

What is the new and peculiar feature of the development of our industry from the point of view of accumulation of resources? The new factor is that the old sources of accumulation are already beginning to prove inadequate for the further expansion of industry; that it is therefore necessary to seek for new sources of accumulation and to reinforce the old sources if we really want to maintain and develop the Bolshevik tempo in industrialization.

The history of capitalist countries shows that not a single young state that desired to raise its industry to a higher level was able to dispense with external aid in the form of long-term credits or loans. For this reason the capitalists in the Western countries have refused point-blank any credits or loans to our country,

in the belief that the lack of credits and loans was bound to disrupt the industrialization of our country. But the capitalists were mistaken. They failed to take into account the fact that our country, unlike capitalist countries, possesses certain special sources of accumulation sufficient to restore and further develop our industry. And indeed, not only have we restored our industry, not only have we restored our agriculture and transport, but we have already tackled the tremendous task of reconstructing our heavy industry, our agriculture and transport. Of course, this cost us tens of milliards of rubles. Where did we get these milliards? From light industry, from agriculture and from budget accumulations. This is how we have managed up to recently.

But the situation is entirely different now. Whereas formerly the old sources of capital accumulation were sufficient for the reconstruction of industry and transport, now they are obviously becoming inadequate. Now it is not a question of reconstructing our old industries. It is a question of creating new, technically well-equipped industries in the Urals, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan. It is a question of creating new, large-scale farming in the grain-growing and stock-raising districts of the U.S.S.R. and in the districts producing raw materials. It is a question of creating a new network of railroads connecting the East and West of the U.S.S.R. Obviously, the old sources of accumulation are inadequate for this gigantic task.

But this is not all. To this must be added the fact that owing to inefficiency the principles of business accounting are grossly violated in a large number of our factories and business organizations. It is a fact that a number of enterprises and business organizations have long ceased to keep proper accounts, to calculate, to draw up sound balance sheets of income and expenditure. It is a fact that in a number of enterprises and business organizations such concepts as "regime of economy," "cutting down unproductive expenditure," "rationalization of production" have long gone out of fashion. Evidently they assume that the State Bank "will advance the necessary money anyway." It is a fact that in

a number of enterprises, cost of production has begun to increase of late. They were instructed to reduce costs by 10 per cent and more, but instead of that they are increasing costs. Yet what does a reduction in the cost of production mean to us? You know that a reduction of costs by one per cent means an accumulation in industry of 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 rubles. Obviously, to raise the cost of production under such circumstances means to deprive industry and the whole of national economy of hundreds of millions of rubles.

From all this it follows that it is no longer possible to rely solely on light industry, on budget accumulations and on revenue from agriculture. Light industry is a bountiful source of accumulation, and there is every prospect of its continuing to expand; but it is not an unlimited source. Agriculture is a no less bountiful source of accumulation, but now, during the period of its reconstruction, agriculture itself requires financial aid from the state. As for budget accumulations, you know yourselves that they cannot and must not be unlimited. What, then, remains? There remain the heavy industries. Consequently, the heavy industries, and particularly the machine-building industry, must also provide accumulations. Consequently, while reinforcing and expanding the old sources of accumulation, we must see to it that the heavy industries, and particularly the machine-building industry, also provide accumulations.

That is the way out.

What must we do to achieve this? We must put an end to inefficiency, mobilize the internal resources of industry, introduce and reinforce business accounting in all our enterprises, systematically reduce production costs and increase internal accumulations in every branch of industry without exception.

That is the way out.

Hence, the task is *to introduce and reinforce business accounting, to increase the accumulation of capital within industry itself.*

VII

NEW METHODS OF WORK, NEW METHODS OF MANAGEMENT

Such, comrades, are the new conditions of development of our industry.

The significance of these new conditions is that they are creating a new situation in industry, which demands new methods of work and new methods of management.

Hence:

a) It follows that we can no longer count, as of old, on a spontaneous influx of labour power. In order to secure labour power for our industries it must be recruited in an organized manner, and labour must be mechanized. To believe that we can do without mechanizing labour, considering our present tempo and scale of production, is like believing that the sea can be emptied with a spoon.

b) It follows, further, that we must no longer tolerate a heavy turnover of labour power in industry. In order to do away with this evil we must organize wages in a new way and see to it that the factories have a more or less permanent personnel.

c) It follows, further, that we must no longer tolerate lack of personal responsibility in industry. In order to do away with this evil, work must be organized in a new way, and the forces must be so distributed that every group of workers is responsible for its work, for the machinery, and for the quality of the work.

d) It follows, further, that we can no longer manage with the very small force of old engineers and technicians we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present rate and scale of production, we must see to it that the working class has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

e) It follows, further, that we can no longer, as of old, lump together all the experts, engineers and technicians of the old school. If we are to take into account the changed conditions we must change our policy and display the utmost care and solicitude for

those experts, engineers and technicians of the old school who are definitely turning towards the working class.

f) It follows, lastly, that we can no longer, as of old, manage with the old sources of accumulation. In order to ensure the further development of industry and agriculture we must tap new sources of accumulation; we must put an end to inefficiency, introduce business accounting, reduce production costs and increase accumulation within industry itself.

Such are the new conditions of development of industry, which demand new methods of work and new methods of management in economic construction.

What is needed in order to organize management along new lines?

First of all, our business executives must understand the new situation; they must study concretely the new conditions of development of industry and readjust their methods of work to meet the requirements of the new situation.

Further, our business executives must direct their enterprises not "in general," not "abstractedly," but concretely, with an eye to particulars; they must approach every question that arises not just for the sake of idle utterances, but in a strictly businesslike manner; they must not confine themselves to formal written instructions or to uttering commonplace phrases and slogans, but study the technique of the business and enter into its every detail, however "minute," for it is out of "minute" details that great things are now being built.

Further, our present unwieldy combines, which sometimes consist of as many as 100 or 200 enterprises, must be immediately split up into several combines each. Obviously, a president of a combine who has to deal with a hundred or more factories cannot really know those factories, their capacities and the way they are working. Obviously, if he does not know those factories he is not in a position to direct them. Hence, in order that the president of a combine may be in a position to study the factories thoroughly, and direct them, he must be relieved of some of the factories; the combine must be split up into several smaller ones, and

the head offices must be brought into closer contact with the factories.

Further, our combines must substitute one-man management for collegium management. The position at present is that there are from ten to fifteen men on the board of a combine, all writing papers and carrying on discussions. We cannot go on managing in this way, comrades. We must put a stop to paper "management" and get down to genuine, business-like, Bolshevik work. Let one president and several vice-presidents remain at the head of a combine. This will be quite enough to take care of its management. The remaining members of the board should be sent to the factories and mills. That will be far more useful, both for the business and for themselves.

Further, the presidents and vice-presidents of combines must pay more frequent visits to the factories, stay and work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more closely with the leading staff in the factories and not only teach, but learn from the people on the spot. To think that you can now direct by sitting in an office, far away from the factories, is a delusion. In order to direct the factories you must come into more frequent contact with the staffs in those factories, maintain live contact with them.

Finally, a word or two regarding our production plan for 1931. There are certain near-Party philistines who contend that our production program is unrealistic, that it cannot be fulfilled. They are somewhat like Shchedrin's "sapient gudgeons" who are always ready to spread "a vacuum of ineptitude" around themselves. Is our production program realistic or not? Most certainly, it is. It is realistic if for no other reason than that all the conditions necessary for its fulfilment are available. It is realistic if for no other reason than that its fulfilment now depends only upon ourselves, on our ability and willingness to take advantage of the vast opportunities at our disposal. How else can we explain the fact that a large number of enterprises and whole branches of industry have already *overfulfilled* their plans? That means that other enterprises and branches of industry too, can fulfil and overfulfil their plans.

It would be foolish to think that the production plan is a mere enumeration of figures and assignments. Actually, the production plan is the embodiment of the living and practical activity of millions of people. What makes our production plan realistic is the millions of working people who are creating a new life. What makes our plan realistic is the living people, it is you and I, our will to work, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to fulfil the plan. Have we that determination? Yes, we have. Well then, our production plan can and must be fulfilled. (*Prolonged applause.*)

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

*Letter to the Editorial Board of
“Proletarskaya Revolyutsia”*

Dear Comrades!

I emphatically protest against the publication in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (No. 6, 1930) of Slutsky's anti-Party and semi-Trotskyite article, "The Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period of its Prewar Crisis," as a discussion article.

Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of *centrism* in German Social-Democracy and in pre-war Social-Democracy in general; that is, he underestimated the danger of camouflaged opportunism, the danger of conciliation with opportunism. In other words, according to Slutsky, Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not wage a relentless struggle against opportunism, for, in essence, underestimation of centrism is tantamount to the renunciation of a forceful struggle against opportunism. Thus, it is suggested that in the period before the war Lenin was not yet a real Bolshevik; that it was only in the period of the imperialist war, or even at the close of that war, that Lenin became a real Bolshevik.

This is the tale Slutsky tells in his article. And you, instead of branding this new-found "historian" as a slanderer and falsifier, enter into discussion with him, provide him with a forum. I cannot refrain from protesting against the publication of Slutsky's article in your journal as a discussion article, for the question of Lenin's *Bolshevism*, the question as to whether Lenin *did* or *did not* wage a relentless principled struggle against centrism as a certain form of opportunism, the question as to whether Lenin *was* or *was not* a real Bolshevik, cannot be made the subject of discussion.

In your statement entitled "From the Editorial Board," sent to the Central Committee on October 20, you admit that the editorial board made a mistake in publishing Slutsky's article as a discussion

article. That is all very well, of course, despite the fact that the statement of the editorial board is very belated. But in your statement you commit a fresh mistake when you declare that "the editorial board consider it to be politically extremely urgent and necessary that the entire complex of problems pertaining to the relations between the Bolsheviks and the prewar Second International be further analyzed in the pages of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia*." That means that you intend once again to draw people into a discussion on questions which are axioms of Bolshevism. It means that you are again thinking of turning the question of Lenin's Bolshevism from an axiom into a problem needing "further analysis." Why? On what grounds?

Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up and became strong in its ruthless struggle against opportunism of every brand, including centrism in the West (Kautsky) and centrism in our country (Trotsky, etc.). This cannot be denied even by the outspoken enemies of Bolshevism. It is an axiom. But you are trying to drag us back by turning an axiom into a problem requiring "further analysis." Why? On what grounds? Perhaps through ignorance of the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of a rotten liberalism, so that the Slutskys and other disciples of Trotsky may not be able to say that they are being gagged? A rather strange sort of liberalism, this, exercised at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism.

What, exactly, is there in Slutsky's article that the editorial board regard as worthy of discussion?

1. Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not pursue a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists in German Social-Democracy, with the opportunists in the Second International of the prewar period. You want to open a discussion on this Trotskyite thesis of Slutsky's? But what is there to discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is simply slandering Lenin, slandering the Bolsheviks? Slander must be branded as such and not made the subject of discussion.

Every Bolshevik, if he is really a Bolshevik, knows that long before the war, approximately since 1903-04 when the Bolshevik

group in Russia became organized and when the Lefts in German Social-Democracy first raised their voice, Lenin pursued a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists both here; in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and over there, in the Second International, particularly in the German Social-Democratic Party.

Every Bolshevik knows that it was for that very reason that even at that time (1903-05) the Bolsheviks won for themselves in the ranks of the opportunists of the Second International honourable fame as "splitters" and "disrupters." But what could Lenin do, what could the Bolsheviks do, if the Left Social-Democrats in the Second International, and above all in the German Social-Democratic Party, were a weak and impotent group, a group which had not yet taken organizational shape, which was ideologically ill-equipped and was afraid even to pronounce the word "rupture," "split"? Lenin, the Bolsheviks, could not be expected to do, from Russia, the work of the Lefts for them and bring about a split in the West-European parties.

This is apart from the fact that organizational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the Left Social-Democrats not only in the period prior to the war. As is well known, the Lefts retained this negative feature in the postwar period as well. Everyone knows the appraisal of the German Left Social-Democrats given by Lenin in his famous article, "*On Junius' Pamphlet*," * published in October 1916—that is, more than two years after the beginning of the war—in which Lenin, criticizing a number of very serious political mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany, speaks of "*the weakness of all German Lefts, who are entangled on all sides in the vile net of Kautskyan hypocrisy, pedantry, 'friendship' for the opportunists*"; in which he says that "*Junius has not yet freed herself completely from the 'environment' of the German, even Left Social-Democrats who are afraid of a split, are afraid to voice revolutionary slogans to the full.*"

* Junius was the pen name of Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the Lefts in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

Of all the groups in the Second International, the Russian Bolsheviks were at that time the only group which, by its organizational experience and ideological training, was capable of undertaking anything serious in the sense of a direct rupture, of a split with its own opportunists in its own Russian Social-Democratic Party. If the Slutskys attempted, not even to prove, but simply to assume that the Russian Bolsheviks headed by Lenin did not exert all their efforts to organize a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) and to oust the centrists (Trotsky and other adherents of the August bloc), then one could argue about Lenin's Bolshevism, about the Bolsheviks' Bolshevism. But the whole point is that the Slutskys dare not even hint at such a wild assumption. They dare not, for they are aware that the commonly known facts concerning the resolute policy of rupture with the opportunists of all brands pursued by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904-12) cry out against such an assumption. They dare not, for they know that they would be pilloried the very next day.

But the question arises: Could the Russian Bolsheviks bring about a split with their opportunists and centrist conciliators long before the imperialist war (1904-12) without at the same time pursuing a policy of rupture, a policy of a split with the opportunists and centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks regarded their policy towards the opportunists and centrists as a model to be followed by the Lefts in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks did all they could to push the Left Social-Democrats in the West, particularly the Lefts in the German Social-Democratic Party, towards a rupture, towards a split with their own opportunists and centrists? It was not the fault of Lenin and of the Russian Bolsheviks that the Left Social-Democrats in the West proved to be too immature to follow in the footsteps of the Russian Bolsheviks.

2. Slutsky reproaches Lenin and the Bolsheviks for not resolutely and wholeheartedly supporting the German Left Social-Democrats, for supporting them only with important reservations, for allowing factional considerations to prevent them from

giving unqualified support to the Lefts. You want to discuss this fraudulent and utterly false reproach. But what is there to discuss? Is it not plain that Slutsky is manoeuvring and trying, by hurling a spurious reproach at Lenin and the Bolsheviks, to cover up the real gaps in the position of the Lefts in Germany? Is it not plain that the Bolsheviks could not support the Lefts in Germany, who time and again wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, *without* important reservations, *without* seriously criticizing their mistakes, and that to act otherwise would have been a *betrayal* of the working class and its revolution? Fraudulent manoeuvres must be branded as such and not made a subject of discussion.

Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social-Democrats in Germany only with certain important reservations, criticizing their semi-Menshevik mistakes. But for this they ought to be applauded, not reproached.

Are there people who doubt this?

Let us turn to the most generally known facts of history.

a) In 1903, serious differences arose between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question of Party membership. By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organizational barrier against the influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic character of the Russian revolution. The Russian Mensheviks advocated the opposite position, which threw the doors of the Party wide open to nonproletarian elements. In view of the importance of the problems of the Russian revolution for the world revolutionary movement, the West-European Social-Democrats decided to intervene. The Left Social-Democrats in Germany, Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, then the leaders of the Lefts, also intervened. But how? Both supported the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks. They accused the Bolsheviks of having ultra-centralist and Blanquist tendencies. Subsequently, these vulgar and philistine epithets were caught up by the Mensheviks and spread far and wide.

b) In 1905, differences developed between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question of the character of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks asserted that the objective must be a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry for the purpose of passing immediately from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, with the support of the rural poor secured. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; as against the policy of alliance between the working class and the peasantry they preferred the policy of agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie; and they declared that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was a reactionary Blanquist scheme which ran counter to the development of the bourgeois revolution. What was the attitude of the German Left Social-Democrats, of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, to this controversy? They invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution (a distorted representation of the Marxian scheme of revolution), which was permeated through and through with the Menshevik repudiation of the policy of alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and opposed this scheme to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was caught up by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and transformed into a weapon of struggle against Leninism.

c) In the period before the war, one of the most urgent questions that confronted the parties of the Second International was the national and colonial question, the question of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of liberating the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the paths to be followed in the struggle against imperialism, the question of the paths to be followed in order to overthrow imperialism. In the interests of developing the proletarian revolution and encircling imperialism,

the Bolsheviks proposed the policy of supporting the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies on the basis of the self-determination of nations, and developed the scheme for a united front between the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries and the revolutionary-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed countries. The opportunists of all countries, the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists of all countries hastened to rally against the Bolsheviks on this account. The Bolsheviks were baited like mad dogs. What position did the Left Social-Democrats in the West take up at that time? They developed the semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxian sense (including secession and formation of independent states), rejected the thesis that the liberation movement in the colonies and oppressed countries was of great revolutionary importance, rejected the thesis that a united front between the proletarian revolution and the movement for national emancipation was possible, and opposed this semi-Menshevik hodgepodge, which was nothing but an underestimation of the national and colonial question, to the Marxian scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is well known that this semi-Menshevik hodgepodge was subsequently caught up by Trotsky who used it as a weapon in the struggle against Leninism.

Such were the universally known mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany.

I need not speak of the other mistakes of the German Lefts which were criticized in various articles by Lenin.

Nor need I speak of the mistakes they committed in appraising the policy of the Bolsheviks in the period of the October Revolution.

What do these mistakes committed by the German Lefts during the prewar period indicate, if not that the Left Social-Democrats, despite their leftism, had not yet rid themselves of their Menshevik baggage?

Of course, the record of the Lefts in Germany consists not only of serious mistakes. They also have great and important revolutionary deeds to their credit. I have in mind a number of their

services and revolutionary actions in relation to questions of internal policy, and in particular, of the electoral struggle, questions concerning the struggle inside and outside of parliament, the general strike, war, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc. This is precisely why the Bolsheviks reckoned with them as Lefts, supported them and urged them forward. But this does not and cannot remove the fact that the Left Social-Democrats in Germany did commit a number of very serious political and theoretical mistakes; that they had not yet rid themselves of their Menshevik burden and therefore needed the severe criticism of the Bolsheviks.

Now judge for yourselves whether Lenin and the Bolsheviks could have supported the Left Social-Democrats in the West *without serious reservations, without severely criticizing* their mistakes, and whether it would not have been a betrayal of the interests of the working class, a betrayal of the interests of the revolution, a betrayal of communism, to act otherwise?

Is it not clear that in reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks for something for which he should have applauded them if he were a Bolshevik, Slutsky fully exposes himself as a semi-Menshevik, as a masked Trotskyite?

Slutsky assumes that in their appraisal of the Lefts in the West, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were guided by their own factional considerations; that, consequently, the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the international revolution to the interests of their faction. It need hardly be proved that there can be nothing more base and despicable than such an assumption. There can be nothing more base, for even the basest of Mensheviks are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution is not the private concern of Russians; that, on the contrary, it is the concern of the working class of the whole world, the concern of the world proletarian revolution. There can be nothing more despicable, for even the professional slanderers in the Second International are beginning to understand that the consistent and thoroughly revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries.

Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks did put in the forefront the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution, such problems as that of the Party, of the attitude of Marxists towards the bourgeois-democratic revolution, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of the hegemony of the proletariat, of the struggle inside and outside of parliament, of the general strike, of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into the socialist revolution, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of imperialism, of the self-determination of nations, of the liberation movement of oppressed nations and colonies, of the policy of supporting this movement, etc. They advanced these problems as the touchstone on which they tested the revolutionary consistency of the Left Social-Democrats in the West. Had they the right to do so? Yes, they had. They not only had the right, but it was their duty to do so. It was their duty to do so because all these problems were also the fundamental problems of the world revolution, to whose aims the Bolsheviks subordinated their policy and their tactics. It was their duty to do so because only on such problems could they really test the revolutionary character of the various groups in the Second International. The question arises: What has the "factionalism" of the Russian Bolsheviks and what have "factional" considerations to do with this?

As far back as 1902 Lenin wrote in his pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?* that "*history has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks that confront the proletariat of any country,*" that "*the fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also of Asiatic reaction would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat.*" Thirty years have elapsed since that pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, appeared. No one will dare deny, that the events of this period have brilliantly confirmed Lenin's words. But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution was (and remains) the nodal point of the world revolution; that the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution were (and are now) also the fundamental problems of the world revolution?

Is it not obvious that only on these fundamental problems was it possible to put the revolutionism of the Left Social-Democrats of the West to a real test?

Is it not obvious that those who regard these problems as "factional" problems fully expose themselves as base and renegade elements?

3. Slutsky asserts that so far there has not been found a sufficient number of official documents testifying to Lenin's (the Bolsheviks') determined and relentless struggle against centrism. He employs this bureaucratic thesis as an irrefutable argument in favour of the postulate that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of centrism in the Second International. And you are willing to open a discussion on this nonsense, this shabby pettifoggery. But what is there to be discussed? Is it not perfectly clear that by his talk about documents Slutsky is trying to cover up the utter inadequacy and falsity of his so-called conception?

Slutsky considers the Party documents now available as inadequate. Why? On what grounds? Are not the universally known documents on the Second International, as well as those dealing with the internal Party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, sufficient to demonstrate with full clarity the revolutionary relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the opportunists and centrists? Is Slutsky at all familiar with these documents? What other documents does he need?

Let us assume that, in addition to the documents already known, a mass of other documents were found, containing, say, more resolutions of the Bolsheviks urging the necessity of wiping out centrism. Would that mean that the mere existence of written documents is sufficient to demonstrate the real revolutionary character and the real relentlessness of the Bolsheviks' attitude towards centrism? Who, save hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on written documents alone? Who, besides archive rats, does not understand that a Party and its leaders must be tested primarily by their *deeds* and not only by their declarations? History knows not a few Socialists who readily signed resolutions no matter how revolutionary, just for the sake of silencing their annoying

critics. But that does not mean that they *carried out* these resolutions. Furthermore, history knows not a few Socialists who, foaming at the mouth, called upon the workers' parties of *other* countries to perform the most revolutionary actions imaginable. But that does not mean that they did not in their own party, or in their own country, *shrink* from fighting *their own* opportunists, *their own* bourgeoisie. Is not this why Lenin taught us to test revolutionary parties, trends and leaders, not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their *deeds*?

Is it not obvious that if Slutsky really wanted to test the relentlessness of Lenin's and the Bolsheviks' attitude towards centrism, he should have taken as the *basis* of his article, not a few separate documents and two or three personal letters, but a test of the Bolsheviks' by their *deeds*, their *history*, their *actions*? Did we not have opportunists and centrists in the Russian Social-Democratic Party? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a determined and relentless struggle against all these trends? Were not these trends ideologically and organizationally connected with the opportunists and centrists in the West? Did not the Bolsheviks smash the opportunists and centrists as no other Left group did anywhere else in the world? How can anyone say after all this that Lenin and the Bolsheviks underestimated the danger of centrism? Why did Slutsky ignore these facts, which are of decisive importance in characterizing the Bolsheviks? Why did he not resort to the most reliable method of testing Lenin and the Bolsheviks by their *deeds*, by their *actions*? Why did he prefer the less reliable method of rummaging among casually selected papers?

Because the more reliable method of testing the Bolsheviks by their *deeds* would have upset Slutsky's whole position in a flash.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their *deeds* would have shown that the Bolsheviks are the *only* revolutionary organization in the world which has completely smashed the opportunists and centrists and driven them out of the Party.

Because the real *deeds* and the real *history* of the Bolsheviks would have shown that Slutsky's teachers, the Trotskyites, were

the *principal* and *basic* group which fostered centrism in Russia, and for this purpose created a special organization—the August bloc, which was a hotbed of centrism.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have exposed Slutsky once and for all as a falsifier of the history of our Party, who is trying to cover up the centrism of prewar Trotskyism by slanderously accusing Lenin and the Bolsheviks of underestimating the danger of centrism.

That, comrade editors, is how matters stand with Slutsky and his article.

As you see, the editorial board made a mistake in permitting a discussion with a falsifier of the history of our Party.

What induced the editorial board to take this wrong road?

I think that they were induced to take that road by the rotten liberalism which has spread to some extent among a section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a faction of communism—one which makes mistakes, it is true, which does many foolish things, is sometimes even anti-Soviet, but which, nevertheless, is a faction of communism. Hence, there is a somewhat liberal attitude towards the Trotskyites and Trotskyite-minded people. It need hardly be proved that such a view of Trotskyism is profoundly wrong and pernicious. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of communism. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the vanguard of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie which is fighting communism, fighting the Soviet regime, fighting the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

Who gave the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie an ideological weapon against Bolshevism in the form of the thesis that it is impossible to build socialism in our country, that the degeneration of the Bolsheviks is inevitable, etc.? Trotskyism gave it that weapon. It is no accident that in their efforts to prove the inevitability of the struggle against the Soviet regime all the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. have been referring to the well-known Trotskyite thesis that it is impossible to build socialism in our country, that the degeneration of the Soviet

government is inevitable, that the return to capitalism is probable.

Who gave the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R. a tactical weapon in the form of attempts at open actions against the Soviet regime? The Trotskyites, who tried to organize anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskyites raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and let loose the wrecking activities of the bourgeois experts.

Who gave the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie an organizational weapon in the form of attempts at setting up underground anti-Soviet organizations? The Trotskyites, who organized their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the underground anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyites helped the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. to organize.

Trotskyism is the vanguard of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is why a liberal attitude towards Trotskyism, even though the latter is shattered and concealed, is stupidity bordering on crime, bordering on treason to the working class.

That is why the attempts of certain "writers" and "historians" to smuggle disguised Trotskyite rubbish into our literature must be met with a determined rebuff on the part of the Bolsheviks.

That is why we cannot permit a literary discussion with the Trotskyite smugglers.

It seems to me that "historians" and "writers" of the Trotskyite smuggler category are for the present trying to pursue their smuggling work along two lines.

Firstly, they are trying to prove that in the period before the war Lenin underestimated the danger of centrism, thus leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not yet a real revolutionary at that time; that he became one only after the war, after he had "re-equipped" himself with Trotsky's assistance. Slutsky may be regarded as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

We have seen above that Slutsky and Co. are not worth making much fuss about.

Secondly, they are trying to prove that in the period prior to the war Lenin did not realize the necessity of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into a socialist revolution, thus leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not a real Bolshevik at that time; that he realized this necessity only after the war, after he had "re-equipped" himself with Trotsky's assistance. We may regard Volosevich, author of *A Course of History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

True, as far back as 1905 Lenin wrote that "*from the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution,*" that "*we stand for uninterrupted revolution,*" that "*we shall not stop half-way.*" True, a very large number of facts and documents of a similar nature can be found in the works of Lenin. But what do the Voloseviches care about the facts of Lenin's life and work? The Voloseviches write in order, by camouflaging themselves in Bolshevik colours, to drag in their anti-Leninist contraband, to utter lies about the Bolsheviks and to falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party.

As you see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the Slutskys.

Such are the "paths and crossroads" of the Trotskyite smugglers.

You understand yourselves that it is not the business of the editorial board of the *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* to facilitate the smuggling activities of such "historians" by providing them with a platform for discussion.

The task of the editorial board is, in my opinion, to raise the questions concerning the history of Bolshevism to the proper level, to put the study of the history of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik lines, and to concentrate attention against the Trotskyite and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party by systematically tearing off their masks.

This is all the more necessary since even some of our historians—I mean historians without quotation marks, *Bolshevik* historians of our Party—are not free from mistakes which bring grist to the mill of the Slutskys and Voloseviches. In this respect, even Comrade Yaroslavsky is not, unfortunately, an exception; his books on the history of the C.P.S.U.(B.), despite all their merits, contain a number of errors in matters of principle and history.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

Proletarskaya Revolyutia,

No. 6 (113), 1931

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Report Delivered at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), January 7, 1933

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Comrades! When the Five-Year Plan was published, people hardly anticipated that it could be of tremendous international significance. On the contrary, many thought that the Five-Year Plan was the private affair of the Soviet Union—an important and serious affair, but nevertheless a private, national affair of the Soviet Union.

History has shown, however, that the international significance of the Five-Year Plan is immeasurable. History has shown that the Five-Year Plan is not the private affair of the Soviet Union, but the concern of the whole international proletariat.

Long before the Five-Year Plan came into being, in the period when we were finishing our struggle against the interventionists and were embarking upon economic development—even in that period Lenin said that our economic development was a matter of profound international significance; that every step forward taken by the Soviet government along the path of economic development was finding a powerful response among the most varied strata in capitalist countries and dividing people into two camps—the camp of the adherents of the proletarian revolution and the camp of its opponents.

Lenin said at that time:

"At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned towards the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all working people in all countries of

the world, without exception and without exaggeration. This much has been achieved.... The struggle in this field is now being waged on a world scale. With this problem solved, we shall have won on an international scale certainly and finally. That is why questions of economic development assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must achieve victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be speedy—but steadily increasing progress." (See Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11.)

This was said at the time when we were bringing to a close the war against the interventionists, when we were passing from the military struggle against capitalism to the struggle on the economic front, to the period of economic development.

Many years have elapsed since then, and every step forward the Soviet government has taken in the sphere of economic development, every year, every quarter, has brilliantly confirmed Comrade Lenin's words.

But the most brilliant confirmation of Lenin's words is provided by our Five-Year Plan of construction, by the way this plan originated, by its development and its fulfilment. Indeed, it seems that no step taken along the path of economic development in our country has found such an echo among the most varied strata in the capitalist countries of Europe, America and Asia as the question of the Five-Year Plan, its development and its fulfilment.

At first the bourgeoisie and its press greeted the Five-Year Plan with ridicule. "Fantastic," "delirium," "utopia"—that is how they dubbed our Five-Year Plan at that time.

Later on, when it began to be evident that the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan was producing real results, they began to sound the alarm, asserting that the Five-Year Plan was threatening the existence of the capitalist countries, that its fulfilment would lead to the flooding of European markets with goods, to intensive dumping and the increase of unemployment.

Still later, when this trick used against the Soviet regime also failed to produce the expected results, a series of voyages to the U.S.S.R. was undertaken by representatives of all sorts of firms, of the press, of societies of various kinds, etc., for the purpose of seeing with their own eyes what was actually going on in the

U.S.S.R. I am not referring here to the workers' delegations, which, from the very first appearance of the Five-Year Plan, have expressed their admiration of the enterprise and successes of the Soviet regime and manifested their readiness to support the working class of the U.S.S.R.

From that time a cleavage began in so-called public opinion, in the bourgeois press, in various kinds of bourgeois societies, etc. Some maintained that the Five-Year Plan had utterly failed and that the Bolsheviks were on the verge of collapse. Others, on the contrary, declared that although the Bolsheviks were bad people, their Five-Year Plan was working out nevertheless and in all probability they would achieve their object.

It will not be superfluous, perhaps, to quote the opinions of various bourgeois press organs.

Take, for example, the *New York Times*, an American newspaper. At the end of November 1932 this paper wrote:

"A Five-Year Industrial Plan which sets out to defy the sense of proportion, which drives towards an objective 'regardless of cost,' as Moscow has often proudly boasted, is really not a plan. It is a gamble."

So it seems that the Five-Year Plan is not even a plan, but a sheer gamble.

And here is the opinion of an English bourgeois newspaper, the *Daily Telegraph*, expressed at the end of November 1932:

"As a practical test of 'planned economics' the scheme has quite clearly failed."

The opinion of the *New York Times* in November 1932:

"...The collectivization campaign is of course a ghastly failure. It has brought Russia to the verge of famine."

The opinion of a bourgeois newspaper in Poland, *Gazeta Polska*, in the summer of 1932:

"The situation seems to show that in its policy of collectivizing the rural districts the government of the Soviets has reached an impasse."

The opinion of an English bourgeois newspaper, *The Financial Times*, in November 1932:

"Stalin and his party, as the outcome of their policy, find themselves faced with the breakdown of the Five-Year Plan system and frustration of the aims it was expected to achieve."

The opinion of the Italian magazine *Politica*:

"It would be absurd to think that nothing has been created in four years' work by a nation consisting of a hundred and sixty million, in four years of superhuman economic and political effort on the part of a régime of such strength as the Bolshevik regime represents. On the contrary, a great deal has been done.... Nevertheless, the catastrophe is evident—it is a fact obvious to all. Friends and enemies, Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, oppositionists on the Right and on the Left are convinced of this."

Finally, the opinion of the American bourgeois magazine *Current History*:

"A survey of the existing posture of affairs in Russia, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the Five-Year Program has failed both in terms of its announced statistical objectives and more fundamentally in terms of certain of its underlying social principles."

Such are the opinions voiced in one section of the bourgeois press.

It is hardly worth while criticizing those who gave utterance to these opinions. I think it is not worth while. It is not worth while because these "die-hards" belong to the species of medieval fossils to whom facts mean nothing, and who will persist in their opinion no matter how our Five-Year Plan is fulfilled.

Let us now turn to the opinion of another section of this same bourgeois camp.

Here is the opinion of a well-known bourgeois newspaper in France, *Le Temps*, expressed in January 1932:

"The U.S.S.R. has won the first round, having industrialized herself without the aid of foreign capital."

The opinion of *Le Temps* again, expressed in the summer of 1932:

"Communism is completing the process of reconstruction with enormous speed, whereas the capitalist system permits only of progress at a slow pace.... In France, where the land is infinitely divided up among individual

property owners, it is impossible to mechanize agriculture; the Soviets, however, by industrializing agriculture, have solved the problem.... In the contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the victors."

The opinion of a British bourgeois magazine, *The Round Table*:

"The development achieved under the Five-Year plan is astounding. The tractor plants of Kharkov and Stalingrad, the Amo automobile factory in Moscow, the automobile plant in Nizhni-Novgorod, the Dnieprostroy hydroelectric project, the mammoth steel plants at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the network of machine shops and chemical plants in the Urals—which bid fair to become Russia's Ruhr—these and other industrial achievements all over the country show that, whatever the shortcomings and difficulties, Russian industry, like a well-watered plant, keeps on gaining colour, size and strength.... She has laid the foundations for future development... and has strengthened prodigiously her fighting capacity."

The opinion of the English bourgeois newspaper *The Financial Times*:

"The progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, and the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, glowing as they are, are not unwarranted. It must be remembered that Russia, of course, produced machines and tools, but only of the simplest kind....

"...True, the importation of machines and tools is actually increasing in absolute figures; but the proportion of imported machines to those of native production is steadily diminishing.... Russia is producing today all the machinery essential to her metallurgical and electrical industries; has succeeded in creating her own automobile industry; has established her own tool-making industry from small precision instruments to the heaviest presses; and in the matter of agricultural machinery is independent of foreign imports....

"...Nor do they agree that the retardation of production in the output of such basic industries as iron and coal is so serious as to endanger the fulfilment of the plan in four years.... The one thing certain is that the enormous plants now being established guarantee a very considerable increase in the output of the heavy industries."

The opinion of an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, *Die Neue Freie Presse*, expressed in the beginning of 1932:

"We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand it.... *The Five-Year Plan is a new huge quantity which must be taken into account in every economic calculation.*"

The opinion of a British capitalist, Gibson Jarvie, the president of the United Dominion Trust, expressed in October 1932:

"Now I want it clearly understood that I am neither Communist nor Bolshevik. I am definitely a capitalist and an individualist.... Russia is forging ahead while all too many of our factories and shipyards lie idle and approximately 3,000,000 of our people despairingly seek work. Jokes have been made about the Five-Year Plan; it has been scoffed at; it has been ridiculed and its failure has been predicted. You can take it beyond question, and you will be wise to accept it, that under the Five-Year Plan much more has been accomplished than was ever really anticipated.... In all these industrial towns which I visited, a new city is growing up, a city on a definite plan with wide streets in the process of being beautified by trees and grass plots, houses of the most modern type with plenty of air space between them, schools, hospitals, workers' clubs and the inevitable crèche or nursery, where the children of working mothers are cared for.... Don't underrate the Russians or their plans, and don't make the mistake of believing that the Soviet Government must crash.... Russia today is a country with a soul and an ideal.... Russia is a country of amazing activity.... I believe that the Russian objective is sound.... And perhaps most important of all, all these youngsters and these workers in Russia have one thing which is too sadly lacking in the capitalist countries today, and that is—hope!"

The opinion of the American bourgeois journal *The Nation* expressed in November 1932:

"...the four years of the Five-Year Plan have witnessed truly *remarkable developments*.... Russia is working with wartime intensity on the positive task of building the physical and social moulds of a new life. *The face of the country is being changed literally beyond recognition*. This is true of Moscow, with hundreds of streets and squares paved with new suburbs, new buildings, and a cordon of new factories on its outskirts, and it is true of smaller and less important cities. New towns have sprung out of the steppe, the wilderness, and the desert—not just a few towns, but at least fifty of them with populations of from 50,000 to 250,000—all in the last four years, each constructed round an enterprise for the development of some natural resource. Hundreds of new district power stations and a handful of 'giants' like Dniepropetrovsk are gradually putting reality into Lenin's formula: 'Electricity plus Soviets equals Socialism....' The Soviet Union now engages in the large-scale manufacture of an endless variety of articles which Russia never before produced—tractors, combines, high-grade steels, synthetic rubber, ball bearings, high-power diesel motors, 50,000-kilowatt turbines, telephone-exchange equipment, electrical mining machinery, aeroplanes, automobiles, lorries, bicycles, electric-welding equipment, and several hundred types of

new machines.... For the first time Russia is mining aluminum, magnesium, apatite, iodine, potash, and many other valuable minerals.... *The guiding landmark on the Soviet countryside is no longer the dome of a rich church towering over the ugly mud-thatched peasant huts clustered in the shadow, but the grain elevator and the silo.* Collectives are building piggeries, barns, and houses. Electricity is penetrating the village, and radio and newspaper have conquered it. Workers are learning to operate the world's most modern machines; peasant boys make and use agricultural machinery bigger and more complicated than ever America has seen.... *Russia is becoming 'machineminded,'* Russia is passing quickly from the age of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors."

The opinion of an English "Left"-reformist journal, the Glasgow *Forward*, expressed in September 1932:

"Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of building work that is going on.

"New factories, new picture-houses, new schools, new restaurants, new clubs, new big blocks of tenements, everywhere new buildings, many completed, others with scaffolding....

"It is difficult to convey to the mind of the British reader exactly what has been done, and what is being done.

"It has to be seen to be believed. Our own wartime efforts are fleabites to what has been done in Russia. Americans admit that even in the greatest rush days in the West there could have been nothing like the feverish building activity that is going on in Russia today.

"One sees so many changes in the Russian scene after two years that one gives up trying to imagine what Russia will be like in another ten years.

"So dismiss from your heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press that lies so persistently, so blatantly, so contemptibly about Russia, and all the half truths and misconceptions that are circulated by the diletante literary academic intelligentsia that look at Russia patronizingly through superior middle-class spectacles without having the slightest understanding of what is going on....

"Russia is building up a new society on what are, generally speaking, fundamentally sound lines. To do this it is taking risks, it is working enthusiastically with an energy that has never been seen in the world before, it has tremendous difficulties inseparable from this attempt to build up socialism in a vast, undeveloped country isolated from the rest of the world. But the impression I have, after seeing it again after two years, is that of a nation making solid progress, planning, creating, constructing in a way that is a striking challenge to the hostile capitalist world."

Such are the discordant voices and the cleavage in the camp of bourgeois circles, of whom some stand for the annihilation of the U.S.S.R. with its allegedly bankrupt Five-Year Plan, while others, apparently, stand for commercial cooperation with the U.S.S.R., obviously calculating that they can obtain some advantage for themselves out of the success of the Five-Year Plan.

The question of the attitude of the working class in capitalist countries towards the Five-Year Plan, towards the successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., is in a category by itself. It may be sufficient to quote here the opinion of just one of the numerous workers' delegations that come to the U.S.S.R. every year, say, for example, the Belgian workers' delegation. The opinion of this delegation is typical of that of all workers' delegations without exception, whether they be English or French, German or American, or delegations of other countries. Here it is:

"We are struck with admiration at the tremendous amount of construction that we have witnessed during our travels. In Moscow, as well as in Makeyevka, Gorlovka, Kharkov, and Leningrad, we could see for ourselves with what enthusiasm the work is carried on there. All the machines are the most up-to-date models. The factories are clean, well ventilated and well lit. We saw how medical assistance and hygienic conditions are provided for the workers in the U.S.S.R.

"The workers' houses are built near the factories. Schools and crèches are organized in the workers' towns, and the children are surrounded with every care. We could see the difference between the old and the newly constructed factories, between the old and the new houses. All that we have seen has given us a clear idea of the tremendous strength of the working people who are building a new society under the leadership of the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. we have observed a great cultural revival, while in other countries there is decadence in all spheres, and unemployment reigns. We were able to see the frightful difficulties the working people of the Soviet Union encounter on their path. We can therefore appreciate all the more the pride with which they point to their victories. We are convinced that they will overcome all obstacles."

Here, then, is the international significance of the Five-Year Plan. It was enough for us to carry on construction work for a

matter of two or three years, it was enough for us to show the first successes of the Five-Year Plan, for the whole world to split up into two camps—the camp of those who never tire of barking at us, and the camp of those who are amazed at the successes of the Five-Year Plan, not to mention the fact that we have all over the world our own camp, which is growing stronger—the camp of the working class in the capitalist countries, which rejoices at the successes of the working class in the U.S.S.R. and is prepared to support it, to the dismay of the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

What does this mean?

It means that there can be no doubt about the international significance of the Five-Year Plan, about the international significance of its successes and achievements.

It means that the capitalist countries are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, and that precisely because they are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie would like to find in the failure of the Five-Year Plan a fresh argument against revolution; whereas, on the other hand, the proletariat is striving to find, and indeed does find, in the successes of the Five-Year Plan a fresh argument in favour of revolution, against the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

The successes of the Five-Year Plan are mobilizing the revolutionary forces of the working class of all countries against capitalism—such is the indisputable fact.

There can be no doubt that the international revolutionary significance of the Five-Year Plan is really immeasurable.

All the more attention, therefore, must we devote to the question of the Five-Year Plan, of the content of the Five-Year Plan, of the fundamental tasks of the Five-Year Plan.

All the more carefully, therefore, must we analyze the results of the Five-Year Plan, the results of the execution and fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan.

II**THE FUNDAMENTAL TASK
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
AND THE PATH OF ITS FULFILMENT**

We now come to the question of the Five-Year Plan as such. What is the Five-Year Plan?

What was the fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan?

The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, and in part medieval, technique, to the lines of new, modern technique.

The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan was to convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism.

The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan was, in converting the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country, fully to eliminate the capitalist elements, to widen the front of socialist forms of economy, and to create the economic base for the abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R., for the construction of socialist society.

The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan was to create in our country such an industrial potential as would be able to re-equip and reorganize, not only the whole of industry, but also transport and agriculture—on the basis of socialism.

The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan was to transform small and scattered agriculture into large-scale collective agriculture, so as to ensure the economic base for socialism in the rural districts and thus to eliminate the possibility of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

Finally, the task of the Five-Year Plan was to create all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for increasing to the utmost the defensive capacity of the country, to enable it to organize determined resistance to any and every attempt at

military intervention from outside, to any and every attempt at military attack from without.

What dictated this fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan; what were the grounds for it?

The necessity of putting an end to the technical and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union, which doomed it to an unenviable existence; the necessity of creating in the country such prerequisites as would enable it not only to overtake but in time to outstrip, technically and economically, the advanced capitalist countries.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not maintain itself for long on the basis of a backward industry; that only a modern large-scale industry, one that is not merely equal to but would in time excel the industries of capitalist countries, can serve as a real and reliable foundation for the Soviet regime.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not for long rest upon two opposite foundations: on large scale socialist industry, which *destroys* the capitalist elements, and on small, individual peasant farming, which *engenders* capitalist elements.

Consideration of the fact that until agriculture was placed on the basis of large-scale production, until the small peasant farms were united into large collective farms, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. would be the most real of all possible dangers.

Lenin said:

"The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries.

"But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*. Perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us." (See Vol. XXI, p. 191.)

Lenin said:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn up the roots of

capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production.... Only when the country has been electrified, when industry, agriculture, and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then will we be fully victorious." (See Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47.)

These were the principles which guided the Party and led to the drawing up of the Five-Year Plan, and which determined the fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan.

That is the position in regard to the fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan.

But the execution of such a prodigious plan cannot be started haphazardly, just anyhow. In order to carry out such a plan it is necessary first of all to find its main link; for only after this main link has been found and grasped can all the other links of the plan be pulled up.

What was the main link in the Five-Year Plan?

The main link in the Five-Year Plan was heavy industry, with machine building as its core. For only heavy industry is capable of reconstructing industry as a whole, as well as the transport system and agriculture, and of putting them on their feet. It was necessary to start the realization of the Five-Year Plan from heavy industry. Hence, the restoration of heavy industry had to be made the basis of the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan.

We have Lenin's directions on this point also:

"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—this, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry.... Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without heavy industry we shall be doomed as an independent country.... Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we cannot provide them, then we are doomed as a civilized state—let alone as a socialist state." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 349.)

But the restoration and development of heavy industry, particularly in such a backward and poor country as our country was at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan period, is an extremely difficult task; for, as is well known, heavy industry calls for enormous financial expenditures and the availability of a certain minimum of experienced technical forces, without which the restoration of heavy industry is quite impossible. Did the Party know this, and did it take this into consideration? Yes, it did. Not only did the Party know this, but it announced it for all to hear. The Party knew how heavy industry had been built up in England, Germany and America. It knew that in those countries heavy industry had been built up either with the aid of big loans, or by plundering other countries, or by both methods simultaneously. The Party knew that those paths were closed to our country. What, then, did it count on? It counted on our country's own resources. It counted on the fact that, with a Soviet government at the helm, and the land, industry, transport, the banks and trade nationalized, we could pursue a regime of strict economy in order to accumulate sufficient resources for the restoration and development of heavy industry. The Party declared frankly that this would call for serious sacrifices, and that it was our duty openly and consciously to make these sacrifices if we wanted to achieve our goal. The Party counted on carrying through this task with the aid of the internal resources of our country—without usurious credits and loans from outside.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

"We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership in relation to the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations.

"We must reduce our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. We must remove from it all traces of extravagance, of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from its bureaucratic capitalist apparatus.

"Will not this be the reign of peasant narrowness?

"No. If we see to it that the working class retains its leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the

economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to finish the construction of Volkhovstroy, etc.

"In this, and this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have done this will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik horse of poverty, from the horse of economy fit for a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroy, etc." (See Vol. XXVII, p. 417.)

To change from the muzhik horse of poverty to the horse of large-scale machine industry—such was the aim the Party pursued in drawing up the Five-Year Plan and working for its fulfilment.

To exercise the strictest economy and to accumulate the resources necessary for financing the industrialization of our country—such was the road that had to be taken in order to secure the restoration of heavy industry and to carry out the Five-Year Plan.

A bold task? A difficult road? But our Party is called a Leninist Party precisely because it has no right to fear difficulties.

More than that. The Party's confidence in the feasibility of the Five-Year Plan and its faith in the forces of the working class were so strong that the Party found it possible to undertake the fulfilment of this difficult task not in five years, as was provided for in the Five-Year Plan, but in four years, or, strictly speaking, in four years and three months, if the special quarter be added.

This is what gave rise to the famous slogan "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years."

And what happened?

Subsequent facts have proved that the Party was right.

The facts have proved that if it had been wanting in boldness and lacking confidence in the forces of the working class, the Party could not have achieved the victory of which we are now so justly proud.

III

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRY

Let us now take up the results of the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan.

What are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of *industry*?

Have we achieved victory in this sphere?

Yes, we have. And not only that, but we have accomplished more than we expected, more than the hottest heads in our Party could have expected. Even our enemies do not deny this now; and certainly our friends cannot deny it.

We did not have an iron and steel industry, the foundation for the industrialization of the country. Now we have this industry.

We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.

We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a big and up-to-date chemical industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a real and big industry for the production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we have one.

We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have one.

In output of electric power we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

In output of oil products and coal we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

We had only one coal and metallurgical base—in the Ukraine—which we barely managed to keep going. We have not only succeeded in improving this base, but have created a new coal and metallurgical base—in the East—which is the pride of our country.

We had only one centre of the textile industry—in the North of our country. As a result of our efforts we will have in the very

near future two new centres of the textile industry—in Central Asia and Western Siberia.

And we have not only created these new great industries, but have created them on a scale and in dimensions that eclipse the scale and dimensions of European industry.

And as a result of all this the capitalist elements have been completely and irrevocably eliminated from industry, and socialist industry has become the sole form of industry in the U.S.S.R.

And as a result of all this our country has been converted from an agrarian into an industrial country; for the proportion of industrial output, as compared with agricultural output, has risen from 48 per cent of the total in the beginning of the Five-Year Plan period (1928) to 70 per cent at the end of the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan period (1932).

And as a result of all this we have succeeded by the end of the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan period in fulfilling the total program of industrial output, which was drawn up for five years, to the extent of 93.7 per cent, thereby increasing the volume of industrial output more than *threefold* as compared with the prewar output, and more than *twofold* as compared with that of 1928. As for the Five-Year Plan program of output for heavy industry, we have fulfilled that to the extent of 108 per cent.

It is true that we are 6 per cent short of fulfilling the total program of the Five-Year Plan. But this is due to the fact that in order to bolster up our defences, in view of the refusal of neighbouring countries to sign pacts of nonaggression with us, and of the complications that arose in the Far East, we were obliged hastily to switch a number of factories to the production of modern weapons of defence. And since this involved the necessity of going through a certain period of preparation, these factories had to suspend production for four months, which could not but affect the fulfilment of the total program provided for in the Five-Year Plan during 1932. As a result of this operation we have completely filled the gaps in our defences. But this was bound to affect the fulfilment of the program provided for in the Five-Year Plan. It is beyond any

doubt that, but for this circumstance, we would not only have fulfilled, but even overfulfilled the total production figures of the Five-Year Plan.

Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern weapons of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from without.

Such, in general terms, are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

Now you may judge for yourselves what all the talk in the bourgeois press about the "failure" of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of industry is worth after this?

And what is the position in regard to growth of industrial output in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe crisis?

Here are the generally known official figures.

While by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 334 per cent of the *prewar* output, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. *dropped* in this same period to 84 per cent, in England to 75 per cent, in Germany to 62 per cent.

While by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 219 per cent of the *1928 output*, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. during this same period *dropped* to 56 per cent, in England to 80 per cent, in Germany to 55 per cent, in Poland to 54 per cent.

What do these figures show if not that the capitalist system of industry has failed to stand the test in the contest with the Soviet system; that the Soviet system of industry has all the advantages over the capitalist system.

We are told: This is all very well; many new factories have indeed been built, and the foundations for industrialization have been laid; but it would have been far better to have abandoned the policy of industrialization, the policy of expanding the production

of means of production, or at least to have relegated it to the background, and to have produced more cotton goods, shoes, clothing, and other consumer goods.

It is true that the output of consumer goods fell short of the demand, and this creates certain difficulties. But, then, we must realize and take into account where such a policy of relegating the task of industrialization to the background would have led us. Of course, out of the 1,500,000,000 rubles in foreign currency that we spent on purchasing equipment for our heavy industries, we could have set apart a half for the purpose of importing cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. Then we would now have more cotton goods, shoes and clothing. But we would not have a tractor industry or an automobile industry; we would not have anything like a big iron and steel industry; we would not have metal for the manufacture of machinery—and we would remain unarmed in a surrounding of capitalist countries which are armed with modern technique.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of supplying our agriculture with tractors and agricultural machinery—which means that we would now have no bread.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of achieving victory over the capitalist elements in our country—which means that we would have raised immeasurably the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

We would not now have all the modern means of defence without which it is impossible for a country to be politically independent, without which a country becomes a target for military attacks of foreign enemies. Our position would be more or less analogous to the present position of China, who has no heavy industry and no war industry of her own and which is being molested by anyone who cares to do so.

In a word, in that case we would have had military intervention; not pacts of nonaggression, but war, dangerous and fatal war, a sanguinary and unequal war; for in such a war we would be almost unarmed in the face of an enemy who has all the modern means of attack at his disposal.

This is how it works out, comrades.

It is obvious that no self-respecting government and no self-respecting Party could adopt such a fatal point of view.

And it is precisely because the Party rejected this antirevolutionary line—it is precisely for that reason that it achieved a decisive victory in the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of industry.

In carrying out the Five-Year Plan and organizing victory in the sphere of industrial development the Party pursued the policy of accelerating the development of industry to the utmost. The Party, as it were, whipped up the country and spurred it onward.

Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

Yes, it was absolutely right.

We had to spur on a country which was a hundred years behind time and which was faced with mortal danger because it was behind time. Only in this way was it possible to enable the country quickly to re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique and to emerge on to the highroad at last.

Furthermore, we could not know just when the imperialists would attack the U.S.S.R. and interrupt our work of construction; but that they might attack us at any moment, taking advantage of the technical and economic backwardness of our country—of that there could not be any doubt. That is why the Party was obliged to spur on the country, so as not to lose time, so as to make the utmost use of the respite to create in the U.S.S.R. the basis of industrialization which is the foundation of her might. The Party could not afford to wait and manoeuvre; it had to pursue the policy of accelerating development to the utmost.

Finally, the Party had to put an end, in the shortest possible space of time, to the weakness of the country in the sphere of defence. The conditions prevailing at the time, the growth of armaments in capitalist countries, the collapse of the idea of disarmament, the hatred of the international bourgeoisie for the U.S.S.R.—all this impelled the Party to accelerate the work of strengthening the defences of the country, the foundation of her independence.

But did the Party have the practical possibilities for pursuing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost? Yes, it did. It had these possibilities, not only because it succeeded in good time in rousing the country to make rapid progress, but primarily because in the work of extensive new construction it could fall back on the old, or renovated, factories and plants, which the workers and engineers had already mastered, and which, therefore, enabled us to achieve the utmost acceleration of development.

That was the basis for the rapid advance of new construction, for the enthusiasm displayed in the extensive construction work, for the rise of heroes and shock workers on construction jobs, for the tempestuous rates of development in our country in the period of the First Five-Year Plan.

Can it be said that exactly the same policy of accelerating development to the utmost must be pursued in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan?

No, it cannot.

Firstly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, we have, in the main, *already achieved* its principal object—to place industry, transport, and agriculture on a new, modern, technical basis. Is there really any need, after this, to urge and spur on the country? This is obviously no longer necessary.

Secondly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, we have *already succeeded* in raising the defences of the country to the proper level. Is there really any need, after this, to urge and spur on the country? This is obviously no longer necessary.

Finally, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, we have been able to build scores and hundreds of big new factories and works, equipped with new, most up-to-date machinery. This means that in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the bulk of industrial output will be provided not by the old factories, whose equipment has already been mastered, as was the case during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, but by the

new factories, whose equipment has not yet been mastered, but has still to be mastered. But the mastering of the new enterprises and of new machinery presents much greater difficulties than the utilization of old, or renovated, factories and plants whose equipment has already been mastered. This requires more time, which must be spent in raising the skill of the workers and engineers and in acquiring the new experience that is needed to make full use of the new machinery. Is it not clear after this, that even if we desired to we could not in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, particularly during the first two or three years, pursue a policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

That is why I think that in the Second Five-Year Plan period we will have to adopt less speedy rates of increase in industrial output. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan the average annual increase in industrial output was 22 per cent. I think that in the Second Five-Year Plan we will have to provide for a 13 to 14 per cent average annual increase in industrial output as a minimum. For capitalist countries such a rate of increase in industrial output is an unattainable ideal. And not only such a rate of increase in industrial output—even a 5 per cent average annual increase in industrial output is now an unattainable ideal for them. But, then, they are capitalist countries. The Soviet Union, with the Soviet system of economy, is altogether different. Under our economic system we are fully able to obtain, and we must obtain, a 13 to 14 per cent annual increase of production as a *minimum*.

In the period of the First Five-Year Plan we succeeded in organizing enthusiasm and fervour *for new construction*, and achieved decisive successes. That is very good. But now that is not enough. Now we must supplement that with enthusiasm and fervour for *mastering* the new factories and the new machinery, for a substantial rise in productivity of labour, for a substantial reduction of production costs.

This is the main thing at present.

For only on this basis will we be able, say, in the latter half of the Second Five-Year Plan period, to make a fresh powerful

spurt both in respect of development and in respect of increasing industrial output.

Finally, a few words about the rates of development and percentages of annual increase of production. Our executives in industry pay little attention to this question. And yet it is a very interesting question. What is behind the per cent increase of output; what does every per cent of increase imply? Take the year 1925, for example, the period of restoration. In that year the increase in output was 66 per cent. Gross industrial output amounted to 7,700,000,000 rubles. The increase of 66 per cent represented, in absolute figures, something over 3,000,000,000 rubles. Hence, every per cent of increase was then equal to 45,000,000 rubles. Now let us take the year 1928. In that year the increase was 26 per cent, i.e., about one third of that in 1925 as far as percentages are concerned. Gross industrial output in 1928 amounted to 15,500,000,000 rubles. The total increase for the year amounted, in absolute figures, to 3,280,000,000 rubles. Thus, every per cent of increase was then equal to 126,000,000 rubles, i.e., almost three times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase. Finally, let us take 1931. In that year the increase was 22 per cent, i.e., one third of that in 1925. Gross industrial output in 1931 amounted to 30,800,000,000 rubles. The total increase, in absolute figures, amounted to a little over 5,600,000,000 rubles. Hence, every per cent of increase represented more than 250,000,000 rubles, i.e., six times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase, and twice as much as in 1928, when we had a little over 26 per cent increase.

What does all this show? It shows that in studying the rate of increase of output we must not confine our examination to the total percentage of increase—we must also take account of what lies behind each per cent of increase and of what is the total sum of the annual increase of output. For 1933, for example, we are providing for a 16 per cent increase, i.e., one fourth that of 1925. But this does not mean that the actual increase of output in 1933 will also be one fourth that of 1925. In 1925 the increase of output in absolute figures, was a little over 3,000,000,000 rubles

and each per cent was equal to 45,000,000 rubles. There is no reason to doubt that a 16 per cent increase of output in 1933 will amount, in absolute figures, to not less than 5,000,000,000 rubles, i.e., almost twice as much as in 1925; and each per cent of increase will be equal to at least 320,000,000 to 340,000,000 rubles, i.e., will represent at least seven times as large a sum as each per cent of increase represented in 1925.

That is how things turn out to be, comrades, if we examine the question of rates of growth and percentages of increase in concrete terms.

Such is the position in regard to the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

IV

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURE

Let us pass on to the question of the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

The Five-Year Plan in the sphere of agriculture was a Five-Year Plan of collectivization. What did the Party proceed from in carrying out collectivization?

The Party proceeded from the fact that in order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to build up socialist society it was necessary, in addition to industrialization, to pass from small, individual peasant farming to large-scale collective agriculture equipped with tractors and modern agricultural machinery, as the only firm basis for the Soviet regime in the rural districts.

The Party proceeded from the fact that without collectivization it would be impossible to lead our country on to the highroad of building the economic foundations of socialism, impossible to free the vast masses of the labouring peasantry from poverty and ignorance.

Lenin said:

"There is no escape from poverty for the small farm." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 540.)

Lenin said:

"If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin." (See Vol. XX, p. 417.)

Lenin said:

"Only by collective, cooperative, artel labour will it be possible to emerge from the impasse into which the imperialist war has driven us." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 537.)

Lenin said:

"It is essential to adopt joint cultivation on large model farms. Without that there can be no escape from the chaos, from the truly desperate condition, in which Russia finds herself." (See Vol. XX, p. 418.)

Proceeding from this, Lenin arrived at the following fundamental conclusion:

"Only if we succeed in proving to the peasants in practice the advantages of common, collective, cooperative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of cooperative or artel farming, will the working class, which holds the state power, be really able to convince the peasant of the correctness of its policy and to secure the real and durable following of the millions of peasants." (See Vol. XXIV, p. 579.)

It was from these theses of Lenin's that the Party proceeded in carrying out the program of collectivizing agriculture, the program of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of agriculture.

In this connection, the object of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of agriculture was to unite the scattered and small individual peasant farms, which lacked the opportunity of utilizing tractors and modern agricultural machinery, into large collective farms, equipped with all the modern implements of highly developed agriculture, and to cover unoccupied land with model state farms.

The object of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of agriculture was to convert the U.S.S.R. from a small-peasant and backward country into a land of large-scale agriculture organized on the

basis of collective labour and providing the maximum output for the market.

What has the Party achieved in carrying out the program of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture? Has it fulfilled this program, or has it failed?

The Party has succeeded, in a matter of three years, in organizing more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms specializing mainly in grain growing and livestock raising, and at the same time it has succeeded, in the course of four years, in expanding the crop area by 21,000,000 hectares.

The Party has succeeded in getting more than 60 per cent of the peasant farms to unite into collective farms which account for more than 70 per cent of the land cultivated by peasants; this means that we have *overfulfilled* the Five-Year Plan *threefold*.

The Party has succeeded in creating conditions which enable it to obtain 1,200,000,000 to 1,400,000,000 poods of marketable grain annually, instead of 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 poods, as was the case when individual peasant farming predominated.

The Party has succeeded in routing the kulaks as a class, although they have not yet been dealt the final blow; the labouring peasants have been emancipated from kulak bondage and exploitation, and a firm economic basis for the Soviet system, the basis of collective farming, has been established in the countryside.

The Party has succeeded in converting the U.S.S.R. from a land of small-peasant farming into a land where agriculture is run on the largest scale in the world.

Such, in general terms, are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

Now you may judge for yourselves what all the talk of the bourgeois press about the "collapse" of collectivization, about the "failure" of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of agriculture is worth after all this.

And what is the position of agriculture in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe agricultural crisis?

Here are the generally known official figures. •

In the principal grain-producing countries the crop area has been reduced 8 to 10 per cent. The cotton area in the United States has been reduced by 15 per cent; the area under sugar beet in Germany and Czechoslovakia has been reduced 22 to 30 per cent; the area under flax in Lithuania and Latvia has been reduced 25 to 30 per cent.

According to the figures of the United States Department of Agriculture, the value of the gross output of agriculture in the United States *dropped* from \$11,000,000,000 in 1929 to \$5,000,000,000 in 1932. The value of the gross output of grain in that country *dropped* from \$1,288,000,000 in 1929 to \$391,000,000 in 1932. The value of the cotton crop in that country *dropped* from \$1,389,000,000 in 1929 to \$397,000,000 in 1932.

Do not all these facts testify to the superiority of the Soviet system of agriculture over the capitalist system? Do not these facts go to show that the collective farms are a more virile form of farming than individual and capitalist farms?

It is said that collective farms and state farms do not always pay, that they eat up an enormous amount of funds, that there is no sense in maintaining such enterprises, that it would be more expedient to dissolve them and to leave only those that pay. But only people who understand nothing about national economy, about economics, can say such things. A few years ago more than half of our textile mills did not pay. Some of our comrades suggested at the time that we should close down these mills. What would have happened had we followed their advice? We would have committed an enormous crime against the country, against the working class; for by doing that we would have ruined our rising industry. What did we do at that time? We persevered for a little more than a year, and finally succeeded in making the whole of our textile industry pay. And what about our automobile plant at Gorky? It does not pay as yet either. Would you, perhaps, have us close it down? Or our iron and steel industry, which does not pay as yet either? Shall we close that down, too, comrades? If this is going to be our view of whether a thing pays or not, then we ought to develop to the utmost only a few industries,

those which are the most profitable, as, for example, the confectionery industry, flour milling, the perfumery industry, the knitted goods industry, the toy industry, etc. Of course, I am not opposed to developing these industries. On the contrary, they must be developed, for they, too, are needed for the population. But, in the first place, they cannot be developed without equipment and fuel, which are provided by the heavy industries. In the second place, we cannot use them as the basis of industrialization. That is the position, comrades.

We cannot approach the question of whether a thing pays or not from the huckster's point of view, from the point of view of the immediate present. We must approach it from the point of view of national economy as a whole, over a period of several years. Only such a point of view can be called a truly Leninist, a truly Marxist one. And this point of view is essential not only in regard to industry, but also, and to an even greater extent, in regard to the collective farms and state farms. Just think: in a matter of three years we have created more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms, i.e., we have created entirely new large enterprises which are as important for agriculture as large mills and factories are for industry. Name another country which has managed in the course of three years to create, not 205,000 new large enterprises, but even 25,000. You will not be able to name it; for there is no such country, and there has never been one. But we have created 205,000 new enterprises in agriculture. It appears, however, that there are people who demand that these enterprises should pay immediately, and if they cannot pay immediately, they should be destroyed and dissolved. Is it not clear that these very strange people are envious of the laurels of Herostratus?

In saying that the collective farms and state farms do not pay, I do not want to suggest that all of them do not pay. Nothing of the kind! Everyone knows that even now we have quite a number of collective farms and state farms which are highly profitable. We have thousands of collective farms and scores of state farms which fully pay even now. These collective farms and state farms

are the pride of our Party, the pride of the Soviet government. Of course, not all collective farms and state farms are alike. Some collective farms and state farms are old, some are new, and some are very young. The latter are still weak economic organisms, which have not yet fully come out of the mould. They are passing through approximately the same period of organizational development that our factories and plants passed through in 1920-21. Naturally, the majority of these cannot pay yet. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that they will begin to pay in the course of the next two or three years, just as our factories and mills began to pay after 1921. To refuse them assistance and support on the grounds that at the present moment not all of them pay would be committing a grave crime against the working class and the peasantry. Only enemies of the people and counterrevolutionaries can assert that the collective farms and state farms are unnecessary.

In putting into effect the Five-Year Plan for agriculture, the Party pursued a policy of collectivization at an accelerated tempo. Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivization? Yes, it was absolutely right, even though certain excesses were committed in the process. In pursuing the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, and in destroying the kulak nests, the Party could not stop half way. It had to carry this work to completion.

This is the first point.

Secondly, having tractors and agricultural machinery at its disposal, on the one hand, and taking advantage of the absence of private property in land (the nationalization of the land!), on the other, the Party had every opportunity of accelerating the collectivization of agriculture. And, indeed, it achieved tremendous successes in this sphere, for it overfulfilled the program of the Five-Year Plan of collectivization threefold.

Does this mean that we must pursue the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivization in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan as well? No, it does not mean that. The point is that, in the main, we have *already completed* the collectivization of the principal regions of the U.S.S.R. Hence, we have done more

in this sphere than could have been expected. And we have not only, in the main, completed collectivization. We have succeeded in making the overwhelming majority of the peasantry realize that collective farming is the most acceptable form of farming. This is a tremendous victory, comrades. Is it worth while, after this, getting into a fever to accelerate the tempo of collectivization? Clearly, it is not.

Now it is no longer a question of accelerating the tempo of collectivization. Still less is it a question as to whether the collective farms should exist or not—that question has already been answered in the affirmative. The collective farms have come to stay, and the road back to old, individual farming is closed forever. The task now is to strengthen the collective farms *organizationally*; to oust the sabotaging elements from them; to recruit real, tried, Bolshevik cadres for the collective farms, and to make them really Bolshevik collective farms.

This is the principal thing today.

This is the position in regard to the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

V

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

I have spoken of our successes in the sphere of industry and agriculture, of the progress of industry and agriculture in the U.S.S.R. What are the results of these successes as regards the improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants? What are the main results of our successes in the sphere of industry and agriculture as regards the radical improvement of the material conditions of the working people?

Firstly, the fact that *unemployment has been abolished* and the uncertainty about the future among the workers has been removed.

Secondly, the fact that almost all of the poor peasants have joined the collective farms; that, on this basis, the process of differentiation among the peasantry into kulaks and poor peasants has been checked; and that, *as a result, an end has been put to impoverishment and pauperism in the rural districts.*

These are tremendous achievements, comrades, achievements of which not a single bourgeois state, be it even the most "democratic," can dream.

In our country, in the U.S.S.R., the workers have long forgotten unemployment. Some three years ago we had about 1,500,000 unemployed. It is already two years now since unemployment has been completely abolished. And in these two years the workers have already forgotten about unemployment, about its burden and its horrors. Look at the capitalist countries: what horrors are taking place there as a result of unemployment! There are now no less than 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 unemployed in those countries. Who are these people? Usually it is said of them that they are "down and out."

Every day they try to get work, seek work, are prepared to accept almost any conditions of work but they are not given work, because they are "superfluous." And this is taking place at a time when vast quantities of goods and products are wasted to satisfy the caprices of the darlings of fate, the scions of the capitalists and landlords.

The unemployed are refused food because they have no money to pay for it; they are refused shelter because they have no money to pay rent. How and where do they live? They live on the miserable crumbs from the rich man's table; by raking refuse bins, where they find decayed scraps of food; they live in the slums of big cities, and more often in hovels outside of the towns, hastily put up by the unemployed out of packing cases and the bark of trees. But this is not all. It is not only the unemployed who suffer as a result of unemployment. The employed workers, too, suffer as a result of it. They suffer because the presence of a large number of unemployed makes their position in industry insecure, makes them uncertain about their future. Today they are

employed, but they are not sure that when they wake up tomorrow they will not find themselves discharged.

One of the principal achievements of the Five-Year Plan in four years is that we have abolished unemployment and have relieved the workers of the U.S.S.R. of its horrors.

The same thing must be said in regard to the peasants. They, too, have forgotten about the differentiation of the peasants into kulaks and poor peasants, about the exploitation of the poor peasants by the kulaks, about the ruin which, every year, caused hundreds of thousands and millions of poor peasants to go begging. Three or four years ago the poor peasants represented no less than 30 per cent of the total peasant population in our country. They numbered about 20,000,000. And further back, in the period before the October Revolution, the poor peasants represented no less than 60 per cent of the peasant population. Who were the poor peasants? They were people who usually lacked either seed, or horses, or implements, or all of these, for carrying on their husbandry. The poor peasants were people who lived in a state of semistarvation and, as a rule, were in bondage to the kulaks—and in the old days, both to the kulaks and to the landlords. Not so long ago more than 2,000,000 poor peasants used to go south—to the North Caucasus and the Ukraine—every year to hire themselves out to the kulaks—and still earlier, to the kulaks and landlords. Still larger numbers used to come every year to the gates of the factories and swell the ranks of the unemployed. And it was not only the poor peasants who found themselves in this unenviable position. A good half of the middle peasants lived in the same state of poverty and privation as the poor peasants. All this is now gone and forgotten.

What has the Five-Year Plan in four years given the poor peasants and the lower stratum of the middle peasants? It has undermined and smashed the kulaks as a class, thus liberating the poor peasants and a good half of the middle peasants from bondage to the kulaks. It has brought them into the collective farms and placed them in a secure position. It has thus eliminated the possibility of the differentiation of the peasantry into

exploiters—kulaks—and exploited—poor peasants, and abolished destitution in the rural districts. It has raised the poor peasants and the lower stratum of the middle peasants to a position of security in the collective farms, and has thereby put a stop to the process of ruination and impoverishment of the peasantry. Now it no longer happens in our country that millions of peasants leave their homes every year to seek work in remote parts. To get a peasant to go to work outside of his own collective farm it is now necessary to sign a contract with the collective farm and, in addition, to pay the collective farmer his railway fare. Now there are no more cases of hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants being ruined and forced to hang around the gates of factories and mills. That is what used to happen; but that was long ago. Now the peasant is in a position of security; he is a member of a collective farm which has at its disposal tractors, agricultural machinery, a seed fund, a reserve fund, etc., etc.

That is what the Five-Year Plan has given to the poor peasants and to the lower stratum of the middle peasants.

That is the substance of the principal achievements of the Five-Year Plan in regard to the improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants.

As a result of these principal achievements in regard to the improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants, we have brought about during the period of the First Five-Year Plan:

a) A *twofold* increase over 1928 in the number of workers and other employees in large-scale industry, which represents an overfulfilment of the Five-Year Plan by 57 per cent.

b) An increase in the national income—hence, an increase in the incomes of the workers and peasants—to 45,100,000,000 rubles in 1932, which represents an increase of 85 per cent over 1928.

c) An increase in the average annual wages of workers and other employees in large-scale industry by 67 per cent as compared with 1928, which represents an overfulfilment of the Five-Year Plan by 18 per cent.

d) An increase in the social insurance fund by 292 per cent as compared with 1928 (4,120,000,000 rubles in 1932, as against 1,050,000,000 rubles in 1928), which represents an overfulfilment of the Five-Year Plan by 111 per cent.

e) An increase in public catering facilities, which now provide food for more than 70 per cent of the workers employed in the decisive industries, which represents an overfulfilment of the Five-Year Plan by 500 per cent.

Of course, we have not yet reached the point where we can fully satisfy the material requirements of the workers and peasants; and it is hardly likely that we shall reach this point within the next few years. But we have unquestionably attained a position where the material conditions of the workers and peasants are improving from year to year. The only ones who may have any doubts on this score are the sworn enemies of the Soviet regime; or, perhaps, certain representatives of the bourgeois press, including some of the Moscow correspondents of that press, who probably know no more about the economics of nations and the condition of the working people than, say, the Abyssinian king knows about higher mathematics.

And what is the position in regard to the material conditions of the workers and peasants in capitalist countries?

Here are the official figures.

The number of unemployed in the capitalist countries has increased catastrophically. In the United States, according to official figures, the number of employed workers in the manufacturing industries alone has dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932; and according to the figures of the American Federation of Labour, the number of unemployed in the United States, in all industries, at the end of 1932, was 11,000,000. In Great Britain, according to official statistics, the number of unemployed has increased from 1,290,000 in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932. In Germany, according to official figures, the number of unemployed has increased from 1,376,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000, in 1932. This is the picture that is observed in all the capitalist countries. Moreover, official statistics, as a rule, minimize the number of

unemployed; the total number of unemployed in the capitalist countries ranges from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000.

The wages of the workers are being systematically cut down. According to official figures, average monthly wages in the United States have been reduced by 35 per cent as compared with 1928. In Great Britain wages have been cut 15 per cent in the same period, and in Germany as much as 50 per cent. According to the estimates of the American Federation of Labour, the American workers lost more than \$35,000,000,000 as a result of wage cuts in 1930-31.

The workers' insurance funds in Great Britain and Germany, small as they were, have been considerably reduced. In the United States and in France unemployment insurance does not exist, or hardly exists at all, and, as a consequence, the number of homeless workers and waifs is growing enormously, particularly in the United States.

The position is no better as regards the condition of the masses of the peasantry in the capitalist countries, where the agricultural crisis is utterly undermining peasant farming and is forcing millions of ruined peasants and farmers to go begging.

Such are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in regard to the improvement of the material conditions of the working people of the U.S.S.R.

VI

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS TRADE TURNOVER BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Let us now pass on to the question of the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in regard to the growth of trade turnover between town and country.

The tremendous growth of the output of industry and agriculture, the growth of the marketable surplus both in industry and in agriculture, and, finally, the growth of the requirements of

the workers and peasants—all this could not but lead, and indeed has led, to a revival and expansion of trade turnover between town and country.

Production ties are the fundamental form of the bond between town and country. But production ties alone are not enough. They must be supplemented by the bond on the basis of trade in order that the ties between town and country may be durable and unseverable. This can only be achieved by developing Soviet trade. It would be wrong to think that Soviet trade can be developed only along one channel, for example, the cooperative societies. In order to develop Soviet trade all channels must be used: the cooperative societies, the state trading system, and collective-farm trade.

Some comrades think that the development of Soviet trade, and particularly the development of collective-farm trade, is a reversion to the first stage of NEP. This is absolutely wrong.

There is a fundamental difference between Soviet trade, including collective-farm trade, and the trade that was carried on in the first stage of NEP.

In the first stage of NEP we permitted a revival of capitalism, permitted private trade, permitted the "activitics" of private traders, capitalists, profiteers.

That was more or less free trade, restricted only by the regulating role of the state. At that time the private capitalist sector occupied a fairly important place in the trade turnover in the country. This is apart from the fact that at that time we did not have the developed industry we now have, or collective farms and state farms working according to plan and placing at the disposal of the state huge reserves of agricultural produce and manufactured goods.

Can it be said that this is the position now? Of course not.

In the first place, Soviet trade cannot be placed on a par with trade in the first stage of NEP, even though the latter was regulated by the state. While trade in the first stage of NEP permitted the revival of capitalism and the functioning of the private capitalist sector in trade turnover, Soviet trade proceeds from

the negation, the absence of both. What is Soviet trade? Soviet trade is trade without capitalists, big or small; it is trade without profiteers, big or small. It is a special form of trade, which has never existed in history before, and which is practised only by us, the Bolsheviks, under the conditions of Soviet development.

Secondly, we now have a fairly widely developed state industry and a complete system of collective farms and state farms, which provide the state with huge reserves of agricultural and manufactured goods for the development of Soviet trade. This was not the case, nor could it be the case, under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thirdly, we have succeeded in the last few years in completely eliminating private traders, merchants, and middlemen of all kinds from the sphere of trade. Of course, this does not mean that private traders and profiteers may not, in accordance with the law of atavism, reappear in the sphere of trade and take advantage of the most favourable field for them in this respect, namely, collective-farm trading. Moreover, collective farmers themselves are sometimes prone to engage in profiteering, which does not do them honour, of course. But to combat these unhealthy activities we have the law recently passed by the Soviet government which provides for the prevention and punishment of profiteering. You know, of course, that this law does not err on the side of leniency. You will understand, of course, that such a law was not, and could not have been, passed under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thus you see that anyone who in spite of these facts talks of a reversion to the trade of the first stage of NEP, shows that he understands nothing, absolutely nothing, about our Soviet economics.

We are told that it is impossible to develop trade, even if it is Soviet trade, without a sound money system and a sound currency; that we must first of all achieve the recovery of our money system and our Soviet currency, which, it is alleged, is worthless. That is what the economists in capitalist countries tell us. I think that those worthy economists understand no more about political economy than, say, the Archbishop of Canterbury understands

about antireligious propaganda. How can it be asserted that our Soviet currency is worthless? Is it not a fact that with this currency we built Magnitostroy, Dnieprostroy, Kuznetskstroy, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor works, the Gorky and Moscow automobile plants, hundreds of thousands of collective farms, and thousands of state farms? Do those gentlemen think that all these enterprises have been built with straw, or clay, and not with real materials, having definite value? What is it that secures the stability of Soviet currency—if we have in mind, of course, the organized market, which is of decisive importance in our trade turnover, and not the unorganized market, which is only of subordinate importance? Of course, it is not the gold reserve alone. The stability of Soviet currency is secured, first of all, by the vast quantity of goods held by the state and put into commodity circulation at stable prices. What economist can deny that this security, which exists only in the U.S.S.R., is a more real guarantee for the stability of the currency than any gold reserve? Will the economists in capitalist countries ever understand that they are hopelessly muddled in their theory of a gold reserve being the "only" security for the stability of currency?

That is the position in regard to the questions concerning the expansion of Soviet trade.

What have we achieved as a result of carrying out the Five-Year Plan as regards the development of Soviet trade?

As a result of the Five-Year Plan we have:

- a) An increase in the output of light industry to 187 per cent of the output in 1928.
- b) An increase in cooperative and state retail trade turnover, which now, calculated in prices of 1932, amounts to 39,600,000,000 rubles, i.e., an increase in the volume of goods in retail trade to 175 per cent of the 1928 figure.
- c) An increase in the number of state and cooperative shops and stores by 158,000 over that of 1929.
- d) The continually increasing development of collective-farm trade and of purchases of agricultural produce by various state and cooperative organizations.

Such are the facts.

An altogether different picture of the condition of internal trade obtains in the *capitalist* countries, where the crisis has resulted in a catastrophic drop in trade, in the mass closing down of enterprises and the ruin of small and medium shopkeepers, in the bankruptcy of large commercial firms, and the accumulation of a large surplus of goods in the stores while the purchasing power of the masses of the working people continues to decline.

Such are the results of the Five-Year Plan in four years in the sphere of the development of trade turnover.

VII

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REMNANTS OF THE HOSTILE CLASSES

As a result of the realization of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of industry, agriculture, and trade we have established the principles of socialism in all spheres of the national economy and have expelled the capitalist elements from them.

What should this have led to with regard to the capitalist elements; and what has it actually led to?

It has led to this: the last remnants of the dying classes—the manufacturers and their servitors, the merchants and their henchmen, the former nobles and priests, the kulaks and their toadies, the former White officers and police officials, policemen and gendarmes, all sorts of bourgeois intellectuals of the chauvinist persuasion, and all other anti-Soviet elements—have been thrown out of their groove.

Thrown out of their groove, and scattered over the whole face of the U.S.S.R., these "have-beens" have crept into our plants and factories, into our government offices and trading organizations, into our railway and water transport enterprises, and,

principally, into the collective farms and state farms. They have crept into these places and concealed their identity, donning the mask of "workers" and "peasants," and some of them have even managed to make their way into the Party.

What did they carry with them into these places? Of course, they carried with them a feeling of hatred towards the Soviet regime, a feeling of burning enmity towards the new forms of economy, life and culture.

These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal attack against the Soviet regime. They and their classes made such attacks several times, but they were defeated and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. And they are doing as much mischief as they can in a stealthy, underhand way. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machinery. They organize sabotage. They organize wrecking activities in the collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their zeal for wrecking as to inject the germs of plague and anthrax into the cattle on the collective farms and state farms, help to spread meningitis among horses, etc.

But that is not the main thing. The main thing in the "activities" of these "have-beens" is that they organize mass theft and plundering of state property, cooperative property, and collective-farm property. Theft and plundering in the factories and plants, theft and plundering of railway freight, theft and plundering in warehouses and commercial enterprises—particularly theft and plundering in the state farms and collective farms—such is the main form of the "activities" of these "have-beens." Their class instinct, as it were, tells them that the basis of Soviet economy is public property, and that it is precisely this basis that must be shaken in order to injure the Soviet regime—and they try indeed to shake the foundations of public property, by organizing mass theft and plundering.

In order to organize plundering they play on the private-property habits and survivals among the collective farmers, the

individual farmers of yesterday who are now members of collective farms. You, as Marxists, should know that in its development the mentality of man lags behind his actual condition. In status the members of collective farms are no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but their mentality is still the old one—that of the owner of private property. And so, the "have-beens" from the ranks of the exploiting classes play on the private-property habits of the collective farmers in order to organize the plundering of public wealth and thus shake the foundation of the Soviet system, viz., public property.

Many of our comrades look complacently upon such phenomena and fail to understand the meaning and significance of this mass theft and plundering. They remain blind to these facts and take the view that "there is nothing particular in it." But these comrades are profoundly mistaken. The basis of our system is public property, just as private property is the basis of capitalism. If the capitalists proclaimed private property sacred and inviolable when they were consolidating the capitalist system, there is all the more reason why we Communists should proclaim public property sacred and inviolable in order to consolidate the new socialist forms of economy in all spheres of production and trade. To permit theft and plundering of public property—no matter whether it is state property or cooperative or collective-farm property—and to ignore such counterrevolutionary outrages is tantamount to aiding and abetting the undermining of the Soviet system, which rests on public property as its basis. It was on these grounds that our Soviet Government passed the recent law for the protection of public property. This enactment is the basis of revolutionary law at the present time. And it is the primary duty of every Communist, of every worker, and of every collective farmer strictly to carry out this law.

It is said that revolutionary law at the present time does not differ in any way from revolutionary law in the first period of NEP—that revolutionary law at the present time is a reversion to revolutionary law of the first period of NEP. That is absolutely wrong. The edge of revolutionary law in the first period of NEP

was directed mainly against the excesses of War Communism, against "illegal" confiscation and imposts. It guaranteed the security of the property of the private owner, of the individual farmer and of the capitalist, provided they strictly observed the Soviet laws. The position in regard to revolutionary law at the present time is entirely different. The edge of revolutionary law at the present time is directed, not against the excesses of War Communism, which long since have ceased, but against thieves and wreckers in public economy, against rowdies and pilferers of public property. The main concern of revolutionary law at the present time is, consequently, the protection of public property, and not something else.

That is why it is one of the fundamental tasks of the Party to fight to protect public property, to fight with all the measures and all the means placed at our command by our Soviet laws.

A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat—that is what we must have now in order to scatter the last remnants of the dying classes to the winds and frustrate their thieving designs.

Some comrades interpreted the thesis on the abolition of classes, the establishment of classless society, and the withering away of the state to mean a justification of laziness and complacency, a justification of the counterrevolutionary theory that the class struggle is subsiding and that state power is to be relaxed. Needless to say, such people cannot have anything in common with our Party. They are either degenerates or double-dealers, and must be driven out of the Party. The abolition of classes is not achieved by the subsiding of the class struggle, but by its intensification. The state will wither away, not as a result of a relaxation of the state power, but as a result of its utmost consolidation, which is necessary for the purpose of finally crushing the remnants of the dying classes and of organizing defence against the capitalist encirclement, which is far from having been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done away with.

As a result of the realization of the Five-Year Plan we have succeeded in completely ejecting the remnants of the hostile

classes from their positions in production; we have routed the kulaks and have prepared the ground for their elimination. Such are the results of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of the struggle against the last detachments of the bourgeoisie. But that is not enough. The task is to eject these "have-beens" from our enterprises and institutions and to render them utterly harmless.

It cannot be said that these "have-beens" can alter anything in the present position of the U.S.S.R. by their wrecking and thieving machinations. They are too weak and impotent to withstand the measures adopted by the Soviet government. But if our comrades do not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and do not actually put an end to the smug, petty-bourgeois attitude towards theft and plundering of public property, these "have-beens" will be able to do considerable mischief.

We must bear in mind that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes. It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to other, sharper forms of attack; they will appeal to the backward sections of the population and try to mobilize them against the Soviet regime. There is no mischief and slander that these "have-beens" will not resort to against the Soviet regime and around which they will not try to rally the backward elements. This may provide grounds for a revival of the activities of the defeated groups of the old counterrevolutionary parties: the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the bourgeois nationalists in the centre and in the border regions; it may also provide grounds for a revival of the activities of the fragments of counterrevolutionary opposition elements, the Trotskyites and Right deviationists. Of course, there is nothing terrible in this. But we must bear all this in mind if we want to get rid of these elements quickly, and without unnecessary sacrifice.

That is why revolutionary vigilance is the quality that Bolsheviks particularly need at the present time.

VIII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Such are the main results of the realization of the Five-Year Plan in the sphere of industry and agriculture, as regards the improvement of the conditions of life of the working people and the development of trade turnover, as regards the consolidation of the Soviet regime and the development of the class struggle against the remnants and survivals of the dying classes.

Such are the successes and gains the Soviet regime has achieved in the past four years.

It would be a mistake to think that since these successes have been attained everything is as it should be. Of course, not everything with us is yet as it should be. There are plenty of defects and mistakes in our work. Inefficiency and confusion are still to be met in our practical work. Unfortunately, I cannot now stop to deal with defects and mistakes, as the limits of the report I was instructed to make do not give me sufficient scope for this. But that is not the point just now. The point is that, notwithstanding defects and mistakes, whose existence none of us denies, we have achieved important successes which evoke admiration among the working class all over the world—we have achieved a victory which is truly of world-wide historic significance.

What are the principal factors that could and actually did bring it about that, despite mistakes and defects, the Party has nevertheless achieved decisive successes in carrying out the Five-Year Plan in four years?

What are the main forces that have ensured this historical victory for us in spite of everything?

They are, first and foremost, the activity and devotion, the enthusiasm and initiative of the millions of workers and collective farmers, who, together with the engineering and technical forces, displayed colossal energy in developing socialist emula-

tion and shock work. There can be no doubt that without this we could not have achieved our goal, we could not have advanced a single step.

Secondly, the firm leadership of the Party and of the Government, which urged the masses forward and overcame all the obstacles that stood in the path to the goal.

And, lastly, the special merits and advantages of the Soviet system of economy, which bears within itself the colossal potentialities necessary for overcoming difficulties.

Such are the three main forces that brought about the historic victory of the U.S.S.R.

General conclusions:

1. The results of the Five-Year Plan have refuted the assertions of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic leaders that the Five-Year Plan was a fantasy, delirium, an unattainable dream. The results of the Five-Year Plan show that the Five-Year Plan has already been fulfilled.

2. The results of the Five-Year Plan have shattered the well-known bourgeois "article of faith" that the working class is incapable of building anything new—that it is capable only of destroying the old. The results of the Five-Year Plan have shown that the working class is as able to build the new as to destroy the old.

3. The results of the Five-Year Plan have shattered the thesis of the Social-Democrats that it is impossible to build socialism in one separate country. The results of the Five-Year Plan have shown that it is quite possible to build a socialist society in one country; for the economic foundations of such a society have already been laid in the U.S.S.R.

4. The results of the Five-Year Plan have refuted the assertion of bourgeois economists that the capitalist system of economy is the best of all systems—that every other system of economy is unstable and incapable of standing the test of the difficulties attending economic development. The results of the Five-Year Plan have shown that the capitalist system of economy is bankrupt and unstable; that it has become obsolete and must give way

to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of economy; that the only system of economy that has no fear of crises and is able to overcome the difficulties which capitalism cannot solve—is the Soviet system of economy.

5. Finally, the results of the Five-Year Plan have shown that the Communist Party is invincible, if it knows its goal, and if it is not afraid of difficulties.

(Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation. All rise to greet Comrade Stalin.)

WORK IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS

*Speech Delivered at the Joint Plenum
of the Central Committee and the Central Control
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.),*

January 11, 1933

Comrades! I think that the previous speakers have correctly described the state of Party work in the rural districts, its defects and its merits—particularly its defects. Nevertheless, it seems to me that they have failed to mention the most important thing about the defects of our work in the rural districts; they have not disclosed the roots of these defects. And yet this aspect is of the greatest interest to us. Permit me, therefore, to express my opinion on the defects of our work in the rural districts; to express it with all the straightforwardness characteristic of the Bolsheviks.

What was the main defect in our work in the rural districts during the past year, 1932?

The main defect was that our grain purchases in 1932 were accompanied by greater difficulties than in the previous year, in 1931.

This cannot be explained by the bad state of the harvest; for in 1932 our harvest was not worse, but better than in the preceding year. No one can deny that the total amount of grain harvested in 1932 was larger than in 1931, when the drought in five of the main districts of the northeastern part of the U.S.S.R. considerably reduced the country's grain balance. Of course, in 1932 we also suffered a certain loss of crops, as a consequence of unfavourable climatic conditions in the Kuban and Terek regions, and also in certain districts of the Ukraine. But there can be no doubt whatever that these losses do not amount to half the loss we suffered in 1931 as a result of the drought in the northeastern districts of the U.S.S.R. Hence, in 1932 we had more grain in the country than in 1931. And yet, despite these circumstances, our

grain purchases were accompanied by greater difficulties in 1932 than in the previous year.

What was the trouble? What are the reasons for this defect in our work? How is this disparity to be explained?

I. It is to be explained, in the first place, by the fact that our comrades in the localities, our Party workers in the rural districts, failed to take into consideration the new situation created in the rural districts by authorization of collective-farm trade in grain. And precisely because they failed to take the new situation into consideration, precisely for that reason, were they unable to reorganize their work along new lines to fit in with the new situation. It was one thing, as regards the situation in the rural districts, when there was no collective-farm trading in grain, when we did not have two prices for grain—the state price and the market price. When collective-farm trade in grain was authorized, the situation was bound to change sharply, because the authorization of collective-farm trading implies the legalization of a market price for grain higher than the established state price. There is no need to prove that this circumstance was bound to bring about a certain reluctance among the peasants to deliver their grain to the state. The peasant calculated as follows: "Collective-farm trade in grain has been authorized; market prices have been legalized; in the market I can obtain more for a given quantity of grain than I can get for the same quantity if I deliver it to the state—hence, if I am not a fool, I must hold on to my grain, deliver less to the state, leave more grain for collective-farm trade, and in this way get more for the same quantity of grain sold."

It is the simplest and most natural logic!

But the unfortunate thing is that Party workers in the rural districts, at all events many of them, failed to understand this simple and natural thing. In order to prevent the disruption of the tasks set by the Soviet government, the Communists, in this new situation, should have done everything to increase and speed up grain purchases from the very first days of the harvest, as early as July 1932. That was what the situation demanded. But what

did they actually do? Instead of speeding up grain purchases, they began to speed up the formation of all sorts of grain funds, thus encouraging the grain producers in their reluctance to fulfil their obligations to the state. Failing to understand the new situation, they began to fear, not that the reluctance of the peasants to deliver grain might impede the grain purchases, but that it would not occur to the peasants to withhold some of the grain in order, later on, to place it on the market for collective-farm trading; that perchance they would go ahead and deliver all their grain to the elevators.

In other words, our rural Communists, the majority of them at all events, grasped only the *positive* aspect of collective-farm trading; they understood and assimilated its *positive* aspect, but absolutely failed to understand and to assimilate the *negative* aspects of collective-farm trading—they failed to understand that the negative aspects of collective-farm trading would bring great harm to the state if they, i.e., the Communists, did not begin to speed up the grain-purchasing campaign to the utmost from the very first days of the harvest.

And this mistake was committed not only by Party workers on the collective farms. It was committed also by directors of state farms, who criminally held up grain which ought to have been delivered to the state and began to sell it on the side at a higher price.

Did the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee take into consideration the new situation that would arise as a result of collective-farm trading in grain when they issued their decision on the development of collective-farm trade? Yes, they did take it into consideration. In that decision it is plainly stated that collective-farm trading in grain may be started only after the plan of grain purchases has been wholly and entirely fulfilled, and after the seed has been stored. It is plainly stated in the decision that only after the grain purchases have been completed and the seed stored—approximately by January 15, 1933—that only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trading in grain be begun. By this decision the Council

of People's Commissars and the Central Committee said, as it were, to our Party workers in the rural districts: Do not allow your attention to be diverted by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; launch the grain-purchasing campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and speed it up; for the first commandment is—fulfil the plan of grain purchases; the second commandment is—get the seed stored; and only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trading in grain be started and developed.

Perhaps the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars made a mistake in not emphasizing this aspect of the matter strongly enough and in not warning our Party workers in the rural districts loudly enough about the dangers latent in collective-farm trading. But there can be no doubt whatever that they did warn against these dangers, and uttered the warning sufficiently clearly. It must be admitted that the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars somewhat overrated the degree of the Leninist training and insight of our Party workers in the localities, not only leaders of district bodies, but also a number of leaders of regional bodies.

Perhaps collective-farm trading in grain should not have been authorized? Perhaps this was a mistake, particularly if we bear in mind that collective-farm trading has not only positive aspects, but also certain negative aspects?

No, it was not a mistake. No revolutionary measure can be safeguarded against certain negative aspects if it is not properly applied. The same must be said of collective-farm trading in grain. Collective-farm trading is necessary and advantageous to the rural districts as well as to the towns, to the working class as well as to the peasantry. And precisely because it is advantageous it had to be introduced.

What were the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee guided by when they introduced collective-farm trading in grain?

First of all, by the consideration that this would widen the base for trade turn over between town and country, and thus

improve the supply of agricultural produce to the workers and of urban manufactures to the peasants. There can be no doubt that state and cooperative trade alone are not sufficient. These channels of trade turnover had to be supplemented by a new channel—collective-farm trading. And we have supplemented them by introducing collective-farm trading.

Further, they were guided by the consideration that collective-farm trading in grain would give the collective farmers an additional source of income and strengthen their economic position.

Finally, they were guided by the consideration that the introduction of collective-farm trading would give the peasants a fresh stimulus for improving the work of the collective farms both in regard to sowing and harvesting.

As you know, all these considerations by which the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee were guided have been fully and entirely confirmed by the recent facts in the life of the collective farms. The accelerated process of consolidation of the collective farms, the cessation of withdrawals of members from the collective farms, the growing eagerness of individual farmers to join the collective farms, the tendency of the collective farmers to show greater discrimination in accepting new members—all this, and much of a like character, shows beyond a doubt that collective-farm trading has not only not weakened, but, on the contrary, has strengthened and consolidated the position of the collective farms.

Hence, the defects in our work in the rural districts are not to be explained by collective-farm trading, but by the fact that it is not always properly conducted; by inability to take into consideration the new situation; by inability to reorganize our ranks to cope with the new situation created by the authorization of collective-farm trade in grain.

2. The second reason for the defects in our work in the rural districts is that our comrades in the localities—and not only those comrades—have failed to understand the change that has taken place in the conditions of our work in the rural districts as a result of the consolidation of the predominant position of the

collective farms in the principal grain-growing districts. We all rejoice at the fact that the collective form of farming has become the predominant form in our grain-growing districts. But not all of us realize that this circumstance does not diminish, but increases our cares and responsibilities in regard to the development of agriculture. Many think that once we have achieved, say, 70 or 80 per cent of collectivization in a given district, or in a given region, we have got all we need, and can now let things take their natural course, let things go their own way, on the assumption that collectivization will do its work itself and will itself raise agriculture to a higher level. But this is a profound delusion, comrades. As a matter of fact the transition to collective farming as the predominant form of farming does not diminish, but increases our cares in regard to agriculture; does not diminish but increases the leading role of the Communists in raising agriculture to a higher level. Letting things take their own course is now more dangerous than ever for the development of agriculture. Letting things take their own course may prove fatal to the whole undertaking.

As long as the individual farmer predominated in the rural districts the Party could confine its intervention in the development of agriculture to certain acts of assistance, advice, and warning. At that time the individual farmer had to take care of his farm himself; for he had no one upon whom to throw the responsibility for his farm, which was his own personal farm, and he had no one to rely upon except himself. At that time the individual farmer had to take care of the sowing and harvesting, and all the processes of agricultural labour generally, himself, if he did not want to be left without bread and fall a victim to starvation. With the transition to collective farming the situation has changed materially. The collective farm is not the enterprise of any one individual. In fact, the collective farmers now say: "The collective farm is mine and not mine; it belongs to me, but it also belongs to Ivan, Philip, Mikhail, and other members of the collective farm; the collective farm is common property." Now, he, the collective farmer—the individual farmer of yesterday, who is the collectivist of today—can shift the responsibility to and rely

upon other members of the collective farm, knowing that the collective farm will not leave him without bread. That is why the collective farmer now has fewer cares than when he was on his individual farm; for the cares and responsibility for the enterprise are now shared by all the members of the collective farm.

What, then, follows from this? It follows from this that the burden of responsibility for conducting the enterprise has been transferred from the individual peasants to the leadership of the collective farm, to the leading group of the collective farm. Now it is not of themselves that the peasants demand care for the farm and its rational management, but of the leadership of the collective farm; or, to put it more correctly, not so much of themselves as of the leadership of the collective farm. And what does this mean? This means that the Party can no longer confine itself to individual acts of intervention in the process of agricultural development. It must now take over the direction of the collective farms, assume responsibility for the work, and help the collective farmers to develop their farms on the basis of science and technology.

But that is not all. A collective farm is a large enterprise. And a large enterprise cannot be managed without a plan. A large agricultural enterprise embracing hundreds and sometimes thousands of households can be run only on the basis of planned management. Without that it will inevitably go to rack and ruin. This, then, is still another new condition arising from the collective-farm system and radically different from the conditions under which individual small farms are run. Can we leave the management of such enterprises to the so-called natural course of things; can we let it drift along? Clearly, we cannot. The management of an enterprise such as the collective farm requires a certain minimum number of people with at least some education, people who are capable of planning the business and running it in an organized manner. It stands to reason that without systematic intervention on the part of the Soviet government in the work of collective-farm development, without its systematic aid, such an enterprise cannot be put in proper shape.

And what follows from this? It follows from this that the collective-farm system does not diminish, but increases the cares and responsibility of the Party and of the Government in regard to the development of agriculture. It follows from this that if the Party desires to direct the collective-farm movement, it must enter into all the details of collective-farm life and collective-farm management. It follows from this that the Party must not diminish but multiply its contacts with the collective farms; that it must know all that is going on in the collective farms, in order to render them timely aid and to avert the dangers that threaten them.

But what do we see in actual practice? In actual practice we see that quite a number of district and regional Party organizations are divorced from the life of the collective farms and from their requirements. People sit in offices, where they complacently indulge in pen-pushing, and fail to see that the development of the collective farms is going on independently of bureaucratic offices. In some cases this divorce from the collective farms has become so complete that certain members of territorial Party organizations have learned of what was going on in the collective farms in their regions, not from the respective district organizations, but from members of the Central Committee in Moscow. This is sad, but true, comrades. The transition from individual farming to collective farming should have led to an intensification of communist leadership in the rural districts. In actual fact, however, it has led in a number of cases to Communists resting on their laurels, to their boasting of high percentages of collectivization, while leaving things to run their own way, letting them take their natural course. The problem of planned management of collective farms should have led to an intensification of communist leadership in the collective farms. In actual fact, however, it happened in a number of cases that the Communists were quite out of it, and the collective farms were run by former White officers, former Petlyura-ists, and enemies of the workers and peasants generally.

This is the position in regard to the second reason for the defects in our work in the rural districts.

3. The third reason for the defects in our work in the rural districts is that many of our comrades overrated the collective farms as the new form of economy, overrated and converted them into an icon. They decided that since we have collective farms, which represent a socialist form of economy, we have everything; that this is sufficient to ensure the proper management of these farms, the proper planning of collective farming, and the conversion of the collective farms into exemplary socialist enterprises. They failed to understand that in their organizational structure the collective farms are still weak and need real assistance from the Party both in the way of providing them with tried Bolshevik cadres, and in the way of giving the collective farms guidance in their everyday affairs. But that is not all, and not even the main thing. The main defect is that many of our comrades overrated the strength and the possibilities of the collective farms as the new form of organization of agriculture. They failed to understand that, notwithstanding the fact that they are a socialist form of economy, the collective farms by themselves are yet far from being secure against all sorts of dangers and against the penetration of all sorts of counterrevolutionary elements into their leadership; that they are not secure against anti-Soviet elements, under certain circumstances, utilizing the collective farms for their own ends.

The collective farm is a socialist form of *economic organization*, just as the Soviets are a socialist form of *political organization*. The collective farms and the Soviets are both a tremendous achievement of our revolution, a tremendous achievement of the working class. But the collective farms and the Soviets are only a *form* of organization—true enough, a socialist form, but only a *form* of organization for all that. Everything depends upon the *content* that is put into this form.

We know of cases when Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for a certain time supported the counterrevolution against the revolution. That was the case in our country, in the U.S.S.R., for example, in July 1917, when the Soviets were led by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and when the Soviets shielded the counterrevolution against the revolution. That was

the case in Germany at the end of 1918, when the Soviets were led by the Social-Democrats, and when they shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. Hence, it is not only a matter of Soviets as a form of organization, even though that form is a great revolutionary achievement in itself. It is primarily a matter of the content of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of the character of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of *who* leads the Soviets—revolutionaries or counterrevolutionaries. This, indeed, explains the fact that counterrevolutionaries are not always opposed to Soviets. It is well known, for example, that during the Kronstadt mutiny Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counterrevolution, came out in favour of Soviets, but without Communists. "Soviets Without Communists"—that was the slogan Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counterrevolution, advanced at that time. The counterrevolutionaries understood that it is not merely a matter of the Soviets as such, but, primarily, a matter of *who* is to lead them.

The same must be said of the collective farms. Collective farms, as a socialist form of economic organization, may perform miracles of economic construction if they are led by real revolutionaries, by Bolsheviks, Communists. On the other hand, collective farms may for a certain period become a shield for all sorts of counterrevolutionary acts if these collective farms are run by Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Petlyura officers and other Whiteguards, former Denikinites and Kolchakites. It also must be borne in mind that the collective farms, as a form of organization, are not only not secure against the penetration of anti-Soviet elements, but, at first, even provide certain facilities which enable counterrevolutionaries to take advantage of them temporarily. As long as the peasants were engaged in individual farming they were scattered and separated from each other, and therefore the counterrevolutionary ventures of anti-Soviet elements among the peasantry could not be very effective. The situation is altogether different once the peasants have adopted collective farming. In the collective farms the peasants have a ready-made form of mass organization. Therefore, the penetration of anti-Soviet

elements into the collective farms and their anti-Soviet activities may be much more effective. We must assume that the anti-Soviet elements take all this into account. We know that a section of the counterrevolutionaries, for example, in the North Caucasus, themselves strive to create something in the nature of collective farms, and use these as a legal screen for their underground organizations. We also know that the anti-Soviet elements in a number of districts, where they have not yet been exposed and crushed, willingly join the collective farms, and even praise the collective farms to the skies, in order to create within them nests of counterrevolutionary activity. We also know that a section of the anti-Soviet elements are now coming out in favour of collective farms, but on condition that there are no Communists in the collective farms. "Collective Farms Without Communists"—this is the slogan that is now being hatched among anti-Soviet elements. Hence, it is not only a matter of the collective farms themselves, as a socialist form of organization; it is primarily a matter of the content that is put into this form; it is primarily a matter of *who* stands at the head of the collective farms and *who* leads them.

From the point of view of Leninism, collective farms, like the Soviets, taken as a form of organization, are a weapon, and a weapon only. Under certain conditions this weapon may be turned against the revolution. It can be turned against counterrevolution. It can serve the working class and the peasantry. Under certain conditions it can serve the enemies of the working class and of the peasantry. It all depends upon who wields this weapon and against whom it is directed.

The enemies of the workers and the peasants, guided by their class instinct, are beginning to understand this.

Unfortunately, some of our Communists still fail to understand this.

And it is precisely because some of our Communists have not understood this simple thing, it is precisely for this reason that we now have a situation where a number of collective farms are managed by well camouflaged anti-Soviet elements, who organize wrecking and sabotage in those collective farms.

4. The fourth reason for the defects in our work in the rural districts is the inability of a number of our comrades in the localities to reorganize the front of the struggle against the kulaks; their failing to understand that the face of the class enemy has changed of late, that the tactics of the class enemy in the rural districts have changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly if we are to achieve success. The enemy understands the changed situation, understands the strength and the might of the new system in the countryside; and because he understands this, he has reorganized his ranks, has changed his tactics—has passed from frontal attacks against the collective farms to the method of stealthily sapping and undermining. But we have failed to understand this; we have overlooked the new situation, and continue to search for the class enemy where he is no longer to be found; we continue to apply the old tactics of oversimplified struggle against the kulak at a time when these tactics have long since become obsolete.

People look for the class enemy outside the collective farms; they look for persons with ferocious visages, with enormous teeth and thick necks, and with sawn-off shotguns in their hands. They look for kulaks like those depicted on our posters. But such kulaks have long ceased to exist on the surface. The present-day kulaks and their toadies, the present-day anti-Soviet elements in the rural districts, are in the main "quiet," "smooth-spoken," almost "saintly" people. There is no need to look for them far from the collective farms; they are inside the collective farms, occupying positions as storehouse men, managers, accountants, secretaries, etc. They will never say, "Down With the Collective Farms!" They are "in favour" of collective farms. But inside the collective farms they carry on sabotage and wrecking work that certainly does the collective farms no good. They will never say, "Down With Grain Deliveries!" They are "in favour" of grain deliveries. They "only" resort to demagogic and demand that the collective farm should set aside a fund for the needs of livestock-raising three times as large as that actually required; that the collective farm should set aside an insurance fund three times as large as that

actually required; that the collective farm should provide from six to ten pounds of bread per worker per day for public catering, etc. Of course, after such "funds" have been formed and such grants for public catering made, after such rascally demagogry, the economic power of the collective farms is bound to be undermined, and there is little left for grain deliveries.

In order to detect such a cunning enemy and not to yield to demagogry, one must possess revolutionary vigilance; one must possess the ability to tear the mask from the face of the enemy and reveal to the collective farmers his real counterrevolutionary features. But have we many Communists in the rural districts who possess these qualities? Not infrequently Communists not only fail to expose these class enemies, but, on the contrary, they themselves yield to their rascally demagogry and follow in their tail.

Failing to detect the class enemy in his new mask, and unable to expose his rascally machinations, certain of our comrades not infrequently soothe themselves with the thought that the kulaks no longer exist; that the anti-Soviet elements in the rural districts have already been destroyed as a result of the application of the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class; and, hence, that we can now reconcile ourselves to the existence of "neutral" collective farms, which are neither Bolshevik nor anti-Soviet, but which must come over to the side of the Soviet government spontaneously, as it were. But this is a profound delusion, comrades. The kulaks have been defeated, but they are far from being crushed yet. Moreover, they will not be crushed very soon if the Communists go round gaping in smug contentment, in the belief that the kulaks will themselves walk into their graves, in the process of their spontaneous development, so to speak. As for "neutral" collective farms, there is no such thing, nor can there be. "Neutral" collective farms are a fantasy conjured up by people who have eyes but do not see. Under the conditions of the acute class struggle that is now going on in our Soviet land there is no room for "neutral" collective farms; under these circumstances, collective farms can be *either* Bolshevik or anti-Soviet. And if it is not we who are leading certain collective farms, that means that they are being

led by anti-Soviet elements. There cannot be the slightest doubt about that.

5. Finally, there is one other reason for the defects in our work in the rural districts. This is the underrating of the role and responsibility of the Communists in the work of collective-farm development; the underrating of the role and responsibility of Communists in the work of organizing the grain purchases. In speaking of the difficulties accompanying grain purchases, Communists usually throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants are not to blame at all. If we are to speak of responsibility and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly and entirely upon the Communists, and we, the Communists, alone are to blame for all this.

There is not, nor has there ever been in the world such a powerful and authoritative government as our Soviet government. There is not, nor has there ever been in the world such a powerful and authoritative party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs of the collective farms in a manner that suits the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism calls for; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable mistakes with regard to grain purchases, say—then we, and we alone, are to blame.

We are to blame for not having perceived the negative aspects of collective-farm trading in grain, and for having committed a number of gross mistakes.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our Party organizations have become divorced from the collective farms, are resting on their laurels and are allowing themselves to drift with the stream of spontaneity.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our comrades still overrate the collective farms as a form of mass organization and fail to understand that it is not so much a matter of the form as of taking the leadership of the collective farms into our own

hands and ousting the anti-Soviet elements from the leadership of the collective farms.

We are to blame for having overlooked the new situation and for not having appreciated the new tactics of the class enemy, who is carrying on his sabotage stealthily.

The question is: why blame the peasants?

I know of whole groups of collective farms which are developing and flourishing, which punctually carry out the assignments of the state and are becoming economically stronger day after day. On the other hand, I also know of a number of collective farms, situated in the neighbourhood of the first-mentioned collective farms, which, in spite of the fact that their harvests are the same and that they are working under the same objective conditions as the former, are nevertheless wilting and in a state of decay. What is the reason for this? The reason is that the first group of collective farms are led by real Communists, while the second group are led by duffers—duffers with Party membership cards in their pockets, it is true, but duffers all the same.

The question is: why blame the peasants?

The result of underrating the role and responsibility of Communists is that, not infrequently, the reasons for the defects in our work in the rural districts are not sought where they should be sought, and because of this the defects remain unremoved.

The reason for the difficulties connected with the grain purchases must not be sought among the peasants, but among ourselves, in our own ranks. For *we* are at the helm; *we* are in command of the instruments of the state; it is *our* mission to lead the collective farms; and *we* must bear the whole of the responsibility for the work in the rural districts.

These are the main reasons for the defects of our work in the rural districts.

It may be thought that I have drawn too gloomy a picture; that all our work in the rural districts is just one mass of defects. That, of course, is not true. As a matter of fact, while we have these defects, we have a number of important and decisive achievements to record in our work in the rural districts. But,

as I said at the beginning of my speech, I did not set out to describe our achievements; I set out to speak only about the defects of our work in the rural districts.

Can these defects be remedied? Yes, unquestionably, they can. Will we remedy them in the near future? Yes, unquestionably, we will. There cannot be the slightest doubt about that.

I think that the Political Departments of the machine-and-tractor stations and of the state farms represent one of the decisive means by which these defects can be removed in the shortest time.
(Loud and prolonged applause.)

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK WORKERS

February 19, 1933

Comrades collective farmers, men and women! I did not intend to speak at your Congress. I did not intend to because the previous speakers have said all that had to be said—and have said it well and to the point. Is it worth while speaking after that? But as you insist, and the power is in your hands (*prolonged applause*), I must submit.

I will say a few words on certain questions.

I

THE COLLECTIVE-FARM PATH IS THE ONLY RIGHT PATH

First question. Is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right path; is the path of collective farming the right one?

This is not an idle question. You shock workers of the collective farms evidently have no doubt that the collective farms are on the right path. Perhaps, for that reason, this question will seem superfluous to you. But not all peasants think as you do. There are not a few among the peasants, even among the collective farmers, who have doubts as to whether the collective-farm path is the right one. And there is nothing surprising about this.

Indeed, for hundreds of years people have lived in the old way, have followed the old path, have bent their backs to the kulaks and the landlords, to the usurers and the profiteers. It cannot be said that that old, capitalist path was approved by the peasants. But that old path was a beaten path, the customary

path, and no one had actually proved that it was possible to live in a different way, in a better way. The more so as in all bourgeois countries people are still living in the old way. And suddenly the Bolsheviks break in on this old stagnant life, break in like a storm and say: "It is time to abandon the old path, it is time to live in a new way, in the collective-farm way; it is time to leave off living as everyone lives in bourgeois countries, and live in a new way, cooperatively." But what is this new life—who can tell? May it not turn out to be worse than the old life? At all events, the new path is not the customary path, it is not a beaten path, not a fully explored path. Would it not be better to keep to the old path? Would it not be better to wait a little before embarking on the new, collective-farm path? Is it worth while taking the risk?

These are the doubts that are now troubling one section of the labouring peasantry.

Ought we not to dispel these doubts? Ought we not to bring these doubts out into the light of day and show what they are worth? Clearly, we ought to.

Hence, the question I have just put cannot be described as an idle question.

And so, is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right one?

Some comrades think that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started in our country three years ago. This is only partly true. Of course, the development of collective farms on a mass scale started in our country three years ago. The transition, as we know, was marked by the routing of the kulaks and by a movement among the millions of the poor and middle peasantry to join the collective farms. All that is true. But in order to start this mass transition to the collective farms, certain preliminary conditions had to be available; without those conditions, generally speaking, the mass collective-farm movement would have been impossible.

First of all, we had to have the Soviet power, which has helped and continues to help the peasantry to take the collective-farm path.

Secondly, it was necessary to drive out the landlords and the capitalists, to take their factories and their land away from them and declare these the property of the people.

Thirdly, it was necessary to curb the kulaks and to take their machines and tractors away from them.

Fourthly, it was necessary to declare that those machines and tractors could be used only by the poor and middle peasants who were organized in collective farms.

Finally, it was necessary to industrialize the country, to set up a new tractor industry, to build new factories for the manufacture of agricultural machinery, in order to supply tractors and machines in abundance to the collective-farm peasantry.

Without these preliminary conditions there could have been no question of a mass transition to the collective-farm path such as started three years ago.

Hence, in order to adopt the collective-farm path it was necessary first of all to accomplish the October Revolution, to overthrow the capitalists and the landlords, to take their land and factories away from them and to set up a new industry.

It was really with the October Revolution that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started. This transition developed with fresh force only three years ago because only then did the economic results of the October Revolution make themselves fully felt; only by that time had we succeeded in pushing forward the industrialization of the country.

The history of nations knows not a few revolutions. But those revolutions differ from the October Revolution in that they were one-sided revolutions. One form of exploitation of the working people was replaced by another form of exploitation; but exploitation, as such, remained. One set of exploiters and oppressors was replaced by another set of exploiters and oppressors; but exploiters and oppressors, as such, remained. Only the October Revolution set itself the aim of abolishing *all* exploitation and of eliminating *all* exploiters and oppressors of every brand.

The revolution of the slaves eliminated the slaveowners and abolished the slave form of exploitation of the toilers. But in

their place it set up the serf owners and the serf form of exploitation of the toilers. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the slave system the "law" permitted the slaveowner to kill his slaves. Under the serf system the "law" permitted the serf owner "only" to sell his serfs.

The revolution of the serf-peasants eliminated the serf owners and abolished the serf form of exploitation. But in place of these it set up the capitalists and landlords, the capitalist and landlord form of exploitation of the toilers. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the serf system the "law" permitted the sale of serfs. Under the capitalist system the "law" permits "only" that the toilers be doomed to unemployment and destitution, to ruin and death from starvation.

It was only our Soviet Revolution, only our October Revolution that dealt with the question, not of substituting one set of exploiters for another, not of substituting one form of exploitation for another, but of eradicating all exploitation, of eradicating all exploiters, all rich and oppressors, old and new. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why the October Revolution was a preliminary condition and a necessary prerequisite for the peasants' transition to the new, collective-farm path.

Did the peasants act wisely in supporting the October Revolution? Yes, they acted wisely. They acted wisely, because the October Revolution helped them to shake off the landlords and the capitalists, the usurers and the kulaks, the merchants and the profiteers.

But that is only one side of the question. It is all very well to oust the oppressors, to oust the landlords and the capitalists, to curb the kulaks and the profiteers. But that is not enough. In order to become entirely free from the old fetters it is not enough merely to rout the exploiters. In order to achieve this it is necessary also to build up a new life—to build up a life that will afford the labouring peasants the opportunity of raising their standard of welfare and culture and of making continuous progress, from day to day and from year to year. In order to achieve

this, a new system must be set up in the countryside, the collective-farm system. This is the other side of the question.

What is the difference between the old system and the new, collective-farm system?

Under the old system the peasants each worked in isolation, following the ancient methods of their forefathers and using antiquated implements of labour; they worked for the landlords and capitalists, the kulaks and profiteers; they lived in penury while they enriched others. Under the new, collective-farm system the peasants work in common, cooperatively, with the help of modern implements—tractors and agricultural machinery; they work for themselves and their collective farms; they live without capitalists and landlords, without kulaks and profiteers; they work with the object of raising their standard of welfare and culture from day to day. Over there, under the old system, the government is a bourgeois government, and it supports the rich against the labouring peasantry. Here, under the new, collective-farm system, the government is a workers' and peasants' government, and it supports the workers and peasants against all the rich of every brand. The old system leads to capitalism. The new system leads to socialism.

These are the two paths, the capitalist path and the socialist path: the path forward—to socialism, and the path leading back—to capitalism.

Some people think that there is some sort of third path that could be followed. This unknown third path is most eagerly clutched at by some wavering comrades who are not yet quite certain whether the collective-farm path is the right one. They want us to return to the old system, to return to individual farming, but without capitalists and landlords. Furthermore, they want us to permit the existence of "only" the kulaks and other small capitalists as a legitimate concomitant of our economic system. Actually, this is not a third path, but a second path—the path to capitalism. For what does it mean to return to individual farming and to restore the kulaks? It means that we are to restore kulak bondage, restore the exploitation of the peasantry by

the kulaks, and give the kulaks power. But is it possible to restore the kulaks and at the same time to preserve the Soviet power? No, it is not possible. The restoration of the kulaks must lead to the creation of a kulak power and to the liquidation of the Soviet power—hence, it must lead to the formation of a bourgeois government. And the formation of a bourgeois government must in its turn lead to the restoration of the landlords and the capitalists, to the restoration of capitalism. The so-called third path is actually the second path, the path leading back to capitalism. Ask the peasants whether they want to restore kulak bondage, to return to capitalism, to destroy the Soviet power and restore the power of the landlords and capitalists. Ask them, and you will find out which path the majority of the labouring peasants regard as the only right path.

Hence, there are only two paths: *either* forward and uphill—to the new, collective-farm system; *or* back and downhill—to the old kulak-capitalist system.

There is no third path.

The labouring peasants did right to reject the capitalist path and take the path of collective-farm development.

It is said that the collective-farm path is the right path, but a difficult one. That is only partly true. Of course, there are difficulties on this path. A good life cannot be obtained without effort. But the point is that the main difficulties are over; and those difficulties which now confront you are not worth talking about seriously. At all events, compared with the difficulties which the workers experienced 10 or 15 years ago, your present difficulties, comrades collective farmers, seem mere child's play. Your speakers here have praised the workers of Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, and the Donbas. They said that these workers have achievements to their credit and that you, collective farmers, have far fewer achievements. It seems to me that even a note of comradely envy has crept into what your speakers have said, as if to say: how good it would be if we collective-farm peasants had the same achievements as you workers of Leningrad, Moscow, Donbas, and Kharkov....

That is all very well. But do you know what these achievements cost the workers of Leningrad and Moscow; what privations they had to endure in order finally to attain these achievements? I could relate to you some facts from the life of the workers in 1918, when for whole weeks not a piece of bread, let alone meat or other food, was distributed to the workers. The best times were then considered to be the days on which we were able to distribute to the workers in Leningrad and Moscow one eighth of a pound of black bread each, and even that was half bran. And that lasted not merely a month or six months, but for two whole years. But the workers bore it and did not lose heart; for they knew that better times would come and that they would achieve decisive successes. Well—you see that the workers were not mistaken. Compare your difficulties and privations with the difficulties and privations which the workers endured, and you will see that they are not even worth talking about seriously.

What is needed to push forward the collective-farm movement and extend collective-farm development to the utmost?

What is needed, in the first place, is that the collective farms have at their disposal land fully secured to them and suitable for cultivation. Have you got that? Yes, you have. It is well known that the best lands have been transferred to the collective farms and have been durably secured to them. Hence, the collective farmers can cultivate and improve their land as much as they please without any fear that it will be taken from them and given to somebody else.

What is needed, secondly, is that the collective farmers have at their disposal tractors and machines. Have you got them? Yes, you have. Everyone knows that our tractor plants and agricultural machinery plants produce primarily and mainly for the collective farms, supplying them with all modern implements.

Finally, what is needed is that the Government support the collective-farm peasants to the utmost with men and money, and that it prevent the last remnants of the hostile classes from disrupting the collective farms. Have you got such a government? Yes, you have. It is called the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet

Government. Name another country where the government supports, not the capitalists and landlords, not the kulaks and other rich, but the labouring peasants. There is not, nor has there ever been, another country like this in the world. Only here, in the Land of the Soviets, does a government exist which stands solidly for the workers and collective-farm peasants, for all the working people of town and country, against all the rich and the exploiters. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Hence, you have all that is needed to extend collective-farm development and to free yourself entirely from the old fetters.

If you only one thing is demanded—and that is to work conscientiously; to distribute collective-farm incomes according to the amount of work done; to take good care of collective-farm property; to take care of the tractors and the machines; to organize proper care of the horses; to fulfil the assignments of your Workers' and Peasants' state; to consolidate the collective farms and to oust from the collective farms the kulaks and their toadies who have wormed their way into them.

You will surely agree with me that to overcome these difficulties, i.e., to work conscientiously and to take good care of collective-farm property, is not so very difficult. The more so that you are now working, not for the rich and not for exploiters, but for yourselves, for your own collective farms.

As you see, the collective-farm path, the path of socialism, is the only right path for the labouring peasants.

II

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK—TO MAKE ALL THE COLLECTIVE FARMERS PROSPEROUS

Second question. What have we achieved on the new path, on our collective-farm path; and what do we expect to achieve within the next two or three years?

Socialism is a good thing. A happy, socialist life is unquestionably a good thing. But all that is a matter of the future. The

main question now is not what we will achieve in the future. The main question is: what have we already achieved at present? The peasantry has taken the collective-farm path. That is very good. But what has it achieved on this path? What tangible results have we achieved by following the collective-farm path?

One of our achievements is that we have helped millions of poor peasants to join the collective farms. It is an achievement of ours that by joining the collective farms, where they have at their disposal the best land and the finest implements of production, millions of poor peasants have risen to the level of middle peasants. It is an achievement of ours that millions of poor peasants who formerly lived in penury have now, in the collective farms, become middle peasants, have attained material security. It is an achievement of ours that we have put a stop to the differentiation of the peasants into poor peasants and kulaks; that we have routed the kulaks and have helped the poor peasants to become masters of their own labour in the collective farms, to become middle peasants.

What was the situation before collective-farm development was launched, about four years ago? The kulaks were growing rich and were on the upgrade. The poor peasants were becoming poorer, were sinking into ruin and falling into bondage to the kulaks. The middle peasants were trying to make the grade and catch up with the kulaks, but they were continually losing their hold, tumbling down, and swelling the ranks of the poor peasants, to the amusement of the kulaks. It is not difficult to see that the only ones to profit by this scramble were the kulaks, and perhaps, here and there, some of the other well-to-do peasants. Out of every hundred households in the rural districts you could count four to five kulak households, eight or ten well-to-do peasant households, forty-five to fifty middle-peasant households, and some thirty-five poor peasant households. Hence, at the lowest estimate, thirty-five per cent of all the peasant households were poor-peasant households, compelled to bear the yoke of kulak bondage. This is apart from the poorer section of the middle peasants, representing more than half of the middle peasantry, whose

condition differed very little from that of the poor peasants and who were directly dependent upon the kulaks.

By developing collective-farm construction we have succeeded in abolishing this scramble and injustice; we have smashed the yoke of kulak bondage, brought this vast mass of poor peasants into the collective farms, given them material security there, and raised them to the level of middle peasants, having at their disposal collective-farm land, enjoying the privileges granted to collective farms and the use of tractors and agricultural machinery.

And what does this mean? It means that no less than 20,000,000 of the peasant population, no less than 20,000,000 poor peasants have been rescued from destitution and ruin, have been rescued from kulak bondage, and have attained material security thanks to the collective farms.

This is a great achievement, comrades. It is an achievement such as has never been known in the world before, such as no other state in the world has yet scored.

These, then, are the practical, tangible results of collective-farm development, the results of the fact that the peasants have taken the collective-farm path.

But this is only our *first* step, our *first* achievement on the path of collective-farm development.

It would be wrong to think that we must stop at this first step, at this first achievement. No, comrades, we cannot stop at this achievement. In order to advance further and finally to consolidate the collective farms we must take the *second* step, we must secure a *new* achievement. What is this second step? It is to raise the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to a still higher level. It is to make all the collective farmers prosperous. Yes, comrades, prosperous. (Prolonged applause.)

Thanks to the collective farms we have succeeded in raising the poor peasants to the level of the middle peasants. That is very good. But it is not enough. We must now take another step forward, and help all the collective farmers—both the former

poor peasants and the former middle peasants—to rise to the level of prosperous peasants. This can be achieved, and we must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

We now have all that is needed to achieve this aim. At present our machines and tractors are badly utilized. Our land is not cultivated as well as it might be. We need only make better use of the machines and tractors, we need only improve the cultivation of the land, to increase the quantity of our produce twofold and threefold. And this will be quite sufficient to convert all our collective farmers into prosperous tillers of collective-farm fields.

What was the position in regard to the prosperous peasants before? In order to become prosperous a peasant had to wrong his neighbours; he had to exploit them; to sell to them dear and buy from them cheap; to hire some labourers and exploit them a great deal; to accumulate some capital and, having strengthened his position, to attain the status of a kulak. This, indeed, explains why formerly, under individual farming, the prosperous peasants aroused suspicion and hatred among the poor and middle peasants. Now the position is different. And the conditions are now different, too. For collective farmers to become prosperous it is not at all necessary now that they wrong or exploit their neighbours. And besides, it is not easy to exploit anybody now; for private ownership of land, and the renting of land no longer exist in our country; the machines and tractors belong to the state; and people who own capital are not in fashion in the collective farms. There was such a fashion in the past, but it is gone forever. Only one thing is now needed for the collective farmers to become prosperous, and that is for them to work in the collective farms conscientiously; to make efficient use of the tractors and machines; to make efficient use of the draught cattle; to cultivate the land efficiently and to take proper care of the collective-farm property.

Sometimes it is said: If we are living under socialism, why do we have to toil? We toiled before and we are toiling now; is it not time we left off toiling? Such talk is fundamentally wrong,

comrades. It is the philosophy of loafers and not of honest working people. Socialism does not in the least repudiate work. On the contrary, socialism is based on work. Socialism and work are inseparable from each other.

Lenin, our great teacher, said: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." What does this mean? Against whom are Lenin's words directed? Against the exploiters, against those who do not work themselves, but compel others to work for them, and get rich at the expense of others. And against whom else? Against loafers who want to live at the expense of others. Socialism demands, not loafing, but that all should work conscientiously; that they should work, not for others, not for the rich and the exploiters, but for themselves, for the community. And if we work conscientiously, work for ourselves, for our collective farms, then we will succeed in a matter of two or three years in raising all the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to the level of prosperous peasants, to the level of people enjoying an abundance of produce and leading a fully cultured life.

This is our immediate task. This we can achieve, and must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

III A FEW REMARKS

And now permit me to make a few separate remarks.

First of all about our *Party members* in the rural districts. There are members of the Party among you, but most of you are non-Party people. It is very good that there are more non-Party people than Party members present at this Congress, because it is precisely the non-Party people that we must enlist for our work first of all. There are Communists who approach the non-Party collective farmers in a Bolshevik manner. But there are also those who are puffed up because they belong to the Party and keep aloof from non-Party people. This is bad and

harmful. The strength of the Bolsheviks, the strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they are able to rally millions of active non-Party people around our Party. We Bolsheviks would never have achieved the successes we have now achieved had we not been able to win for the Party the confidence of millions of non-Party workers and peasants. And what is needed for this? What is needed is for the members of the Party not to isolate themselves from the non-Party people; for the Party members not to withdraw into their Party shell, not to get puffed up about belonging to the Party, but to heed the voice of the non-Party people; not only to teach the non-Party people, but also to learn from them.

It must not be forgotten that Party members do not drop from the skies. We must remember that all Party members were at one time not members of the Party. Today a man does not belong to the Party; tomorrow he will become a member of the Party. What is there to get puffed up about? Among us old Bolsheviks there are not a few who have been working in the Party for 20 or 30 years. But there was a time when we, too, were not members of the Party. What would have happened to us 20 or 30 years ago had the Party members at that time domineered over us and would not let us come close to the Party? Perhaps we would then have been kept away from the Party for a number of years. Yet we old Bolsheviks are not people of the least account in the world, comrades. (*Laughter, prolonged applause.*)

That is why our Party members, the present young Party members who sometimes turn up their noses at non-Party people, should remember all this, should remember that it is not priggishness but modesty that is the adornment of the Bolshevik.

Now a few words about the *women*, the *women collective farmers*. The woman question in the collective farms is a big question, comrades. I know that many of you underrate the women and even laugh at them. That is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake. The point is not only that women comprise half the population. Primarily, the point is that the collective-farm movement has advanced a number of remarkable and capable

women to leading positions. Look at this Congress, at the delegates, and you will realize that women have long since advanced from the ranks of the backward to the ranks of the forward. The women in the collective farms are a great force. To keep this force down would be criminal. It is our duty to bring the women in the collective farms forward and to make use of this great force.

Of course, not so long ago, the Soviet government had a slight misunderstanding with the women collective farmers. That was over the cow. But now this business about the cow has been settled, and the misunderstanding has been removed. (*Prolonged applause.*) We have reached the position where the majority of the collective-farm households have a cow each. Another year or two will pass and there will not be a single collective farmer who will not have his own cow. We Bolsheviks will see to it that every one of our collective farmers has a cow. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As for the women collective farmers themselves, they must remember the power and significance of the collective farms for women; they must remember that only in the collective farm do they have the opportunity of becoming equal with men. Without collective farms—inequality; in collective farms—equal rights. Let our comrades, the women collective farmers, remember this and let them cherish the collective-farm system as the apple of their eye. (*Prolonged applause.*)

A few words about the members of the *Young Communist League, young men and women*, in the collective farms. The youth is our future, our hope, comrades. The youth must take our place, the place of the old people. It must carry our banner to final victory. Among the peasants there are not a few old people, borne down by the burden of the past, burdened with the habits and the recollections of the old life. Naturally, they are not always able to keep pace with the Party, to keep pace with the Soviet system. Our youth is different. They are free from the burden of the past, and it is easiest for them to assimilate Lenin's behests. And precisely because it is easiest for the youth to assimilate Lenin's behests, it is their mission to give guidance

to the laggards and waverers. True, they lack knowledge. But knowledge is a thing that can be acquired. They have not the knowledge today; but they will have it tomorrow. Hence, the task is to study and study again the principles of Leninism. Comrades members of the Young Communist League! Learn the principles of Bolshevism and lead the waverers forward! Talk less and work more, and your success will be assured. (*Applause.*)

A few words about the *individual farmers*. Little has been said here about the individual farmers. But that does not mean that they no longer exist. No, it does not mean that. Individual farmers do exist, and we must not leave them out of our calculations; for they are our collective farmers of tomorrow. I know that one section of the individual farmers has become utterly corrupt and has taken to profiteering. This, no doubt, explains why the collective farmers accept new members into the collective farms with great circumspection, and sometimes do not accept them at all. This, of course, is quite proper, and there cannot be any objection to it. But there is another section of individual farmers, the majority, who have not taken to profiteering and who earn their bread by honest labour. These individual farmers, perhaps, would not be averse to joining the collective farms. But they are hindered in this, on the one hand, by their hesitation as to whether the collective-farm path is the right path; and, on the other hand, by the bitter feelings now prevailing amongst the collective farmers against the individual farmers.

Of course, we must understand the feelings of the collective farmers and appreciate their attitude. During the past years they have often been the butt of insults and sneers on the part of the individual farmers. But we must not attach decisive importance to these insults and sneers. He is a bad leader who cannot forget an offence, and who puts his own feelings above the interests of the collective-farm cause. If you want to be leaders, you must be able to forget the insults to which you were subjected by certain individual farmers. Two years ago I received a letter

from a peasant woman, a widow, living in the Volga region. She complained that the collective farm refused to accept her as a member, and she demanded my support. I made inquiries at the collective farm. I received a reply from the collective farm stating that they could not accept her because she had insulted a collective-farm meeting. Now, what was it all about? It seems that at a meeting of peasants at which the collective farmers called upon the individual farmers to join the collective farm, this very widow, in reply to this appeal, had lifted up her skirt and said—Here, take your collective farm! (*Laughter.*) Undoubtedly she had behaved badly and had insulted the meeting. But should her application to join the collective farm be rejected if, a year later, she sincerely repented and admitted her error? I think that her application should not be rejected. That is what I wrote to the collective farm. The widow was accepted into the collective farm. And what happened? It turns out that she is now working in the collective farm, not in the last, but in the front ranks. (*Applause.*)

This, then, is another example which shows that leaders, if they want to be true leaders, must be able to forget an offence if the interests of the cause demand it.

The same thing must be said about individual farmers generally. I am not opposed to the exercise of circumspection in accepting people into the collective farms. But I am against barring the path to the collective farms to all individual farmers without discrimination. That is not our policy, not the Bolshevik policy. The collective farmers must not forget that not long ago they themselves were individual farmers.

Finally, a few words about *the letter written by the collective farmers of Bezenchuk*. This letter has been published, and you must have read it: It is unquestionably a good letter. It shows that among our collective farmers there are not a few experienced and intelligent organizers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, who are the pride of our country. But this letter contains one incorrect passage with which we cannot possibly agree. The Bezenchuk comrades describe their work in the collec-

tive farm as modest and all but insignificant work; while they describe the efforts of orators and leaders, who sometimes make speeches three yards long, as great and creative work. Can we agree with this? No, comrades, we cannot possibly agree with this. The Bezengchuk comrades have made a mistake here. Perhaps they made the mistake because of their modesty. But the mistake does not cease to be a mistake for all that. The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the working millions. The workers and the peasants, who work without fuss and noise, who build factories and mills, sink mines, lay railroads, build collective farms and state farms, those who create all the values of life, who feed and clothe the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life. Apparently, our Bezengchuk comrades have forgotten this. It is not good when people overrate their strength and begin to be puffed up about the services they have rendered. This leads to boasting, and boasting is not a good thing. But it is still worse when people begin to underrate their strength and fail to see that their "modest" and "insignificant" work is really great and creative work, which decides the fate of history.

I would like the Bezengchuk comrades to accept my slight amendment to their letter.

With this, let us conclude, comrades.

(*Loud and prolonged applause and ovation. All rise and greet Comrade Stalin. Loud cheers. Shouts: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the advanced collective farmer!" "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin!"*)

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C. P. S. U. (B.) ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

January 26, 1934

I

THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Comrades, more than three years have passed since the Sixteenth Congress. That is not a very long period. But it has been fuller in content than any other period. I do not think a single period in the last decade has been so rich in events as this one.

In the *economic* sphere these years have been years of continuing world economic crisis. The crisis has affected not only industry, but also agriculture as a whole. The crisis has raged not only in the sphere of production and trade; it has also invaded the sphere of credit and money circulation, and has completely upset the established credit and currency relations among countries. While formerly people here and there still debated as to whether there was a world economic crisis or not, now this is no longer a matter of debate; for the existence of the crisis and its devastating effects are only too obvious. Now the controversy centres around another question: Is there a way out of the crisis or not; and if there is, then what is to be done?

In the *political* sphere these years have been years of growing tension in the relations among capitalist countries as well as within these countries. Japan's war on China and the occupation of Manchuria, which have strained relations in the Far East; the victory of fascism in Germany and the triumph of the idea of revenge, which have strained relations in Europe; the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations, which has given a new impetus to the growth of armaments and to the

preparations for an imperialist war; the defeat of fascism in Spain, which is one more indication that the revolutionary crisis is maturing and that fascism is far from being durable—such are the most important events of the period under review. It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is breathing its last and that the trend towards disarmament is openly and definitely giving way to a trend towards armament and rearmament.

Amid the surging waves of economic perturbations and military-political catastrophes, the U.S.S.R. stands out alone, like a rock, continuing its work of socialist construction and its fight to preserve peace. While in the capitalist countries the economic crisis is still raging, the U.S.S.R. is advancing steadily both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture. While in the capitalist countries feverish preparations are in progress for a new war, for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the U.S.S.R. is continuing its systematic and persistent struggle against the menace of war and for peace; and it cannot be said that the efforts of the U.S.S.R. in this direction have been entirely unsuccessful.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present moment.

Let us examine the most essential data on the economic and political situation in the capitalist countries.

1. THE COURSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The present economic crisis in the capitalist countries differs from all analogous crises, among other things, in that it is the longest and most protracted crisis. Formerly crises would pass over in one or two years; the present crisis, however, is now in its fifth year, devastating the economy of the capitalist countries year after year and using up the fat accumulated in previous years. It is not surprising that this is the most severe of all the crises that have taken place.

How is the unprecedentedly protracted character of the present industrial crisis to be explained?

It is to be explained, first of all, by the fact that the industrial crisis has affected every capitalist country without exception, thus making it difficult for some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others.

Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis has become interwoven with the agrarian crisis which has affected all the agrarian and semiagrarian countries without exception, and this could not but make the industrial crisis more complicated and more profound.

Thirdly, it is to be explained by the fact that the agrarian crisis has grown more acute in this period, and has affected all branches of agriculture, including livestock farming; that it has brought about a deterioration of agriculture, the reversion from machines to hand labour, the substitution of horses for tractors, a sharp reduction in, and in some cases the complete abandonment of, the use of artificial fertilizers—all of which has caused the industrial crisis to become still more protracted.

Fourthly, it is to be explained by the fact that the monopolist cartels which dominate industry strive to maintain high commodity prices, a circumstance which makes the crisis particularly painful and hinders the absorption of commodity stocks.

Lastly—and this is the most important thing—it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis broke out in the conditions of the *general* crisis of capitalism, when capitalism no longer has, nor can have, either in the major countries or in the colonial and dependent countries, the strength and stability it had before the war and the October Revolution; when industry in the capitalist countries is confronted with the heritage it received from the imperialist war in the shape of chronic undercapacity operation of plants, and of an army of millions of unemployed of which it is no longer able to rid itself.

These are the circumstances that have combined to give the present industrial crisis its extremely protracted character.

These are also the circumstances that explain the fact that the crisis has not been confined to the sphere of production and trade, but has also affected the credit system, foreign exchange, the debt settlements, etc., and has broken down the traditionally established relations between countries and between social groups in the various countries.

An important part was played by the drop in commodity prices. Notwithstanding the resistance of the monopolist cartels, the drop in prices continued with elemental force, affecting primarily and mostly the unorganized commodity owners, viz., peasants, artisans, small capitalists, and only gradually and to a smaller degree the organized commodity owners, viz., the capitalists united in cartels. The drop in prices made the position of debtors (manufacturers, artisans, peasants, etc.) intolerable, while, on the other hand, it placed the creditors in an unprecedentedly privileged position. Such a situation was bound to lead, and actually did lead, to the mass bankruptcy of firms and of individual businessmen. As a result, tens of thousands of joint stock companies have failed in the United States, Germany, Great Britain and France during the past three years. The bankruptcy of joint stock companies was followed by a depreciation of currency, which slightly alleviated the position of the debtors. The depreciation of currency was followed by the nonpayment of debts, both foreign and internal, legalized by the state. The collapse of such banks as the Darmstadt and Dresden banks in Germany and the Kredit-Anstalt in Austria, and of concerns like Kreuger's in Sweden, the Insull Company in the United States, etc., is well known to all.

Naturally, these phenomena, which shook the foundations of the credit system, were bound to bring in their train, and actually did bring about, the cessation of payments on credits and foreign loans, the cessation of payments on inter-Allied debts, the cessation of export of capital, a further decline in foreign trade, a further decline in the export of commodities, an intensification of the struggle for foreign markets, trade war between countries, and—dumping. Yes, comrades, dumping. I do not

mean the alleged Soviet dumping about which only very recently certain honourable members of honourable parliaments in Europe and America were shouting until they were hoarse. I mean the real dumping that is now being practised by almost all "civilized" states, and about which these gallant and honourable members of parliaments maintain a prudent silence.

Naturally, also, these destructive phenomena accompanying the industrial crisis, which set in outside the sphere of production, could not but in their turn influence the course of the industrial crisis, aggravating it and complicating the situation still further.

Such is the general picture of the course of the industrial crisis.

Here are a few figures taken from official data, which illustrate the course of the industrial crisis in the period under review.

VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
(*Per cent of 1929*)

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R	. 100	129.7	161.9	184.7	201.6
U.S.A.	. 100	80.7	68.1	53.8	64.9
Great Britain	. 100	92.4	83.8	83.8	86.1
Germany	. 100	88.3	71.7	59.8	66.8
France	. 100	100.7	89.2	69.1	77.4

As you see, this table speaks for itself.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined from year to year, as compared with 1929, and began to recover somewhat only in 1933—though it is still far below the level of 1929—industry in the U.S.S.R. grew from year to year, experiencing an uninterrupted rise.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries at the end of 1933 shows on the average a *reduction* of 25 per cent and more in volume of production as compared with 1929, industrial

output in the U.S.S.R. has more than doubled during this period, i.e., it has *increased* more than 100 per cent. (*Applause.*)

Judging by this table it may seem that of these four capitalist countries, Great Britain is in the most favourable position. But that is not quite correct. If we compare industry in these countries with its prewar level we get a somewhat different picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
(*Per cent of prewar level*)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R .	100	194.3	252.1	314.7	359.0	391.9
U.S.A. .	100	170.2	137.3	115.9	91.4	110.2
Great Britain .	100	99.1	91.5	83.0	82.5	85.2
Germany .	100	113.0	99.8	81.0	67.6	75.4
France .	100	139.0	140.0	124.0	96.1	107.6

As you see, industry in Great Britain and Germany has not yet come up to the prewar level, while the United States and France have exceeded it by several per cent, and the U.S.S.R. has raised, increased its industrial output during this period by more than 290 per cent as compared with the prewar level. (*Applause.*)

But there is still another conclusion to be drawn from these tables.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined steadily after 1930, and particularly after 1931, and reached its lowest point in 1932, in 1933 it began to recover and pick up somewhat. If we take the monthly returns for 1932 and 1933 we find still further confirmation of this conclusion; for they show that, despite fluctuations of output in the course of 1933, industry in these countries has revealed no tendency to drop to the lowest point reached in the summer of 1932.

What does this mean?

It means that, apparently, industry in the principal capitalist countries had already reached the lowest point of decline and did not return to it in the course of 1933.

Some people are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon exclusively to the influence of artificial factors, such as the war and inflation boom. There can be no doubt that the war and inflation boom plays no small part in it. This is particularly true in regard to Japan, where this artificial factor is the principal and decisive force stimulating a certain revival in some industries, principally the war industries. But it would be a gross mistake to explain everything by the war and inflation boom. Such an explanation would be incorrect, if only for the reason that the changes in industry which I have described are observed, not in separate and chance districts, but in all, or nearly all, the industrial countries, including the countries with a stable currency. Apparently, in addition to the war and inflation boom, the internal economic forces of capitalism are also operating here.

Capitalism has succeeded in alleviating the position of industry somewhat *at the expense of the workers*, by speeding them up and thus intensifying their exploitation; *at the expense of the farmers*, by pursuing a policy of paying the lowest prices for the products of their labour—foodstuffs and, partly, raw materials; and *at the expense of the peasants in the colonies and in the economically weak countries*, by still further forcing down prices on the products of their labour, principally on raw materials, and also on foodstuffs.

Does this mean that we are witnessing a transition from a crisis to an ordinary depression, to be followed by a new upward trend and industrial boom? No, it does not. At any rate, at the present time there is no evidence, direct or indirect, to indicate the approach of an industrial boom in capitalist countries. Moreover, judging by all things, there can be no such evidence, at least in the near future. There can be no such evidence, because all the unfavourable conditions which prevent industry in the capitalist countries from rising to any serious extent continue to

operate. I have in mind the fact that the *economic* crisis is proceeding in the conditions of the continuing *general* crisis of capitalism: the chronic undercapacity operation of industry; chronic mass unemployment; the interweaving of the industrial crisis with an agricultural crisis; the absence of tendencies towards a more or less serious renewal of fixed capital, which usually heralds the approach of a boom, etc., etc.

Evidently, what we are witnessing is a transition from the lowest point of decline of industry, from the lowest point of the industrial crisis, to a depression—not an ordinary depression, but a depression of a special kind, which does not lead to a new upward trend and industrial boom, but which, on the other hand, does not force industry back to the lowest point of decline.

2. THE GROWING TENSION IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

A result of the protracted economic crisis has been the hitherto unprecedented tension in the political situation in capitalist countries, both within those countries and in their mutual relations.

The intensified struggle for foreign markets, the abolition of the last vestiges of free trade, prohibitive tariffs, trade war, currency war, dumping, and many other analogous measures which demonstrate extreme *nationalism* in economic policy have strained to the utmost the relations among the various countries, have prepared the ground for military conflicts, and have put war on the order of the day as a means for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence in favour of the stronger states.

Japan's war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and her advance in North China have made the situation still more tense. The intensified struggle for the Pacific and the growth of naval armaments in Japan, the United States, Great Britain and France are results of this increased tension.

Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the spectre of revanchism have further added to the tension and have given a fresh impetus to the growth of armaments in Europe.

It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is now dragging out a miserable existence, and that idle talk of disarmament is giving way to "businesslike" talk about armament and rearmament.

Again, as in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, the parties of war and revanchism are coming into the foreground.

Quite clearly things are heading for a new war.

The internal situation of the capitalist countries, in view of the operation of these same factors, is becoming still more tense. Four years of industrial crisis have exhausted the working class and reduced it to despair. Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the poorer strata of the peasantry, not only in the principal capitalist countries, but also—and particularly—in the dependent and colonial countries. It is a fact that, notwithstanding all attempts to manipulate statistics in order to show a drop in unemployment, the number of unemployed, according to the official figures of bourgeois institutions, reaches 3,000,000 in Great Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany and 10,000,000 in the United States, not to mention the other European countries. Add to this the more than ten million part-time workers; add the millions of ruined peasants—and you will get an approximate picture of the poverty and despair of the labouring masses. The masses of the people have not yet reached the stage when they are ready to storm capitalism; but the idea of storming it is maturing in the minds of the masses—of that there can hardly be any doubt. This is eloquently testified to by such facts as, say, the Spanish revolution which overthrew the fascist regime, and the expansion of the Soviet districts in China, which the united counterrevolution of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie is unable to stop.

This, indeed, explains why the ruling classes in the capitalist countries are so zealously destroying or nullifying the last vestiges of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy which

might be used by the working class in its struggle against the oppressors; why they are driving the Communist parties underground and resorting to open terrorist methods to maintain their dictatorship.

Chauvinism and preparation of war as the main elements of foreign policy; repression of the working class and terrorism in the sphere of home policy as a necessary means for strengthening the rear with a view to future wars—that is what is now particularly engaging the minds of contemporary imperialist politicians.

It is not surprising that fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among bellicose bourgeois politicians. I am referring not only to fascism in general, but, primarily, to fascism of the German type, which is wrongly called National-Socialism—wrongly because the most searching examination will fail to reveal even an atom of socialism in it.

In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness of the working class and a result of the betrayals of the working class by the Social-Democratic Party, which paved the way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a symptom of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, of the fact that the bourgeoisie is no longer able to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terroristic methods of rule—as a symptom of the fact that it is no longer able to find a way out of the present situation on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, and that, as a consequence, it is compelled to resort to a policy of war.

That is the situation.

As you see, things are heading towards a new imperialist war as a way out of the present situation.

Of course, there are no grounds for assuming that a war can provide a real way out. On the contrary, it will confuse the situation still more. More than that, it is sure to unleash revolution and jeopardize the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as was the case in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, notwithstanding the experience of the first imperialist

war, the bourgeois politicians clutch at war as a drowning man clutches at a straw, that shows that they have gotten into a hopeless mess, have reached an impasse, and are ready to rush headlong over the precipice.

It will do no harm, therefore, briefly to examine the plans for the organization of war which are now being hatched in the circles of bourgeois politicians.

Some think that war should be organized against one of the Great Powers. They think of inflicting a crushing defeat upon that power and of improving their own affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organize such a war. What may be the upshot?

As is well known, during the first imperialist war it was also intended to destroy one of the Great Powers, viz., Germany, and to profit at her expense. And what was the upshot of this? They did not destroy Germany; but they sowed such a hatred for the victors in Germany, and created such a rich soil for revenge, that they have not been able to clear up the revolting mess they made even to this day, and will not, perhaps, be able to do so for quite some time. But they did get the smash-up of capitalism in Russia, the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and—of course—the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that the second imperialist war will produce “better” results for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Others think that war should be organized against a country that is weak in the military sense, but represents an extensive market—for example, against China, which, it is claimed, cannot even be described as a state in the strict sense of the word, but is merely “unorganized territory” which needs to be seized by strong states. They evidently want to divide her up completely and improve their affairs at her expense. Let us assume that they organize such a war. What may be the upshot?

It is well known that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Italy and Germany were regarded in the same light as China is today, i.e., they were considered “unorganized territories,”

and not states, and they were subjugated. But what was the upshot of this? As is well known, the upshot was wars for independence waged by Germany and Italy, and the amalgamation of these countries into independent states. The upshot was increased hatred for the oppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, the results of which have not been removed to this day and will not, perhaps, be removed for quite some time. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the same thing will not result from an imperialist war against China?

Still others think that war should be organized by a "superior race," say, the German "race," against an "inferior race," primarily against the Slavs; that only such a war can provide a way out of the situation, for it is the mission of the "superior race" to fecundate the "inferior race" and rule over it. Let us assume that this queer theory, which is as far removed from science as the sky from earth, let us assume that this queer theory is put into practice. What may be the upshot?

It is well known that ancient Rome looked upon the ancestors of the present-day Germans and French in the same way as the representatives of the "superior race" now look upon the Slavonic tribes. It is well known that ancient Rome treated them as an "inferior race," as "barbarians," destined to live in eternal subordination to the "superior race," to "great Rome"; and between ourselves be it said, ancient Rome had some grounds for this, which cannot be said of the representatives of the "superior race" of today. (*Thunderous applause.*) But what was the upshot of this? The upshot was that the non-Romans, i.e., all the "barbarians," united against the common enemy and brought Rome down with a crash. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the claims of the representatives of the "superior race" of today will not lead to the same grievous results? What guarantee is there that the fascist literary politicians in Berlin will be more fortunate than the old and experienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Finally, there are others who think that war should be organized against the U.S.S.R. Their plan is to defeat the U.S.S.R.,

divide up its territory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the leading political circles of certain states in Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from words to deeds. What may be the upshot?

There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would be the most dangerous war, not only because the peoples of the U.S.S.R. would fight to the very death to preserve the gains of the revolution; it would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie for the added reason that it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also behind the enemy's lines. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the U.S.S.R. in Europe and in Asia will do their best to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who start a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments so near and dear to them, which today rule happily "by the grace of God," are missing on the morrow after such a war. (*Thunderous applause.*)

One such war against the U.S.S.R. has been waged already, if you remember, fifteen years ago. As is well known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed that war in a poetic formula—"the campaign of fourteen states." You remember, of course, that that war rallied the working people of our country into one united camp of heroic warriors, who stalwartly defended their workers' and peasants' motherland against the foreign foe. You know how it ended. It ended in the ejection of the invaders from our country and the establishment of revolutionary Councils of Action in Europe. It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries.

Such are the war plans of the perplexed bourgeois politicians,

As you see, they are not distinguished either for their brilliance or for their valour. (*Applause.*)

But while the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, the working class in the capitalist countries, brought to despair by four years of crisis and unemployment, is taking the path of revolution. This means that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue to mature. And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled in its war combinations, the more frequently it resorts to terroristic methods in its fight against the working class and the labouring peasantry, the more rapidly will the revolutionary crisis develop.

Some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie is bound to be in a hopeless position; that its end is therefore a foregone conclusion; that the victory of the revolution is thus assured, and that all they have to do is to wait for the fall of the bourgeoisie and to draw up victorious resolutions. This is a profound mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes by itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win victory. Moments occur when the situation is revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat sufficiently strong and influential to lead the masses and to take power. It would be unwise to believe that such "cases" cannot occur.

It will do no harm in this connection to recall Lenin's prophetic words on revolutionary crises, uttered at the Second Congress of the Communist International:

"We have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, the bourgeois economists represent this crisis simply as 'unrest,' as the English so elegantly express it. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes try to prove that the crisis is absolutely hopeless. That is a mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. The bourgeoisie is behaving like an arrant brigand who has lost his head: it commits blunder after blunder, thus making the situation more acute and hastening its own doom. All this is true. But it cannot

be 'proved' that there is absolutely no chance of its gulling some minority of the exploited with some concessions or other, or of suppressing some movement or uprising of some section or another of the oppressed and exploited. To try to 'prove' beforehand that a situation is 'absolutely' hopeless would be sheer pedantry, or juggling with concepts and catchwords. In this and similar questions the only real 'proof' is practice. The bourgeois system all over the world is experiencing a most profound revolutionary crisis. And the revolutionary parties must now 'prove' by their practical actions that they are intelligent and organized enough, are in contact enough with the exploited masses, are determined and skilful enough to utilize this crisis for a successful and victorious revolution." (Lenin, Vol. XXV, pp. 340-41.)

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST STATES

It is quite easy to understand how difficult it has been for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its peace policy in this atmosphere which is poisoned with the miasma of war combinations.

In the midst of this eve-of-war frenzy which is going on in a number of countries, the U.S.S.R. during these years has stood firmly and indomitably by its position of peace: fighting against the menace of war; fighting to preserve peace; meeting half-way those countries which for one reason or another stand for the preservation of peace; exposing and tearing the masks from those who are preparing for and provoking war.

What did the U.S.S.R. rely on in this difficult and complicated struggle for peace?

a) On its growing economic and political might.

b) On the moral support of the vast masses of the working class in every country, who are vitally interested in the preservation of peace.

c) On the prudence of those countries which for one motive or another are not interested in disturbing the peace, and which want to develop commercial relations with such a punctual client as the U.S.S.R.

d) Finally—on our glorious army, which stands ready to defend our country against attacks from without.

It was on this basis that we began our campaign for the conclusion with neighbouring states of pacts of nonaggression and of pacts defining aggression. You know that this campaign has been successful. As you know, pacts of nonaggression have been concluded not only with the majority of our neighbours in the West and in the South, including Finland and Poland, but also with such countries as France and Italy; and pacts defining aggression have been concluded with those same neighbouring states, including the Little Entente.

On this basis, also, the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey has been consolidated; relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy have been improved and have become indisputably satisfactory; relations with France, Poland and other Baltic states have improved; relations have been restored with the U.S.A., China, etc.

Of the many facts reflecting the successes of the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. two facts of indisputably material significance should be noted and singled out.

1. I have in mind, first, the change for the better that has taken place recently in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and between the U.S.S.R. and France. As is well known, our relations with Poland in the past were not at all good. Representatives of our state were assassinated in Poland. Poland regarded herself as the barrier of the Western states against the U.S.S.R. All and sundry imperialists counted on Poland as their vanguard in the event of a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and France were no better. We need only recall the facts relating to the trial of the Ramzin group of wreckers in Moscow to bring back the picture of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and France. But now those undesirable relations are gradually beginning to disappear. They are giving way to other relations, which cannot be otherwise described than as relations of rapprochement.

It is not only that we have concluded pacts of nonaggression with these countries, although these pacts in themselves are of great importance. The point is, primarily, that the atmosphere of mutual distrust is beginning to be dissipated. This does not mean,

of course, that the incipient process of rapprochement can be regarded as sufficiently stable and as guaranteeing ultimate success. Surprises and zigzags in policy, for example in Poland, where anti-Soviet sentiments are still strong, cannot by far be regarded as precluded. But a change for the better in our relations, irrespective of its results in the future, is a fact worthy of being noted and singled out as a factor in the advancement of the cause of peace.

What is the cause of this change? What stimulates it?

Primarily, the growth of the strength and might of the U.S.S.R.

In our times it is not the custom to give any consideration to the weak—consideration is given only to the strong. Besides, there have been some changes in the policy of Germany which reflect the growth of revanchist and imperialist sentiments in Germany.

In this connection some German politicians say that the U.S.S.R. has now taken an orientation towards France and Poland; that from an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of that treaty, and that this change is to be explained by the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country. Nor is it a question of any alleged change in our attitude towards the Versailles Treaty. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into the abyss of a new war on account of that treaty. The same must be said of the alleged new orientation taken by the U.S.S.R. We never had any orientation towards Germany, nor have we any orientation towards Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is towards the U.S.S.R., and towards the U.S.S.R. alone. (*Loud applause.*) And if the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand rapprochement with one country or another

which is not interested in disturbing peace, we take this step without hesitation.

No, that is not the point. The point is that Germany's policy has changed. The point is that even before the present German politicians came into power, and particularly after they came into power, a contest began in Germany between two political lines: between the old policy, which was reflected in the well-known treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, and the "new" policy, which, in the main, recalls the policy of the former German Kaiser, who at one time occupied the Ukraine, marched against Leningrad, and converted the Baltic countries into a military base for this march; and this "new" policy is obviously gaining the upper hand over the old policy. The fact that the advocates of the "new" policy are gaining supremacy in all things, while the supporters of the old policy are in disfavour, cannot be regarded as an accident. Nor can the well-known statement made by Hugenberg in London, nor the equally well-known declarations of Rosenberg, who directs the foreign policy of the ruling party in Germany, be regarded as accidents. That is the point, comrades.

2. Secondly, I have in mind the restoration of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. There cannot be any doubt that this act is of great significance for the whole system of international relations. It is not only that it improves the chances of preserving peace, and that it improves the relations between the two countries, strengthens commercial intercourse between them, and creates a base for their mutual collaboration. The point is that it is a landmark between the old position, when in various countries the U.S.A. was regarded as the bulwark for all sorts of anti-Soviet trends, and the new position, when that bulwark has been voluntarily removed, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Such are the two main facts which reflect the successes of the Soviet peace policy.

It would be wrong, however, to think that everything went smoothly in the period under review. No, not everything went smoothly, by a long way.

Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear upon us by England; the embargo on our exports, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs to see how the land lies and thereby to test our power of resistance. True, nothing came of this attempt, and later the embargo was lifted; but the unpleasant taste left after these sallies is still felt in everything affecting the relations between England and the U.S.S.R., including the negotiations for a commercial treaty. And these sallies against the U.S.S.R. must not be regarded as accidental. It is well known that a certain section of the British conservatives cannot live without such sallies. And precisely because they are not accidental we must bear in mind that in the future, too, sallies will be made against the U.S.S.R., all sorts of menaces will be created, attempts will be undertaken to damage the U.S.S.R., etc.

Nor can we lose sight of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, which stand in need of very considerable improvement. Japan's refusal to conclude a pact of nonaggression, of which Japan stands in no less need than the U.S.S.R., once again emphasizes the fact that all is not well in the sphere of our relations. The same must be said of the rupture of negotiations concerning the Chinese-Eastern Railway due to no fault of the U.S.S.R.; and also of the outrageous actions of the Japanese agents on the C.E.R., the illegal arrests of Soviet employees on the C.E.R., etc. All this apart from the fact that one section of the military people in Japan, with the avowed approval of another section of the military, is openly advocating in the press the necessity for a war against the U.S.S.R. and the seizure of the Maritime Province; while the government of Japan, instead of calling these instigators of war to order, pretends that it has nothing to do with the matter. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but create an atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty. Of course, we will persistently continue our policy of peace and will strive to bring about an improvement in our relations with Japan, because we want to improve these relations. But it does not depend entirely upon us. That is why we must at the same time take all measures to guard our country.

against surprises, and be prepared to defend it in the event of attack. (*Loud applause.*)

As you see, besides successes in our peace policy we also have a number of negative occurrences.

Such is the situation as regards the foreign relations of the U.S.S.R.

Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and of strengthening commercial relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody—let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to return the instigators of war blow for blow. (*Loud applause.*) Those who want peace and seek business relations with us will always have our support. But those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing repulse to teach them not to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is our foreign policy. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The task is to continue this policy with unflagging perseverance and consistency.

II

THE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

I now pass to the question of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

From the point of view of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. the period under review presents a picture of ever-increasing progress, both in the sphere of national economy and in the sphere of culture.

This progress has not been merely a simple quantitative accumulation of strength. This progress is remarkable in that it has introduced fundamental changes into the structure of the U.S.S.R., and has radically changed the face of the country.

During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically transformed and has cast off the integument of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become an industrial country. From a country of small individual agriculture it has become a country of collective, large-scale mechanized agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become—or rather it is becoming—a literate and cultured country covered by a vast network of higher, secondary and elementary schools teaching in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

New industries have been created: machine-tool construction, automobile, tractor, chemical, motor construction, aircraft, harvester combines, the construction of powerful turbines and generators, high-grade steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, nitrates, artificial fibre, etc., etc. (*Prolonged applause.*)

During this period thousands of new, up-to-date industrial plants have been built and put into operation. Giants like the Dnieprostroy, Magnitostroy, Kuznetskstroy, Chelyabstroy, Bobriki, Uralmashstroy and Krammashstroy have been built. Thousands of old plants have been reconstructed and provided with modern technical equipment. New plants have been built, and industrial centres created, in the national republics and in the border regions of the U.S.S.R.: in Byelorussia, in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Buryat-Mongolia, in Tataria, in Bashkiria, in the Urals, in East and West Siberia, in the Far East, etc.

More than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state farms have been organized, with new district centres and industrial centres serving them.

New large towns, with large populations, have sprung up in what were formerly almost vacant spaces. The old towns and industrial centres have grown enormously.

The foundations have been laid for the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, which unites the coking coal of Kuznetsk with the iron ore of the Urals. Thus, we may consider that the dream of a new metallurgical base in the East has become a reality.

The foundations for a powerful new oil base have been laid in the regions of the western and southern slopes of the Ural range—in the Ural region, Bashkiria and Kazakhstan.

It is obvious that the enormous capital investments of the state in all branches of national economy, which in the period under review amounted to over 60,000,000,000 rubles, have not been ill-spent, and are beginning to bear fruit.

As a result of these achievements the national income of the U.S.S.R. has increased from 29,000,000,000 rubles in 1929 to 50,000,000,000 in 1933; whereas there has been an enormous decline in the national income of all capitalist countries without exception during this period.

It goes without saying that all these achievements and all this progress had to lead—and actually did lead—to the further consolidation of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

How was it possible for these colossal changes to take place in a matter of three or four years on the territory of a vast state with a backward technique and a backward culture? Was it not a miracle? It would have been a miracle had this development proceeded on the basis of capitalism and individual small farming. But it cannot be described as a miracle if we bear in mind that this development took place on the basis of expanding socialist construction.

It goes without saying that this enormous progress could take place only on the basis of the successful building of socialism; on the basis of the collective work of scores of millions of people; on the basis of the advantages which the socialist system of economy has over the capitalist and individual-peasant system.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the colossal progress in the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R. during the period under review has also signified the elimination of the capitalist elements, and the relegation of individual-peasant economy to the background. It is a fact that the socialist system of economy in the sphere of industry now represents 99 per cent of the total; and in agriculture, according to area sown to grain crops, it represents 84.5 per cent of the total, whereas individual-peasant economy accounts for only 15.5 per cent.

It follows, then, that capitalist economy in the U.S.S.R. has already been eliminated and that the individual-peasant sector in the countryside has been forced back to a secondary position.

At the time when the New Economic Policy was being introduced Lenin said that we had the elements of five forms of economy in our country: 1) patriarchal economy (largely natural economy); 2) small commodity production (the majority of the peasants who sell grain); 3) private capitalism; 4) state capitalism; 5) socialism. Of all these forms of economy, Lenin said, the socialist form of economy must in the end gain the upper hand. We can now say that the first, the third and the fourth forms of economy no longer exist; the second form of economy has been forced into a secondary position, while the fifth form of economy—the socialist form of economy—now holds unchallenged sway and is the sole commanding force in the whole national economy. (*Loud prolonged applause.*)

Such is the result.

This result is the basis of the stability of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R., the basis of the firmness of its front and rear positions in the midst of the capitalist encirclement.

Let us now examine the concrete material relating to the various questions of the economic and political situation in the Soviet Union.

1. PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY

Of all branches of the national economy, the one that has grown most rapidly is industry. During the period under review, i.e., since 1930, the output of our industry has more than doubled—namely, it has increased by 101.6 per cent; and compared with the prewar level it has grown almost fourfold—namely, by 291.9 per cent.

This means that industrialization has been going on full steam ahead.

As a result of the rapid growth of industrialization the output of industry has advanced to first place in the total volume of production of the whole of our national economy.

Here is the corresponding table:

**PROPORTION OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN GROSS
OUTPUT OF NATIONAL ECONOMY**

(Per cent of total, in prices of 1926-27)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
1. Industry (without small industry)	42.1	54.5	61.6	66.7	70.7	70.4
2. Agriculture	57.9	45.5	38.4	33.3	29.3	29.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This means that our country has definitely and finally become an industrial country.

Of decisive significance for the industrialization of the country is the growth of the output of instruments and means of production in the gross output representing the development of industry. The figures for the period under review show that this item has become predominant in the gross output of industry.

Here is the corresponding table:

**PROPORTION OF OUTPUT OF THE TWO MAIN
GROUPS OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRIES**

(In prices of 1926-27)

	Gross output (in billions of rubles)				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total large-scale industry	21.0	27.5	33.9	38.5	41.9
Of which:					
Group "A": instruments and means of production	10.2	14.5	18.8	22.0	24.3
Group "B": consumer goods	10.8	13.0	15.1	16.5	17.6
	Per cent of total				
Group "A": instruments and means of production	48.5	52.6	55.4	57.0	58.0
Group "B": consumer goods	51.5	47.4	44.6	43.0	42.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As you see, this table requires no explanation.

In our country, which is still young as regards technical development, industry has a special task to fulfil. It must reconstruct on a new technical basis not only itself, not only all branches of industry, including the light industries, the food industries, and the timber industry; it must also reconstruct all forms of transport and all branches of agriculture. It can fulfil this task, however, only if the machine-building industry—which is the main lever for the reconstruction of the national economy—occupies a predominant place in it. The figures for the period under review show that our machine-building industry has advanced to the leading place in the total volume of industrial output.

Here is the corresponding table:

PROPORTION OF OUTPUT OF VARIOUS BRANCHES
OF INDUSTRY IN GROSS OUTPUT
(*Per cent of total*)

	U. S. S. R.			
	1913	1929	1932	1933
Coal	2.9	2.1	1.7	2.0
Coke	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.6
Oil (extraction)	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.4
Oil (refining)	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.6
Iron and steel	No data	4.5	3.7	4.0
Nonferrous metals	"	1.5	1.3	1.2
Machine building	11.0	14.8	25.0	26.1
Basic chemicals	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9
Cotton textiles	18.3	15.2	7.6	7.3
Woolen textiles	3.1	3.1	1.9	1.8

This shows that our industry is developing on a sound foundation, and that the key to reconstruction—the machine-building industry—is entirely in our hands. All that is required is that we use it skilfully and rationally.

The development of our industry during this period according to social sectors presents an interesting picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

**GROSS OUTPUT OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY
ACCORDING TO SOCIAL SECTORS**
(In prices of 1926-27)

	In millions of rubles				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total output .	21,025	27,477	33,903	38,464	41,968
Of which:					
I. Socialized industry	20,891	27,402	No data	38,436	41,940
Of which:					
a) State industry .	19,143	24,989		35,587	38,932
b) Cooperative in- dustry .	1,748	2,413		2,849	3,008
II. Private industry	134	75	"	28	28
Per cent of total					
Total output .	100	100	100	100	100
Of which:					
I. Socialized industry	99.4	99.7	No data	99.93	99.93
Of which:					
a) State industry .	91.1	90.9		92.52	92.76
b) Cooperative in- dustry .	8.3	8.8	"	7.41	7.17
II. Private industry	0.6	0.3		0.07	0.07

From this table it is evident that we have put an end to the capitalist elements in industry and that the socialist system of economy is now the sole system, the system holding a position of monopoly, in our industry. (*Applause.*)

However, of all the achievements scored by industry in the period under review the most important is the fact that it has

succeeded in this period in fostering and training thousands of new men and women, of new leaders of industry—a whole stratum of new engineers and technicians—hundreds of thousands of young skilled workers who have mastered the new technique and who have advanced our socialist industry. There can be no doubt that without these men and women industry could not have achieved the successes it has achieved, and of which it has a perfect right to be proud. The figures show that in this period about 800,000 more or less qualified workers have been graduated from factory training schools, and over 180,000 engineers and technicians from higher technical educational institutions, universities and technical schools; all of these are now working in industry. If it is true that the problem of cadres is a most important problem of our development, then it must be admitted that our industry is beginning really to cope with this problem.

Such are the main achievements of our industry.

It would be wrong, however, to think that industry has only successes to record. No, it also has its defects. The principal of these are:

a) The continuing lag of the *iron and steel industry*;

b) The lack of order in the *nonferrous metals industries*;

c) The underestimation of the great importance of developing the mining of *local coal* for the general fuel balance of the country (Moscow Region, Caucasus, Urals, Karaganda, Central Asia, Siberia, the Far East, the Northern Territory, etc.);

d) The absence of proper attention to the question of organizing new *centres of the oil industry* in the Urals, Bashkiria, and Emba districts;

e) The absence of serious concern for the development of the production of *consumer goods* both in the light and food industries and in the timber industry;

f) The absence of proper attention to the question of developing *local industry*;

g) An absolutely intolerable attitude towards the question of improving the *quality of products*;

h) The continuing backwardness in the matter of increasing the *productivity of labour*, reducing the *cost of production*, and inculcating *business accounting*;

i) The fact that bad organization of work and wages, lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalization have not yet been eliminated;

j) The fact that *red tape* methods of management in the economic Commissariats and their departments, including the People's Commissariats of the light and food industries, have not yet been eliminated by far.

The absolute necessity for the speedy elimination of all these defects need hardly be explained. As you know, the iron and steel and nonferrous metals industries failed to fulfil their plan throughout the First Five-Year Plan period; nor have they fulfilled the plan of the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan period. If they continue to lag behind they may become a drag on industry and cause disruptions in its work. As to the creation of new centres of the coal and oil industries, it is not difficult to understand that unless this urgent task is fulfilled both industry and transport may be run aground. The question of producing consumer goods and of developing local industry, as well as the questions of improving the quality of output, of increasing the productivity of labour, of reducing production costs, and of inculcating business accounting also need no further explanation. As for the bad organization of work and wages, and red tape methods of management, the case of the Donbas and of the factories in the light and food industries has shown that this dangerous disease has affected all our industries and hinders their development. If it is not removed, industry will just hobble along.

Our immediate tasks are:

1. To maintain the present leading role of machine building in the system of industries.
2. To eliminate the lag of the iron and steel industry.
3. To put the nonferrous metals industries in order.
4. To develop to the utmost the mining of local coal in all

the districts where it is known to be available; to develop new coal fields (for example, in the Bureya District in the Far East), and to convert the Kuzbas into a second Donbas. (*Prolonged applause.*)

5. Seriously to tackle the job of organizing a centre of the oil industry in the districts on the western and southern slopes of the Ural range.

6. To expand the production of consumer goods in all the industries controlled by the economic Commissariats.

7. To develop local Soviet industry; to give it the opportunity to display initiative in the production of consumer goods and to lend it all possible assistance in the way of raw materials and funds.

8. To improve the quality of manufactured goods; to discontinue the practice of producing incomplete sets of goods, and to punish all those comrades, without respect of person, who violate or evade the laws of the Soviet government concerning the quality and completeness of sets of goods.

9. To secure a systematic increase in the productivity of labour, a reduction in production costs, and the inculcation of business accounting.

10. To put an end to lack of personal responsibility in work and to wage equalization.

11. To eliminate red tape methods of management in all the departments of the economic Commissariats, and to check up systematically on the fulfilment of the decisions and instructions of the directing centres by the subordinate organizations.

2. PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURE

Development in the sphere of agriculture has proceeded somewhat differently. In the period under review progress in the main branches of agriculture was much slower than in industry, but nevertheless more rapid than in the period when individual farming predominated. In livestock farming, however, there

was even a reverse process—a decline in the number of livestock; only in 1933 were symptoms of progress observed, and then only in hog breeding.

Apparently the enormous difficulties attending the amalgamation of scattered small peasant farms into collective farms, the difficult task of creating a large number of big grain and livestock farms, which had to be built practically from the ground up, and, in general, the period of *reorganization*, when individual agriculture was being remodelled and put on the new, collective-farm basis, which required considerable time and involves considerable outlay—all these factors inevitably predetermined the slow rate of progress in agriculture, as well as the relatively long period of decline in the number of livestock.

In point of fact, in agriculture the period under review was not so much a period of rapid progress and powerful upswing as a period during which we created the conditions for such a progress and upswing in the near future.

If we take the figures for the increase in the area under all crops, and separately the figures for industrial crops, we will get the following picture of the development of agriculture in the period under review.

AREA UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

(*In millions of hectares*)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total crop area .	105.0	118.0	127.2	136.3	134.4	129.7
Of which:						
a) Grain crops .	94.4	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5
b) Industrial crops .	4.5	8.8	10.5	14.0	14.9	12.0
c) Vegetables and melons .	3.8	7.6	8.0	9.1	9.2	8.6
d) Fodder .	2.1	5.0	6.5	8.8	10.6	7.3

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.
(In millions of hectares)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Cotton	. 0.69	1.06	1.58	2.14	2.17	2.05
Flax (long fibre)	. 1.02	1.63	1.75	2.39	2.51	2.40
Sugar beet	. 0.65	0.77	1.04	1.39	1.54	1.21
Oil seed	. 2.00	5.20	5.22	7.55	7.98	5.79

These tables reflect the two main lines in agriculture:

1. The line of the greatest possible expansion of crop areas in the period when the reorganization of agriculture was at its height, when collective farms were being formed by the tens of thousands and were driving the kulaks from the land, seizing the vacated land, and taking charge of it.

2. The line of discontinuing the practice of indiscriminate expansion of crop areas; the line of passing on from indiscriminate expansion of crop areas to improved cultivation of the land, to the introduction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, to increasing the harvest yield and, if practice shows this to be necessary, to a temporary reduction in crop areas.

As is well known, the second line, the only correct line in agriculture, was proclaimed in 1932, when the period of reorganization in agriculture was drawing to a close and the question of increasing the harvest yield became one of the fundamental questions of the progress of agriculture.

But data of the growth of the crop areas cannot be regarded as a sufficient index of the development of agriculture. It sometimes happens that while the crop area increases, output does not increase, or even declines, because cultivation of the soil has deteriorated, and the yield per hectare has declined. In view of this, data for crop areas must be supplemented with data for gross output.

Here is the corresponding table:

**GROSS OUTPUT OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL
CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.**
(In millions of centners)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Grain	801.0	717.4	835.4	694.8	698.7	893.0
Raw cotton	7.4	8.6	11.1	12.9	12.7	13.2
Flax fibre	3.3	3.6	4.4	5.5	5.0	5.6
Sugar beet	109.0	62.5	140.2	120.5	65.6	90.0
Oil seeds	21.5	35.8	36.2	51.0	45.5	46.0

It can be seen from this table that the years in which the reorganization of agriculture was at its height, viz., 1931 and 1932, were the years in which the output of grain diminished most.

It can also be seen from this table that in the flax and cotton districts, where the reorganization of agriculture proceeded at a slower pace, flax and cotton hardly suffered, and progressed more or less evenly and steadily, while maintaining a high level of development.

Thirdly, it can be seen from this table that there was only a slight fluctuation in the output of oil seeds, and a high level of development, as compared with the prewar level, was maintained, while in the sugar beet districts, where the reorganization of agriculture proceeded at the most rapid rate, sugar beet farming, which was the last to enter the period of reorganization, suffered its worst decline in the last year of reorganization, viz., in 1932, when output dropped below the prewar level.

Lastly, it can be seen from this table that 1933, the first year after the completion of the reorganization period, marks a turning point in the development of grain and industrial crops.

This means that from now on grain crops, to begin with, and then industrial crops, will firmly and surely advance with giant strides.

It was livestock farming that suffered most in the reorganization period.

Here is the corresponding table:

LIVESTOCK IN THE U. S. S. R.
(*Million head*)

	1916	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
a) Horses .	35.1	34.0	30.2	26.2	19.6	16.6
b) Large cattle .	58.9	68.1	52.5	47.9	40.7	38.6
c) Sheep and goats .	115.2	147.2	108.8	77.7	52.1	50.6
d) Hogs .	20.3	20.9	13.6	14.4	11.6	12.2

This table shows that in the period under review there was not an improvement, but a continual decline in the quantity of livestock in the country as compared with the prewar level. It is obvious that this table reflects, on the one hand, the fact that livestock farming was dominated by big kulak elements to a greater extent, and, on the other, the intense kulak agitation for the slaughter of livestock which found favourable soil in the years of reorganization.

Furthermore, it follows from this table that the decline in the number of livestock began in the very first year of reorganization (1930) and continued right up to 1933. The decline was most marked in the first three years; in 1933, however, the first year after the termination of the period of reorganization, when the grain crops marked an advance, the decline in the number of livestock reached its minimum.

Lastly, it follows from this table that the reverse process has already commenced in hog breeding, and that in 1933 symptoms of direct progress were already to be seen.

This means that the year 1934 can and must mark a turning point towards progress in all branches of livestock farming.

How did the collectivization of peasant farms develop in the period under review?

Here is the corresponding table:

COLLECTIVIZATION

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Number of collective farms (thousands) . .	57.0	85.9	211.1	211.05	224.5
Number of households in collective farms (millions)	1.0	6.0	13.0	14.9	15.2
Per cent of peasant farms collectivized . .	3.9	23.6	52.7	61.5	65.0

And what was the development as regards the areas under grain crops according to sectors?

Here is the corresponding table:

AREAS UNDER GRAIN CROPS ACCORDING TO SECTORS
(*In millions of hectares*)

Sectors	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	Per cent of total area in 1933
1. State farms .	1.5	2.9	8.1	9.3	10.8	10.6
2. Collective farms .	3.4	29.7	61.0	69.1	75.0	73.9
3. Individual peasant farms .	91.1	69.2	35.3	21.3	15.7	15.5
Total U.S.S.R. .	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5	100.0

What do these tables show?

They show that the period of reorganization in agriculture, during which the number of collective farms and the number of their members increased at a tempestuous pace, is now ended, that it was already ended in 1932.

Hence, the further process of collectivization is a process of the gradual absorption of the remaining individual peasant farms and the re-education of the individual peasants by the collective farms.

This means that the collective farms have triumphed completely and irrevocably. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

They show also that the state farms and collective farms together control 84.5 per cent of the total area under grain in the U.S.S.R.

This means that the collective farms and state farms together have become so great a force as to determine the fate of the whole of agriculture and of all its branches.

The tables further show that the 65 per cent of the peasant farms, which are organized in collective farms, control 73.9 per cent of the total area under grain; whereas all the individual farms put together, representing 35 per cent of the entire peasant population, control only 15.5 per cent of the total area under grain crops.

If we add to this the fact that in 1933 the various deliveries to the state made by the collective farms amounted to more than 1,000,000,000 poods of grain, while the individual peasants, who fulfilled their plan 100 per cent, delivered only about 130,000,000 poods; whereas in 1929-30 the individual peasants delivered to the state about 780,000,000 poods, and the collective farms not more than 120,000,000 poods—then it becomes as clear as clear can be that during the period under review the collective farms and the individual peasants have completely exchanged roles: The collective farms during this period have become the predominant force in agriculture, whereas the individual peasants have dropped to the position of a secondary force and are compelled to submit and adapt themselves to the collective-farm system.

It must be admitted that the labouring peasantry, our Soviet peasantry, has completely and irrevocably taken its stand under the red banner of socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Let the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and bourgeois-Trotskyite gossips tell old wives' tales about the peasantry being counterrevolutionary by its very nature; about its being destined to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.; about its inability to serve as the ally of the working class in building socialism, and about the impossibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. The facts show that these gentlemen are slandering the U.S.S.R.

and the Soviet peasantry. The facts show that our Soviet peasantry has quit the shores of capitalism for good and is headed, in alliance with the working class, for socialism. The facts show that we have already built the foundations of socialist society in the U.S.S.R., and that all we have to do now is to erect the superstructures—a task which undoubtedly is much easier than that of building the foundations of socialist society.

The increase in crop area and in output is not the only thing, however, that reflects the strength of the collective farms and state farms. Their strength is reflected also in the increase in the number of tractors at their disposal, in the growing rate of their use of machinery. There is no doubt that in this respect our collective farms and state farms have made very marked progress.

Here is the corresponding table:

NUMBER OF TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE
IN THE U.S.S.R.

(Allowance made for depreciation)

	Number of tractors in thousands				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total number of tractors . . .	34.9	72.1	125.3	148.5	204.1
Of which:					
a) In machine and tractor stations . . .	2.4	31.1	63.3	74.8	122.3
b) In state farms of all systems . . .	9.7	27.7	51.5	64.0	81.8
	Capacity in thousands hp				
Total number of tractors . . .	391.4	1,003.5	1,850.0	2,225.0	3,100.0
Of which:					
a) In machine and tractor stations . . .	23.9	372.5	848.0	1,077.0	1,782.0
b) In state farms of all systems	123.4	483.1	892.0	1,043.0	1,318.0

Thus, we have 204,000 tractors with a total of 3,100,000 hp working for the collective farms and state farms. As you see, this is not a small force; it is a force capable of pulling up all the roots

of capitalism in the countryside; it is a force twice as great as the number of tractors that Lenin once mentioned as a remote prospect.

As regards the number of agricultural machines in the machine and tractor stations and in the state farms under the People's Commissariat of State Farms, the figures are given in the following tables:

IN MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	7 (units)	0.1	2.2	11.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands) .	0.1	4.9	6.2	17.6
Complex and semicomplex grain threshers (thousands) .	2.9	27.8	37.0	50.0
Electric threshing installations .	168	268	551	1,283
M.T.S. repair shops .	104	770	1,220	1,933
Motor trucks (thousands) .	0.2	1.0	6.0	13.5
Passenger automobiles (units)	17	191	245	2,800

IN STATE FARMS CONTROLLED
BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF STATE FARMS

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	1.7	6.3	11.9	13.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands) .	0.3	0.7	1.2	2.5
Complex and semicomplex grain threshers (thousands) .	1.4	4.2	7.1	8.0
Electric installations .	42	112	164	222
Repair shops .				
a) For capital repairs .	72	133	208	302
b) For medium repairs .	75	160	215	476
c) For current repairs .	205	310	578	1,166
Motor trucks (thousands) .	2.1	3.7	6.2	10.9
Passenger automobiles (units)	118	385	625	1,890

I do not think these figures require explanation.

Of no little importance for the progress of agriculture was the formation of the Political Departments of the machine-and-tractor stations and state farms and the sending of qualified workers into agriculture. Everybody admits now that the personnel of the Political Departments played an extremely important part in improving the work of the collective farms and state farms. You know that during the period under review the Central Committee of the Party sent more than 23,000 Communists to the rural districts to reinforce the cadres in agriculture. Of these, more than 3,000 were sent to work in the land departments, more than 2,000 to state farms, more than 13,000 to the Political Departments of the M.T.S., and over 5,000 to the Political Departments of the state farms.

The same is to be said in regard to the task of providing new engineering, technical and agronomic forces for the collective farms and state farms. As you know, more than 111,000 workers of this category were sent into agriculture during the period under review.

During the period under review, over 1,900,000 tractor drivers, harvester combine drivers and operators, and automobile drivers were trained and sent to work by the organizations under the People's Commissariat of Agriculture alone.

During the same period more than 1,600,000 chairmen and members of management boards of collective farms, brigade leaders for field work, brigade leaders for livestock raising, and bookkeepers were trained or received additional training.

This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. But still, it is something.

As you see, the state has done all it possibly could to help the departments of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and of the People's Commissariat of State Farms to direct the work of collective-farm and state-farm development.

Can it be said that the best use has been made of these possibilities?

Unfortunately, it cannot.

To begin with, these People's Commissariats are more infected than others with the disease of red tape. Decisions are made, but not a thought is given to checking up on their fulfilment, to calling to order those who disobey the instructions and orders of the leading bodies, and to promoting honest and conscientious workers.

One would think that the existence of an enormous number of tractors and machines would impose upon the land departments the obligation to keep these valuable machines in good condition, to see to their timely repair, to employ them more or less efficiently. What is being done in this respect? Unfortunately, very little. The maintenance of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. Repairs are also unsatisfactory, because even to this day these people refuse to understand that the basis of repairs is current and medium repairs, and not capital repairs. As for the utilization of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory position in this respect is so clear and well known that it needs no proof.

One of the immediate tasks in agriculture is to introduce proper rotation of crops and to secure the extension of clean fallow and the improvement of seeds in all branches of agriculture. What is being done in this respect? Unfortunately, very little as yet. The state of affairs in regard to grain and cotton seed is so muddled that it will take a long time to straighten things out.

One of the effective means of increasing the yield of industrial crops is to supply them with fertilizers. What is being done in this respect? Very little as yet. Fertilizers are available, but the organizations of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture fail to get them; and when they do get them they do not take the trouble to deliver them on time to the places where they are required, and to see to it that they are utilized properly.

In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate the great revolutionizing role of our state farms. But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date, we will find an

enormous discrepancy with an adverse balance against the state farms. The principal reason for this discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge farms. The farms are also too specialized, they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do not engage in livestock breeding. Evidently, it will be necessary to split up the state farms and make them less specialized. One might think that it was the People's Commissariat of State Farms that raised this question opportunely and succeeded in solving it. But that is not so. The question was raised and settled on the initiative of people who had no connection whatsoever with the People's Commissariat of State Farms.

Finally, there is the problem of livestock breeding. I have already reported on the gravity of the situation with regard to livestock. One might think that our Land Departments would display feverish activity in an effort to put an end to the livestock crisis; that they would raise the alarm and mobilize their people to attack the livestock problem. Unfortunately, nothing of the kind has happened, or is happening. Not only have they failed to raise the alarm about the serious livestock situation, but, on the contrary, they try to gloss over the question, and sometimes in their reports even try to conceal from the public opinion of the country the real state of affairs in regard to livestock, which is an absolutely impermissible thing for Bolsheviks to do. To hope, after this, that the Land Departments will be able to bring livestock farming on to the highroad and raise it to its proper level would be building on sand. The whole Party, all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take this matter in hand, bearing in mind that the livestock problem today is just as urgent as the grain problem—now successfully solved—was yesterday. There is no need to prove that our Soviet men and women, who have overcome many a serious obstacle in the path to the goal, will be able to overcome this obstacle as well. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is a brief and far from complete enumeration of defects which must be removed, and an enumeration of the tasks which must be fulfilled in the nearest future.

But the matter does not end with these tasks. There are other tasks in agriculture, concerning which a few words must be said.

First of all, we must bear in mind that the old division of our regions into industrial regions and agrarian regions has now become obsolete. We no longer have exclusively agrarian regions to supply grain, meat and vegetables to the industrial regions; nor have we exclusively industrial regions which can hope to obtain all the necessary produce from other regions. Development is leading to the point when all our regions will be more or less industrial; and they will become increasingly so as this development proceeds. This means that the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Chernozem Region, and other formerly agrarian districts can no longer supply the industrial centres with as much produce as they supplied in the past because now they have to feed their own towns and their own workers, whose number will be increasing. But from this it follows that every region will have to develop its own agricultural base, so as to have its own supply of vegetables, potatoes, butter and milk, and, to some extent, grain and meat, if it does not want to get into difficulties. You know that this is quite practicable and is already being done.

The task is to pursue this line to the end at all costs.

Furthermore, we should note the fact that the accepted division of our regions into consuming regions and producing regions is also beginning to lose its hard and fast character. This year "consuming" regions such as the Moscow and Gorky regions delivered nearly 80,000,000 poods of grain to the state. This, of course, is no small item. In the so-called consuming zone there are about 5,000,000 hectares of virgin soil, covered with scrub. It is well known that the climate in this zone is not bad; precipitation is ample, and droughts unknown. If this land were cleared of scrub and a number of organizational measures were undertaken, it would be possible to obtain a vast area for grain crops, which at the usually high yield in these districts could supply no less grain for the market than is now supplied by the Lower and Middle

Volga. This would be a great help for the industrial centres in the north.

Evidently the task is to develop large tracts for grain crops in the districts of the consuming zone.

Finally, there is the question of combating drought in the trans-Volga regions. Afforestation, the planting of forest shelter belts in the eastern districts of the trans-Volga is a matter of enormous importance. As you know, this work has been started already, although it cannot be said that it is being carried on with sufficient intensity. Further, we must not allow the irrigation of the trans-Volga regions—the most important thing in combating drought—to be indefinitely postponed. It is true that this work has been held up somewhat by certain external circumstances which caused a considerable diversion of forces and funds to other purposes. But now there is no longer any reason why this work should be further postponed. We cannot do without a large and absolutely stable grain base on the Volga which shall be independent of the vagaries of the weather and which shall provide annually about 200,000,000 poods of grain for the market. This is absolutely necessary, in view of the growth of the towns on the Volga, on the one hand, and of the possibility of all sorts of complications in the sphere of international relations, on the other.

The task is to set to work seriously to organize the irrigation of the trans-Volga regions. (*Applause.*)

3. THE RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

We have thus depicted the state of our industry and agriculture: their development in the period under review and their position at the present moment.

To sum up, we have:

- a) A mighty advance in production both in industry and in the main branches of agriculture.
- b) The final victory, on the basis of this advance, of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist system both in industry

and in agriculture; the socialist system has become the sole system in the whole of the national economy, and the capitalist elements have been forced out of all spheres of the national economy.

c) The final abandonment of individual small commodity farming by the overwhelming majority of the peasants; their amalgamation in collective farms on the basis of collective labour and the collective ownership of the means of production; the complete victory of collective farming over individual small commodity farming.

d) The ever-increasing expansion of the collective farms through the absorption of individual peasant farms, whose number is thus diminishing month by month—the individual peasant farms being, in fact, converted into an auxiliary force for the collective farms and state farms.

It goes without saying that this historic victory over the exploiters could not but lead to a radical improvement in the material standard of the working people and in their conditions of life generally.

The elimination of the parasitic classes has led to the disappearance of the exploitation of man by man. The labour of the worker and the peasant is freed from exploitation. The incomes which the exploiters used to squeeze out of the labour of the people now remain in the hands of the working people and are used partly for the expansion of production and the enlistment of new detachments of working people in production, and partly for the purpose of directly increasing the incomes of the workers and peasants.

Unemployment, that scourge of the working class, has disappeared. In the bourgeois countries millions of unemployed suffer want and privation owing to lack of work; but in our country there are no longer any workers who have no work and no earnings.

With the disappearance of kulak bondage, poverty in the countryside has disappeared. Every peasant, whether a collective farmer or an individual farmer, now has the opportunity of enjoying a human existence, if only he wants to work

conscientiously and not to be a loafer, a tramp, or a despoiler of collective-farm property.

The abolition of exploitation, the abolition of unemployment in the towns, and the abolition of poverty in the countryside are such historic achievements in the material condition of the working people as are beyond even the dreams of the workers and peasants in bourgeois countries, even in the most "democratic" ones.

The very appearance of our large towns and industrial centres has changed. An inevitable feature of the big towns in bourgeois countries are the slums, the so-called working-class districts on the outskirts of the towns—a heap of dark, damp, and dilapidated dwellings, mostly of the basement type, where usually the poor live in filth and curse their fate. The revolution in the U.S.S.R. has swept the slums out of our towns. They have been replaced by blocks of bright and well-built workers' houses; in many cases the working-class districts of our towns present a better appearance than the central districts.

The appearance of our rural districts has changed even more. The old type of village, with the church in the most prominent place, with the best houses—those of the police officer, the priest, and the kulaks—in the foreground, and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the background, is beginning to disappear. Its place is being taken by the new type of village, with its public farm buildings, with its clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries, and crèches; with its tractors, harvester combines, threshing machines, and automobiles. The former important personages of the village, the kulak-exploiter, the blood-sucking usurer, the profiteering merchant, the "little father" police officer, have disappeared. Now, the prominent personages of the village are the leading workers in the collective farms and state farms, in the schools and clubs; the senior tractor and combine drivers, the team leaders in field work and livestock raising, and the best men and women shock workers on the collective-farm fields.

The antithesis between town and country is disappearing. The peasants are ceasing to regard the town as the centre of their

exploitation. The economic and cultural bond between town and country is becoming stronger. The country now receives assistance from the town and from urban industry in the shape of tractors, agricultural machinery, automobiles, workers, and funds. And the rural districts, too, now have their own industry, in the shape of the machine and tractor stations, repair shops, all sorts of industrial undertakings in the collective farms, small electric power plants, etc. The cultural gulf between town and country is being bridged.

Such are the main achievements of the working people in the sphere of improving their material conditions, their everyday life, and their cultural standard.

On the basis of these achievements we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) An increase in the national income from 35,000,000,000 rubles in 1930 to 50,000,000,000 rubles in 1933. In view of the fact that the income of the capitalist elements, including concessionaires, at the present time represents less than one half of one per cent of the total national income, almost the whole of the national income is distributed among the workers and other employees, the labouring peasants, the cooperative societies, and the state.

b) An increase in the population of the Soviet Union from 160,500,000 at the end of 1930 to 168,000,000 at the end of 1933.

c) An increase in the number of workers and other employees from 14,530,000 in 1930 to 21,883,000 in 1933. The number of manual workers increased during this period from 9,489,000 to 13,797,000; the number of workers employed in large-scale industry, including transport, increased from 5,079,000 to 6,882,000; the number of agricultural workers increased from 1,426,000 to 2,519,000, and the number of workers and other employees engaged in trade increased from 814,000 to 1,497,000.

d) An increase in the total payroll of the workers and other employees from 13,597,000,000 rubles in 1930 to 34,280,000,000 rubles in 1933.

e) An increase in the average annual wages of industrial workers from 991 rubles in 1930 to 1,519 in 1933.

f) An increase in the social unsurance fund for workers and other employees from 1,810,000,000 rubles in 1930 to 4,610,000,000 rubles in 1933.

g) The adoption of a seven-hour day in all surface industries.

h) State aid to the peasants in the form of 2,860 machine-and-tractor stations, involving an investment of 2,000,000,000 rubles.

i) State aid to the peasants in the form of credits to the collective farms amounting to 1,600,000,000 rubles.

j) State aid to the peasants in the form of seed and food loans amounting, in the period under review, to 262,000,000 poods of grain.

k) State aid to poorer peasants in the shape of relief from taxation and insurance payments amounting to 370,000,000 rubles.

As regards the cultural development of the country, we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education throughout the U.S.S.R., and an increase in literacy among the population from 67 per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 1933.

b) An increase in the number of pupils and students attending schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929 to 26,419,000 in 1933, including an increase from 11,697,000 to 19,163,000 in the number of pupils attending *elementary* schools, from 2,453,000 to 6,674,000 in the number attending *secondary* schools, and from 207,000 to 491,000 in the number of students attending institutions of *higher* learning.

c) An increase in the number of children receiving preschool education from 838,000 in 1929 to 5,917,000 in 1933.

d) An increase in the number of higher educational institutions, general and special, from 91 in 1914 to 600 in 1933.

e) An increase in the number of scientific research institutes from 400 in 1929 to 840 in 1933.

f) An increase in the number of clubs and similar institutions from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933.

g) An increase in the number of cinema theatres, cinema installations in clubs, and travelling cinemas, from 9,800 in 1929 to 29,200 in 1933.

h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933.

Perhaps it will not be amiss to point out that the number of workers among the students in our higher educational institutions represents 51.4 per cent of the total, and that of labouring peasants 16.5 per cent; whereas in Germany, for instance, the number of workers among the students in higher educational institutions in 1932-33 represented only 3.2 per cent and that of small peasants only 2.4 per cent of the total.

We must note as a gratifying fact and as an indication of the progress of culture in the rural districts, the increased activity of the women collective farmers in social and organizational work. We know, for example, that about 6,000 women collective farmers are chairmen of collective farms, more than 60,000 are members of management boards of collective farms, 28,000 are brigade leaders, 100,000 are team organizers, 9,000 are managers of collective-farm marketable livestock sectors, and 7,000 are tractor drivers.

Needless to say, these figures are incomplete; but even these figures are sufficient to indicate the great progress of culture in the rural districts. This fact, comrades, is of tremendous significance. It is of tremendous significance because women represent half the population of our country; they represent a huge army of workers; and they are called upon to bring up our children, our future generation, that is to say, our future. That is why we must not permit this huge army of working people to linger in darkness and ignorance! That is why we must welcome the growing social activity of the working women and their promotion to leading posts as an indubitable indication of the growth of our culture.
(Prolonged applause.)

Finally, I must point out one more fact, but of a negative character. I have in mind the intolerable fact that our pedagogical

and medical faculties are still neglected. This is a great defect bordering on violation of the interests of the state. We must remove this defect without fail, and the sooner this is done the better.

4. PROGRESS IN TRADE TURNOVER AND THE TRANSPORT SERVICES

Thus we have:

- a) An increased output of manufactured goods, including consumer goods.
- b) An increased output of agricultural produce.
- c) A growth in the requirements of the labouring masses of town and country and an increased demand for produce and manufactured goods.

What is needed to coordinate these conditions and to make sure that the masses of consumers receive the necessary goods and produce?

Some comrades think that these conditions alone are sufficient for the economic life of the country to make rapid progress. That is a profound delusion. We can imagine a situation in which all these conditions exist; yet if the goods do not reach the consumers, economic life—far from making rapid progress—will, on the contrary, be dislocated and disorganized to its very foundations. It is high time we realized that in the last analysis goods are produced not for the sake of producing them, but for consumption. Cases have occurred where we have had a fair quantity of goods and produce, but instead of reaching the consumer, they flowed for years back and forth in the bureaucratic backwaters of our so-called commodity-distribution network, out of reach of the consumers. It goes without saying that under these circumstances industry and agriculture lost all stimulus to increase production; the commodity-distribution network became overstocked, while the workers and peasants had to go without these goods and produce. The result was a dislocation of the economic life of the country, notwithstanding the fact that goods and produce were available. If the economic life of the country is to make rapid

progress, and industry and agriculture are to have a stimulus for further increasing their output, one more condition is necessary—namely, fully developed *trade turnover* between town and country, between the various districts and regions of the country, between the various branches of the national economy. The country must be covered with a vast network of wholesale distribution bases, shops and stores. There must be a ceaseless flow of goods through these bases, shops, and stores from the producer to the consumer. The state trading system, the cooperative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms, and the individual peasants must be drawn into this work.

This is what we call fully developed *Soviet trade*, trade *without* capitalists, trade *without* profiteers.

As you see, the expansion of Soviet trade is a very urgent problem, which, if not solved, will make further progress impossible.

And yet, in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly obvious, the Party had to contend in the period under review with a number of obstacles which arose in the way of expanding Soviet trade as a result of what could briefly be described as an aberration of the brain among a section of the Communists on the question of the necessity and importance of Soviet trade.

To begin with, there is still among a section of Communists a supercilious, contemptuous attitude towards trade in general, and towards Soviet trade in particular. These Communists, so-called, look upon Soviet trade as a matter of secondary importance, hardly worth bothering about, and regard those engaged in trade as being beyond salvation. Evidently, these people do not realize that their supercilious attitude towards Soviet trade does not express the Bolshevik point of view, but rather the point of view of shabby noblemen who are full of ambition but lack ammunition. (*Applause.*) These people do not realize that Soviet trade is our own, Bolshevik, work, and that the workers employed in trade, including those behind the counter—if only they work conscientiously—are doing our revolutionary, Bolshevik, work. (*Applause.*) It goes without saying that the Party had to

give these Communists, so-called, a slight drubbing and throw their aristocratic prejudices on the refuse dump. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Then we had to overcome prejudices of another kind. I have in mind the Leftist chatter that has gained currency among a section of our functionaries to the effect that Soviet trade is a superseded stage; that it is now necessary to organize the direct exchange of products; that money will soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens; that it is unnecessary to develop trade, since the direct exchange of products is knocking at the door. It must be observed that this Leftist petty-bourgeois chatter, which plays into the hands of the capitalist elements who are striving to prevent the expansion of Soviet trade, has gained currency not only among a section of our "Red professors," but also among certain persons in charge of trade. Of course, it is ridiculous and funny to hear these people, who are incapable of organizing the very simple business of Soviet trade, chatter about their readiness to organize the more complicated and difficult business of a direct exchange of products. But Don Quixotes are called Don Quixotes precisely because they lack the most elementary sense of reality. These people, who are as far removed from Marxism as the sky is from the earth, evidently do not realize that we shall use money for a long time to come, right up to the time when the first stage of communism, i.e., the socialist stage of development, has been completed. They do not realize that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy which the Soviet government has taken over and adapted to the interests of socialism for the purpose of expanding Soviet trade to the utmost, and of thus creating the conditions necessary for the direct exchange of products. They do not realize that the direct exchange of products can replace, and be the result of, only a perfectly organized system of Soviet trade, of which we have not a trace as yet, and are not likely to have for some time. It goes without saying that in trying to organize developed Soviet trade our Party found it necessary to give a drubbing to these "Left" freaks as well, and to scatter their petty-bourgeois chatter to the winds.

Furthermore, we had to overcome among the people in charge of trade the unhealthy habit of distributing goods mechanically; we had to put a stop to their indifference to the demand for varied assortments and to the requirements of the consumers; we had to put an end to the mechanical consignment of goods, to lack of personal responsibility in trade. For this purpose, regional and interdistrict wholesale distribution bases and tens of thousands of new shops and booths were opened.

Furthermore, we had to put an end to the monopolistic position of the cooperative societies in the market. In this connection we instructed all the People's Commissariats to start trade in the goods manufactured by the industries under their control; and the People's Commissariat of Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive open trade in agricultural produce. This has led, on the one hand, to an improvement in cooperative trade as a result of emulation, and, on the other hand, to a drop in market prices and to sounder conditions in the market.

A wide network of dining rooms was established which provide food at reduced prices ("public catering"). Workers' Supply Departments were set up in the factories, and all those who had no connection with the factory were taken off the supply list; in the factories under the control of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry alone, 500,000 such persons had to be removed from the list.

We have organized short term credit through a single centralized bank—the State Bank, with its 2,200 district branches capable of financing commercial operations.

As a result of these measures we have the following to record for the period under review:

- a) An increase in the number of shops and trading booths from 184,662 in 1930 to 277,974 in 1933.
- b) A newly created network of regional wholesale distribution bases, numbering 1,011, and interdistrict wholesale distribution bases, numbering 864.
- c) A newly created network of Workers' Supply Departments, numbering 1,600.

d) An increase in the number of open trade stores for the sale of bread, which now exist in 330 towns.

e) An increase in the number of public dining rooms, which at the present time cater to 19,800,000 consumers.

f) An increase in state and cooperative trade turnover, including public dining rooms, from 18,900,000,000 rubles in 1930 to 49,000,000,000 rubles in 1933.

It would be wrong, however, to think that this expansion of Soviet trade is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of our economy. On the contrary, it has now become clearer than ever that the present state of trade turnover cannot satisfy our requirements. Hence, the task is to develop Soviet trade still further; to draw local industry into this trade; to increase collective-farm and peasant trade, and thus to achieve new and decisive successes in the sphere of increasing Soviet trade.

It must be pointed out, however, that we cannot restrict ourselves merely to the expansion of Soviet trade. While the development of our economy depends upon the development of the trade turnover, upon the development of Soviet trade, the development of Soviet trade, in its turn, depends upon the development of our transport system, of our railways and waterways, and also of automobile transport. It may happen that goods are available, that all the possibilities exist for expanding trade turnover, but the transport system cannot keep up with the development of trade turnover and refuses to carry the freight. As you know, this happens rather often. Hence, transport is the weak spot which may cause a hitch, and perhaps is already causing a hitch, in the whole of our economy, primarily in the sphere of trade turnover.

It is true that the railway system has increased its freight turnover from 133,900,000,000 ton-kilometres in 1930 to 172,000,000,000 ton-kilometres in 1933. But this is too little, far too little for us, for our economy.

The water transport system has increased its freight turnover from 45,600,000,000 ton-kilometres in 1930 to 59,900,000,000 ton-kilometres in 1933. But this is too little, far too little for our economy.

I need not mention automobile transport, in which the number of automobiles (trucks and passenger cars) has increased from 8,800 in 1913 to 117,800 at the end of 1933. This is so inadequate for our national economy that one is ashamed to speak of it.

There can be no doubt that all these transport services could work ever so much better if the transport system did not suffer from the well-known disease called red tape methods of management. Hence, in addition to helping the transport system by providing forces and funds, our task is to root out the red tape attitude in the administration departments of the transport system and to make them more efficient.

Comrades, we have succeeded in finding the correct solutions for the main problems of industry, and industry is now standing firmly on its feet. We have also succeeded in finding the correct solutions for the main problems of agriculture, and we can say quite definitely that agriculture is now also standing firmly on its feet. But we are in danger of losing all these achievements if trade turnover begins to limp and if transport becomes a fetter on our feet. Hence, the task of expanding trade turnover and of decisively improving transport is the immediate and urgent problem; and unless this problem is solved, further progress will be impossible.

III

THE PARTY

I now come to the question of the Party.

The present Congress is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism; under the flag of the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist groups.

The anti-Leninist Trotskyite group has been defeated and scattered. Its organizers are now to be found in the back yards of the bourgeois parties abroad.

The anti-Leninist group of the Right deviationists has been defeated and scattered. Its organizers have long since renounced their views and are now trying in various ways to expiate the sins they committed against the Party.

The groups of nationalist deviators have been defeated and scattered. Their organizers have either completely merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else recanted.

The majority of the adherents to these antirevolutionary groups had to admit that the line of the Party was correct and have capitulated before the Party.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress it was still necessary to prove that the Party line was correct and to wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; and at the Sixteenth Party Congress we had to deal the final blow to the last adherents of these groups. At this Congress, however, there is nothing more to prove and, it seems, no one to fight. Everyone now sees that the line of the Party has triumphed. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The policy of industrializing the country has triumphed. Its results are obvious to everyone. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The policy of eliminating the kulaks and of mass collectivization has triumphed. Its results are also obvious to everyone. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The experience of our country has shown that it is entirely possible for socialism to achieve victory in one, separate country. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

It is obvious that all these successes, and primarily the victory of the Five-Year Plan, have utterly demoralized and smashed all and sundry anti-Leninist groups.

It must be admitted that the Party today is united as it has never been before. (*Thunderous, prolonged applause.*)

1. PROBLEMS OF IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and that the offensive of socialism is to be discontinued as unnecessary?

No, it does not.

Does this mean that all is well in our Party; that there will be no more deviations, and that, therefore, we may now rest on our laurels?

No, it does not.

We have defeated the enemies of the Party, the opportunists of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all types. But remnants of their ideology still live in the minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently they find expression. The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. And the soil for such moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for the reason that there still exist in town and country certain intermediary strata of the population who represent the medium that breeds such moods.

The Seventeenth Conference of our Party declared that one of the fundamental political tasks in connection with the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan is "to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people." This is an absolutely correct idea. But can we say that we have already overcome all the survivals of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. We cannot say that, not only because the development of people's minds lags behind their economic position, but also because we are still surrounded by capitalist countries which are trying to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism in the economic life and in the minds of the people of the U.S.S.R., and against which we Bolsheviks must always keep our powder dry.

It stands to reason that these survivals cannot but create a favourable soil for the revival of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups in the minds of individual members of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical level of the majority of the members of our Party, the inadequate ideological work of the Party organs, and the fact that our Party workers are overburdened with purely practical work, which deprives them of the opportunity of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and you will understand the origin of the confusion on a

number of problems of Leninism that exists in the minds of individual Party members, a confusion which not infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to reanimate the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups.

That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any need for the policy of the socialist offensive.

A number of problems of Leninism could be taken to demonstrate how tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups continue to subsist in the minds of certain Party members.

Take, for example, the problem of building a *classless socialist society*. The Seventeenth Party Conference declared that we are heading for the formation of a classless socialist society. It goes without saying that a classless society cannot come of itself, spontaneously, as it were. It has to be achieved and built by the efforts of all the working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by intensifying the class struggle, by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants of the capitalist classes, and in battles with enemies both internal and external.

The point is clear, one would think.

And yet, who does not know that the promulgation of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given rise to not a little confusion and to unhealthy sentiments among a section of Party members? The thesis that we are advancing towards a classless society—which was put forward as a slogan—was interpreted by them to mean a spontaneous process. And they began to reason in this way: If it is a classless society, then we can relax the class struggle, we can relax the dictatorship of the proletariat, and get rid of the state altogether, since it is fated to wither away soon in any case. They dropped into a state of moon-calf ecstasy, in the expectation that soon there will be no classes, and therefore no class struggle, and therefore no cares and worries, and therefore we can lay down our arms and retire—to sleep and to wait for the advent of a classless society. (*General laughter.*)

There can be no doubt that this confusion of mind and these sentiments are as like as two peas to the well-known views of the Right deviationists, who believed that the old must automatically grow into the new, and that one fine day we shall wake up and find ourselves in socialist society.

As you see, remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups can be reanimated, and have not lost their tenacity by far.

It goes without saying that if this confusion of mind and these non-Bolshevik sentiments obtained a hold over the majority of our Party, the Party would find itself demobilized and disarmed.

Now take the question of the agricultural *artel* and the agricultural *commune*. Everybody admits now that under present conditions the artel is the only proper form of the collective-farm movement. And that is quite understandable: a) the artel properly combines the individual, everyday interests of the collective farmers with their public interests; b) the artel successfully adapts the individual, everyday interests to public interests, and thereby helps to educate the individual peasants of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism.

Unlike the artel, where only the means of production are socialized, the communes, until recently, socialized not only the means of production, but also the appurtenances of life of every member of the commune; that is to say, the members of a commune, unlike the members of an artel, did not individually own poultry, small livestock, a cow, grain, or household land. This means that in the commune the individual, everyday interests of the members have not so much been taken into account and combined with the public interests as they have been eclipsed by the latter in the pursuit of petty-bourgeois equalization. It is clear that this is the weakest side of the commune. This really explains why communes are not widespread, why there are but a few score of them in existence. For the same reason the communes, in order to preserve their existence and save themselves from disruption, have been compelled to

abandon the system of socializing the appurtenances of life; they are beginning to work on the principle of the workday unit, and have begun to distribute grain among their members, to permit their members to own poultry, small livestock, a cow, etc. But from this it follows that, actually, the commune has assumed the status of the artel. And there is nothing bad in this, because it is necessary in the interests of the sound development of the mass collective-farm movement.

This does not mean, of course, that the commune is not needed at all, and that it no longer represents a higher form of the collective-farm movement. No, the commune is needed, and, of course, it is a higher form of the collective-farm movement. This does not apply, however, to the present commune, which arose on the basis of undeveloped technique and of a shortage of products, and which is itself assuming the status of the artel; it applies to the commune of the future, which will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of an abundance of products. The present agricultural commune arose on the basis of an under-developed technique and a shortage of products. This really explains why it practised equalization and showed little concern for the individual, everyday interests of its members—as a result of which it is now being compelled to assume the status of the artel, in which the individual and public interests of the collective farmers are rationally combined. The future communes will arise out of developed and prosperous artels. The future agricultural commune will arise when the fields and farms of the artel are replete with grain, with cattle, with poultry, with vegetables, and all other produce; when the artels have mechanized laundries, modern dining rooms, mechanized bakeries, etc.; when the collective farmer sees that it is more to his advantage to receive his meat and milk from the collective farm's meat and dairy department than to keep his own cow and small livestock; when the woman collective farmer sees that it is more to her advantage to take her meals in the dining room, to get her bread from the public bakery, and to get her linen washed in the public laundry, than to do all these things herself. The future commune

will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed artel, on the basis of an abundance of products. When will that be? Not soon, of course. But be it will. It would be criminal artificially to accelerate the process of transition from the artel to the future commune. That would confuse the whole issue, and would facilitate the work of our enemies. The transition from the artel to the future commune must proceed gradually, to the extent that *all* the collective farmers become convinced that such a transition is necessary.

This is the position in regard to the question of the artel and the commune.

One would think that this was clear and almost elementary.

And yet there is a fair amount of confusion on this question among a section of the members of the Party. There are those who think that in declaring the artel to be the fundamental form of the collective-farm movement the Party has drifted away from socialism, has retreated from the commune, from the higher form of the collective-farm movement, to a lower form. The question arises—why? Because, it is suggested, there is no equality in the artel, since differences in the requirements and in the individual lives of the members of the artel are preserved; whereas in the commune there is equality, because the requirements and the individual life of all its members have been made equal. But in the first place, there are no longer any communes which practise levelling, equalization in requirements and in individual life. Practice has shown that the communes would certainly have been doomed had they not abandoned equalization and had they not actually assumed the status of artels. Hence, it is useless talking about what no longer exists. Secondly, every Leninist knows (that is, if he is a real Leninist) that equalization in the sphere of requirements and individual life is a piece of reactionary petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics, but not of a socialist society organized on Marxian lines; for we cannot expect all people to have the same requirements and tastes, and all people to live their individual lives on the same model. And, finally, are not differ-

ences in requirements and in individual life still preserved among the workers? Does that mean that the workers are more remote from socialism than the members of the agricultural communes?

These people evidently think that socialism calls for equalization, for levelling the requirements and the individual lives of the members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but the abolition of classes, i.e., a) the equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production after they have been converted into the property of the whole of society; c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to the amount of work performed (*socialist* society); d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to their needs (*communist* society). Furthermore, Marxism proceeds from the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical, equal, in regard to quality or quantity, either in the period of socialism or in the period of communism.

That is the Marxian conception of equality.

Marxism has never recognized, nor does it recognize, any other equality.

To draw from this the conclusion that socialism calls for equalization, for the levelling of the requirements of the members of society, for the levelling of their tastes and of their individual lives—that according to the plans of the Marxists all should wear the same clothes and eat the same dishes in the same quantity—is to deal in vulgarities and to slander Marxism.

It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization. Even in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels scoured primitive utopian socialism and

described it as reactionary because it preached "universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form." In his *Anti-Dühring* Engels devoted a whole chapter to a withering criticism of the "radical equalitarian socialism" proposed by Dühring in opposition to Marxian socialism.

"The real content of the proletarian demand for equality," said Engels, "is the demand for the *abolition of classes*. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that of necessity passes into absurdity."

Lenin said the same thing:

"Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote that to conceive equality as meaning anything *beyond* the abolition of classes is a stupid and absurd prejudice. Bourgeois professors have tried to make use of the idea of equality to accuse us of wanting to make all men equal to one another. They have tried to accuse the Socialists of this absurdity, which they themselves invented. But in their ignorance they did not know that the Socialists—and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels—said: equality is an empty phrase unless by equality is meant the abolition of classes. We want to abolish classes, and in this respect we stand for equality. But the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals." (Lenin's speech "On Deceiving the People With Slogans About Liberty and Equality," *Works*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 293-94.)

Clear, one would think.

Bourgeois writers are fond of depicting Marxian socialism in the shape of the old tsarist barracks, where everything is subordinated to the "principle" of equalization. But Marxists cannot be held responsible for the ignorance and stupidity of bourgeois writers.

There can be no doubt that the confusion in the minds of certain Party members concerning Marxian socialism, and their infatuation with the equalitarian tendencies of agricultural communes, are as like as two peas to the petty-bourgeois views of our Leftist blockheads, who at one time idealized the agricultural communes to such an extent that they even tried to set up communes in factories, where skilled and unskilled workers, each working at his trade, had to pool their wages in a common

fund, which was then shared out equally. You know what harm these infantile equalitarian exercises of our "Left" blockheads caused our industry.

As you see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups still display rather considerable tenacity.

It is obvious that if these Leftist views were to triumph in the Party, the Party would cease to be a Marxist party; and the collective-farm movement would be utterly disorganized.

Or take, for example, the slogan "*Make all the collective farmers prosperous.*" This slogan applies not only to collective farmers; it applies still more to the workers, for we want to make all the workers prosperous—people leading a prosperous and fully cultured life.

One would think that the point was clear. There would have been no use in overthrowing capitalism in October 1917 and building socialism all these years if we were not going to secure a life of plenty for our people. Socialism does not mean destitution and privation, but the abolition of destitution and privation; it means the organization of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society.

And yet, this clear and really elementary slogan has caused perplexity, bewilderment, and confusion among a section of our Party members. Is not this slogan, they ask, a reversion to the old slogan, "Enrich yourselves," that was rejected by the Party? If everyone becomes prosperous, they argue, and the poor cease to be with us, upon whom can we Bolsheviks then rely in our work? How can we work without the poor?

This may sound funny, but the existence of such naive and anti-Leninist views among a section of the members of the Party is an undoubted fact, which we must indeed bear in mind.

Evidently, these people do not understand that a wide gulf lies between the slogan "Enrich yourselves" and the slogan "*Make all collective farmers prosperous.*" In the first place, only *individual* persons or groups can enrich themselves; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life applies not to individual persons or groups, but to *all* collective farmers. Secondly,

individual persons or groups enrich themselves for the purpose of subjugating other people and of *exploiting* them; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life for *all* collective farmers—with the means of production in the collective farms socialized—*precludes* all possibility of the exploitation of some persons by others. Thirdly, the slogan "Enrich yourselves" was issued in the period when the New Economic Policy was in its initial stage, when capitalism was being partly restored, when the kulak was a power, when individual peasant farming predominated in the country and collective farming was in a rudimentary state; whereas the slogan "Make all collective farmers prosperous" was issued in the last stage of NEP, when the capitalist elements in industry had been eliminated, the kulaks in the countryside crushed, individual peasant farming forced into the background and the collective farms had become the predominant form of agriculture. This is apart from the fact that the slogan "Make all collective farmers prosperous" is not an isolated slogan, but is inseparably bound up with the slogan "Make the collective farms Bolshevik farms."

Is it not clear that in point of fact the slogan "Enrich yourselves" was a call for the *restoration* of capitalism, whereas the slogan "Make all collective farmers prosperous" is a call to *deal the final blow* to the last remnants of capitalism by increasing the economic power of the collective farms and by transforming all collective farmers into prosperous working people? (*Voices: "Hear, hear!"*)

Is it not clear that there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between these two slogans? (*Voices: "Hear, hear!"*)

As for the argument that Bolshevik work and socialism are inconceivable without the existence of the poor, it is so stupid that it is embarrassing even to talk about it. The Leninists rely upon the poor when there exist capitalist elements and the poor who are exploited by the capitalists. But when the capitalist elements have been crushed and the poor have been emancipated from exploitation, the task of the Leninists is not to perpetuate and preserve poverty and the poor—the conditions for whose

existence have already been eliminated—but to abolish poverty and to raise the poor to the standard of prosperity. It would be absurd to think that socialism can be built on the basis of poverty and privation, on the basis of reducing individual requirements and the standard of living to the level of the poor, who, moreover, refuse to remain poor any longer and are pushing their way upward to prosperity. Who wants this sort of socialism, so-called? This would not be socialism, but a caricature of socialism. Socialism can only be built up on the basis of a rapid growth of the productive forces of society; on the basis of an abundance of products and goods; on the basis of the prosperity of the working people, and on the basis of the rapid growth of culture. For socialism, Marxian socialism, means not cutting down individual requirements but developing them to the utmost, to full bloom; not the restriction of these requirements or a refusal to satisfy them, but the full and all-round satisfaction of all the requirements of culturally developed working people.

There can be no doubt that this confusion in the minds of certain members of the Party concerning the poor and prosperity is a reflection of the views of our Leftist blockheads, who idealize the poor as the eternal bulwark of Bolshevism under all conditions, and who regard the collective farms as the arena of fierce class struggle.

As you see, here too, on this question, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups have not yet lost their tenacity.

It goes without saying that had such blockhead views prevailed in our Party, the collective farms would not have achieved the successes they have gained during the past two years, and would have disintegrated in a very short time.

Or take, for example, the *national problem*. Here, too, in the sphere of the national problem, just as in the sphere of other problems, there is a confusion in the views of a section of the Party which creates a certain danger. I have spoken of the tenacity of the survivals of capitalism. It should be observed that the

survivals of capitalism in people's minds are much more tenacious in the sphere of the national problem than in any other sphere. They are more tenacious because they are able to disguise themselves well in national costume. Many think that Skrypnik's fall was an individual case, an exception to the rule. This is not true. The fall of Skrypnik and his group in the Ukraine is not an exception. Similar aberrations are observed among certain comrades in other national republics as well.

What is the deviation towards nationalism—regardless of whether we are dealing with the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism or with the deviation towards local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of "one's own," "national" bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. It is a *departure* from Leninist internationalism. If you want to keep both these deviations under fire, then aim primarily against this source, against those who depart from internationalism—regardless of whether we are dealing with the deviation towards local nationalism or with the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism. (*Loud applause.*)

There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the major danger: the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local nationalism? Under present conditions, this is a formal, and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be absurd to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable for all times and for all conditions as regards the major and the minor danger. Such recipes do not exist. The major danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the state. (*Prolonged applause.*)

In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but

when we ceased to fight it and allowed it to grow to such an extent that it merged with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger. The question as to which is the major danger in the sphere of the national problem is determined not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxian analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by a study of the mistakes that have been committed in this sphere.

The same should be said of *the Right and the "Left" deviations* in the sphere of general policy. Here, too, as in other spheres, there is no little confusion in the views of certain members of our Party. Sometimes, while fighting against the Right deviation, they turn away from the "Left" deviation and relax the fight against it, on the assumption that it is not dangerous, or hardly dangerous. This is a grave and dangerous error. It is a concession to the "Left" deviation which is impermissible for a member of the Party. It is all the more impermissible for the reason that of late the "Lefts" have completely slid over to the positions of the Rights, so that there is no longer any essential difference between them.

We have always said that the "Lefts" are in fact the Rights, only they mask their Rightness behind Left phrases. Now the "Lefts" themselves confirm the correctness of our statement. Take last year's issues of the Trotskyite *Bulletin*. What do Messieurs the Trotskyites demand; what do they write about; in what does their "Left" program express itself? They demand: *the dissolution of the state farms* because they do not pay; *the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms* because they are fictitious; *the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks; reversion to the policy of concessions, and the leasing to concessionaires of a number of our industrial enterprises*, because they do not pay.

There you have the program of these contemptible cowards and capitulators—their counterrevolutionary program of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!

What difference is there between this program and that of the extreme Rights? Clearly, there is none. It follows, then, that

the "Lefts" have openly associated themselves with the counter-revolutionary program of the Rights in order to enter into a bloc with them and to wage a joint struggle against the Party.

How can it be said, after this, that the "Lefts" are not dangerous, or hardly dangerous? Is it not clear that those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of the sworn enemies of Leninism?

As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations from the line of the Party—regardless of whether we are dealing with deviations on general policy or with deviations on the national problem—the survivals of capitalism in people's minds, including the minds of certain members of our Party, are quite tenacious.

These, then, are a few serious and urgent problems of our ideological-political work on which there is lack of clarity, confusion, and even direct deviation from Leninism among certain strata of the Party. Nor are these the only problems which could serve to demonstrate the confusion in the views of certain members of the Party.

After this, can it be said that all is well in the Party?

Clearly, it cannot.

Our tasks in the sphere of ideological-political work are:

1. To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper plane.
2. To intensify ideological work in all the organizations of the Party.
3. To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.
4. To train the Party organizations and the non-Party *active* which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.
5. Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticize the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.
6. Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.

2. PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national economy and of culture, as well as in the sphere of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have spoken of the world-wide historical significance of our victory. But this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere and in all things, and that all our problems have been solved. Such successes and such victories never occur in real life. Plenty of unsolved problems and defects of all sorts still remain. We are confronted by a host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly mean that the major part of the urgent problems has already been successfully solved, and in this sense the great victory of our Party is beyond any doubt.

But here the question arises: how was this victory brought about; how was it actually obtained; what fight was put up for it; what efforts were exerted to achieve it?

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and take a vote and carry it unanimously for victory to come of itself, spontaneously, as it were. That, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come spontaneously, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself—it usually has to be attained. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organized; on the organization of the struggle for the application of the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on the way a check is kept on the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Otherwise the correct line of the Party and the correct

solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced. Furthermore, after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a stern and systematic struggle against all sorts of difficulties that stood in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming the difficulties; by mobilizing the Party and the working class for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties; by organizing the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and wherein are they lodged?

They are difficulties attending our organizational work, difficulties attending our organizational leadership. They are lodged in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organizations, in the apparatus of our Party, state, economic, trade union, Young Communist League, and all other organizations.

We must realize that the strength and prestige of our Party, state, economic, and all other organizations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything. There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organizations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members and candidate members. In the Young Communist League we have

more than 4,000,000 members and candidate members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Aircraft and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 members. The trade unions have a membership of over 17,000,000 million. It is to these organizations that we are indebted for our successes. And if, notwithstanding the existence of such organizations and of such possibilities, which facilitate the achievement of success, we still suffer from quite a number of defects and not a few failures in our work, then it is only we ourselves, our organizational work, our bad organizational leadership, that are to blame for this.

Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about "leadership in general" instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organizations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalization; the absence of a systematic check upon the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism—these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties are now lodged.

It would be naive to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long become past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and government decisions in words, and pigeonholing them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organizational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organizational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organizational work guarantees the practical realization of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was necessary to *organize* the struggle to eliminate these difficulties; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilize the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organizations of unreliable, unstable and demoralized elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organize:

1. Extensive self-criticism and exposure of the defects in our work.
2. The mobilization of the Party, state, economic, trade union, and Young Communist League organizations for the struggle against difficulties.
3. The mobilization of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the Government.
4. The extension of emulation and shock work among the working people.
5. A wide network of Political Departments of machine-and-tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages.
6. The subdivision of the People's Commissariats, head offices, and trusts, and the establishment of closer contact in the economic sphere between the leadership and the enterprises.
7. The elimination of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalization.
8. The elimination of the "functional" system; the extension of individual responsibility, and a policy aiming at the abolition of collegium management.
9. The exercise of greater control over the fulfilment of decisions, while taking the line towards reorganizing the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with a view to the further enhancement of the work of checking up on the fulfilment of decisions.
10. The transfer of qualified workers from offices to posts that would bring them into closer contact with production.
11. The exposure and expulsion from the administrative apparatus of incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists.
12. The removal from their posts of people who violated the decisions of the Party and the Government, of "window-dressers" and windbags, and to promotion to their place of new people—businesslike people, capable of concretely directing the work

entrusted to them and of strengthening Party and state discipline.

13. The purging of state and economic organizations and the reduction of their staffs.

14. Lastly, the purging of the Party of unreliable and demoralized persons.

These, in the main, are the measures which the Party has had to adopt in order to overcome difficulties, to raise our organizational work to the level of political leadership, and in this way to ensure the application of the Party line.

You know that this is exactly how the Central Committee of the Party carried on its organizational work during the period under review.

In this, the Central Committee was guided by the brilliant thought uttered by Lenin to the effect that the chief thing in organizational work is *the choice of personnel and the keeping of a check on the fulfilment of decisions*.

In regard to choosing the right people and dismissing those who fail to justify the confidence placed in them, I would like to say a few words.

Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executive who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executive is represented by people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become aristocrats, who consider that Party decisions and the Soviet laws are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet government will not have the courage to touch them, because of their past services. These overconceited aristocrats think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives

of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (*Voices: "Hear, hear!"*) They must be demoted to lower positions and this must be announced in the press. (*Voices: "Hear, hear!"*) This must be done in order to bring those conceited aristocrat-bureaucrats down a peg or two, and to put them in their proper place. This must be done in order to strengthen Party and state discipline in the whole of our work. (*Voices: "Hear, hear!" Applause.*)

And now about the second type of executives. I have in mind the windbags, I would say, honest windbags (*laughter*), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet power, but who are incompetent as executives, incapable of organizing anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any living cause in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation.

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves. (*Laughter.*)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter.*)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still?

He: We can say that there is an indication of some progress. (*Laughter.*)

I: But for all that, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General laughter.*)

Here you have the portrait of the windbag: They have mobilized themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some progress, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organization when he was asked whether that organization had any definite line: "Well," he said, "they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (*General*

laughter.) Evidently that organization also has its quota of honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organize a rally of shock workers? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the Government at the conference of shock workers? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? (*General laughter.*) Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin—what more do they want of us?" (*General laughter.*)

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they would drown every living cause in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (*Voices: "Hear, hear!" Applause.*)

I have already briefly reported on how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the state and economic organizations, and how it pursued the work of keeping a closer check on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the agenda of the Congress.

I would like to say a few words, however, about future work in connection with the task of keeping a closer check on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organization of the work of checking up on the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeonholed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working ineffectually? These things can be promptly found out only if a proper check is kept on the fulfilment of decisions. A proper check on the fulfilment of decisions is

a searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment, exposing bureaucrats and red-tapists to full view. We can say with certainty that nine tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organized system of check-up on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that had there been such a system of check-up on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if the work of checking up on fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: first, that fulfilment be checked up systematically and not spasmodically; second, that the work of checking up on fulfilment in all sections of the Party, state, and economic organizations, be entrusted not to second-rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organizations concerned.

The proper organization of the work of checking up on fulfilment is of supreme importance for the central leading bodies. The organizational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-functioning system for checking up on fulfilment of decisions. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of *inspecting* the work of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organizations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to *inspect* it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganized. What we need now is not an inspectorate, but the checking up on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre—what we need now is the *control* over fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organization that will not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which can concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking up on the fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organization can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., working on the assignments of the Council of People's

Commissars, and having local representatives who are independent of the local authorities. And in order that this organization may wield sufficient authority and be able, when necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party Congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only such an organization can strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organizations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, on the other hand, there is an imperative need for an organization that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking up on the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organization can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), working on the assignments of the Party and of its Central Committee and having local representatives who are independent of the local organizations. It goes without saying that such a responsible organization must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority, and in order that it may be able to take proceedings against any delinquent comrade holding a responsible post, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this Commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party Congress. There can be no doubt that such an organization will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.

Such is the position in regard to the questions of organizational leadership.

Our tasks in the sphere of organizational work are as follows:

1. Our organizational work in the future, must, like in the past, be adapted to the requirements of the political line of the Party.
2. Organizational leadership must be raised to the level of political leadership.
3. Organizational leadership must be made fully equal to the task of ensuring the realization of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

* * *

I have now come to the end of my report, comrades.

What conclusions must be drawn from it?

Everybody now admits that our successes are great and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time our country has been switched to the basis of industrialization and collectivization. The First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. This rouses a sense of pride in our workers and increases their confidence in their own powers.

That is all very good, of course. But successes sometimes have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck the whole cause. There is, for example, the danger that some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. There have been cases like that, as you know. There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having become intoxicated with success, will get swelled heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, such as: "It's a walkover," "We can knock anybody into a cocked hat," etc. This is not precluded by any means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and demobilize its ranks. If such sentiments were to gain sway in our Party we would be faced with the danger of all our successes being wrecked.

Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. That is true. But the matter does not, nor can it, end there, comrades. Before us is the Second Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, and also successfully. You know that plans

are carried out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will tell you about the Second Five-Year Plan. From their reports you will see what great difficulties we will have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilize it, but hold it in a state of mobilization for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Hence, the first conclusion: *We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by the successes achieved, and must not get swelled heads.*

We have achieved successes because we have had the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we have been able to organize the masses for the purpose of applying this line. Needless to say, without these conditions we would not have achieved the successes we have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct line and to be able to apply it.

Look at the countries which surround us: can you find many ruling parties there that have a correct line and are applying it? In point of fact, there are no longer any such parties in the world; for they are all living without prospects; they are floundering in the chaos of the crisis, and see no road to lead them out of the swamp. Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its course; and it is marching forward successfully. To what does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it is a Marxian Party, a Leninist Party. It owes it to the fact that it is guided in its work by the tenets of Marx, Engels, Lenin. There cannot be any doubt that as long as we remain true to these tenets, as long as we have this compass, we will achieve successes in our work.

It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That is nonsense, of course. Only people who are ignorant of history can say such things. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental

interests of the working class. If Marxism is to be destroyed, the working class must be destroyed. And it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. But what has been the upshot? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism remained. (*Stormy applause.*) Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one sixth of the globe—has achieved it in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. (*Stormy applause.*) It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has fully triumphed is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries, crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, this is not an accident. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin.

Hence, the second conclusion: *We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin.* (*Applause.*)

The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong not only because it has a Leninist Party that has been tried in battles; and, further, it is strong not only because it enjoys the support of the millions of the labouring peasants; it is strong also because it is supported and assisted by the world proletariat. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its vanguard; and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. There can be no doubt that had our working class not been supported by the working class in the capitalist countries it would not have been able to retain power; it would not have secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, hence, would not have achieved the successes that it has achieved. International ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the capitalist countries; the fraternal alliance between the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries—this is one of the cornerstones of the strength and might of the Republics of Soviets. The

workers in the West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very good. It shows that the world proletariat is prepared to continue rendering all the support it can to the working class of the U.S.S.R. But it imposes a very serious duty upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.

Hence, the third conclusion: *We must remain true to the end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all countries.* (*Applause.*)

Such are the conclusions.

Long live the great and invincible banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin! (*Stormy and prolonged applause. The Congress gives Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "International" is sung, after which the ovation is resumed with renewed vigour. Shouts of "Hurrah for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C. of the Party!"*)

IN LIEU OF CONCLUDING REMARKS

January 31, 1934

Comrades, the debate at this Congress has revealed complete unity of opinion among our Party leaders on all questions of Party policy, one can say. As you know, no objections whatever have been raised against the report. Hence, it has been revealed that there is extraordinary ideological-political and organizational solidarity in the ranks of our Party. (*Applause.*) The question arises: Is there any need, after this, for any concluding remarks? I do not think there is any need for it. Permit me therefore to refrain from making any concluding remarks. (*Ovation. All the delegates rise to their feet. Loud cheers. A chorus of cheers: "Long live Stalin!" The delegates, all standing, sing the "International," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Hurrah for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C.P."*)

ADDRESS DELIVERED IN THE KREMLIN PALACE TO THE GRADUATES FROM THE RED ARMY ACADEMIES

May 4, 1935

Comrades, it cannot be denied that in the last few years we have achieved great successes both in the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration. In this connection there is too much talk about the services rendered by chiefs, by leaders. They are credited with all, or nearly all, of our achievements. That, of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. It is not merely a matter of leaders. But it is not of this I wanted to speak today. I should like to say a few words about cadres, about our cadres in general and about the cadres of our Red Army in particular.

You know that we inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-illiterate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms—such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from medieval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture. A serious and difficult task, as you see. The question that confronted us was: *Either* we solve this problem in the shortest possible time and consolidate socialism in our country, *or* we do not solve it, in which case our country—weak technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense—will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.

At that time our country was passing through a period of an appalling dearth of technique. There were not enough machines for industry. There were no machines for agriculture. There were no machines for transport. There was not that elementary technical base without which the reorganization of a country on industrial

lines is inconceivable. There were only a few of the necessary prerequisites for the creation of such a base. A first-class industry had to be built up. This industry had to be so directed as to be capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, but also agriculture and our railway transport. And to achieve this it was necessary to make sacrifices and to exercise the most rigorous economy in everything; it was necessary to economize on food, on schools, on textiles, in order to accumulate the funds required for building up industry. There was no other way of overcoming the dearth of technique. That is what Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed in the footsteps of Lenin.

Naturally, uniform and rapid successes could not be expected in so great and difficult a task. In a task like this successes become apparent only after several years. We therefore had to arm ourselves with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit, and stubborn patience to overcome our first failures and to march unswervingly towards the great goal, permitting no wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.

You know that that is precisely how we set about this task. But not all our comrades had the necessary spirit, patience and grit. There turned out to be people among our comrades who at the first difficulties began to call for a retreat. "Let bygones be bygones," it is said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed with memory, and in summing up the results of our work one involuntarily recalls the past. (*Animation.*) Well, then, there were comrades among us who were frightened by the difficulties and began to call on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the good of your industrialization and collectivization, your machines, your iron and steel industry, tractors, harvester combines, automobiles? You should rather have given us more textiles, bought more raw materials for the production of consumer goods, and given the population more of the small things that make life pleasant. The creation of an industry, and a first-class industry at that, when we are so backward, is a dangerous dream."

Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 rubles in foreign currency obtained as a result of a most rigorous economy, and spent on building up our industry, for importing raw materi-

als and for increasing the output of articles of general consumption. That is also a "plan," in a way. But with such a "plan" we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or aeroplanes and tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in face of foreign foes. We would have undermined the foundations of socialism in our country. We would have fallen captive to the bourgeoisie, domestic and foreign.

It is obvious that a choice had to be made between two plans: between the plan of retreat, which would have led, and was bound to lead, to the defeat of socialism, and the plan of advance, which led and, as you know, has already brought us to the victory of socialism in our country.

We chose the plan of advance, and moved forward along the Leninist road, brushing aside those comrades as people who could see more or less what was under their noses, but who closed their eyes to the immediate future of our country, to the future of socialism in our country.

But these comrades did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist road. These people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are people of a special cut. They forgot that neither difficulties nor threats can frighten Bolsheviks. They forgot that we had been trained and steeled by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our father, who knew and tolerated no fear in the fight. They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the more hysterical the foes within the Party become, the more ardent the Bolsheviks become for fresh struggles and the more vigorously they push forward.

Of course, it never even occurred to us to turn from the Leninist road. Moreover, once we stood firmly on this road, we pushed forward still more vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path. True, in pursuing this course we were obliged to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a hand in it. (*Loud cheers and applause.*)

Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigorously along the road of industrializing and collectivizing our country. And now we may consider that the road has been traversed.

Everybody now admits that we have achieved tremendous successes along this road. Everybody now admits that we already have a powerful, first-class industry, a powerful mechanized agriculture, a growing and improving transport system, an organized and excellently equipped Red Army.

This means that we have in the main emerged from the period of dearth of technique.

But, having emerged from the period of dearth of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing it. The point is that we have factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, a transport system, an army; we have technique for all this; but we lack people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say that "technique decides everything." That slogan helped us to put an end to the dearth of technique and to create a vast technical base in every branch of activity for the equipment of our people with first-class technique. That is very good. But it is not enough, it is not enough by far. In order to set technique going and to utilize it to the full, we need people who have mastered technique, we need cadres capable of mastering and utilizing this technique according to all the rules of the art. Without people who have mastered technique, technique is dead. In the charge of people who have mastered technique, technique can and should perform miracles. If in our first-class mills and factories, in our state farms and collective farms, in our transport system and in our Red Army we had sufficient cadres capable of harnessing this technique, our country would secure results three and four times as great as at present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique decides everything," which is a reflection of a period already passed, a period in which we suffered from a dearth

of technique, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything." That is the main thing now.

Can it be said that our people have fully grasped and realized the great significance of this new slogan? I would not say so. Otherwise, there would not have been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards cadres, towards workers, which we not infrequently observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" demands that our leaders should display the most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, training them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they show their first successes, promoting them, and so forth. Yet in practice we meet in a number of cases with a soulless, bureaucratic, and positively outrageous attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being studied, and placed at their posts only after being studied, people are frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned to value machinery and to make reports on how many machines we have in our mills and factories. But I do not know of a single instance when a report was made with equal zest on the number of people we have trained in a given period, on how we have assisted people to grow and become tempered in their work. How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, to value workers, to value cadres.

I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the spring floods. About thirty men went to the river to pull out timber which had been carried away by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned to the village, but with one comrade missing. When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained there." To my question, "how do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, "Why ask—drowned, of course." And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've got to go and water the mare." When I reproached them with having more concern for animals than for men, one of them said, amid the general approval of the rest: "Why should we be concerned about men? We can always make

men. But a mare just try and make a mare." (*Animation.*) Here you have a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that the indifference of certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their inability to value people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far-off Siberia that I have just related.

And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get over the dearth of people and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique and setting it going, we must first of all learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefiting our common cause. It is time to realize that of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized that under our present conditions "cadres decide everything." If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport, and the army—our country will be invincible. If we do not have such cadres—we shall be lame on both legs.

In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a toast to the health and success of our graduates from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success in the work of organizing and directing the defence of our country.

Comrades, you have graduated from institutions of higher learning, in which you received your first tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive their real tempering in practical work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that only those cadres are any good who do not fear difficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only in the fight against difficulties that real cadres are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible.

Your health, comrades! (*Stormy applause. All rise. Loud cheers for Comrade Stalin.*)

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF STAKHANOVITES

November 17, 1935

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT

Comrades, so much has been said at this conference about the Stakhanovites, and it has been said so well, that there is really very little left for me to say. But since I have been called on to speak, I will have to say a few words.

The Stakhanov movement cannot be regarded as an ordinary movement of working men and women. The Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which will go down in the history of our socialist construction as one of its most glorious pages.

Wherein lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?

Primarily, in the fact that it is the expression of a new wave of socialist emulation, a new and higher stage of socialist emulation. Why new, and why higher? Because the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of socialist emulation, contrasts favourably with the old stage of socialist emulation. In the past, some three years ago, in the period of the first stage of socialist emulation, socialist emulation was not necessarily associated with modern technique. At that time, in fact, we had hardly any modern technique. The present stage of socialist emulation, the Stakhanov movement, on the other hand, is necessarily associated with modern technique. The Stakhanov movement would be inconceivable without a new and higher technique. We have before us people like Comrades Stakhanov, Busygin, Smetanin, Krivonos, Pronin, the Vinogradovas, and many others, new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven ahead. There were no such

people, or hardly any such people, some three years ago. These are new people, people of a special type.

Further, the Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which sets itself the aim of surpassing the present technical standards, surpassing the existing designed capacities, surpassing the existing production plans and estimates. Surpassing them—because these standards have already become antiquated for our day, for our new people. This movement is breaking down the old views on technique, it is shattering the old technical standards, the old designed capacities, and the old production plans, and demands the creation of new and higher technical standards, designed capacities, and production plans. It is destined to produce a revolution in our industry. That is why the Stakhanov movement is at bottom a profoundly revolutionary movement.

It has already been said here that the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of new and higher technical standards, is a model of that high productivity of labour which only socialism can give, and which capitalism cannot give. That is absolutely true. Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour, it enabled society to procure an incomparably greater quantity of products than could be procured under the feudal system; because it made society richer. Why is it that socialism can, should, and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of economy? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour, than the capitalist system of economy; because it can provide society with more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy.

Some people think that socialism can be consolidated by a certain equalization of people's material conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living. That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception of socialism. In point of fact, socialism can succeed only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. But if

socialism is to achieve this aim and make our Soviet society the most prosperous of all societies, our country must have a productivity of labour which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries. Without this we cannot even think of securing an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds. The significance of the Stakhanov movement lies in the fact that it is a movement which is smashing the old technical standards, because they are inadequate, which in a number of cases is surpassing the productivity of labour of the foremost capitalist countries, and is thus creating the practical possibility of further consolidating socialism in our country, the possibility of converting our country into the most prosperous of all countries.

But the significance of the Stakhanov movement does not end there. Its significance lies also in the fact that it is preparing the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism.

The principle of socialism is that in a socialist society each works according to his ability and receives articles of consumption, not according to his needs, but according to the work he performs for society. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class is as yet not a high one, that the antithesis between mental and physical labour still exists, that the productivity of labour is still not high enough to ensure an abundance of articles of consumption, and, as a result, society is obliged to distribute articles of consumption not in accordance with the needs of its members, but in accordance with the work they perform for society.

Communism represents a higher stage of development. The principle of communism is that in a communist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to the work he performs, but according to his needs as a culturally developed individual. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class has become high enough to undermine the basis of the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour, that the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour has already disappeared, and that productivity of labour has reached such a high level that it can provide

an absolute abundance of articles of consumption, and as a result society is able to distribute these articles in accordance with the needs of its members.

Some people think that the elimination of the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and technical equalization of mental and manual workers by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive communism in this way. In reality the elimination of the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour can be brought about only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technical workers. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive forces of the country have been freed from the fetters of capitalism, where labour has been freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working class is in power, and where the younger generation of the working class has every opportunity of obtaining an adequate technical education. There is no reason to doubt that only such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class can undermine the basis of the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour, that only this can ensure the high level of productivity of labour and the abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary in order to begin the transition from socialism to communism.

In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is significant for the fact that it contains the first beginnings—still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless the beginnings—of precisely such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class of our country.

And, indeed, look at our comrades, the Stakhanovites, more closely. What type of people are they? They are mostly young or middle-aged working men and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, who show examples of precision and accuracy in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor in work and who have learned to count not only the minutes, but also the seconds.

The majority of them have taken the technical minimum courses and are continuing their technical education. They are free of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, technicians and business executives, they are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated technical standards and creating new and higher standards; they are introducing amendments into the designed capacities and economic plans drawn up by the leaders of our industry; they often supplement and correct what the engineers and technicians have to say, they often teach them and impel them forward, for they are people who have completely mastered the technique of their job and who are able to squeeze out of technique the maximum that can be squeezed out of it. Today the Stakhanovites are still few in number, but who can doubt that tomorrow there will be ten times more of them? Is it not clear that the Stakhanovites are innovators in our industry, that the Stakhanov movement represents the future of our industry, that it contains the seed of the future rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class, that it opens to us the path by which alone can be achieved those high indices of productivity of labour which are essential for the transition from socialism to communism and for the elimination of the antithesis between mental labour and physical labour?

Such, comrades, is the significance of the Stakhanov movement for our socialist construction.

Did Stakhanov and Busygina think of this great significance of the Stakhanov movement when they began to smash the old technical standards? Of course not. They had their own worries—they were trying to get their enterprises out of difficulties and to overfulfil the economic plan. But in seeking to achieve this aim they had to smash the old technical standards and to develop a high productivity of labour, surpassing that of the foremost capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous, however, to think that this circumstance can in any way detract from the great historical significance of the movement of the Stakhanovites.

The same may be said of those workers who first organized the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in our country in 1905. They never

thought, of course, that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would become the foundation of the socialist system. They were only defending themselves against tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, when they created the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But this circumstance in no way contradicts the unquestionable fact that the movement for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies began in 1905 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow led in the end to the rout of capitalism and the victory of socialism on one sixth of the globe.

2. THE ROOTS OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT

We now stand at the cradle of the Stakhanov movement, at its source.

Certain characteristic features of the Stakhanov movement should be noted.

What first of all strikes the eye is the fact that this movement began somehow of itself, almost spontaneously, from below, without any pressure whatsoever from the administrators of our enterprises. More than that—this movement in a way arose and began to develop in spite of the administrators of our enterprises, even in opposition to them. Comrade Molotov has already told you what troubles Comrade Mussinsky, the Archangelsk sawmill worker, had to go through when he worked out new and higher technical standards, in secret from the administration, in secret from the inspectors. The lot of Stakhanov himself was no better, for in his progress he had to defend himself not only against certain officials of the administration, but also against certain workers, who jeered and hounded him because of his "newfangled ideas." As to Busygin, we know that he almost paid for his "newfangled ideas" by losing his job at the factory, and it was only the intervention of the shop superintendent, Comrade Sokolinsky, that helped him to remain at the factory.

So you see, if there was any kind of action at all on the part of the administrators of our enterprises, it was not to help

the Stakhanov movement but to hinder it. Consequently, the Stakhanov movement arose and developed as a movement coming from below. And just because it arose of itself, just because it comes from below, it is the most vital and irresistible movement of the present day.

Mention should further be made of another characteristic feature of the Stakhanov movement. This characteristic feature is that the Stakhanov movement spread over the whole of our Soviet Union not gradually, but at an unparalleled speed, like a hurricane. How did it begin? Stakhanov raised the technical standard of output of coal five or six times, if not more. Busygin and Smetanin did the same—one in the sphere of machine building and the other in the shoe industry. The newspapers reported these facts. And suddenly, the flames of the Stakhanov movement enveloped the whole country. What was the reason? How is it that the Stakhanov movement has spread so rapidly? Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin are great organizers, with wide contacts in the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R., and they organized this movement themselves? No, of course not! Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin have ambitions of becoming great figures in our country, and they themselves carried the sparks of the Stakhanov movement all over the country? That is also not true. You have seen Stakhanov and Busygin here. They spoke at this conference. They are simple, modest people, without the slightest ambition to acquire the laurels of national figures. It even seems to me that they are somewhat embarrassed by the scope the movement has acquired, beyond all their expectations. And if, in spite of this, the match thrown by Stakhanov and Busygin was sufficient to start a conflagration, that means that the Stakhanov movement is absolutely ripe. Only a movement that is absolutely ripe, and is awaiting just a jolt in order to burst free—only such a movement can spread with such rapidity and grow like a rolling snowball.

How is it to be explained that the Stakhanov movement proved to be absolutely ripe? What are the causes for its rapid spread? What are the roots of the Stakhanov movement?

There are at least four such causes.

1. The basis for the Stakhanov movement was first and foremost the radical improvement in the material welfare of the workers. Life has improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when life is joyous, work goes well. Hence the high rates of output. Hence the heroes and heroines of labour. That, primarily, is the root of the Stakhanov movement. If there had been a crisis in our country, if there had been unemployment—that scourge of the working class—if people in our country lived badly, drably, joylessly, we should have had nothing like the Stakhanov movement. (*Applause.*) Our proletarian revolution is the only revolution in the world which had the opportunity of showing the people not only political results but also material results. Of all workers' revolutions, we know only one which managed to achieve power. That was the Paris Commune. But it did not last long. True, it endeavoured to smash the fetters of capitalism; but it did not have time enough to smash them, and still less to show the people the beneficial material results of revolution. Our revolution is the only one which not only smashed the fetters of capitalism and brought the people freedom, but also succeeded in creating the material conditions of a prosperous life for the people. Therein lies the strength and invincibility of our revolution. It is a good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, to drive out the landlords, to drive out the tsarist henchmen, to seize power and achieve freedom. That is very good. But, unfortunately, freedom alone is not enough, by far. If there is a shortage of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom will not carry you very far. It is very difficult, comrades, to live on freedom alone. (*Shouts of approval. Applause.*) In order to live well and joyously, the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented by material benefits. It is a distinctive feature of our revolution that it brought the people not only freedom, but also material benefits and the possibility of a prosperous and cultured life. That is why life has become joyous in our country, and that is the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang.

2. The second source of the Stakhanov movement is the fact that there is no exploitation in our country. People in our country do not work for exploiters, for the enrichment of parasites, but for themselves, for their own class, for their own, Soviet society, where power is wielded by the best members of the working class. That is why labour in our country has social significance, and is a matter of honour and glory. Under capitalism labour bears a private and personal character. You have produced more—well, then receive more, and live as best you can. Nobody knows you, or wants to know you. You work for the capitalists, you enrich them? Well, what do you expect? That is what they hired you for, to enrich the exploiters. If you do not agree with that, join the ranks of the unemployed and get along as best you can—we shall find others who are more tractable. That is why people's labour is not valued very highly under capitalism. Under such conditions, of course, there can be no room for a Stakhanov movement. But things are different under the Soviet system. Here the working man is held in esteem. Here he works not for the exploiters, but for himself, for his class, for society. Here the working man cannot feel neglected and alone. On the contrary, the man who works feels himself a free citizen of his country, a public figure, in a way. And if he works well and gives society his best—he is a hero of labour, and is covered with glory. Obviously, the Stakhanov movement could have arisen only under such conditions.

3. We must regard as the third source of the Stakhanov movement the fact that we have a modern technique. The Stakhanov movement is organically bound up with the modern technique. Without the modern technique, without the modern mills and factories, without the modern machinery, the Stakhanov movement could not have arisen. Without modern technique, technical standards might have been doubled or trebled, but not more. And if the Stakhanovites have raised technical standards five and six times, that means that they rely entirely on the modern technique. It thus follows that the industrialization of our country, the reconstruction of our mills and factories, the introduction

of modern technique and modern machinery, was one of the causes that gave rise to the Stakhanov movement.

4. But modern technique alone will not carry you very far. You may have first-class technique, first-class mills and factories, but if you have not the people capable of harnessing that technique, you will find that your technique is just bare technique. For modern technique to produce results, people are required, cadres of working men and women capable of taking charge of the technique and advancing it. The birth and growth of the Stakhanov movement means that such cadres have already appeared among the working men and women of our country. Some two years ago the Party declared that in building new mills and factories and supplying our enterprises with modern machinery, we had performed only half of the job. The Party then declared that enthusiasm for the construction of new factories must be supplemented by enthusiasm for mastering these factories, that only in this way could the job be completed. It is obvious that the mastering of this new technique and the growth of new cadres have been proceeding during these two years. It is now clear that we already have such cadres. It is obvious that without such cadres, without these new people, we would never have had a Stakhanov movement. Hence the new people, working men and women, who have mastered the new technique constitute the force that has shaped and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

Such are the conditions that gave rise to and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

3. NEW PEOPLE—NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS

I have said that the Stakhanov movement developed not gradually, but like an explosion, as if it had broken through some sort of dam. It is obvious that it had to overcome certain barriers. Somebody was hindering it, somebody was holding it back; and then, having gathered strength, the Stakhanov movement broke through these barriers and swept over the country.

What was wrong? Who exactly was hindering it?

It was the old technical standards, and the people behind these standards, that were hindering it. Several years ago our engineers, technical workers, and business managers drew up certain technical standards, adapted to the technical backwardness of our working men and women. Several years have elapsed since then. During this period people have grown and acquired technical knowledge. But the technical standards have remained unchanged. Of course, these standards have now proved out of date for our new people. Everybody now abuses the existing technical standards. But, after all, they did not fall from the skies. And the point is not that these technical standards were set too low at the time when they were drawn up. The point is primarily that now, when these standards have already become antiquated, attempts are made to defend them as modern standards. People cling to the technical backwardness of our working men and women, guiding themselves by this backwardness, basing themselves on this backwardness, and matters finally reach a pitch when people begin to pretend backwardness. But what is to be done if this backwardness is becoming a thing of the past? Are we really going to worship our backwardness and turn it into an icon, a fetish? What is to be done if the working men and women have already managed to grow and to gain technical knowledge? What is to be done if the old technical standards no longer correspond to reality, and our working men and women have already managed in practice to exceed them five or tenfold? Have we ever taken an oath of loyalty to our backwardness? It seems to me we have not, have we, comrades? (*General laughter.*) Did we ever assume that our working men and women would remain backward forever? We never did, did we? (*General laughter.*) Then what is the trouble? Will we really lack the courage to smash the conservatism of certain of our engineers and technicians, to smash the old traditions and standards and allow free scope to the new forces of the working class?

People talk about science. They say that the data of science, the data contained in technical handbooks and instructions, contradict the demands of the Stakhanovites for new and higher

technical standards. But what kind of science are they talking about? The data of science have always been tested by practice, by experience. Science which has severed contact with practice, with experience—what sort of science is that? If science were the thing it is represented to be by certain of our conservative comrades, it would have perished for humanity long ago. Science is called science just because it does not recognize fetishes, just because it does not fear to raise its hand against the obsolete and antiquated, and because it lends an attentive ear to the voice of experience, of practice. If it were otherwise, we would have no science at all; we would have no astronomy, say, and would still have to get along with the outworn system of Ptolemy; we would have no biology, and would still be comforting ourselves with the legend of the creation of man; we would have no chemistry, and would still have to get along with the auguries of the alchemists.

That is why I think that our engineers, technical workers, and business managers, who have already managed to fall a fairly long distance behind the Stakhanov movement, would do well if they ceased to cling to the old technical standards and readjusted their work in a real scientific manner to the new way, the Stakhanov way.

Very well, we shall be told, but what about technical standards in general? Does industry need them, or can we get along without any standards at all?

Some say that we no longer need any technical standards. That is not true, comrades. More, it is stupid. Without technical standards, planned economy is impossible. Technical standards are, moreover, necessary in order to help the masses who have fallen behind to catch up with the more advanced. Technical standards are a great regulating force which organizes the masses of the workers in the factories around the advanced elements of the working class. We therefore need technical standards; not those, however, that now exist, but higher ones.

Others say that we need technical standards, but that they must immediately be raised to the level of the achievements of people like Stakhanov, Busygin, the Vinogradovas, and the others. That

is also not true. Such standards would be unreal at the present time, since working men and women with less technical knowledge than Stakhanov and Busygin could not fulfil these standards. We need technical standards somewhere between the present technical standards and those achieved by people like Stakhanov and Busygin. Take, for example, Maria Demchenko, the well-known "five-hundreder" in sugar beet. She achieved a harvest of over 500 centners of sugar beet per hectare. Can this achievement be made the standard yield for the whole of sugar beet production, say, in the Ukraine? No, it cannot. It is too early to speak of that. Maria Demchenko secured over 500 centners from one hectare, whereas the average sugar beet harvest this year in the Ukraine, for instance, is 130 or 132 centners per hectare. The difference, as you see, is not a small one. Can we set the standard of sugar beet yield at 400 or 300 centners? Every expert in this field says that this cannot be done yet. Evidently, the standard yield per hectare for the Ukraine in 1936 must be set at 200 or 250 centners. And this is not a low standard, for if it were fulfilled it might give us twice as much sugar as we got in 1935. The same must be said of industry. Stakhanov exceeded the existing standard of output ten times or even more, I believe. To declare this achievement the new technical standard for all pneumatic drill operators would be unwise. Obviously, a standard must be set somewhere between the existing technical standard and that achieved by Comrade Stakhanov.

One thing, at any rate, is clear: the present technical standards no longer correspond to reality; they have fallen behind and become a brake on our industry; and in order that there shall be no brake on our industry, they must be replaced by new, higher technical standards. New people, new times—new technical standards.

4. IMMEDIATE TASKS

What are our immediate tasks from the standpoint of the interests of the Stakhanov movement?

In order not to be diffuse, let us reduce the matter to two immediate tasks.

First. The task is to help the Stakhanovites further to develop the Stakhanov movement and to spread it in all directions throughout all the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R. That, on the one hand. And on the other hand, the task is to curb all those elements among the business managers, engineers, and technical workers who obstinately cling to the old, do not want to advance, and systematically hinder the development of the Stakhanov movement. The Stakhanovites alone, of course, cannot spread the Stakhanov movement in its full scope over the whole face of our country. Our Party organizations must take a hand in this matter and help the Stakhanovites to consummate the movement. In this respect the Donets regional organization has undoubtedly displayed great initiative. Good work is being done in this direction by the Moscow and Leningrad regional organizations. But what about the other regions? They, apparently, are still "getting started." For instance, we somehow hear nothing, or very little, from the Urals, although, as you know, the Urals is a vast industrial centre. The same must be said of Western Siberia and the Kuzbas, where, to all appearances, they have not yet managed to "get started." However, we need have no doubt that our Party organizations will take a hand in this matter and help the Stakhanovites to overcome their difficulties. As to the other aspect of the matter—the curbing of the obstinate conservatives among the business managers, engineers and technical workers—things will be a little more complicated. We shall have in the first place to persuade these conservative elements in industry, persuade them in a patient and comradely manner, of the progressive nature of the Stakhanov movement and of the necessity of readjusting themselves to the Stakhanov way. And if persuasion does not help, more vigorous measures will have to be adopted. Take, for instance, the People's Commissariat of Railways. In the central apparatus of that Commissariat there was until recently a group of professors, engineers, and other experts—among them Communists—who assured everybody that a commercial speed of 13 or 14 kilometres per hour was a limit that could not be

exceeded without contradicting "the science of railway operation." This was a fairly authoritative group, who preached their views by word of mouth and in print, issued instructions to the various departments of the People's Commissariat of Railways, and in general were the "dictators of opinion" in the traffic departments. We, who are not experts in this sphere, basing ourselves on the suggestions of a number of practical workers on the railways, on our part assured these authoritative professors that 13 or 14 kilometres could not be the limit, and that if matters were organized in a certain way this limit could be extended. In reply, this group, instead of heeding the voice of experience and practice and revising their attitude to the matter, launched into a fight against the progressive elements on the railways and still further intensified the propaganda of their conservative views. Of course, we had to give these esteemed individuals a light tap on the jaw and very politely remove them from the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Railways. (*Applause.*) And what is the result? We now have a commercial speed of 18 and 19 kilometres per hour. (*Applause.*) It seems to me, comrades, that at the worst we shall have to resort to this method in other branches of our national economy as well—that is, of course, if the stubborn conservatives do not cease interfering and putting spokes in the wheels of the Stakhanov movement.

Second. In the case of those business executives, engineers and technicians who do not want to hinder the Stakhanov movement, who sympathize with this movement, but have not yet been able to readjust themselves and assume the lead of the Stakhanov movement, the task is to help them readjust themselves and take the lead of the Stakhanov movement. I must say, comrades, that we have quite a few such business executives, engineers and technicians. And if we help these comrades, there will undoubtedly be still more of them.

I think that if we fulfil these tasks, the Stakhanov movement will develop to its full scope, will embrace every region and district of our country, and will show us miracles of new achievements.

5. A FEW MORE WORDS

A few words regarding the present conference, regarding its significance. Lenin taught us that only such leaders can be real Bolshevik leaders as know not only how to teach the workers and peasants but also how to learn from them. Certain Bolsheviks were not pleased with these words of Lenin's. But history has shown that Lenin was one hundred per cent right in this field also. And, indeed, millions of working people, workers and peasants, labour, live and struggle. Who can doubt that these people do not live in vain, that, living and struggling, these people accumulate vast practical experience? Can it be doubted that leaders who scorn this experience cannot be regarded as real leaders? Hence, we leaders of the Party and the Government must not only teach the workers, but also learn from them. I shall not undertake to deny that you, the members of the present conference, have learned something here at this conference from the leaders of our Government. But neither can it be denied that we, the leaders of the Government, have learned a great deal from you, the Stakhanovites, the members of this conference. Well, comrades, thanks for the lesson, many thanks! (*Loud applause.*)

Finally, two words about how it would be fitting to mark this conference. We here in the presidium have conferred and have decided that this conference between the leaders of the government and the leaders of the Stakhanov movement must be marked in some way. Well, we have come to the decision that a hundred or a hundred and twenty of you will have to be recommended for the highest distinction.

Voice: Quite right. (*Loud applause.*)

Stalin: If you approve, comrades, that is what we shall do.

(*The conference gives to Comrade Stalin a stormy enthusiastic ovation. Thunderous cheers and applause. Greetings are shouted to Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party, from all parts of the hall. The three thousand members of the conference join in singing the proletarian hymn, the "International."*)

ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

*Report Delivered at the Extraordinary
Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.,
November 25, 1936*

Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the Great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Glory to Comrade Stalin!"

I

FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION AND ITS TASKS

Comrades, the Constitution Commission, whose draft has been submitted for consideration to the present Congress, was formed, as you know, by special decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. This decision was adopted on February 6, 1935. It reads:

"1. To amend the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction of:

"a) further democratizing the electoral system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage by equal suffrage, indirect elections by direct elections, and the open ballot by the secret ballot;

"b) giving more precise definition to the social and economic basis of the Constitution by bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present relation of class forces in the U.S.S.R. (the creation of a new, socialist industry, the demolition of the kulak class, the victory of the collective-farm system, the consolidation of socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, and so on).

"2. To enjoin the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to elect a Constitution Commission which shall be

instructed to draw up an amended text of the Constitution in accordance with the principles indicated in Clause 1 and to submit it for approval to a Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"3. To conduct the next ordinary elections of the organs of Soviet power in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the new electoral system."

This was on February 6, 1935. The day after this decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. met and, in pursuance of the decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission to prepare a draft of an amended Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Such were the formal grounds and instructions of the supreme body of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of which the work of the Constitution Commission was to proceed.

Thus, the Constitution Commission was to introduce changes in the Constitution now in force, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the direction of socialism which have been brought about in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to the present day.

II

CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936

What are the changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. that have been brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936 and which the Constitution Commission was to reflect in its Draft Constitution?

What is the essence of these changes?

What was the situation in 1924?

That was the first period of the NEP, when the Soviet power permitted a certain revival of capitalism while taking all meas-

ures to develop socialism; when it calculated on securing, in the course of competition between the two systems of economy, the capitalist system and the socialist system, the preponderance of the socialist system over the capitalist system. The task was to consolidate the position of socialism in the course of this competition, to achieve the elimination of the capitalist elements, and to consummate the victory of the socialist system as the fundamental system of the national economy.

Our industry, particularly heavy industry, presented an unenviable picture at that time. True, it was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the prewar level. It was based on the old, backward, and insufficient technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction of socialism. The socialist sector of our industry at that time accounted for about 80 per cent of the whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no less than 20 per cent of industry.

Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly picture. True, the landlord class had already been eliminated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with backward, medieval technical equipment. In this ocean there existed, in the form of isolated small dots and islets, collective farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were not yet of any considerable significance in our national economy. The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time we spoke not of eliminating the kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same must be said about our country's trade turnover. The socialist sector in trade turnover represented some 50 or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the field was occupied by merchants, profiteers, and other private traders.

Such was the picture of our economy in 1924.

What is the situation now, in 1936?

At that time we were in the first period of the NEP, the beginning of NEP, the period of a certain revival of capitalism;

now, however, we are in the last period of NEP, the end of NEP, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of the national economy.

Take the fact, to begin with, that during this period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on new, plentiful, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully developed heavy industry and an even more developed machine-building industry. But the most important thing is that capitalism has been banished entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the socialist form of production now holds undivided sway in the sphere of our industry. The fact that in volume of output our present socialist industry exceeds prewar industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded as a minor detail.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean of small individual peasant farms, with their poor technical equipment, and a strong kulak influence, we now have mechanized production, conducted on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an all-embracing system of collective farms and state farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class in agriculture has been eliminated, while the sector of small individual peasant farms, with its backward, medieval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant place; its share in agriculture as regards crop area does not amount to more than two or three per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horsepower, and, together with the state farms, over 400,000 tractors, with a total of 7,580,000 horsepower.

As for the trade turnover in the country, the merchants and profiteers have been banished entirely from this sphere. All trade turnover is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies, and the collective farms. A new Soviet trade—trade without profiteers, trade without capitalists—has arisen and developed.

Thus the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact.

And what does this mean?

It means that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, eliminated, while the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production has been established as the unshakable foundation of our Soviet society. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As a result of all these changes in the sphere of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we now have a new, socialist economy, which knows neither crises nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor ruin, and which provides our citizens with every opportunity to lead a prosperous and cultured life.

Such, in the main, are the changes which have taken place in the sphere of our *economy* during the period from 1924 to 1936.

In conformity with these changes in the economy of the U.S.S.R., the *class structure* of our society has also changed.

The landlord class, as you know, had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the Civil War. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have now been eliminated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained the same as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. By force of habit, it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the instruments and means of production, under an economic system in which

the instruments and means of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been eliminated, and the instruments and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, the leading force of which is the working class. Consequently, there is no longer a capitalist class which could exploit the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the instruments and means of production, on the contrary, possesses them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them, and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. This being the case, can our working class be called a proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments and means of production from the capitalists, and abolish the conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already brought about these conditions for its emancipation? Unquestionably, it can and must be said. And what does this mean? This means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R., which has abolished the capitalist economic system, which has established the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to communism.

As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with its members atomized, scattered over the face of the land, delving away in isolation on their small farms with their backward technical equipment; that they are slaves to private

property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further. Our Soviet peasantry, its overwhelming majority, is a collective-farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on individual labour and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labour and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasantry is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labour.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia, too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but which actually, taken in the mass, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots to the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. People who come from the nobility and the bourgeoisie constitute but a small portion of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must serve the people, for there

are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, socialist society.

As you see, it is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period as regards the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, are being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are declining, are becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also declining and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the *class structure* of the U.S.S.R.

The picture of the changes in the social life of the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete without a few words about the changes in yet another sphere. I have in mind the sphere of *national* relationships in the U.S.S.R. As you know, within the Soviet Union there are about sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multinational state. Clearly, the question of the relations among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be of prime importance for us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you know, was formed in 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles of equality and voluntary affiliation of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in force, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was the period when relations among the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great-Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal

forces still continued to operate. Under those conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation among the peoples on the basis of economic, political, and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single, federal, multinational state. The Soviet power had a very clear conception of the difficulties attending this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multinational states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the experiment of old Austria-Hungary, which ended in failure. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multinational state, for it knew that a multinational state which has arisen on the basis of socialism is bound to stand any and every test.

Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the experiment of forming a multinational state based on socialism has been completely successful. This is an unquestionable victory of the Leninist national policy. (*Prolonged applause.*)

How is this victory to be explained?

The absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is the foe of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and socialist in content—all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal cooperation among the peoples has been established within the system of a single federal state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multinational socialist state, which has stood all tests, and whose stability might

well be envied by any national state in any part of the world.
(Loud applause.)

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of *national relationships* in the U.S.S.R.

Such is the sum total of changes which have taken place in the sphere of the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

III

THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

How are all these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. reflected in the Draft of the new Constitution?

In other words: What are the principal specific features of the Draft Constitution submitted for consideration to the present Congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The work of the Constitution Commission has resulted in a new text of the Constitution, a Draft of a new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In drafting the new Constitution, the Constitution Commission proceeded from the premise that a constitution must not be confused with a program. This means that there is an essential difference between a program and a constitution. Whereas a program speaks of that which does not yet exist, of that which has yet to be achieved and won in the future, a constitution, on the contrary, must speak of that which already exists, of that which has already been achieved and won now, at the present time. A program deals mainly with the future, a constitution with the present.

Two examples by way of illustration.

Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving socialism; it has created a socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, phase of communism. Hence, in the main, we have

already achieved the first phase of communism, socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*) The fundamental principle of this phase of communism is, as you know, the formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that socialism has been achieved? Should it be based on this achievement? Unquestionably, it should. It should, because for the U.S.S.R. socialism is something already achieved and won.

But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher phase of communism, in which the ruling principle will be the formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase of communism in the future. Can our Constitution be based on the higher phase of communism, which does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? No, it cannot, because for the U.S.S.R. the higher phase of communism is something that has not yet been realized, and which has to be realized in the future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into a program or a declaration of future achievements.

Such are the limits of our Constitution at the present historical moment.

Thus, the Draft of the new Constitution is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of the gains already achieved. In other words, it is the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won in actual fact. (*Loud applause.*)

That is the first specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist system is immutable. The main foundation of these constitutions consists of the principles of capitalism, of its main pillars: the private ownership of the land, forests, factories, works, and other instruments and means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the nontoiling

but secure minority at the other pole, etc., etc. They rest on these and similar pillars of capitalism. They reflect them, they embody them in law.

Unlike the former, the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that the capitalist system has been liquidated, and that the socialist system has triumphed in the U.S.S.R. The main foundation of the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the principles of socialism, whose main pillars are things that have already been achieved and realized: the socialist ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other instruments and means of production; the abolition of exploitation and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and an honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the formula: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"; the right to work, i.e., the right of every citizen to guaranteed employment; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc., etc. The Draft of the new Constitution rests on these and similar pillars of socialism. It reflects them, it embodies them in law.

Such is the second specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth; that no matter what party comes into power, the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie; that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by and beneficial to the propertied classes.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the labouring classes, that are in power; that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society; that a

constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by and beneficial to the working people.

Such is the third specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot have equal rights, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example in the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without full rights. This means that, at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, i.e., constitutions of ruling nations.

Unlike these constitutions, the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the premise that all nations and races have equal rights. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference in colour or language, cultural level or level of political development, nor any other difference between nations and races, can serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, should enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing democratism. From the standpoint of democratism bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups: One group of constitutions openly denies, or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions readily accepts, and even advertises, democratic principles, but at the same time it makes reservations and provides for restrictions which utterly mutilate these democratic rights and liberties. They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, but at the same time limit it by residential, educational, and even property qualifications.

They speak of equal rights for citizens, but at the same time they make the reservation that this does not apply to women, or applies to them only in part. And so on and so forth.

What distinguishes the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the fact that it is free from such reservations and restrictions. For it, there exists no division of citizens into active and passive ones; for it, all citizens are active. It does not recognize any difference in rights as between men and women, "residents" and "nonresidents," propertied and nonpropertied, educated and uneducated. For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, but personal ability and personal labour, that determines the position of every citizen in society.

Lastly, there is still one more specific feature of the Draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights, about the opportunity of exercising them, about the means by which they can be exercised. They speak of the equality of citizens, but forget that there cannot be real equality between employer and workman, between landlord and peasant, if the former possess wealth and political weight in society while the latter are deprived of both—if the former are exploiters while the latter are exploited. Or again: they speak of freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, but forget that all these liberties may be merely a hollow sound for the working class, if the latter cannot have access to suitable premises for meetings, good printing shops, a sufficient quantity of printing paper, etc.

What distinguishes the Draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but especially stresses the guarantees of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation. It does not merely

proclaim the right to work, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that there are no crises in Soviet society, and that unemployment has been abolished. It does not merely proclaim democratic liberties, but legislatively ensures them by providing definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, that the democratism of the Draft of the new Constitution is not the "ordinary" and "universally recognized" democratism in the abstract, but *socialist* democratism.

These are the principal specific features of the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

This is the way the Draft of the new Constitution reflects the progress and changes that have been brought about in the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

IV

BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

A few words about bourgeois criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The question of the attitude of the foreign bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is undoubtedly of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign press reflects the public opinion of the various sections of the population of bourgeois countries, we cannot ignore the criticism that that press is directing at the Draft Constitution.

The first reaction of the foreign press to the Draft Constitution was expressed in a definite tendency—to hush up the Draft Constitution. I am referring here to the most reactionary press, the fascist press. This group of critics thought it best simply to hush up the Draft Constitution and to pretend that there is no such draft, and never has been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not true. The method of keeping silent, as a special method of ignoring things, is also a form of criticism—a stupid and ridiculous form, it is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. (*General laughter and applause.*) But

their method of keeping silent did not work. In the end they were obliged to open the valve and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, a Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. does exist, and not only does it exist but it is beginning to exercise a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could it be otherwise; for, after all, there is such a thing as public opinion in the world, there is the reading public, living people, who want to know the facts, and it is quite impossible to hold them in the vise of deception for long. Deception does not carry one far....

The second group of critics admits that there really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution, but considers that the draft is not of much interest, because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a scrap of paper, an empty promise, intended as a manoeuvre to deceive people. And they add that the U.S.S.R. could not produce a better draft, because the U.S.S.R. itself is not a state, but only a geographical concept (*general laughter*), and since it is not a state, its Constitution cannot be a real constitution. A typical representative of this group of critics is, strange as this may appear, the German semiofficial organ, *Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz*. This journal bluntly declares that the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin village." It unhesitatingly declares that the U.S.S.R. is not a state, that the U.S.S.R. "is nothing more nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" (*general laughter*), and that in view of this, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. cannot be regarded as a real constitution.

What can one say about such critics, so-called?

In one of his tales the great Russian writer Shchedrin portrays a pigheaded bureaucrat, very narrow-minded and obtuse, but self-confident and zealous to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established "order and tranquillity" in the region "under his charge," having exterminated thousands of its inhabitants and burned down scores of towns in the process, he looked around him, and on the horizon espied America—a country little known, of course, where, it appears, there are liberties of some sort or other which serve to agitate the people, and where the state is

administered in a different way. The bureaucrat espied America and became indignant: What country is that, how did it get there, by what right does it exist? (*General laughter and applause.*) Of course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that it should never be heard of again? (*General laughter.*) Thereupon he wrote an order: "Shut America up again!" (*General laughter.*)

It seems to me that the gentlemen of the *Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz* and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. (*General laughter and applause.*) The U.S.S.R. has long been an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years the U.S.S.R. has stood like a beacon, spreading the spirit of emancipation among the working class all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies of the working class. And it turns out that this U.S.S.R. not only exists, but is even growing; is not only growing, but is even flourishing; and is not only flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds and inspiring the oppressed classes with new hope. (*Applause.*) How can the gentlemen of the German semiofficial organ be anything but indignant after this? What sort of country is that?—they howl; by what right does it exist? (*General laughter.*) And if it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be shut up so that it should never be heard of again? Thereupon they resolved: Shut the U.S.S.R. up again; proclaim publicly that the U.S.S.R., as a state, does not exist, that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but a mere geographical concept! (*General laughter.*)

In writing his order to shut America up again, Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, evinced some sense of reality by adding to himself: "However, it seems that same is not in my power." (*Roars of laughter and applause.*) I do not know whether the gentlemen of the German semiofficial organ are endowed with sufficient intelligence to suspect that—while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that country on paper—speaking seriously, however, "same is not in their power...." (*Roars of laughter and stormy applause.*)

As for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. being an empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would like to refer to a number of established facts which speak for themselves.

In 1917 the peoples of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, established the Soviet power. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet power eliminated the landlord class and transferred to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government, and monasterial lands, over and above the lands which were already in the possession of the peasants. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet power expropriated the capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, railways, and other instruments and means of production, declared these to be socialist property, and placed at the head of these enterprises the best members of the working class. This is a fact, not a promise. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, having organized industry and agriculture on new, socialist lines, with a new technical base, the Soviet power has today attained a position where agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is producing one and a half times as much as was produced in pre-war times, where industry is producing seven times more than was produced in prewar times, and where the national income has increased fourfold compared with prewar times. All these are facts, not promises. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, the Soviet power has abolished unemployment, has introduced the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, has provided better material and cultural conditions for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and has ensured the introduction of universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. All these are facts, not promises. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Finally, the U.S.S.R. has produced the Draft of a new Constitution which is not a promise but the registration and legislative embodiment of these generally known facts, the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won.

One may ask: In view of all this, what can all the talk of the gentlemen of the German semiofficial organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to but an attempt on their part to conceal from the people the truth about the U.S.S.R., to mislead the people, to deceive them.

Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semiofficial organ may say: So much the worse for the facts. (*Laughter.*) But then, we can answer them in the words of the well-known Russian proverb: "There is no telling what a fool will do." (*Laughter and prolonged applause.*)

The *third* group of critics are not averse to recognizing certain merits in the Draft Constitution; they regard it as a good thing; but, you see, they doubt very much whether a number of its principles can be applied in practice, because they are convinced that these principles are generally impracticable and must remain a dead letter. They, to put it mildly, are sceptics. Such sceptics are to be found in all countries.

It must be said that this is not the first time we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the sceptics said: The Bolsheviks may not be bad fellows, but nothing will come of their government; they will fail. Actually, it turned out, however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, but the sceptics.

During the Civil War and foreign intervention this group of sceptics said: The Soviet power is not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that the sceptics were wrong again in their calculations.

When the Soviet government published the First Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the scene saying: The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, of course, but it is hardly feasible; the Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts proved, however, that once again the sceptics had bad luck: the Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years.

The same must be said about the Draft of the new Constitution and the criticism levelled against it by the sceptics. No sooner was the draft published than this group of critics again

appeared on the scene with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts as to the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. There is not the slightest ground for doubt that in this case, too, the sceptics will fail, that they will fail today as they have failed more than once in the past.

The *fourth* group of critics, in attacking the Draft of the new Constitution, characterize it as a "swing to the Right," as the "abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as the "liquidation of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung to the Right, that is a fact," they declare in a chorus of different voices. Particularly zealous in this respect are certain Polish newspapers, and also some American newspapers.

What can one say about these critics, so-called?

If the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship of the working class and the transformation of the dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state is interpreted by them not as strengthening the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know what the dictatorship of the working class means?

If the legislative embodiment given to the victories of socialism, the legislative embodiment given to the successes of industrialization, collectivization and democratization is represented by them as a "swing to the Right," then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know the difference between left and right? (*General laughter and applause.*)

There can be no doubt that these gentlemen got muddled up in their criticism of the Draft Constitution, and, in their muddle, they confuse right with left.

One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the "wench" Pelageya in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Gogol relates that Pelageya offered to act as guide to Chichikov's coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the right side of the road from the left, she got muddled up, and got into an embarrassing situation. It must be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, the intelligence of our critics in the Polish newspapers is not much above that of

the "wench" Pelageya in *Dead Souls*. (*Applause.*) If you remember, the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to her: "Oh, you, dirty legs... you don't know which is right and which is left." It seems to me that our luckless critics should be chided in the same way: "Oh, you, sorry critics... you don't know which is right and which is left." (*Prolonged applause.*)

Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the U.S.S.R., of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.

I must admit that the Draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. (*Loud applause.*) If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. (*Loud applause.*)

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable—in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests—far from being mutually hostile—are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, and, consequently,

for freedom for these parties. In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt. (*Loud applause.*)

They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.

Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the Draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

V

AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Let us pass on to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during the nation-wide discussion of the draft.

The nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution, as you know, produced a fairly large number of amendments and addenda. These have all been published in the Soviet press. In view of the great variety of amendments and the fact that they are not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, be divided into three categories.

The distinguishing feature of the amendments in the first category is that they deal not with constitutional questions but with questions which come within the scope of the current legis-

lative work of the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning social insurance, some questions concerning collective-farm development, some questions concerning industrial development, financial questions—such are the subjects with which these amendments deal. Evidently the authors of these amendments were not clear as to the difference between constitutional questions and questions of current legislation. That is why they strive to squeeze as many laws as possible into the Constitution, thus tending to convert the Constitution into something in the nature of a code of laws. But a constitution is not a code of laws. A constitution is the fundamental law, and only the fundamental law. A constitution does not preclude but presupposes current legislative work on the part of the future legislative bodies. A constitution provides the juridical basis for the future legislative activities of these bodies. Therefore, amendments and addenda of this kind, which have no direct bearing on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be referred to the future legislative bodies of the country.

To the second category should be assigned those amendments and addenda which strive to introduce into the Constitution elements of historical references, or elements of declarations concerning what the Soviet power has not yet achieved and what it should achieve in the future. To describe in the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working class, and all the working people have overcome during the long years of struggle for the victory of socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of a complete communist society—such are the subjects with which these amendments deal, in different variations. I think that such amendments and addenda should also be set aside as having no direct bearing on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration and legislative embodiment of the gains that have already been achieved and secured. Unless we want to distort this fundamental character of the Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with historical references to the past, or with declarations concerning the future achievements of the working people of the U.S.S.R. For this we have other means and other documents.

Finally, to the third category should be assigned amendments and addenda which have a direct bearing on the Draft Constitution.

A large number of amendments in this category are simply a matter of wording. They could therefore be referred to the Drafting Commission of the present Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with instructions to decide on the final text of the new Constitution.

As for the rest of the amendments in the third category, they are of greater material significance, and, in my opinion, a few words should be said about them.

1. First of all about the amendments to Article 1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. Some propose that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of working people." Others propose that we add the words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state of workers and peasants." A third group proposes that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of all the races and nationalities inhabiting the territory of the U.S.S.R." A fourth group proposes that we substitute for the word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or "toilers of socialist agriculture."

Should these amendments be adopted? I think they should not.

What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speak of? It speaks of the class composition of Soviet society. Can we, Marxists, ignore the question of the class composition of our society in the Constitution? No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution properly reflects the class composition of our society. It may be asked: What about the working intelligentsia? The intelligentsia has never been a class, and never can be a class—it was and remains a stratum, which recruits its members from among all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia recruited its members from the ranks of the nobility, of the bourgeoisie, partly from the ranks of the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable extent from the ranks of the workers.

In our day, under the Soviets, the intelligentsia recruits its members mainly from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But no matter where it may recruit its members, and what character it may bear, the intelligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class.

Does this circumstance infringe upon the rights of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 1 of the Draft Constitution deals not with the rights of the various strata of Soviet society, but with the class composition of that society. The rights of the various strata of Soviet society, including the rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft Constitution. It is evident from these chapters that the workers, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia enjoy entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon the rights of the working intelligentsia.

The same must be said of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R. In Chapter II of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the U.S.S.R. is a free union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worth while repeating this formula in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, which deals not with the national composition of Soviet society, but with its class composition? Clearly it is not worth while. As to the rights of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R., these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters it is evident that the nations and races of the U.S.S.R. enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon national rights.

It would also be wrong to substitute for the word "peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler of socialist agriculture." In the first place, besides the collective farmers, there are still over a million households of noncollective farmers among the peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the authors of this amendment propose to strike them off the books? That would be

unwise. Secondly, the fact that the majority of the peasants have started collective farming does not mean that they have already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer have their personal economy, their own households, etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then have to substitute the words "toiler of socialist industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment for some reason or other do not propose. Finally, have the working class and the peasant class already disappeared in our country? And if they have not disappeared, is it worth while deleting from our vocabulary the established names for them? Evidently, what the authors of the amendment have in mind is not present society, but future society, when classes will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants will have been transformed into toilers of a homogeneous communist society. Consequently, they are obviously running ahead. But in drawing up a constitution one must not proceed from the future, but from the present, from what already exists. A constitution should not and must not run ahead.

2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of the Draft Constitution. The amendment proposes that we completely delete from the Constitution Article 17, which reserves to the Union Republics the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. I think that this proposal is a wrong one and therefore should not be adopted by the Congress. The U.S.S.R. is a voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. To delete from the Constitution the article providing for the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. would be to violate the voluntary character of this union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we cannot and should not agree to it. It is said that there is not a single Republic in the U.S.S.R. that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R., and that therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. It is, of course, true that there is not a single Republic that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R. But this does not in the least mean that we should not fix in the Constitution the right of Union Republics freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. In the U.S.S.R. there is not a single Union Republic that would want to subjugate another Union Republic. But that does not in the least mean that we ought to delete from

the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the article dealing with the equality of rights of the Union Republics.

3. Then there is a proposal that we add a new article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution, to the following effect: that on reaching the proper level of economic and cultural development Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics may be raised to the status of Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not be adopted. It is a wrong proposal not only because of its content, but also because of the condition it lays down. Economic and cultural maturity can no more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged as grounds for leaving any particular Republic in the list of Autonomous Republics. That would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; but that does not mean that from the standpoint of cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic.

What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics?

There are three such grounds.

First, the republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the U.S.S.R. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Of course, none of our Republics would actually raise the question of seceding

from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R.? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet Republics and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go to if they secede from the U.S.S.R. (*Laughter and applause.*) Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer such Republics to the category of Union Republics.

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet Republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border Republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that Republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong and illogical to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet Republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent state. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay hands on it.

I think that unless these three objective grounds exist, it would be wrong at the present historical moment to raise the question of transferring any particular Autonomous Republic to the category of Union Republics.

4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the detailed enumeration of the administrative territorial division of the Union Republics into territories and regions. I think that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are people in the U.S.S.R., who are always ready and eager to go on

tirelessly recarving the territories and regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in our work. The Draft Constitution puts a check on those people. And that is a very good thing, because here, as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of certainty, we need stability and clarity.

5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The creation of two Chambers is regarded as inexpedient, and it is proposed that the Soviet of Nationalities be abolished. I think that this amendment is also wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than a dual-chamber system if the U.S.S.R. were a single-nation state. But the U.S.S.R. is not a single-nation state. The U.S.S.R., as we know, is a multinational state. We have a supreme body in which are represented the *common* interests of all the working people of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of nationality. This is the Soviet of the Union. But in addition to common interests, the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have *their particular, specific* interests, connected with their specific national characteristics. Can these specific interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need a special supreme body to reflect precisely these specific interests? Unquestionably, we do. There can be no doubt that without such a body it would be impossible to administer a multinational state like the U.S.S.R. Such a body is the second Chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Reference is made to the parliamentary history of European and American states; it is pointed out that the dual-chamber system in these countries has produced only negative results—that the second chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction and a brake on progress. All that is true. But this is due to the fact that in those countries there is no equality between the two chambers. As we know, the second chamber is not infrequently granted more rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a rule the second chamber is constituted undemocratically, its members not infrequently being appointed from above. Undoubtedly, these defects will be obviated if equality is established between the chambers and if the second chamber is constituted as democratically as the first.

6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution is proposed calling for an equal number of members in both Chambers. I think that this proposal might be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the Chambers.

7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution which proposes that the members of the Soviet of Nationalities be elected by direct vote, as in the case of the members of the Soviet of the Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. True, it may create certain technical inconveniences during elections; but, on the other hand, it would be of great political advantage, for it would enhance the prestige of the Soviet of Nationalities.

8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40, proposing that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. I think that this addendum is wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress. It is time we put an end to a situation in which not one but a number of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the principle that laws should be stable. And we need stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative power in the U.S.S.R. must be exercised only by one body, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be elected not by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. but by the whole population of the country. I think this addendum is wrong, because it runs counter to the spirit of our Constitution. According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual president in the U.S.S.R., elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Soviet. The president in the U.S.S.R. is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, elected, not by the whole population, but by the Supreme Soviet, and accountable to the Supreme Soviet. Historical experience shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most

democratic, and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies.

10. Then follows an amendment to the same Article 48. It reads as follows: the number of Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to be increased to eleven, one from each Union Republic. I think that this amendment might be adopted, for it would be an improvement and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's Commissariat—the People's Commissariat of the Defence Industry. I think that this amendment should likewise be accepted (*applause*), for the time has arrived to separate our defence industry and have a corresponding People's Commissariat for it. It seems to me that this would only improve the defence of our country.

12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the article be changed to provide for the prohibition of the performance of religious rites. I think that this amendment should be rejected as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution.

13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a more or less material character. I am referring to an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. It proposes that ministers of religion, former Whiteguards, all the former rich, and persons not engaged in socially useful occupations be disfranchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of people in this category be restricted to the right to elect, but not to be elected. I think that this amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet power disfranchised the nonworking and exploiting elements not for all time, but temporarily, up to a certain period. There was a time when these elements waged open war against the people and actively resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet power's reply to this resistance. Quite some time has elapsed since then. During this period we have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, and the Soviet

power has become an invincible force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise this law? I think it has. It is said that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the Soviet power, some of the former Whiteguards, kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the supreme governing bodies of the country. But what is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods. (*Laughter and loud applause*). In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards and priests are hostile to the Soviet power. Secondly, if the people in some place or other do elect hostile persons, that will show that our propaganda work has been very badly organized, and we shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way, the people will not let hostile persons slip into the supreme governing bodies. This means that we must work and not whine (*loud applause*), we must work and not wait to have everything put before us ready-made by official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that the time was not far distant when the Soviet power would deem it expedient to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions. Please note: *without any restrictions*. He said this at a time when foreign military intervention had not yet been overcome, and when our industry and agriculture were in a desperate condition. Seventeen years have elapsed since then. Comrades, is it not time we carried out Lenin's behest? I think it is.

Here is what Lenin said in 1919 in his *Draft Program of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks)*. Permit me to read it:

"The Russian Communist Party must explain to the masses of the working people, in order to avoid a wrong generalization of transient historical needs, that the disfranchisement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as has been the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who, in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength for socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships,

automatically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than two or three per cent. On the other hand, in the not distant future the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian state power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage *without any restrictions.*"* (Lenin, Vol. XXIV, p. 94.)

That is clear, I think.

Such is the position with regard to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ,

VI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Judging by the results of the nation-wide discussion, which lasted nearly five months, it may be presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved by the present Congress. (*Loud applause passing into an ovation. All rise.*)

In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a new, socialist Constitution, built on the principles of fully developed socialist democracy.

It will be an historical document dealing in simple and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, with the facts of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., with the facts of the emancipation of the working people of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, with the facts of the victory in the U.S.S.R. of full and thoroughly consistent democracy.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed of and still dream of has already been realized in the U.S.S.R. (*Loud applause.*)

* My italics.—J.S.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been realized in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible of realization in other countries also. (*Loud applause.*)

But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic aspirations of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that socialism and democracy are invincible. (*Applause.*) The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. (*Loud applause.*)

Still greater is the significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will have the significance of a program of action, it is significant for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. as the summary of their struggles, a summary of their victories in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it gives pleasure and happiness to have our Constitution, which treats of the fruits of our victories. It gives pleasure and happiness to know what our people fought for and how they achieved this victory of world-wide historical importance. It gives pleasure and happiness to know that the blood our people shed so plentifully was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. (*Prolonged applause.*) This arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement of new victories of communism. (*Thunderous ovation. All rise. A thunderous "Hurrah!" Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" All stand and sing the "International," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin, Hurrah!"*)

DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

(September 1938)

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is *dialectical*, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is *materialistic*.

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.

When describing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does not mean that the dialectics of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectics of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from the Hegelian dialectics only its "rational kernel," casting aside its Hegelian idealistic shell, and developed dialectics further so as to lend it a modern scientific form.

"My dialectic method," says Marx, "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, ... the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurges (creator) of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (K. Marx, Preface to the Second German edition of Volume I of *Capital*.)

When describing their materialism, Marx and Engels usually refer to Feuerbach as the philosopher who restored materialism

to its rights. This, however, does not mean that the materialism of Marx and Engels is identical with Feuerbach's materialism. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from Feuerbach's materialism its "inner kernel," developed it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism and cast aside its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances. We know that Feuerbach, although he was fundamentally a materialist, objected to the name materialism. Engels more than once declared that "in spite of the" materialist "foundation," Feuerbach "remained . . . bound by the traditional idealist fetters," and that "the real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. XIV, pp. 652-54.)

Dialectics comes from the Greek *dialego*, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature.

In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics.

1) The principal features of the *Marxist dialectical method* are as follows:

a) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.

The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from

surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena.

b) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away.

The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being.

The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear to be not durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing.

"All nature," says Engels, "from the smallest thing to the biggest, from grains of sand to suns, from protista (the primary living cells —*J. St.*) to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in a ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change." (*Ibid.*, p. 484.)

Therefore, dialectics, Engels says, "takes things and their perceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, in their movement, in their rise and disappearance." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. XIV, p. 23.)

c) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible

quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher:

"Nature," says Engels, "is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical, that it does not move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle, but passes through a real history. Here prime mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical conception of nature by proving that the organic world of today, plants and animals, and consequently man too, is all a product of a process of development that has been in progress for millions of years." (*Ibid.*, p. 23.)

Describing dialectical development as a transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes, Engels says:

"In physics ... every change is a passing of quantity into quality, as a result of a quantitative change of some form of movement either inherent in a body or imparted to it. For example, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state; but as the temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion changes and the water is converted in one case into steam and in the other into ice.... A definite minimum current is required to make a platinum wire glow; every metal has its melting temperature; every liquid has a definite freezing point and boiling point at a given pressure, as far as we are able with the means at our disposal to attain the required temperatures; finally, every gas has its critical point at which, by proper pressure and cooling, it can be converted into a liquid state... What are known as the constants of physics (the point at which one state passes into another.—J. St.) are in most cases nothing but designations for the nodal points at which a quantitative (change);

Increase or decrease of movement causes a qualitative change in the state of the given body, and at which, consequently, quantity is transformed into quality." (*Ibid.*, pp. 527-28.)

Passing to chemistry, Engels continues:

"Chemistry may be called the science of the qualitative changes which take place in bodies as the effect of changes of quantitative composition. This was already known to Hegel.... Take oxygen: if the molecule contains three atoms instead of the customary two, we get ozone, a body definitely distinct in odour and reaction from ordinary oxygen. And what shall we say of the different proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur, and each of which produces a body qualitatively different from all other bodies!" (*Ibid.*, p. 528.)

Finally, criticizing Dühring, who scolded Hegel for all he was worth, but surreptitiously borrowed from him the well-known thesis that the transition from the insentient world to the sentient world, from the kingdom of inorganic matter to the kingdom of organic life, is a leap to a new state, Engels says:

"This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a *qualitative leap*, for example, in the case of water which is heated or cooled, where boiling point and freezing point are the nodes at which—under normal pressure—the leap to a new aggregate state takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality." (*Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.)

d) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a

harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a "struggle" of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.

"In its proper meaning," Lenin says, "dialectics is the study of the contradiction *within the very essence of things*." (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 263.)

And further:

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, p. 301.)

Such, in brief, are the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of "eternal justice" or some other preconceived idea, as is not infrequently done by historians, but from the standpoint of the conditions which gave rise to that system or that social movement and with which they are connected.

The slave system would be senseless, stupid and unnatural under modern conditions. But under the conditions of a disintegrating primitive communal system, the slave system is a quite understandable and natural phenomenon, since it represents an advance on the primitive communal system.

The demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic when tsardom and bourgeois society existed, as, let us say, in Russia in 1905, was a quite understandable, proper and revolutionary demand, for at that time a bourgeois republic would have meant a step forward. But now, under the conditions of the U.S.S.R.,

the demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic would be a senseless and counterrevolutionary demand, for a bourgeois republic would be a retrograde step compared with the Soviet republic.

Everything depends on the conditions, time and place.

It is clear that without such a *historical* approach to social phenomena, the existence and development of the science of history is impossible, for only such an approach saves the science of history from becoming a jumble of accidents and an agglomeration of most absurd mistakes.

Further, if the world is in a state of constant movement and development, if the dying away of the old and the upgrowth of the new is a law of development, then it is clear that there can be no "immutable" social systems, no "eternal principles" of private property and exploitation, no "eternal ideas" of the subjugation of the peasant to the landlord, of the worker to the capitalist.

Hence, the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system.

Hence, we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force.

In the eighties of the past century, in the period of the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks, the proletariat in Russia constituted an insignificant minority of the population, whereas the individual peasants constituted the vast majority of the population. But the proletariat was developing as a class, whereas the peasantry as a class was disintegrating. And just because the proletariat was developing as a class the Marxists based their orientation on the proletariat. And they were not mistaken, for, as we know, the proletariat subsequently grew from an insignificant force into a first-rate historical and political force.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must look forward, not backward.

Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist.

Further, if development proceeds by way of the disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromisers' policy of "the growing of capitalism into socialism."

Such is the Marxist dialectical method when applied to social life, to the history of society.

As to Marxist philosophical materialism, it is fundamentally the direct opposite of philosophical idealism.

2) The principal features of *Marxist philosophical materialism* are as follows:

a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea," a "universal spirit," "consciousness," Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature *material*, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of

moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit."

"The materialistic outlook on nature," says Engels, "means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists, without any foreign admixture." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. XIV, p. 651.)

Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that "the world, the all in one, was not created by any god or any man, but was, is and ever will be a living flame, systematically flaring up and systematically dying down," Lenin comments: "A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism." (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 318.)

b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our consciousness really exists, and that the material world, being, nature, exists only in our consciousness, in our sensations, ideas and perceptions, the Marxist philosophical materialism holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error. Engels says:

"The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of *idealism*. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of *materialism*." (K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 329.)

And further:

"The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality.... Our consciousness and thinking, however

suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter." (*Ibid.*, p. 332.)

Concerning the question of matter and thought, Marx says:

"*It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks.* Matter is the subject of all changes." (*Ibid.*, p. 302.)

Describing Marxist philosophical materialism, Lenin says:

"Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience.... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, pp. 266-67.)

And further:

— "Matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation.... Matter, nature, being, the physical—is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical—is secondary." (*Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.)

— "The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how matter thinks." (*Ibid.*, p. 288.)

— "The brain is the organ of thought." (*Ibid.*, p. 125.)

c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things-in-themselves" that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice.

Criticizing the thesis of Kant and other idealists that the world is unknowable and that there are "things-in-themselves" which are unknowable, and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our knowledge is authentic knowledge, Engels writes:

"The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable 'thing-in-itself.' The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained such 'things-in-themselves' until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the 'thing-in-itself' became a thing for us, as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For three hundred years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favour, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the necessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet, the Copernican system was proved." (K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 330.)

Accusing Bogdanov, Bazarov, Yushkevich and the other followers of Mach of fideism (a reactionary theory, which prefers faith to science) and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our scientific knowledge of the laws of nature is authentic knowledge, and that the laws of science represent objective truth, Lenin says:

"Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the 'exaggerated claims' of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human 'experience,' is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, p. 102.)

Such, in brief, are the characteristic features of the Marxist philosophical materialism.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life, of the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows,

too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental.

Hence, social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of "accidents," for the history of society becomes a development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history of society becomes a science.

Hence, the practical activity of the party of the proletariat must not be based on the good wishes of "outstanding individuals," not on the dictates of "reason," "universal morals," etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws.

Further, if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic knowledge, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the development of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of objective truths.

Hence, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes.

Hence, the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by casual motives, but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws.

Hence, socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science.

Hence, the bond between science and practical activity, between theory and practice, their unity, should be the guiding star of the party of the proletariat.

Further, if nature, being, the material world, is primary, and consciousness, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of men, while consciousness is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality exist-

ing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being.

Hence, the source of formation of the spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions, should not be sought for in the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but in the conditions of the material life of society, in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflection.

Hence, if in different periods of the history of society different social ideas, theories, views and political institutions are to be observed; if under the slave system we encounter certain social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, under feudalism others, and under capitalism others still, this is not to be explained by the "nature," the "properties" of the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves but by the different conditions of the material life of society at different periods of social development.

Whatever is the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, such are the ideas, theories, political views and political institutions of that society.

In this connection, Marx says:

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 269.)

Hence, in order not to err in policy, in order not to find itself in the position of idle dreamers, the party of the proletariat must not base its activities on abstract "principles of human reason," but on the concrete conditions of the material life of society, as the determining force of social development; not on the good wishes of "great men," but on the real needs of development of the material life of society.

The fall of the utopians, including the Narodniks, Anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries, was due, among other things, to the fact that they did not recognize the primary rôle which the

conditions of the material life of society play in the development of society, and, sinking to idealism, did not base their practical activities on the needs of the development of the material life of society, but, independently of and in spite of these needs, on "ideal plans" and "all-embracing projects" divorced from the real life of society.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces itself from the real life of society.

It does not follow from Marx's words, however, that social ideas, theories, political views and political institutions are of no significance in the life of society, that they do not reciprocally affect social being, the development of the material conditions of the life of society. We have been speaking so far of the *origin* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, of the *way they arise*, of the fact that the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As regards the *significance* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, as regards their *role* in history, historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the important role and significance of these factors in the life of society, in its history.

There are different kinds of social ideas and theories. There are old ideas and theories which have outlived their day and which serve the interests of the moribund forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they hamper the development, the progress of society. Then there are new and advanced ideas and theories which serve the interests of the advanced forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they facilitate the development, the progress of society; and their significance is the greater the more accurately they reflect the needs of development of the material life of society.

New social ideas and theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set new tasks before society. But once they have arisen they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the development

of the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society. It is precisely here that the tremendous organizing, mobilizing and transforming value of new ideas, new theories, new political views and new political institutions manifests itself. New social ideas and theories arise precisely because they are necessary to society, because it is *impossible* to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without their organizing, mobilizing and transforming action. Arising out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, the new social ideas and theories force their way through, become the possession of the masses, mobilize and organize them against the moribund forces of society, and thus facilitate the overthrow of these forces, which hamper the development of the material life of society.

Thus social ideas, theories and political institutions, having arisen on the basis of the urgent tasks of the development of the material life of society, the development of social being, themselves then react upon social being, upon the material life of society, creating the conditions necessary for completely carrying out the urgent tasks of the material life of society, and for rendering its further development possible.

In this connection, Marx says:

"Theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses."
(K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. I, p. 406.)

Hence, in order to be able to influence the conditions of material life of society and to accelerate their development and their improvement, the party of the proletariat must rely upon such a social theory, such a social idea as correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, and which is therefore capable of setting into motion broad masses of the people and of mobilizing them and organizing them into a great army of the proletarian party, prepared to smash the reactionary forces and to clear the way for the advanced forces of society.

The fall of the "Economists" and Mensheviks was due, among other things, to the fact that they did not recognize the mobilizing,

organizing and transforming role of advanced theory, of advanced ideas and, sinking to vulgar materialism, reduced the role of these factors almost to nothing, thus condemning the Party to passivity and inanition.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism is derived from the fact that it relies upon an advanced theory which correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, that it elevates theory to a proper level, and that it deems it its duty to utilize every ounce of the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of this theory.

That is the answer historical materialism gives to the question of the relation between social being and social consciousness, between the conditions of development of material life and the development of the spiritual life of society.

3) *Historical Materialism.*

It now remains to elucidate the following question: what, from the viewpoint of historical materialism, is meant by the "conditions of material life of society" which in the final analysis determine the physiognomy of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, etc.?

What, after all, are these "conditions of material life of society," what are their distinguishing features?

There can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" includes, first of all, nature which surrounds society, geographical environment, which is one of the indispensable and constant conditions of material life of society and which, of course, influences the development of society. What role does geographical environment play in the development of society? Is geographical environment the chief force determining the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system of man, the transition from one system to another?

Historical materialism answers this question in the negative.

Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, influences the development of society, accelerates or retards its development. But its influence is not the *determining*

influence, inasmuch as the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and development of geographical environment. In the space of three thousand years three different social systems have been successively superseded in Europe: the primitive communal system, the slave system and the feudal system. In the eastern part of Europe, in the U.S.S.R., even four social systems have been superseded. Yet during this period geographical conditions in Europe have either not changed at all, or have changed so slightly that geography takes no note of them. And that is quite natural. Changes in geographical environment of any importance require millions of years, whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are enough for even very important changes in the system of human society.

It follows from this that geographical environment cannot be the chief cause, the *determining* cause of social development, for that which remains almost unchanged in the course of tens of thousands of years cannot be the chief cause of development of that which undergoes fundamental changes in the course of a few hundred years.

Further, there can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" also includes growth of population, density of population of one degree or another, for people are an essential element of the conditions of material life of society, and without a definite minimum number of people there can be no material life of society. Is not growth of population the chief force that determines the character of the social system of man?

Historical materialism answers this question too in the negative.

Of course, growth of population does influence the development of society, does facilitate or retard the development of society, but it cannot be the chief force of development of society, and its influence on the development of society cannot be the *determining* influence because, by itself, growth of population does not furnish the clue to the question why a given social system is replaced precisely by such and such a new system and not by

another, why the primitive communal system is succeeded precisely by the slave system, the slave system by the feudal system, and the feudal system by the bourgeois system, and not by some other.

If growth of population were the determining force of social development, then a higher density of population would be bound to give rise to a correspondingly higher type of social system. But we do not find this to be the case. The density of population in China is four times as great as in the U.S.A., yet the U.S.A. stands higher than China in the scale of social development, for in China a semifeudal system still prevails, whereas the U.S.A. has long ago reached the highest stage of development of capitalism. The density of population in Belgium is 19 times as great as in the U.S.A., and 26 times as great as in the U.S.S.R. Yet the U.S.A. stands higher than Belgium in the scale of social development; and as for the U.S.S.R., Belgium lags a whole historical epoch behind this country, for in Belgium the capitalist system prevails, whereas the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capitalism and has set up a socialist system.

It follows from this that growth of population is not, and cannot be, the chief force of development of society, the force which determines the character of the social system, the physiognomy of society.

a) What, then, is the chief force in the complex of conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, the development of society from one system to another?

This force, historical materialism holds, is the *method of procuring the means of life* necessary for human existence, the *mode of production of material values*—food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc.—which are indispensable for the life and development of society.

In order to live, people must have food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc.; in order to have these material values, people must produce them; and in order to produce them, people must have the instruments of production with which food, clothing,

footwear, shelter, fuel, etc., are produced; they must be able to produce these instruments and to use them.

The *instruments of production* wherewith material values are produced, the *people* who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certain *production experience* and *labour skill*—all these elements jointly constitute the *productive forces* of society.

But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relation of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's *relations of production*. Men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups, in societies. Production, therefore, is at all times and under all conditions *social production*. In the production of material values men enter into mutual relations of one kind or another within production, into relations of production of one kind or another. These may be relations of cooperation and mutual help between people who are free from exploitation; they may be relations of domination and subordination; and, lastly, they may be transitional from one form of relations of production to another. But whatever the character of the relations of production may be, always and in every system, they constitute just as essential an element of production as the productive forces of society.

"In production," Marx says, "men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. V, p. 429.)

Consequently, production, the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men's relations of

production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of production of material values.

b) *The first feature* of production is that it never stays at one point for a long time and is always in a state of change and development, and that, furthermore, changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions—they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order. At different stages of development people make use of different modes of production, or, to put it more crudely, lead different manners of life. In the primitive commune there is one mode of production, under slavery there is another mode of production, under feudalism a third mode of production, and so on. And, correspondingly, men's social system, the spiritual life of men, their views and political institutions also vary.

Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions.

Or, to put it more crudely, whatever is man's manner of life, such is his manner of thought.

This means that the history of development of society is above all the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed each other in the course of centuries, the history of the development of productive forces and of people's relations of production.

Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the labouring masses, who are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values necessary for the existence of society.

Hence, if historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kings and generals, to the actions of "conquerors" and "subjugators" of states, but must above all devote itself to the history of the producers of material values, the history of the labouring masses, the history of peoples,

Hence, the clue to the study of the laws of history of society must not be sought in men's minds, in the views and ideas of society, but in the mode of production practised by society in any given historical period; it must be sought in the economic life of society.

Hence, the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if the party of the proletariat is to be a real party, it must above all acquire a knowledge of the laws of development of production, of the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if it is not to err in policy, the party of the proletariat must both in drafting its program and in its practical activities proceed primarily from the laws of development of production, from the laws of economic development of society.

c) *The second feature* of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, *depending* on these changes and *in conformity with them*, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change. This, however, does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces and that the latter are not dependent on the former. While their development is dependent on the development of the productive forces, the relations of production in their turn react upon the development of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it. In this connection it should be noted that the relations of production cannot for too long a time lag behind and be in a state of contradiction to the growth of the productive forces, inasmuch as the productive forces can develop in full measure only when the relations of production correspond to the character, the state of the productive forces and allow full scope for their development.

Therefore, however much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come into correspondence with—and actually do come into correspondence with—the level of development of the productive forces, the character of the productive forces. Otherwise we would have a fundamental violation of the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production, a disruption of production as a whole, a crisis of production, a destruction of productive forces.

An instance in which the relations of production do not correspond to the character of the productive forces, conflict with them, is the economic crises in capitalist countries, where private capitalist ownership of the means of production is in glaring incongruity with the social character of the process of production, with the character of the productive forces. This results in economic crises, which lead to the destruction of productive forces. Furthermore, this incongruity itself constitutes the economic basis of social revolution, the purpose of which is to destroy the existing relations of production and to create new relations of production corresponding to the character of the productive forces.

In contrast, an instance in which the relations of production completely correspond to the character of the productive forces is the socialist national economy of the U.S.S.R., where the social ownership of the means of production fully corresponds to the social character of the process of production, and where, because of this, economic crises and the destruction of productive forces are unknown.

Consequently, the productive forces are not only the most mobile and revolutionary element in production, but are also the determining element in the development of production.

Whatever are the productive forces such must be the relations of production.

While the state of the productive forces furnishes the answer to the question—with what instruments of production do men produce the material values they need?—the state of the rela-

tions of production furnishes the answer to another question — who owns the *means of production* (the land, forests, waters, mineral resources, raw materials, instruments of production, production premises, means of transportation and communication, etc.), who commands the means of production, whether the whole of society, or individual persons, groups, or classes which utilize them for the exploitation of other persons, groups or classes?

Here is a rough picture of the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day. The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plough fitted with an iron coulter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith's bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry—such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man's history. It will be clear that the development and improvement of the instruments of production was effected by men who were related to production, and not independently of men; and, consequently, the change and development of the instruments of production was accompanied by a change and development of men, as the most important element of the productive forces, by a change and development of their production experience, their labour skill, their ability to handle the instruments of production.

In conformity with the change and development of the productive forces of society in the course of history, men's relations of production, their economic relations also changed and developed.

Five *main* types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist.

The basis of the relations of production under the primitive communal system is that the means of production are socially owned. This in the main corresponds to the character of the productive forces of that period. Stone tools, and, later, the bow and arrow, precluded the possibility of men individually combating the forces of nature and beasts of prey. In order to gather the fruits of the forest, to catch fish, to build some sort of habitation, men were obliged to work in common if they did not want to die of starvation, or fall victim to beasts of prey or to neighbouring societies. Labour in common led to the common ownership of the means of production, as well as of the fruits of production. Here the conception of private ownership of the means of production did not yet exist, except for the personal ownership of certain implements of production which were at the same time means of defence against beasts of prey. Here there was no exploitation, no classes.

The basis of the relations of production under the slave system is that the slaveowner owns the means of production; he also owns the worker in production—the slave, whom he can sell, purchase, or kill as though he were an animal. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Instead of stone tools, men now have metal tools at their command; instead of the wretched and primitive husbandry of the hunter, who knew neither pasturage nor tillage, there now appear pasturage, tillage, handicrafts, and a division of labour between these branches of production. There appears the possibility of the exchange of products between individuals and between societies, of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, the actual accumulation of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the possibility of subjugation of the majority by a minority and the conversion of the majority into slaves. Here we no longer find the common and free labour of all members of society in the production process—here there

prevails the forced labour of slaves, who are exploited by the nonlabouring slaveowners. Here, therefore, there is no common ownership of the means of production or of the fruits of production. It is replaced by private ownership. Here the slaveowner appears as the prime and principal property owner in the full sense of the term.

Rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, people with full rights and people with no rights, and a fierce class struggle between them—such is the picture of the slave system.

The basis of the relations of production under the feudal system is that the feudal lord owns the means of production and does not fully own the worker in production—the serf, whom the feudal lord can no longer kill, but whom he can buy and sell. Alongside of feudal ownership there exists individual ownership by the peasant and the handicraftsman of his implements of production and his private enterprise based on his personal labour. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Further improvements in the smelting and working of iron; the spread of the iron plough and the loom; the further development of agriculture, horticulture, viniculture and dairying; the appearance of manufactories alongside of the handicraft workshops—such are the characteristic features of the state of the productive forces.

The new productive forces demand that the labourer shall display some kind of initiative in production and an inclination for work, an interest in work. The feudal lord therefore discards the slave, as a labourer who has no interest in work and is entirely without initiative, and prefers to deal with the serf, who has his own husbandry, implements of production, and a certain interest in work essential for the cultivation of the land and for the payment in kind of a part of his harvest to the feudal lord.

Here private ownership is further developed. Exploitation is nearly as severe as it was under slavery—it is only slightly mitigated. A class struggle between exploiters and exploited is the principal feature of the feudal system.

The basis of the relations of production under the capitalist system is that the capitalist owns the means of production, but not the workers in production—the wage labourers, whom the capitalist can neither kill nor sell because they are personally free, but who are deprived of means of production and, in order not to die of hunger, are obliged to sell their labour power to the capitalist and to bear the yoke of exploitation. Alongside of capitalist property in the means of production, we find, at first on a wide scale, private property of the peasants and handicraftsmen in the means of production, these peasants and handicraftsmen no longer being serfs, and their private property being based on personal labour. In place of the handicraft workshops and manufactories there appear huge mills and factories equipped with machinery. In place of the manorial estates tilled by the primitive implements of production of the peasant, there now appear large capitalist farms run on scientific lines and supplied with agricultural machinery.

The new productive forces require that the workers in production shall be better educated and more intelligent than the downtrodden and ignorant serfs, that they be able to understand machinery and operate it properly. Therefore, the capitalists prefer to deal with wage-workers, who are free from the bonds of serfdom and who are educated enough to be able properly to operate machinery.

But having developed productive forces to a tremendous extent, capitalism has become enmeshed in contradictions which it is unable to solve. By producing larger and larger quantities of commodities, and reducing their prices, capitalism intensifies competition, ruins the mass of small and medium private owners, converts them into proletarians and reduces their purchasing power, with the result that it becomes impossible to dispose of the commodities produced. On the other hand, by expanding production and concentrating millions of workers in huge mills and factories, capitalism lends the process of production a social character and thus undermines its own foundation, inasmuch as the social character of the process of production demands the

social ownership of the means of production; yet the means of production remain private capitalist property, which is incompatible with the social character of the process of production.

These irreconcilable contradictions between the character of the productive forces and the relations of production make themselves felt in periodical crises of overproduction, when the capitalists, finding no effective demand for their goods owing to the ruin of the mass of the population which they themselves have brought about, are compelled to burn products, destroy manufactured goods, suspend production, and destroy productive forces at a time when millions of people are forced to suffer unemployment and starvation, not because there are not enough goods, but because there is an overproduction of goods.

This means that the capitalist relations of production have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into irreconcilable contradiction with them.

This means that capitalism is pregnant with revolution, whose mission it is to replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by socialist ownership.

This means that the main feature of the capitalist system is a most acute class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited.

The basis of the relations of production under the socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R., is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labour performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by comradely cooperation and the socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation. Here the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces, for the social character of the process of production is reinforced by the social ownership of the means of production.

For this reason socialist production in the U.S.S.R. knows no periodical crises of overproduction and their accompanying absurdities.

For this reason, the productive forces here develop at an accelerated pace, for the relations of production that correspond to them offer full scope for such development.

Such is the picture of the development of men's relations of production in the course of human history.

Such is the dependence of the development of the relations of production on the development of the productive forces of society, and primarily, on the development of the instruments of production, the dependence by virtue of which the changes and development of the productive forces sooner or later lead to corresponding changes and development of the relations of production.

"The use and fabrication of instruments of labour,"* says Marx, "although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as a tool-making animal. Relics of by-gone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on." (K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, 1935, p. 121.)

And further:

— "Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. V, p. 364.)

— "There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement." (*Ibid.*, p. 364.)

Speaking of historical materialism as formulated in the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels says:

* By "instruments of labour" Marx has in mind primarily instruments of production.—*J.St.*

"Economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; consequently ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social development; this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles." (Engels' Preface to the German edition of the *Manifesto*.)

d) *The third feature* of production is that the rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them does not take place separately from the old system, after the disappearance of the old system, but within the old system; it takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man. It takes place spontaneously and independently of the will of man for two reasons.

Firstly, because men are not free to choose one mode of production or another, because as every new generation enters life it finds productive forces and relations of production already existing as the result of the work of former generations, owing to which it is obliged at first to accept and adapt itself to everything it finds ready-made in the sphere of production in order to be able to produce material values.

Secondly, because, when improving one instrument of production or another, one element of the productive forces or another, men do not realize, do not understand or stop to reflect what *social* results these improvements will lead to, but only think of their everyday interests, of lightening their labour and of securing some direct and tangible advantage for themselves.

When, gradually and gropingly, certain members of primitive communal society passed from the use of stone tools to the use of iron tools, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* results this innovation would lead to; they did

not understand or realize that the change to metal tools meant a revolution in production, that it would in the long run lead to the slave system. They simply wanted to lighten their labour and secure an immediate and tangible advantage; their conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this everyday personal interest.

When, in the period of the feudal system, the young bourgeoisie of Europe began to erect, alongside of the small guild workshops, large manufactories, and thus advanced the productive forces of society, it, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this innovation would lead to; it did not realize or understand that this "small" innovation would lead to a regrouping of social forces which was to end in a revolution both against the power of kings, whose favours it so highly valued, and against the nobility, to whose ranks its foremost representatives not infrequently aspired. It simply wanted to lower the cost of producing goods, to throw larger quantities of goods on the markets of Asia and of recently discovered America, and to make bigger profits. Its conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this commonplace practical aim.

When the Russian capitalists, in conjunction with foreign capitalists, energetically implanted modern large-scale machine industry in Russia, while leaving tsardom intact and turning the peasants over to the tender mercies of the landlords, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this extensive growth of productive forces would lead to; they did not realize or understand that this big leap in the realm of the productive forces of society would lead to a regrouping of social forces that would enable the proletariat to effect a union with the peasantry and to bring about a victorious socialist revolution. They simply wanted to expand industrial production to the limit, to gain control of the huge home market, to become monopolists, and to squeeze as much profit as possible out of the national economy. Their conscious activity did not extend beyond their commonplace, strictly practical interests.

Accordingly, Marx says:

"In the social production of their life (that is, in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men—*J. St.*), men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and *independent** of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces." (K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 269.)

This, however, does not mean that changes in the relations of production, and the transition from old relations of production to new relations of production proceed smoothly, without conflicts, without upheavals. On the contrary, such a transition usually takes place by means of the revolutionary overthrow of the old relations of production and the establishment of new relations of production. Up to a certain period the development of the productive forces and the changes in the realm of the relations of production proceed spontaneously, independently of the will of men. But that is so only up to a certain moment, until the new and developing productive forces have reached a proper state of maturity. After the new productive forces have matured, the existing relations of production and their upholders—the ruling classes—become that "insuperable" obstacle which can only be removed by the conscious action of the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution. Here there stands out in bold relief the *tremendous role* of new social ideas, of new political institutions, of a new political power, whose mission it is to abolish by force the old relations of production. Out of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, out of the new economic demands of society, there arise new social ideas; the new ideas organize and mobilize the masses; the masses become welded into a new political army, create a new revolutionary power, and make use of it to abolish by force the old system of relations of production, and to firmly establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious actions of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution.

* My italics.—*J. St.*

"The proletariat," says Marx, "during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class... by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production." (*Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1938, p. 52.)

And further:

— "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible." (*Ibid.*, p. 50.)

— "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, 1935, p. 603.)

Here is the formulation—a formulation of genius—of the essence of historical materialism given by Marx in 1859 in his historic Preface to his famous book, *Critique of Political Economy*:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, esthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of trans-

formation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation." (K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 269-70.)

Such is Marxist materialism as applied to social life, to the history of society.

Such are the principal features of dialectical and historical materialism.

REPORT TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

March 10, 1939

I

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Comrades, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth Party Congress. No small period, as you see. During this period the world has undergone considerable changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, are now in many respects totally altered.

What changes exactly have taken place in this period in the international situation? In what way exactly has the external and internal position of our country changed?

For the capitalist countries this period was one of very profound perturbations in both the economic and political spheres. In the economic sphere these were years of depression, followed, from the beginning of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the United States, Britain and France—consequently, these were years of new economic complications. In the political sphere they were years of serious political conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar, and involving over 500,000,000 people. The map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. The entire postwar system, the so-called peace regime, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further growth of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

Such is the general picture.

Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating the changes in the international situation.

**1. NEW ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.
INTENSIFICATION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR MARKETS AND SOURCES
OF RAW MATERIAL, AND FOR A NEW REDIVISION
OF THE WORLD**

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began which seized first of all the United States and then Britain, France and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the recent one.

This circumstance naturally led to an increase of unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from 30,000,000 in 1933 to 14,000,000 in 1937, has now again risen to 18,000,000 as a result of the new crisis.

A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it differs in many respects from the preceding one, and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival, which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Further, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economies on a

war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal recovery from the present crisis than during the preceding one.

Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present crisis is not universal, but as yet involves chiefly the economically powerful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war economy basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, who have already reorganized their economies on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful, nonaggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries.

VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
(*In millions of former gold dollars*)

	End of 1936	September 1938
<i>Total</i>	12,980	14,301
U.S.A.	6,649	8,126
Britain	2,029	2,396
France	1,769	1,435
Holland	289	595
Belgium	373	318
Switzerland	387	407
Germany	16	17
Italy	123	124
Japan	273	97

This table shows that the combined gold reserves of Germany, Italy and Japan amount to less than the reserves of Switzerland alone.

Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the trend of industrial progress in the U.S.S.R.

VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 1929
(1929=100)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.A.	66.4	75.6	88.1	92.2	72.0
Britain	98.8	105.8	115.9	123.7	112.0
France	71.0	67.4	79.3	82.8	70.0
Italy	80.0	93.8	87.5	99.6	96.0
Germany	79.8	94.0	106.3	117.2	125.0
Japan	128.7	141.8	151.1	170.8	165.0
U.S.S.R.	238.3	293.4	382.3	424.0	477.0

This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is continuously on the upgrade.

This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has already begun and is developing in the United States, Britain and France.

Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, who placed their national economies on a war footing earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry already began in 1938.

Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, who reorganized her economy on a war footing later than Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend—although a small one, it is true—as was the case in Japan and Italy until recently.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must enter the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a

one-sided, war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption—and, consequently, reducing consumption by the population and confronting the country with an economic crisis.

Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations among the powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and sharpened the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy—all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis was bound to lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These methods of struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres of influence and colonies, by military action.

Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions with the argument that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess vast colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, who had suffered severely as a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first imperialist war had deprived her.

Thus the bloc of three aggressive states came to be formed.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.

2. INCREASING ACUTENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION. COLLAPSE OF THE POSTWAR SYSTEM OF PEACE TREATIES. BEGINNING OF A NEW IMPERIALIST WAR

Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which marked the beginning of a new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of Spain and in the Balearic Islands. In 1937, having seized Manchuria, Japan invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.

Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn over 500,000,000 people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar.

After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, set up a new regime in the relations between countries, the postwar peace regime. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defence of the security of states. However, three aggressive states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, upset the entire system of this postwar peace regime. Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have

their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations.

The new imperialist war became a fact.

It is not so easy in our day suddenly to break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this quite well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to mould public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it.

A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of Britain and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (*Laughter.*)

A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind! "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. (*General laughter.*)

A war against the interests of Britain, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.

That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought to mould public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (*Laughter.*)

But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain—and all this in defiance of the interests of the nonaggressive states. The war remains a war; the

military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become a universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the nonaggressive states, primarily Britain, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the nonaggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain connivance, on their part.

Incredible, but true.

To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How is it that the nonaggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily and without resistance abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the nonaggressive states? Of course not! Combined, the nonaggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and militarily.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors?

It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the nonaggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that a second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the nonaggressive countries, particularly Britain and France, have rejected the policy of

collective security, the policy of collective resistance to aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, a position of "neutrality."

Formally speaking, the policy of nonintervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself against the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of nonintervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of nonintervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan commenced military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hongkong: Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying: "Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then they began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging on the Germans to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on the Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait jackets for them in our country. (*Thunderous applause.*) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish seriously to talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine: the gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you.... Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way to live?... I look at you and I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me.... (*General laughter.*)

Well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories. . ." (*General laughter and applause.*)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of nonintervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of nonintervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics are politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of nonintervention may end in serious fiasco for them.

Such is the true face of the now prevailing policy of nonintervention.

Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.

3. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the basis of the postwar peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including

primarily those which practise the policy of nonintervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, who are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.

Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these ominous developments. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peace-loving countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of maintaining peace, it is at the same time working very seriously to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.

At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors could be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet Union concluded a pact of nonaggression with the Chinese Republic.

It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit,

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to return two blows for every one delivered by warmongers who attempt to violate our Soviet frontiers.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon:

1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might;
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our country;
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;
5. Its policy of peace;
6. The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;
7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;

2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;
3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;
4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

II

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Let us now pass to the internal affairs of our country.

From the standpoint of its internal situation, the Soviet Union, during the period under review, presented a picture of further progress of its entire economic life, a rise in culture, and growth of the political might of the country.

In the sphere of economic development, the most important result in the period under review is the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of new, modern technique. There are no more or hardly any more old plants in our country, with their backward technique, and hardly any old peasant farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry and agriculture are now based on new, up-to-date technique. It may be said without exaggeration that from the standpoint of technique of production, from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry and agriculture with new machinery, our country is more advanced than any other country, where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production and hampers the introduction of new techniques.

In the sphere of the social and political development of the country, the most important achievement in the period under review is that the remnants of the exploiting classes have been completely eliminated, that the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been welded into one common front of the working

people, that the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been strengthened, that the friendship among the nations of our country has become closer, and that as a result of all this, the political life of our country has been completely democratized and a new Constitution created. No one will dare deny that our Constitution is the most democratic in the world, and that the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., as well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, are the most indicative.

The result of all this is a completely stable internal situation and a solid power in the country such as any government in the world might envy.

Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the economic and political situation of our country.

1. FURTHER PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

a) *Industry*. During the period under review our industry presented a picture of uninterrupted progress. This progress was reflected not only in an increase of output generally, but, and primarily, in the flourishing state of socialist industry, on the one hand, and the doom of private industry, on the other.

Here is a table which illustrates this: [See p. 761—Ed.]

This table shows that during the period under review the output of our industry more than doubled, and that, moreover, the whole increase in output was accounted for by socialist industry.

Further, this table shows that the only system of industry in the U.S.S.R. is the socialist system.

Lastly, this table shows that the utter doom of private industry is a fact which even a blind man cannot now deny.

The doom of private industry must not be regarded as a thing of chance. It perished, firstly, because the socialist economic system is superior to the capitalist system; and, secondly, because the socialist economic system made it possible for us to re-equip in a few years the whole of our socialist industry on new and

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1934-38

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	Per cent of previous year
In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices												
Per cent												
Total output	42,030	50,477	62,137	80,929	90,166	100,375	120.1	123.1	130.2	141.4	141.3	238.8
Of which:												
1. Socialist industry	42,002	50,443	62,114	80,898	90,138	100,349	120.1	123.1	130.2	141.4	141.3	238.9
2. Private industry	28	34	23	31	28	26	121.4	67.6	134.8	90.3	92.9	92.9
Total output	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Of which:												
1. Socialist industry	99.93	99.93	99.96	99.96	99.97	99.97	99.97	99.97	99.97	99.97	99.97	99.97
2. Private industry	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03

up-to-date technical lines. This is a possibility which the capitalist economic system does not and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from the standpoint of technique of production, from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry with modern machinery, our industry holds first place in the world.

If we take the rate of growth of our industry, expressed in percentages of the prewar level, and compare it with the rate of growth of industry in the principal capitalist countries, we get the following picture:

GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
(In 1913-38)

	1913	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.S.R.	100.0	380.5	457.0	562.6	732.7	816.4	908.8
U.S.A.	100.0	108.7	112.9	128.6	149.8	156.9	120.0
Britain	100.0	87.0	97.1	104.0	114.2	121.9	113.3
Germany	100.0	75.4	90.4	105.9	118.1	129.3	131.6
France	100.0	107.0	99.0	94.0	98.0	101.0	93.2

This table shows that our industry has grown more than ninefold as compared with prewar, whereas the industry of the principal capitalist countries continues to mark time round about the prewar level, exceeding the latter by only 20 or 30 per cent.

This means that as regards rate of growth our socialist industry holds first place in the world.

Thus we find that as regards technique of production and rate of growth of our industry, we have already overtaken and outstripped the principal capitalist countries.

In what respect are we lagging? We are still lagging economically, that is, as regards the volume of our industrial output per head of the population. In 1938 we produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem that we are better off than Britain. But if we divide this

number of tons by the number of population we shall find that the output of pig iron per head of the population in 1938 was 145 kilograms in Britain, and only 87 kilograms in the U.S.S.R. Or, further: in 1938 Britain produced 10,800,000 tons of steel and about 29,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity, whereas the U.S.S.R. produced 18,000,000 tons of steel and over 39,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity. It might seem that we are better off than Britain. But if we divide this number of tons and kilowatt-hours by the number of population we shall find that in 1938 in Britain the output of steel per head of the population was 226 kilograms and of electricity 620 kilowatt-hours, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the output of steel per head of the population was only 107 kilograms, and of electricity only 233 kilowatt-hours.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that our population is several times larger than that of Britain, and hence our requirements are greater: the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000, whereas Britain has a population of not more than 46,000,000. The economic power of a country's industry is not expressed by the volume of industrial output in general, irrespective of the size of population, but by the volume of industrial output taken in direct reference to the amount consumed per head of the population. The larger a country's industrial output per head of the population, the greater is its economic power; and, conversely, the smaller the output per head of the population, the less is the economic power of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the larger a country's population, the greater is the need for articles of consumption, and hence the larger should be the industrial output of the country.

Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order to outstrip Britain economically in respect to production of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted in that country to 7,000,000 tons, we must increase our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons. In order economically to outstrip Germany, which in 1938 produced 18,000,000 tons of pig iron in all, we must raise our annual

output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,000 tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically—not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year of crisis, and in which the U.S.A. produced only 18,800,000 tons of pig iron, but as regards the level of 1929, when the U.S.A. was experiencing an industrial boom and when it produced about 43,000,000 tons of pig iron—we must raise our annual output of pig iron to 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 tons.

The same must be said of the production of steel and rolled steel, of the machine-building industry, and so on, inasmuch as these branches of industry, and all others too, depend in the long run on the production of pig iron.

We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. That is very good, but it is not enough. We must outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated with consumer goods, on having an abundance of products, and on being able to make the transition from the first phase of communism to its second phase.

What do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically? First of all, we require the earnest and indomitable desire to move ahead and the readiness to make sacrifices and considerable capital investments for the utmost expansion of our socialist industry. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Further, we require a high technique of production and a high rate of industrial development. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Lastly, we require time. Yes, comrades, time. We must build new factories. We must train new cadres for industry. But that requires time, and no little time at that. We cannot outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in two or three years. It will require rather more than that. Take, for example, pig iron and its production. How much time do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in regard to the production of pig iron? When the second five-year plan was being drawn up, certain mem-

bers of the former personnel of the State Planning Commission proposed that the annual output of pig iron towards the end of the second five-year plan should be fixed in the amount of sixty million tons. That means that they assumed the possibility of an average annual increase in pig iron production of ten million tons. This, of course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Incidentally, it was not only in regard to the production of pig iron that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They considered, for example, that during the period of the second five-year plan the annual increase of population in the U.S.S.R. should amount to three or four million persons, or even more. That was also fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic dreamers and come down to reality, we may consider quite feasible an average annual increase in the output of pig iron of two or two and a half million tons, bearing in mind the present state of technique of iron smelting. The industrial history of the principal capitalist countries, as well as of our country, shows that such an annual rate of increase involves a great strain, but is quite feasible.

Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, in order to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically. And the higher our productivity of labour becomes, and the more our technique of production is perfected, the more rapidly shall we be able to accomplish this cardinal economic task, the more shall we be able to reduce the period of its accomplishment.

b) *Agriculture.* Like the development of industry, the development of agriculture during the period under review has followed an upward trend. This upward trend is expressed not only in an increase of agricultural output, but, and primarily, in the growth and consolidation of socialist agriculture on the one hand, and the downfall of individual peasant farming on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective farms increased from 75,000,000 hectares in 1933 to 92,000,000 in 1938, the grain area of the individual peasant farmers dropped in this period from 15,700,000 hectares to 600,000 hectares, or to 0.6 per cent of the

total grain area. I will not mention the area under industrial crops, a branch in which individual peasant farming has been reduced to nil. Furthermore, it is well known that the collective farms now unite 18,800,000 peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of all the peasant households, aside from the collective fisheries and mixed industrial and agricultural artels.

This means that the collective farms have been firmly established and consolidated, and that the socialist system of farming is now our only form of agriculture.

If we compare the areas under all crops during the period under review with the crop areas in the prerevolutionary period, we observe the following picture of growth:

AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

	Millions of hectares						1938 compared with 1913 (per cent)
	1913	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
Total crop area .	105.0	131.5	132.8	133.8	135.3	136.9	130.4
Of which:							
a) Grain . .	94.4	104.7	103.4	102.4	104.4	102.4	108.5
b) Industrial . .	4.5	10.7	10.6	10.8	11.2	11.0	244.4
c) Vegetable . .	3.8	8.8	9.9	9.8	9.0	9.4	247.4
d) Fodder . .	2.1	7.1	8.6	10.6	10.6	14.1	671.4

This table shows that we have an increase in area for all cultures, and above all for fodder, industrial crops, and vegetables.

This means that our agriculture is becoming more high-grade and productive, and that a solid foundation is being provided for the increasing application of proper crop rotation.

The way our collective farms and state farms have been increasingly supplied with tractors, harvester combines and other machines during the period under review is shown by the following tables:

1. TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
a) Number of tractors (thousands)							
Total .	210.9	276.4	360.3	422.7	454.5	483.5	229.3
Of which:							
a) In machine and tractor stations .	123.2	177.3	254.7	328.5	365.8	394.0	319.8
b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings .	83.2	95.5	102.1	88.5	84.5	85.0	102.2
b) Capacity (thous. hp)							
All tractors .	3,209.2	4,462.8	6,184.0	7,672.4	8,385.0	9,256.2	288.4
Of which:							
a) In machine and tractor stations .	1,758.1	2,753.9	4,281.6	5,856.0	6,679.2	7,437.0	423.0
b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings .	1,401.7	1,669.5	1,861.4	1,730.7	1,647.5	1,751.8	125.0

2. TOTAL HARVESTER COMBINES AND OTHER MACHINES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

(In thousands; at end of year)

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
Harvester combines .	25.4	32.3	50.3	87.8	128.8	153.5	604.3
Internal combustion and steam engines .	48.0	60.9	69.1	72.4	77.9	83.8	174.6
Complex and semicomplex grain threshers .	120.3	121.9	120.1	123.7	126.1	130.8	108.7
Motor trucks .	26.6	40.3	63.7	96.2	144.5	195.8	736.1
Automobiles (units) .	3,991	5,533	7,555	7,630	8,156	9,594	240.4

If in addition to these figures, we bear in mind that in the period under review the number of machine and tractor stations increased from 2,900 in 1934 to 6,350 in 1938, it may be safely said, on the basis of all these facts, that the reconstruction of our agriculture on the foundation of a new and up-to-date machine technique has in the main already been completed.

Our agriculture, consequently, is not only run on the largest scale, is not only the most mechanized in the world, and therefore produces the largest surplus for the market, but is also more fully equipped with modern machinery than the agriculture of any other country.

If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial crops during the period under review with the prerevolutionary period, we get the following picture of growth:

GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS
IN THE U.S.S.R.

	In millions of centners						1938 com- pared with 1913 (per cent)
	1913	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
Grain	801.0	894.0	901.0	827.3	1,202.9	949.9	118.6
Raw cotton	7.4	11.8	17.2	23.9	25.8	26.9	363.5
Flax fibre	3.3	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.46	165.5
Sugar beet	109.0	113.6	162.1	168.3	218.6	166.8	153.0
Oil seed	21.5	36.9	42.7	42.3	51.1	46.6	216.7

From this table it can be seen that despite the drought in the eastern and southeastern districts in 1936 and 1938, and despite the unprecedentedly large harvest in 1913, the gross production of grain and industrial crops during the period under review steadily increased as compared with 1913.

Of particular interest is the question of the amount of grain marketed by the collective farms and state farms as compared

with their gross harvests. Comrade Nemchinov, the statistician, has calculated that of a gross grain harvest of 5,000,000,000 poods in prewar times, only about 1,300,000,000 poods were marketed. Thus the marketed proportion of the grain crop in those days was 26 per cent. Comrade Nemchinov computes that in the years 1926-27, for example, the proportion of marketed produce to gross harvest was about 47 per cent in the case of collective and state farming, which is large-scale farming, and about 12 per cent in the case of individual peasant farming. If we approach the matter more cautiously and assume the amount of marketed produce in the case of collective and state farming in 1938 to be 40 per cent of the gross harvest, we find that in that year our socialist grain farming was able to release, and actually did release, about 2,300,000,000 poods of grain for the market, or 1,000,000,000 poods more than was marketed in pre-war times.

Consequently, the high proportion of produce marketed constitutes an important feature of state and collective farming, and is of cardinal importance for the food supply of our country.

It is this feature of the collective farms and state farms that explains the secret why our country has succeeded so easily and rapidly in solving the grain problem, the problem of producing an adequate supply of market grain for this vast country.

It should be noted that during the last three years annual grain deliveries to the state have not dropped below 1,600,000,000 poods, while sometimes, as for example in 1937, they reached 1,800,000,000 poods. If we add to this about 200,000,000 poods or so of grain purchased annually by the state, as well as several hundred million poods sold by collective farms and farmers directly in the market, we get in all the total of grain released by the collective farms and state farms already mentioned.

Further, it is interesting to note that during the last three years the base of market grain has shifted from the Ukraine, which was formerly considered the granary of our country, to the north and the east, that is, to the R.S.F.S.R. We know that during the last two or three years grain deliveries in the Ukraine

have amounted in all to about 400,000,000 poods annually, whereas in the R.S.F.S.R. the grain deliveries during these years have amounted to 1,100,000,000 or 1,200,000,000 poods annually.

That is how things stand with regard to grain farming.

As regards livestock farming, considerable advances have been made during the past few years in this, the most backward branch of agriculture, as well. True, in the number of horses and in sheep breeding we are still below the prerevolutionary level; but as regards cattle and hog breeding we have already passed the prerevolutionary level.

Here are the figures:

TOTAL HEAD OF LIVESTOCK IN THE U.S.S.R.

(*In millions*)

	July							1938 compared with	
	1916 according to census	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1916 according to census (per cent)	1933 (per cent)
Horses	. 35.8	16.6	15.7	15.9	16.6	16.7	17.5	48.9	105.4
Cattle	. 60.6	38.4	42.4	49.2	56.7	57.0	63.2	104.3	164.6
Sheep and goats	. 121.2	50.2	51.9	61.1	73.7	81.3	102.5	84.6	204.2
Hogs	. 20.9	12.1	17.4	22.5	30.5	22.8	30.6	146.4	252.9

There can be no doubt that the lag in horse breeding and sheep breeding will be remedied in a very short period.

c) *Trade turnover and transport.* The progress in industry and agriculture was accompanied by an increase in the trade turnover of the country. During the period under review the number of state and cooperative retail stores increased by 25 per cent. State and cooperative retail trade increased by 178 per cent. Trade in the collective-farm markets increased by 112 per cent.

Here is the corresponding table:

TRADE TURNOVER

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
1. State and cooperative stores and booths—at end of year	285,355	286,236	268,713	289,473	327,361	356,930	125.1
2. State and cooperative retail trade, including public catering (in millions of rubles)	49,789.2	61,814.7	81,712.1	106,760.9	125,943.2	138,574.3	278.3
3. Trade in collective-farm markets (in millions of rubles) . . .	11,500.0	14,000.0	14,500.0	15,607.2	17,799.7	24,399.2	212.2
4. Regional wholesale departments of the People's Commissariats of the Food Industry, Light Industry, Heavy Industry, Timber Industry, and Local Industry, and Local Industry of the Union Republics—at end of year	718	836	1,141	1,798	1,912	1,994	277.7

It is obvious that trade turnover in the country could not have so developed without a certain increase in freight traffic. And indeed during the period under review freight traffic increased in all branches of transport, especially rail and air. There was an increase in water-borne freight, too, but with considerable fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, there was even a drop in water-borne freight as compared with the previous year.

Here is the corresponding table:

FREIGHT TRAFFIC

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 com-pared with 1933 (per cent)
Railways (in millions of ton-kilometres) . . .	169,500	205,700	258,100	323,400	354,800	369,100	217.7
River and marine transport (in millions of ton-kilometres) . . .	50,200	56,500	68,300	72,300	70,100	66,000	131.5
Civil air fleet (in thousands of ton-kilometres) . . .	3,100	6,400	9,800	21,900	24,900	31,700	1,022.6

There can be no doubt that the comparative lag in water transport in 1938 will be remedied in 1939.

2. FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE PEOPLE

The steady progress of industry and agriculture could not but lead, and has actually led, to a new rise in the material and cultural standard of the people.

The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with its attendant poverty, in town and country, the enormous expansion of industry and the steady growth in the number of workers, the increase in the productivity of labour of the workers and collective farmers, the securement of the land to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast number of first-class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the collective farms—all this has created effective conditions for a further rise in the standard of living of the workers and peasants. In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants has naturally led to an improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia, who represent a considerable force in our country and serve the interests of the workers and the peasants.

Now it is no longer a question of finding room in industry for unemployed and homeless peasants who have been set adrift from their villages and live in fear of starvation—of giving them jobs out of charity. The time has long gone by when there were such peasants in our country. And that is a good thing, of course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our countryside. If anything, it is now a question of asking the collective farms to comply with our request and to release, say, about 1,500,000 young collective farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry. The collective farms, which have already become prosperous, should bear in mind that if we do not get this assistance from them it will be very difficult to continue the expansion of our industry, and that if we do not expand our industry we shall not be able to satisfy the peasants' growing demand for consumer goods. The collective farms are quite able to meet this request of ours, since the abundance of machinery in the collective farms releases

a portion of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry, could be of immense service to our whole national economy.

As a result, we have the following indications of the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants during the period under review:

1. The national income rose from 48,500,000,000 rubles in 1933 to 105,000,000,000 rubles in 1938;
2. The number of factory and office workers rose from a little over 22,000,000 in 1933 to 28,000,000 in 1938;
3. The total annual payroll rose from 34,953,000,000 rubles to 96,425,000,000 rubles;
4. The average annual wages of industrial workers, which amounted to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 3,447 rubles in 1938;
5. The total monetary incomes of the collective farms rose from 5,661,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 14,180,100,000 rubles in 1937;
6. The average amount of grain received per collective-farm household in the grain-growing regions rose from 61 poods in 1933 to 144 poods in 1937, exclusive of seed, emergency seed stocks, fodder for the collectively-owned cattle, grain deliveries, and payments in kind for work performed by the machine and tractor stations;
7. State budget appropriations for social and cultural services rose from 5,839,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 35,202,500,000 rubles in 1938.

As regards the cultural standard of the people, its rise was commensurate with the rise in the standard of living.

From the standpoint of the cultural development of the people, the period under review has been marked by a veritable cultural revolution. The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education in the languages of the various nationalities of the U.S.S.R., the increasing number of schools and scholars of all grades, the increasing number of college-trained experts, and the creation and growth of a new intelligentsia, a Soviet intelligentsia—such is the general picture of the cultural advancement of our people.

Here are the figures:

1) RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE

	Unit of measurement	1933-34	1938-39	1938-39 compared with 1933-34
Number of pupils and students of all grades	thousands	23,814	33,965.4	142.6%
Of which:				
In elementary schools		17,873.5	21,288.4	119.1%
In secondary schools (general and special)		5,482.2	12,076.0	220.3%
In higher educational institutions		458.3	601.0	131.1%
Number of persons engaged in all forms of study in the U.S.S.R.		—	47,442.1	—
Number of public libraries	" millions	40.3	70.0	173.7%
Number of books in public libraries	thousands	86.0	126.6	147.2%
Number of clubs	units	61.1	95.6	156.5%
Number of theatres		587	790	134.6%
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film)		27,467	30,461	110.9%
Of which:				
With sound equipment		498	15,202	31 times
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film) in rural districts		17,470	18,991	108.7%
Of which:				
With sound equipment		24	6,670	278 times
Annual newspaper circulation	" millions	4,984.6	7,092.4	142.3%

**2) NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R.
IN 1933-38**

	In towns and hamlets	In rural localities	Total
1933	326	3,261	3,587
1934	577	3,488	4,065
1935	533	2,829	3,362
1936	1,505	4,206	5,711
1937	730	1,323	2,053
1938	583	1,246	1,829
Total (1933-38)	4,254	16,353	20,607

**3) YOUNG SPECIALISTS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1933-38**
(In thousands)

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Total for U.S.S.R. (exclusive of military specialists)	34.6	49.2	83.7	97.6	104.8	106.7
1. Engineers for industry and building	6.1	14.9	29.6	29.2	27.6	25.2
2. Engineers for transport and communications	1.8	4.0	7.6	6.6	7.0	6.1
3. Agricultural engineers, agro- nonomists, veterinarians and zootechnicians	4.8	6.3	8.8	10.4	11.3	10.6
4. Economists and jurists	2.5	2.5	5.0	6.4	5.0	5.7
5. Teachers of secondary schools, workers' faculties, technical schools, and other educational workers, including art workers	10.5	7.9	12.5	21.6	31.7	35.7
6. Physicians, pharmacists, and physical culture instructors	4.6	2.5	7.5	9.2	12.3	13.6
7. Other specialities	4.3	11.1	12.7	14.2	9.9	9.8

As a result of this immense cultural work a numerous new, Soviet intelligentsia has arisen and developed in our country, an intelligentsia which has emerged from the ranks of the working class, peasantry and Soviet employees, which is of the flesh and blood of our people, has never known the yoke of exploitation, hates exploiters, and is ready to serve the peoples of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly.

I think that the rise of this new, socialist intelligentsia of the people is one of the most important results of the cultural revolution in our country.

3. FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

One of the most important results of the period under review is that it has led to the further internal consolidation of the country, to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment of the socialist system in all branches of national economy, the progress of industry and agriculture, the rising material standard of the working people, the rising cultural standard of the masses and their increasing political activity—all this, accomplished under the guidance of the Soviet government, could not but lead to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants and intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. Whereas capitalist society is torn by irreconcilable antagonisms between workers and capitalists and between peasants and landlords—resulting in its internal instability—Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such antagonisms, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is this community of interest which has formed the basis for

the development of such motive forces as the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R., and Soviet patriotism. It has also been the basis for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in November 1936, and for the complete democratization of the elections to the supreme organs of the country.

As to the elections to the supreme organs, they were a magnificent demonstration of that unity of Soviet society and of that friendship among the nations of the U.S.S.R. which constitute the characteristic feature of the internal situation of our country. As we know, in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in December 1937, nearly 90,000,000 votes, or 98.6 per cent of the total ballot, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc, while in the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in June 1938, 92,000,000 votes, or 99.4 per cent of the total ballot, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc.

There you have the basis of the stability of the Soviet system and the source of the inexhaustible strength of Soviet government.

This means, incidentally, that in case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which foreign lovers of military conflicts would do well to remember.

Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of Soviet organizations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukachevsky, Rosengolts, Bukharin and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoralization." All this cheap drivel deserves is laughter and scorn. How can the purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralize the Soviet system? The Trotsky-Bukharin bunch, that handful of spies, assassins and wreckers, who kowtowed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig and were ready to serve him as spies—that handful of individuals who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fet-

ters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery—of what use that miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the people, and whom can they "demoralize"? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for Soviet government. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengolts, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for Soviet government. Where are the symptoms of "demoralization," we would like to know, and why was this "demoralization" not reflected in the results of the elections?

To listen to these foreign drivellers one would think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. (*Laughter.*) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins and wreckers?

Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet organizations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organizations?

What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations?

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of internal policy are:

1. To promote the further progress of our industry, rise of productivity of labour, and perfection of the technique of production, in order, having already outstripped the principal capitalist countries in technique of production and rate of industrial

development, to outstrip them economically as well in the next ten or fifteen years.

2. To promote the further progress of our agriculture and stock breeding so as to achieve in the next three or four years an annual grain harvest of 8,000,000,000 poods, with an average yield of 12-13 centners per hectare; an average increase in the harvest of industrial crops of 30-35 per cent; and an increase in the number of sheep and hogs by 100 per cent, of cattle by about 40 per cent, and of horses by about 35 per cent.

3. To continue to improve the material and cultural standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.

4. Steadfastly to carry into effect our socialist Constitution; to complete the democratization of the political life of the country; to strengthen the moral and political unity of Soviet society and fraternal collaboration among our workers, peasants and intellectuals; to promote the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, and to develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism.

5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.

III

FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

From the standpoint of the political line and day-to-day practical work, the period under review was one of complete victory for the general line of our Party. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness of the policy of our Party and the correctness of its leadership are the firm establishment of the socialist system in the entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of modern technique, the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry ahead of time, the

increase of the annual grain harvest to a level of 7,000,000,000 poods, the abolition of poverty and unemployment, and the rising material and cultural standard of the people.

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov renegades were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed "platforms" and go under cover. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to commit themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.

Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people.

Having smashed the enemies of the people and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of renegades, the Party became still more strongly united in its political and organizational work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Committee. (*Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Central Committee of our Party!"*)

Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating the development of the internal life of the Party and its organizational and propaganda work during the period under review.

1. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY.

DIVISION OF ORGANIZATIONS. CLOSER CONTACT BETWEEN THE LEADING PARTY BODIES AND THE WORK OF THE LOWER BODIES

The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two lines: along the line of regulating the composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best elements, and

along the line of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies.

At the Seventeenth Party Congress 1,874,488 Party members were represented. Comparing this figure with the number of Party members represented at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in the interval between these two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. The Party could not but feel that such a mass influx into its ranks in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that not only honest and loyal people were joining its ranks, but also chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal ends. The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. The question accordingly arose of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and it actually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were no few suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed. As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in culling the staunchest and most loyal. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no need to resort to the method of mass purges any more. Nevertheless,

the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and on the whole its results were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth Congress, is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party is strengthened by purging its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

As regards improvement of the Party's day-to-day leadership by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size. People's Commissariats as well as the administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were divided up. The result of the measures adopted is that instead of 7 Union Republics, we now have 11; instead of 14 People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. we have 34; instead of 70 territories and regions we have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural districts we have 3,815. Correspondingly, within the system of leading Party bodies, we now have 11 central committees, headed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 6 territorial committees, 104 regional committees, 30 area committees, 212 city committees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 rural district committees, and 113,060 primary Party organizations.

It cannot be said that the dividing of organizations will stop there. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, it is already yielding good results both in improving the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. I need not mention that this dividing up of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts.

That, too, is a big achievement.

2. SELECTION, PROMOTION AND ALLOCATION OF CADRES

Regulating the composition of the Party and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies was not, and could not be, the only means of further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in the period under review was a radical improvement in the training of cadres, in the work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of testing them in the process of work.

The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the leadership exercised by the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the problem of properly selecting cadres and fostering them, of promoting new people, of correctly allocating cadres, and testing them by work accomplished.

What is meant by properly selecting cadres?

Properly selecting cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of deps and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order. (*Laughter.*) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (*Laughter.*)

Proper selection of cadres means:

Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

Secondly, knowing cadres, carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must chiefly rely on young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken. The old cadres, of course, are a valuable asset to the Party and the state. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a steeled knowledge of Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But, firstly, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming. As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But,

firstly, the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become worthy of replacing them. Consequently, the point is not whether we should rely on the old cadres or the new, but rather that we should steer for a combination; a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party during the period under review in the matter of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state and Party posts over 500,000 young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, over 20 per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors and concentrating it in one body.

This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, territorial and regional Party organizations.

8. PARTY PROPAGANDA. MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF PARTY MEMBERS AND PARTY CADRES

There is still another sphere of Party work, a very important and very responsible one, in which the work of strengthening the Party and its leading bodies has been carried on during the period under review. I am referring to Party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the Party members and Party cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and theoretical level of the Party and its workers.

There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our personnel. I am referring not only to Party personnel. I am also referring to the personnel of the Young Communist League, trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, military and other organizations. The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may also be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above—then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the workers in any branch of state or Party work, the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level and Marxist-Leninist understanding of the workers, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry

plodders, of their degenerating altogether. It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxists-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and moulding of our young cadres usually proceeds in each particular branch of science or technology along the line of specialization. That is necessary and expedient. There is no reason why a man who specializes in medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa. But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of socialist construction, and of the victory of communism. For a man who calls himself a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his speciality, in mathematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing beyond that speciality. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his favourite science; he must also be a political and public worker, keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws of social development, capable of applying these laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political guidance of the country. This, of course, will be an additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks. But it will be a burden more than compensated for by its results.

The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development.

Measures for improving the work of propaganda and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed many times by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) jointly with propagandists from various regional Party organizations. The publication, in September 1938, of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—Short Course* was taken into account in this connection. It was ascertained that the publication of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* had given a new impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country. The results of the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) have been published in its decision "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—Short Course.*"

On the basis of this decision and with due reference to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of March 1937 on "Defects in Party Work," the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has outlined the following major measures for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and improving the Marxist-Leninist training of Party members and Party cadres:

1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments and the press departments into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation departments in each republican, territorial and regional Party organization;

2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for the system of propaganda through study circles, and considering the method of individual study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members to be more expedient, to centre the attention of the Party on propaganda through the press and on the organization of a system of propaganda by lectures;

3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for our lower cadres in each regional centre;

4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle cadres in a number of centres of the country;

5. To organize a Higher-School of Marxism-Leninism under the auspices of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) with a three-year course for the training of highly-qualified Party theoreticians;

6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for propagandists and journalists in a number of centres of the country;

7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction for teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational establishments.

There can be no doubt that the implementation of these measures, which are already being carried out, although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results.

4. SOME QUESTIONS OF THEORY

Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological work is the absence of full clarity among our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our socialist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet intelligentsia.

It is sometimes asked: "We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away.—Why then do we not help our socialist state to wither away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to get rid of the state, as so much lumber?"

Or again: "The exploiting classes have already been abolished in our country; socialism has in the main been built; we are advancing towards communism. Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under communism.—Why then do we not help our socialist state to wither away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?"

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorized certain tenets of the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades

have not grasped the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they do not realize in what historical conditions the various tenets of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the socialist country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our socialist state and of its military, penal and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defence of the Land of Socialism from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones guilty of this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, to a certain extent sin in this respect. Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinist ring-leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification: for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and significance of the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an

underestimation of the importance of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in the Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

What could have given rise to this underestimation?

It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general tenets of the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely elaborated and were inadequate. It received currency owing to our unpardonably heedless attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have had twenty years of practical experience in state affairs which provides rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important injunction about the theoretical duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further develop the Marxist theory. Here is what Lenin said in this connection:

"We do not regard Marxist theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the cornerstone of the science which Socialists *must* further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian Socialists, for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia." (Lenin, Vol. II, p. 492.)

Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the theory of the development of the socialist state given by Engels:

"As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production hitherto, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The

government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away." (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Partizdat, 1933, p. 202.)

Is this proposition of Engels' correct?

Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: a) if we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of a country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or b) if we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

Well, but what if socialism has been victorious only in one separate country, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions—what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that socialism has already been victorious more or less simultaneously in all countries, or in a majority of countries. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the socialist state in general, on the assumption that socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries—according to the formula: "Assuming that socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletarian, socialist state undergo?" Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the socialist state in general cannot be extended to the particular and specific case of the victory of socialism in one

separate country, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized penal organs, and a strong intelligence service, consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of socialism from foreign attack.

We cannot expect the Marxian classics, separated as they were from our day by a period of 45 or 55 years, to have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect the Marxian classics to have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country 50 or 100 years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the Marxian classics, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. (*General laughter.*) But we can and should expect the Marxists-Leninists of our day not to confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; to delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; to learn to take account of the experience gained in the 20 years of existence of the socialist state in our country; and, lastly, utilizing this experience and basing themselves on the essence of Marxism, to learn to apply the various general tenets of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them. Lenin wrote his famous book, *The State and Revolution*, in August 1917, that is, a few months before the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state. Lenin considered it the main task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' teaching on the state from distortion and vulgarization by the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a second volume of *The State and Revolution*, in which he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in the second volume of his book to elaborate and to further develop the theory of the state on the basis of the experience gained during the existence of Soviet power in our country. Death, however, prevented him from carrying this task

into execution. But what Lenin did not manage to do should be done by his disciples. (*Loud applause.*)

The state arose because society split up into antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in check the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The instruments of state power became concentrated mainly in the army, the penal organs, the intelligence service, the prisons. Two basic functions characterize the activity of the state: at home (the main function), to keep in check the exploited majority; abroad (not the main function), to extend the territory of its class, the ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other states, or to defend the territory of its own state from attack by other states. Such was the case in slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case under capitalism.

In order to overthrow capitalism it was necessary not only to remove the bourgeoisie from power, not only to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state machine, its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, proletarian form of state, a new, socialist state. And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not at all follow that the new, proletarian state may not retain certain functions of the old state, modified to suit the requirements of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms of our socialist state must remain unchanged, that all the original functions of our state must be fully retained in future. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing and will continue to change in line with the development of our country and with the changes in the international situation.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said:

"The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their form, in the final analysis are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a great abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the *dictatorship of the proletariat*." (Lenin, Vol. XXI, p. 393.)

Since the October Revolution, our socialist state has in its development passed through two main phases.

The first phase was the period from the October Revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize the defence of the country against the attack of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes within the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the labouring majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defended from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function: this was economic and organizational work and cultural and educational work performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the young shoots of the new, socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of socialism. But this new function did not attain any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to organize socialist economy throughout the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to organize a cultural revolution, and to organize a thoroughly modern army for the

defence of the country. And the functions of our socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the property of the people. The function of armed defence of the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the penal organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign intelligence services. The function of the state organs as regards economic and organizational work, and cultural and educational work, remained and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country lies in peaceful economic and organizational work, and cultural and educational work. As for our army, penal organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, socialist state, one without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are moving ahead, towards communism. Will our state remain in the period of communism also?

Yes, it will, if the capitalist encirclement is not liquidated, and if the danger of foreign military attack is not eliminated, although naturally, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will wither away if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and is replaced by a socialist encirclement.

That is how the question stands with regard to the socialist state.

The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia.

On this question, too, as on the question of the state, there is a certain uncleariness and confusion among Party members.

In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly clear, there are still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the Party position. As you know, those who hold these false views practise a disdainful and contemptuous attitude towards the Soviet intelligentsia and regard it as a force alien and even hostile to the working class and the peasantry. True, during the period of Soviet development the intelligentsia has undergone a radical change both in composition and status. It has become closer to the people and is honestly collaborating with it, in which respect it differs fundamentally from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia. But this apparently means nothing to these comrades. They go on harping on the old tune and wrongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views and attitudes which were justified in the old days when the intelligentsia was in the service of the landlords and capitalists.

In the old prerevolutionary days, under capitalism, the intelligentsia consisted primarily of members of the propertied classes—noblemen, manufacturers, merchants, kulaks and so on. Some members of the intelligentsia were sons of small tradesmen, petty officials, and even of peasants and workingmen, but they did not and could not play a decisive part. The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelihood on the propertied classes and ministered to them. Hence it is easy to understand the mistrust, often bordering on hatred, with which the revolutionary elements of our country and above all the workers regarded the intellectuals. True, the old intelligentsia produced some courageous and revolutionary individuals or handfuls of individuals who adopted the standpoint of the working class and completely threw in their lot with the working class. But such people were all too few among the intelligentsia, and they could not change the complexion of the intelligentsia as a whole.

But the position with regard to the intelligentsia has radically

changed since the October Revolution, since the defeat of the foreign armed intervention, and especially since the victory of industrialization and collectivization, when the abolition of exploitation and the firm establishment of the socialist economic system made it effectively possible to give the country a new Constitution and to put it into effect. The most influential and highly-qualified section of the old intelligentsia broke away from the main body in the very first days of the October Revolution, proclaimed war on the Soviet government, and joined the ranks of the saboteurs. They met with well-deserved punishment for this; they were smashed and dispersed by the organs of Soviet power. Subsequently the majority of those that survived were recruited by the enemies of our country as wreckers and spies, and thus expunged themselves by their own deeds from the ranks of the intellectuals. Another section of the old intelligentsia, less qualified but more numerous, continued for a long time to temporize, waiting for "better days"; but then, apparently giving up hope, decided to go and serve and live in harmony with the Soviet government. The greater part of this group of the old intelligentsia are getting well on in years and are beginning to go out of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, mainly comprising its rank and file, and still less qualified than the section just mentioned, joined forces with the people and supported the Soviet government. They needed to perfect their education, and they set about doing so in our universities. But parallel with this painful process of differentiation and break-up of the old intelligentsia there was going on a rapid process of formation, mobilization and mustering of forces of a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands of young people from the ranks of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia entered the universities and technical colleges, from which they emerged to reinforce the attenuated ranks of the intelligentsia. They infused fresh blood into it and animated it with a new, Soviet spirit. They radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, moulding it in their own form and image. The remnants of the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, Soviet intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the people.

There thus arose a new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately bound up with the people and, for the most part, ready to serve them faithfully and loyally.

As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, socialist intelligentsia, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia both in composition and in social and political character.

The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that it should be distrusted and combated, fully applied to the old prerevolutionary intelligentsia, which served the landlords and capitalists. That theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our new, Soviet intelligentsia. A new theory is needed for our new intelligentsia, one teaching the necessity for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class and the peasantry.

That is clear, I should think.

It is therefore all the more astonishing and strange that after all these fundamental changes in the status of the intelligentsia, there should be people in our Party who attempt to apply the old theory, which was directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia, to our new, Soviet intelligentsia, which is basically a socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, assert that workers and peasants who until recently were working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and collective farms and who were then sent to universities to be educated, thereby ceased to be real people and became second-rate people. So we are to conclude that education is a pernicious and dangerous thing. (*Laughter.*) We want all our workers and peasants to be cultured and educated, and we shall achieve this in time. But in the opinion of these queer comrades, this purpose harbours a grave danger; for when the workers and peasants become cultured and educated they may face the danger of being classified as second-rate people. (*General laughter.*) The possibility is not precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink to the level of extolling backwardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism. It would be quite in the nature

of things. Theoretical vagaries never have led, and never can lead, to any good.

Such is the position with regard to our new, socialist intelligentsia.

* * *

Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening of the Party are:

1. To systematically improve the composition of the Party, raising the ideological level of its membership, and admitting into its ranks, by a process of individual selection, only tried and tested comrades who are loyal to the cause of communism.

2. To establish closer contact between the leading bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to make their work of leadership more practical and specific and less confined to meetings and offices.

3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to train them carefully and foster them, to study the merits and demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote young workers boldly and adapt the selection and allocation of cadres to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, to extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and to raise the theoretical level and improve the political schooling of our cadres.

* * *

Comrades, I am now about to conclude my report.

I have sketched in broad outline the path traversed by our Party during the period under review. The results of the work of the Party and of its Central Committee during this period are well known. There have been mistakes and shortcomings in our work. The Party and the Central Committee did not conceal them and strove to correct them. There have also been important

successes and big achievements, which must not however be allowed to turn our heads.

The main outcome is that the working class of our country, having abolished the exploitation of man by man and firmly established the socialist system, has proved to the world the truth of its cause. That is the main outcome, for it strengthens confidence in the power of the working class and in the inevitability of its ultimate victory.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the people cannot get along without capitalists and landlords, without merchants and kulaks. The working class of our country has proved in practice that the people can get along perfectly well without exploiters.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the working class, having destroyed the old bourgeois system, will be incapable of building anything new to replace the old. The working class of our country has proved in practice that it is quite capable not only of destroying the old system but of building a new and better system, a socialist system, a system, moreover, to which crises and unemployment are unknown.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the peasantry is incapable of taking the path of socialism. The collective-farm peasants of our country have proved in practice that they can do so quite successfully.

The chief endeavour of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of its reformist hangers-on is to kill in the working class faith in its own strength, faith in the possibility and inevitability of its victory, and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For the bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been overthrown and still continues to exist, it owes this not to its own merits, but to the fact that the proletariat still has not enough faith in the possibility of its victory. It cannot be said that the efforts of the bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether unsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie and its agents among the working class have to some extent succeeded in poisoning the minds of the working class with the virus of doubt and disbelief. If the successes of the working class of our country, if its fight and

victory serve to rouse the spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, then our Party may say that its work has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that this will be the case. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Long live our victorious working class! (*Applause.*)

Long live our victorious collective-farm peasantry! (*Applause.*)

Long live our socialist intelligentsia! (*Applause.*)

Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! (*Applause.*)

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). (*Applause.*)

(*The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and stormy cheers. Cries of: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!"*)

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics